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FOREWORD 
Th.i s thesi s do es not pretend to be a biography' of Jean Bochart 
de Champigny, too little is known of h1 s li fe and Cal'eer in 
France to perm1 t of auch a work. Rather, i t i s a a tudy of 
Chaxnpigny as intendant of New France, of the ecope of his res-
ponsib1li ti es and the manner in which he d1echarged them. At 
the same time it is, to a large extent, a re-evaluation of the 
hi story of the per1od. 
In the arrangement of material i t we.s round necessary to 
effeèt a compromise between the chronological and topical sequence 
of events; thus, the two main themes of th1 s period, mili tary 
affaira and the fur trade, have been treated chronolôgically, 
while the rest of Champigny 1 s acti vi ti es have been arranged more 
topically than chronolog1cally. As with all compromises, auch 
an arrangement has weaknesses, but it was found to be the most 
workable method of dealing with the subject. 
The main danger in a work of this type is that the a.uthor 
becomes enamoured of the person be1ng studied and tumbles into 
the pit-fall of prejudice, rationalising his subject's failings 
and ex agger a ting his virtues. This I have do ne my beat to guard 
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aga.1nst, my main aim having been to be fair, not only to Champigny 
but to the others wi th whom he ha.d dealings. However, i t must be 
sta.ted that in e:P3 discussion of matters and personalities a.s 
controversial as some that are dealt with in this thesis, the 
au thor' s own background, sense of values a.nd viewpoints, of 
neceeesi ty must determine the ma.nner in which he interpreta the 
hi storical evidence ava.1lable to him. Were this not eo then all 
hi a tory would be as sterile as an out of date railwa,y time table. 
And here I muet a.cknowledge a debt of gra.t1 tude to my d1rector 
of etudiee, Professor E .R. Ada.1r, who se tranchant cri ti ci sm saved 
me from committing innumerable aina of omission a.nd commission. 
I have also to thank Professor J .I. Cooper for several timely 
suggestions as to source material. 
The staff of the Dominion Archives at Ottawa were alwaY s 
exceedingly helpful and extended me every assistance durlng my 
researches there; ln particular I must thank Mr. Richardson, to 
whom I am indebted. for his having provided the photostatic copies 
of Franquelin's ma;p and the sketches of ~uebec; and also, Miss 
Storey and her assistante, Mr. L. Crotea.u and Mr. W.J. Ormsby. 
To Dr. AJ.la.na Reid I am very grateful for her having auggested 
th at Champigny' s ca.reer as intendant needed to be invest1gated. 
And finally, I must gratefully acknowledge the forbearance of 
my wife. 
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CHAPTER ONE • 
IN'rRODUCT ION • 
Let me tell you that this kingdom of France 
is governed by its thirty intendants ••• on 
whom, so far as the provinces are concerned, 
welfare and want, prosperity and adversity, 
absolutely depend. 
John Law. 
At the court of Louis XIV during the first weeks of 1686, a group 
of very influential people were doing everything in their power 
to have the intendant of New France, the sieur de ~J!:eulles, recalled 
from his post and replaced by his predecessor, the sieur Duchesneau. 
To accomplish this, one of the group stated, would be to attain 
1 
ule comble du bonheur de Canada •••• " 
An intendant of a French province or colony could hardly fail 
to make some enemies, no matter how judiciously he were to perform 
his duties. If his enemies had greater influence at court than had 
his friends and supporters, then he could expect an early dismissal 
from office. By the end of the yea.r 1685 the sieur de 1·Ieulles 
could count among his anemies the Messieurs de st. Sulpice, seigneuœ 
1. Can. Arch. Librairie de St. Sulpice, ~Iontreal. Lettres de l'abbé 
Tronson, vol. III, no. 297, abbé Tronson à M. de Casson, Paris, 
12 February 1686. 
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1 
of I'4:ontreal, and the marquis de Denonville, governor of' the colony. 
Thus by the following March, the decision to recall him had been 
2 
taken. 
However, although de Meulles• anemies aucceeded in having him 
recalled, they failed in their attempts to have Duchesneau appointed 
in his place. The marquis de Seignelay, miniater of marine, chose 
instead Jean Bochart, seigneur de Champigny, Noroy and Lalande. 
The supporters of Duchesneau were not unduly dismayed by this turn 
of eventa, for they had not been too sanguine of success in their 
schema in the first place; and they also had reason to hope that 
Champigny, who was reputed to be an honest man, would prove to be 
3 
a satisfactory intendant. The abbé Tronson, superior of the order 
of st. Sulpice in Paris, expressed himself as being highly grati-
fied by this appointment but restrained himself from praising the 
new intendant too highly because Champigny wa.s closely related to 
his own family. To a member of his order in Montreal he wrote: 
Le nouvel Intendant que l'on vous envoie 
ne contribuera pas peu à procurer à ce 
bonheur dans tout le pays, et il y a lieu 
d'esperer qu'on y goutera à l'avenir autant 
de consolations et de douceurs qu'on y a eu 
de sujets de peine et de chagrin sous le 
gouvernement passé. 
4 
In the past, as the abbé Tronson indicated, the administration 
of the colony had been sorely troubled by constant quarrels between 
1. ibid~; B .R .H. vol. XX.X:'l, 1929, p 179, De ~~eulles à ~~. Pauvret 
de Mesnu, la Source, 5 June 1687. 
2. Can. Arch. Lettres de l'abbé Tronson, vol. III, no. 299, 
Tronson à Iv!. de Casson, Paris, 15 J'•iarch 1686. 
3. Can. Arch. Lettres de l'abb9 Tronson, vol. III, no. 303, 
Tronson à r.r. d'Urfé, Paris, 13 April 1686. 
4. Can. Arch. Lettres de l'abb9 Tronson, vol. III, no. 311, 
•.rronson à !,1. de Remy, Paris, l:J April 1686. 
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the colonial officials; Frontenac with Talon, the clergy, and 
Duchesneau; de Meulles with La Barre, the clergy, and Den~nville. 
Since Cbampigny was a close nersonal friand of Denonville, who in 
turn was on good terme with the new bishop, Saint Vallier, it was 
1 
hoped that for once these officials would be able to work in harmony. 
This, very likely, being one of the main reasons why Champigny was 
selected for the position. 
It is unfortunate that so little is known about the background 
and career of Jean Bochart de Champigny prior to his arrival in 
New France. His ancestors are reputed originally to have come from 
~ Burgundy; Guillaume Bochart, seigneur de Noroi, ~o was a gentleman 
in waiting at the court of Charles VII, owned lands at Vézelay in 
2 
that Duchy. Guillaume's son, Jean I, was a counc~llor in the 
Parlement de Paris in the year 1490 and was at one time recommended 
3 
for the presidency of that august body. A grand-daughter of Jean I 
married a François de la Porte and their grandson, on the distaff 
4 
sida was Cardinal Richelieu. 
Another Jean Bochart de Champigny was a friend and correspondent 
of Cardinal Richelieu's, and in 1616 was appointed intendant de la 
justice in Poitou, a province which had been desol~ted by the civil 
5 
war; and during the reign of Henri IV a member of th~ Bochart 
family is said to have been surintendant des finances and was later 
1. Can. Arch. Lettres de l'abbé Tronson, vol. III, no. 311, 
Tronson à M. de Casson, Paris, 2 May 1686. 
2. B.R.H. vol. VII, 1901, pp 325-327, REY, REGIS: Jean Bochart. 
3- ibid. 
4. ibid. 
5· HANOTEAU, GABRIEL: Origines des Intendants des Prov~nces, pp 96-~ 
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1 
appointed president of the Parlement de Paris in 1628 by Louis XIII. 
The father of Jean Bochart de Champigny, the intendant of New 
France, had himself been intendant of Rouen and a councillor of 
2 
state. Thus it would seem that there was soma substance to the 
baron de Lahontan 1 s remarks when he wrote: 
Ce nouvel Intendant est d'une des plus 
Illustres ~aisons de la Robe qui soient 
en France. On dit qu'il est très honnête 
homme, et que Madame son épouse est une 
Dame d'une merite distingué• 
3 
On the 22nd of July 1686, Champigny sailed from La Rochelle, 
4 
accompanied by his wife and two of his sone. They did not reach 
5 
·~uebec until sometime in September. On the 23rd of that month 
the sieur de 'ft1eulles performed his last official function by 
presiding over a meeting of the Sovereign Council, assembled to 
register Champigny's lattera patent a.ppointing him intendant of 
justice, police and finance. This done, and de Meulles having 
taken his leave of the assembled company, two councillors were 
delegated to escort Champigny into the chamber and conduct him 
to his place at the council table. The new intendant was now 
1. B.R.H. vol. VII, 1901, pp 325-327, ROY, REGIS: Jean Bochart. 
2. Ca.n. Arch. AN. Series B3/53· Fonds Français, 22733, vol. XII, 
fo. 16, Charges de Robes et Ambassades, March 1686. (In an 
article in the B .R .H. vol. XX, 1914, pp 80-81, M. Regis Roy 
states tha.t Champigny, the intendant of Nww France, ha.d pre-
viouely been intendant of Rouen from 1659 to 1663. In this he 
is in error since in the above Fonds Français transcript is the 
following informa.tion:'Champigni Nauroi, a l'Intendance du 
Canada, fils de Champigni qui â été Intendant à Rouen à Tours 
et Conseiller d'Etat avant la reformation de Conseil.' The 
article on Champigny in The Dictiona.ry of Cana.dian Biograpby, 
edited by \1. Stewart w·allace, commits the sa.me mistake. 
3. LAHONTAN, Nouveaux Voyages de Mr. le Baron de Lahontan daE!_ 
l'Amerique Septentrionale, vol. I, p 73· 
4. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Q.uebec, 16 November 1686; JUCHEREAU, Les Annales de l'Hôtel 
Dieu de Quebec, p 225. 
5· Can. Arch> AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Champigny au Xinistre, 
~uebec, lo November ~686. 
-5-
officially responsible for the social well being, the interna! 
security, the economie prosperity and the maintenance of law and 
arder in New France. With such responsibilities resting on his 
shoulders he could fairly claim that he had begun ta earn his 
1 
salary of 12,000 livres a year. 
Naturally enough, it took Champigny a few weeks ta ge1restab-
lished in his new position. 'rhe sieur de Meulles, before he sailed 
for France, gave his successor all the assistance he could, which 
2 
Champigny was quick ta acknowledge in a dispatch ta the minister. 
:tvieanwhile, he and his family did not immedia.tely ta.ke up their 
residence in the Intendant's Palace, instead they occupied quartera 
in a house nea.r the Ursulines, and here, just a few daye after their 
3 
arrival in Quebec, madame de Champigny gave birth to a daughter. 
Under the circumstances it must have required considerable forti-
tude on her part ta have crossed the Atlantic in a small sailing 
vessel; and fortitude she evidently possessed ta a marked degree, 
for just two days after the birth of her daughter she was forced 
to flee the house where she resided,in the middle of the night, 
when the nea.rby Ursulines convent caught fire add burned ta the 
4 
ground. 
Despite all this, Champigny wasted no time in settling down to 
work. As had been expected, his relations with the governor were 
5 
very cordial from the first. Denonville informed the minister 
1. Gan. Arch. AN. Series B3/ 53, Fonds Français, 22733, vol. XII, 
Collection Dangeau. Comptes du Trésor Royal. 
2. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1686. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol.VIII, Denonville au I•Iinistre, 
Quebec, 10 November 1686. 
4. ibid. 
5. ibidj Champigny a.u r~Iinistre, Q.uebec, 16 November 1686. 
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tho.t he could not thank him enough for this ha-ppy choice of an 
intend<1.nt "!.nd he expressed the wish that the King :night be so 
fortunate as to be served by men as fqi thful qnd disinterested 
throughout his real:n. Eut lest such a close union betvJeen governor 
end intendant should breed suspicion of collusion in h~J,e :nind of 
the .üinister, as well i t might have done, he hastened to add th,g,t 
their close relationship would not in 3XlY wa:y be prejudicial to 
1 
the King' s interests. However, i t 9.P:Pears thg.t in every Eden 
there h,g,s to be a serpent, B.Ud auch was also the case at Quebec. 
"Quoy que nous soyons bons amis,'' wrote Denonville, "1!:1 semence 
2 
des brouillons n'est Pas pour celB, perdue en ce pqy s. 'l But these 
seeds of discord a,ppear to have f~llen on very barren soil for the 
following y ear the anonymous vlri ter of a mémoire remarked th at: 
"Il se trouve ... un Intend3Pt P!é!rf!:li tement uny avec le gouverneur, 
3 
ce que n'est point arrivé jusques à cette heure. 
Champigny Was at least fortun·üe in having begun his intend8ncy 
under auch 11uspicious clrcumst'3.nces; but i t w"'~s not toolast. He 
held this post for sixteen years g,nd during sorne thirteen of them 
New France was at war. He SA.W large sections of the colony laid 
waste by the Iroquois, sali-T New France brought almost to i ts knees, 
:'1Xld he PlaY ed no small part in i t2 3low struggle to final victory. 
But underneqth the trg,ppings 8nd responsibili ties of his office 
1. Can. Arch. AC .seri es CllA, vol. IX, Denonville qU rüni stre, 
i~·:ontreal, 8 June 1687. 
2. ibid. 
3. Ca,..YJ.. ,ll,rch. ,llC. Series CllA, vol. X, ~:·émoire au rfiinistre, 
(Canada) 1688. 
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what sort of a man was Cha1Jlpigny? It i s extra.ordinarily di ffi cult 
to ob tain a clear pic ture of this man's personali ty from the 
hi storical evidence ava.ila.ble in this country. Champigny, the 
man, can be glimpsed only :f'a.intly in the tra.nscripts of his 
official dispa.tches to the m1n1ster, and from the commenta made 
by his contempora.ries in other dispatches. EY'en just two or three 
of his priva.te letters to friands or members of his family in 
France would have been of inestimable help in this respect, a 
personal diary or journal would have been • veritable treasure 
trove, but none of the se were av ail able. Thus one has to pic ture 
him by what he states were his reactions to men and events, alwaYs 
bearing in m1nd the pereonalities of the two ministers of marine, 
SeignelaY and his successor Pontchartraln, to whom his dispatches 
were addressed; and also, by what his contemporaries cla.imed were 
thei r reac ti ons to him and to his deeds. 
When he a,r"t"iVed in New France he was probably in his late 
thirties or early forti es, for his eldest son wa.s made an enseigne 
1 
.9:! vaisseau in 1688, and Cha1Jlpigny himself is reputed to have 
2 
died in 1720. M"ere Juchereau of the Hôtel Dieu states tha.t he 
was very well 11ked in the co1ony, describing him as being "un 
homme dont la bonne mine et 1' air noble ressentoi t bien 1' ancienne 
3 
Mai son d'ou il étoi t sorti." 
4 
He received at lea.st part of his education from the Jesuite, 
1 • C an • Arch. AC • Series Cl lA, vol • X, Champigny au Mini et re, 
Montre al , 6 July 1689 • 
2. B .R.H. vol. VII, 1901, pp 325-327. BOY, Regis: Jean Bocha.rt. 
3. JUCHEREAU; Les AnnaJ:.es de l'Hôtel Dieu de Quebec, pp 306-307 • 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series Cl1A, vol. XIII, Mémoire écrit par 
l'officier envoyé par Frontenac commander à Missilimakina en 
1694; ROCHEMONTEIX, le R .P. Camille de: Les Jesui ts et la 
Nouvelle Frap.ce au XVII siècle, vol. III, p 503 • 
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whose schools at this time were the beat in Europe. ~ihether or not 
he had received any legal training is not known, and Judging by his 
early sine of omission 1n his accounting system, it is likely that 
he had not previously held office where auch an intricate financial 
knowledge was required. 
That he was an unusually intelligent man there can be no doubt, 
and even his ch~f antagon1st, Frontenac, had to pay grudging 
tribute to the efficient manner in which he performed his duties. 
He appears to have been an honest man; at least there is no valid 
evidence to the contrary, which admittedly is not the same thing, 
but had there been even the breath of suspicion of malversations 
on his part, his enemies undoubtedly would have made much of it. 
It is hard to say whether or not he had a well developed sense 
of humour, the odd incident displays marked evidence that he posa-
essad this quality; yet on other occasions he took seriously 
situations which seemingly were deserving of little more than 
laughter, if not ridicule. However, it must be remembered in this 
respect that many things which merely amuse today were not taken 
so lightly by the 17th century ecale of values. His w1t frequently 
took the form of a very biting irony; and by this token he was not 
lacking 1n moral courage, for when he cons1dered himself to be in 
the right he did not hesitate to employ this irony, at times verging 
on sarcasm, against the minister himself. 
Other recogniaable traits in his cha~acter were, a pronounced 
stubborn streak and a certain degree of vindictiveness. His 
stubbornness was perhaps one of his greatest strengths in trying 
times, and the greatest obstacle to advancement any man could 
have while serving under a governor like Frontenac and a minister 
~-
auch as Pontchartrain. His vindictiveness was reserved for men 
whom he regarded as rogues and hypocrites, not so much as a 
result of actions which concerned him personally, but of actions 
which he regarded as contrary to the good of the colony in partic-
ular and the King's service in general. He did not suffer knaves 
or fools in high places gladly; this being a most serious short-
coming for anyone in his position a~xious to make his way in the 
world, but he could on occasion display understanding and magnan-
imity for the human failings of men holding a lesa exalted rank 
than his own. 
Champigny's entire career as intendant of New France is 
indisputably marked by a singular devotion to what he regarded 
as the beat interests of the King's service. This devotion led 
him on one notable occasion to sanction actions for which he has 
been vilified by some modern historians, whose righteous indigna-
tion was greater than their understanding of the complex issues 
involved. For the events of the late 17th century cannot be 
judged solely by the self conscious moral standards of the 19th 
century; thus, to do justice not only to Champigny but also to 
the history of New France, the career of this intendant deserves 
to be examined in some detail. 
K.Al? OF NORTH .AMERICA DRAWN BY 
JEAJ BAPTIS'l'E LOOIS FRABQUD..IN IN 1688. 

o o- Î'\ . 6 ~) 
··-~---------- ------
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CHAPTER II. 
WAR WITH THE IROQUOIS • 
When Champigny arrived 1n New France the colony was enJ07ins the 
last tew .months ot peace it wa.s to know until the end. of' the century. 
B7 the beginning of' November 1686, Denonville bad decided that var 
1 
would have to be va.ged against the iroquois. This decision vas not 
taken hastily or without considering long' and earnestly a.ll that 
auch a war would entail, and despite subsequent events, the decis-
ion was basically a sound one. 
Perhaps no period in Canadian histor7 has been more misunder-
stood by historical writers than this one; and few men more maligned 
than Denonvil~e. Since Cham.pigD1 wa.s a close f'riend and staunch 
sppporter of' Denonville right up to the last, he too has received 
more than hls share of' abuse. Pur ely from the historian• s point of' 
view it is 1n some waya unto:rtunate that the governor and intendant 
were auch close friends, tor it is this singular tact which makes 
it rather dif'f'icult to obtain a clear eut picture of' events and 
personalitiea during Denonville'• period in office. If' there ha.d 
been a fair degree of antipathy between th'm we should know far 
more than we do as to the causes and ef'f'ects of' many or their 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, 
Que bec, 8 November 1686. 
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actions. For bad auch been the case they would have kept the 
minister of marine well informed o~ each other's actions; they 
wou1d have defended their own actions and opinions, and argued 
their cases 1n detail. !hus, by intorming and attempting to 
convince the minister of the Justice of their respective views 
they would àave provided the historian with the evidence which 
he requires. 
In order to understand subsequent events it will be necessary 
to diseuse brietly the reasons why Denonville vas convinced that 
war wi th the Iroquois vas unavoidable. For it is 1n their failure 
to understand the basic causes of this war that most historians 
of this period have gone so woetully astray. 
The ~ong standing antipatbJ between French and Iroquois resulted 
from two things: the geographie position of the Iroquois, situated 
as they were like a butter state between the French and the Engl1sh 
colonies, and the economie dependance of both French and Iroquois 
on the fUr trade. The French, wit.h their poste at Michilimackinà.c 
and in the Illinois country, obtained the bulk o~ the ture of the 
west and north-west, and by the middle of the 17th century the 
Iroquois bad exhausted the supply or furs in their own hunting 
grounds, thus they were torced to become m1ddlemen in order to 
obtain the EUrppean manutactured goods, the knives, pots, hatchets, 
muakets, powder and ball, upon which they were by this time depend-
1 . 
ent • They now had .to obtain their tura 1n trade :rrom the more 
remote tribes to the west and north, and this 1mmed1ately brought 
them into conflict with the French, whose allies, both econom1-
cally and politically, tnese triwes were. 
1. HUNT, GEORGE: Wars of the Irog.uois, pp 34-35· 
-----------~ ~ 
Portunately for the Iroquois, the trade goods supplied by the 
Albany marchants were far cheaper and ot better quality than any-
thing the French had to offer and the geographie position of the 
Iroquois prevented the western and northern tribes from trading 
directly with the English and Dutch marchants at .Albarq. Thua the 
Iroquois were seemingly 1n a strong economie position; they could 
undersell the French traders and still make a good middleman's 
profit, and they were powertul eriough to back up their demanda 
that the other tribes trade with them rather than with the French 
by threats of force. 
Nevertheless, the desperate efforts of the Iroquois to wean the 
fur trade &W&1. from the French met with repeated rebutfs from the 
allies and customers or the French. Despite the high priees charged 
by the Freach for their goods, the northern and western tribes 
conaistently preferred to deal with them rather than w1th the 
Iroquois middlemen. The main reasons for this were: their ancient 
antipatbJ to the Iroquois, the ability of the French to understand 
the Indian mentalit;r and so retain a sympathetic relationship 
with them, and most important of all, the tact that so•e ot these 
French allies, notably the Ot tawas and Hurons who supplied the 
1 
bulk ot the tura received by the French, were themselves middlemen 
and had no desire to place themselves at the economie mercy of 
others of the same ilk. 
In the 1670's the Iroquois gave the French and their allies~ 
singularly little trouble tor the simple reason that they themselves 
were being attacked by the Andastes, a powertul tr1be of Iroquois 
stock to their south. By 1680 the .Andastes had been crushed and 
1. N .y .c .D. vol. IX, p 201, M. de la Barre to M. 4e SeipelaY, 
Qaebeo,~ 4 IfeT .. ber 1683. 
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and the strength of the western cantons of the Five Nations 
greatly augmented by the wholesale adoption into their ranke 
1 
of the defeated Andastes. Thus the Iroquois were able to turn 
their attention once more to the problem of capturing the western 
fur trade. One of their tiret moves vas to launeh a sudden attack 
on the lllinois and Miami s tri bee t o the south of Lake Michigan. 
It was their invasion of this area in 1680 which f"rightened the 
French fur traders and the governor o~ New France, La Barre, into 
- 2 
launchi:ng the abortive oampa.ign of 1684. 
The resulta of this campàign are well known • .As a result or 
La Barre' a agreeing to peace on Iroquois terme, wh1ch meant the 
abandonment of the Illinois and M1amis to their f"ate, French 
prestige vith all their western allies vas reduced to a very low 
ebb. The French vere illlAediately taced wi th the very real danger 
ot themselves being abandoned by their allies who, much as they 
disl1ked the prospect of becoming Junior partners to the Iroquois 
in the fur trade, relished far lesa the thought or withstanding 
al one the tull :t'ury of these powertul tribes. Throughout the 
next fif"teen years the prospect ot auch a political and economie 
volte face continually haunted the French, and their allies did 
not hesitate to play on these fears when it served their interests. 
When word of La Barre's actions reaehed Versailles he was 
immediately recalled and the marquis de Denonville sent out in his 
iD a.. place to try to salvage French interests in the west before 
it was too la te. Denonville was instructed by the King to try to 
1. DE BAUGY: Journal d'une Expedition contre les Iroquois ~n 1687, 
pp 50-51. 
2. H .Y .c .D • vol. IX, pp 230•232, De Meulles to Seignelay, Quebec, 
8 July 1684; HUNT, GEORGE: Wars of the Iroquois, pp 149-157 
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achieve a firm &Dd solid peace, but at the aame tiae he was told 
that the pride of the Iroquois had to be humbled and the Illinois 
and other allies given every protection in the 1nterests of trade. 
The vital question of whether or not to wage war on the western 
Iroquois in order to accompliah all this was left BP to Denonville's 
. 1 
cl.1scret1on.. However, he was la ter warned to re sort to war on17 as 
a last resort, and if war 1t had to be then he had to exterm1Date 
the Iroquois quicltl7 and avold a long drawn out conflict. To 
accoaplish this the King suggested that Denonville should attack 
. 
the Iroquois by surprise since the7 h&d used similar tacties against 
2 
the French several times 1n the past • 
When Denonville took stock of the military situation he immediat~ 
ly real1sed that New France was teetering on the brink of complete 
disaster. He certai:rüJ bad good cause to be appalled by the seem1ng 
hopelessness of the taslt bef ore hlm. The colony was 1n a virtually 
defenoeless state and co.œpletely unprepared to sustain a long war. 
There had been a long period of peace during which concessions 
had been grant~ and settlements allowed. to spread out in auch a 
tashion that to put the colon, in a state of securit7 and order 
adequate to repel attaclts, would have required ea&J;U1B'I4 a complete 
reorganizatio.n ot the concessions and the abandonment ot manr 
settled areas. Denonville reported to the m1n1ster that, " .... dans 
la dissipation ou est la colonie, la guerre est la chose du monde 
3 
la plus dangereuse." .As a soldier 1 t seemed to hlm the height of 
1. B .R .H. vol. XXXVI, 1930, pp 235-236, Mémoire du RoJ au sieur 
de Meulles, Versailles, 10 March 1685; N.Y.c~. vol. IX, pp 271• 
272, Instructions to Denonville, Versailles, 10 March 1685. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Mémoire du Roy au Sr. de 
Denonville, Versailles, 31 May 1686. 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, Que bec, 8 Novem.ber 1686. 
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tolly to launch a cam.paign which would a trip the colony of' i ta 
manpower, bef'ore conatructing fortifications adequate f'or its 
def'enc e. Y et this he dared not do as he f'eared that i t would 
bring the Iroquois f'Ury down on them bef'ore they were 1n any way 
1 
ready to meet it.. 
New France vas in no position to wage a full acale war, but 
Denonville saw all too elearly that ~ere waa no hope ~t a lasting 
peaee beins arranged on terms acceptable to the French, tor the 
eneay held the initiative and the western allies vere waver1ng 1n 
their allegiance. The diplomatie vic tory gained by the Iroquois 
over La Barre bad greatly inereased their arrogance towards both 
2 
the French and the French allies. Father ED.jelran, f'rom his mission 
amongst the ottawas, reported that the Iroquois were labour1ng 
ineeasantly to draw the Ottawas and Hurons into an alliance aga1nst 
3 
the French. These tribes now moeked the French openly, stating that 
the French were voo weak and eowardly to attack the Iroquois who 
4 
were pillaging their canoes wherever they fouad them. To malte 
matters worse, the E.nglish and Dutch at Albany were inciting the · 
Iroquois at every turn and supplying them with cheap arme and 
munitions. Dongan, the governor or New Yor-k, bad sent a party or· 
f'1f'ty men with a Seneca escort and a large supply or cheap trade 
goods to the ottawa country and a further party was preparing to 
5 
make the same t1'1\p the tollowing year. Thus Denonville was forced 
1. ibid. 
2. Oan. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. J'III, Denonville au Ministre, Que bec, 16 November 1686. 
3 • Oan • Arch. AC. Series OlU, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, 
Montreal, 12 June 1686. 
4. ibid; Denonville au Ministre, QUebec, 8 November 1686; DE BAUGY: 
Journal d'une Expedition contre les Iroquois en 1687, p 51 • 
. 
5. Oan. Arch. AC. Seriee ClU, vol.. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1686. 
to conclude that, desperate as ·the m1litary situation of New 
France actually vas, war was the lesser of two evils. For not 
to strike iame4iately at the Iroquois would result in the desertion 
of the allies to the enemy,and the loss or &ll the up country trade 
l 
which vas the very lite blood of New France. 
At the same time, Denonville realised full vell th&t it would 
be of little use tlerely to ch&stise the western Iroquois; they had 
to be annihilated and eo prevented from launehing counter attacks 
2 
against the French settlements. To do this required two armies, 
one to attack the Mohawks via the Richelieu, the other to strike at 
the Senecas in the west and so drive both f'la.nks 1n on the center. 
Yet this vas just what Denonville eould not do, for he lacked the 
3 
forees necessary to launeh two campaigns simulàaneously. Thus, it 
is small wonder that he had serious m1sgivings as to the final 
outcome of the var. Just before leaving Moatreal with the ar., he 
wrote to the m1nister: "Le plus habille ne peut juger sy cette 
guerre finira bientost ou non. Je suis b•en persuad' que l'Interest 
de la colonie est de la maintenir en paix mais 11 faut que cette 
4 
nation soit detruite ou du moins humili'•···" 
The only hope of the campaign's succeeding in its aima depended 
upon the abil1ty of the French to take the enemy by surprise. OVer 
and above the necessity for secreey on this score, there vas the 
grave danger that should the Iroquois ae forewarned they could all 
too easily ambush the French forces and vreck havoc on them as 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, 
Que bec, 8 November 1686. 
2, N .Y .c .D vol. IX, p 283, Memoir on the state of Canada, (Denon-
ville) 12 November 1685. . .. 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series Cll.A, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, 
Quebec, 8 November 1686. 
4. Can. Arch. AC • Series Clllt., vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre .. 
Montreal, 8 June 1687. 
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they struggled through the miles of rapids and cataracte along 
the St • Lawrence between l&k:es St. Louis and ontario. Thus 
-
Denonville took every precaution to prevent the ene~ learning of 
his plans, even going so far as to conceal his intentions from 
rather Lamberville, a Jesuit missionary living amongat the onoDdagas. 
As the abb' Belmont put it: "Rien ne tut mieux et plus secrètement 
condtû.t que cette affaire • Les prépari tifs de vivres et les ordres 
pour les missions d'en haut turent si secreta que ny le Père 
Lamberville qui vint d' cmnontaguez, ni les Sauvages ne s'en 
1 
doutèrent." 
The presence of father Jean Lamberville and his younger brother 
amongat the Iroquois created a very awkward problem tor Denonville. 
He dare not recall them tor fear of arousing the suspicions of the 
Iroquois; consequently he had to resort to guile, for tather 
Lamberville was bitterly opposed to any thought of var with the 
Iroquois. He bad counselled against La Barre's earlier expedition 
- 2 
and bad applauded this governor's untortunate peace negotiations. 
His opposition to any auch war vas a perfeetly understandable one 
for it meant the end of hia miaaionary activities amongst ~heae 
tribes, a task to wh1ch hia life was dedicated. However, not all 
the clergy in New France Sbared his vievs; Bishop Laval claimed 
that the Iroquois must be destroyed since they presented the 
greatest single obstacle to the e~anJelising Dl1.ss1on of the 
ohurch, and fathers Enjelran and Carhe11 at Mich1limackinac 
1. BELMO!l'r, ABBE DE: Histoire de Canada, p 20. 
2. N .Y .c .D. vol~ IX, pp 252-254, Jean de Lamberville to La Barre, 
10 July 1684; vol. IX, p 257, Jean de Lamberville to La Barre, 
17 August 1684. 
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l 
we:re or the same opinion. In othe:r wo:rds, each missiona:ry had a 
vested inte:rest 1n the particular tribe he se:rved, and tather 
Lamberville'& vested interest was the Iroquois. 
Denonville bad very good reasons tor his duping ot rather 
Lamberville, an act which this priest was to :resent bitterly tor 
2 
mauy years to come. He had to consider not only the satety ot 
two Jesuite but also the success of the eampaign and the satety 
ot his men vhose very lives might vell depend on his ability to 
p:revent the eneliJ learning ot his· plans. He sent vord to Lamber-
ville to come to Que bee tor an interview, diseemb~ed hia plana 
for var and aslted hlm to bring the Iroquois ehiefs to Cataracoui 
3 
the tollowing spring for a peace conference. This was primarily 
a ruse to get Lamberville out of the clutehes of the Iroquois 
without giving them varning of his milita:ry plans, as is made 
quite clear in his dispatch to Seignelay: 
Le père de Lamberville s'en est retourn' 
avec ordre de moi de Convoquer toutes les 
Nations Iroquoises pour parler de nos affaires 
au printemps prochain à Cataraeouy. Je suis 
persuadé qu'i~ n'y en viendra gu\res, mais 
mon dessein.principal est d'y attirer le 
père Jesuit restant seul, car des cette 
aDnée il doit renvoyer son trere le cadet 
afin qu'i~ aye moins de peine à se retirer 
luy seUl, ce pauvre père ne scait rien 
cependant de nos desseins ••• il me fasche 
de le voir exposé mais si Je le retirois 
cette année sans doute que l'orage tomberait 
sur nous des cette année, car ils a'aasure-
roient de nos desseins par sa retraite. 
4 
1. B .B.H. vol. XLVI, l91f0, p 76, Laval à Louis XIV, .Ir July 1684~ 
Can. Ar.ch. AC. Series ClU, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, 
,_. •œstl!eal, 12 June 1686; Jesuit Relations, vol. LXV, pp 189-253, 
Père Carheil à M. de Champ1SJl1, M1chilimackinac, 30 August 1702. 
2. Jesuit Relations, vol. LXIV, pp 238-258, Jean de Lamberville à 
un Père M1ss1onaire de Chine, Paris, 23 January 1695. 
3· ibid. 
4. can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, Que bee, 8 lovember 1686. 
-19-
This scheae to effect the safe vithdrawal or Lamberville vas l . 
approved b7 the King, who also issued. a directive which brief'lJ 
stated: 
Elle s'atteDd d'apprendre dans la fin de 
cette amn'e la ruine entiè~e de la plus 
grande partie de ces Sauvages, Et eODUD.e 
il en pourra faire plusieurs prisonniers 
et que Sa Majest' estiae qu'Elle pourroit 
s'en servir sur .ses gal\res, Elle veut 
qu'il tasse en aorte de les garder Jusques 
a ce qu'il 1 aJt des vaisseaux que repassent 
en France ••• 
2 
This cUrt demap.d by Louis XIV vas to be the direct cause or one 
ot the most contentious issues 1n the h1story or New France. 
Meanwhile, preparations for the campaign were going on apace. 
Denonville sent his orders to tll.e commandera of the up .COUl'ltrJ 
posta, Durant_,e, Tonty and Du Luth, instructing them to muster 
as many of' the coureurs de bois and allied Indiana as they could 
3 
and assemble at Niagara the following year at the end of Juae. 
At Quebec and Montreal during that ~inter aid epring of 1686-1687 
equipment vas being made read7; two hundred flat boats vere built 
4 
for the transport of the troops, and food and equipment were 
staeked away in the Iing's stores. To send an ar~ hundreds of 
leagues into the wilderness, an armT forced to carry with .1t all 
1ts supplies for the entire campaign, was in itself a major UD!er-
taking, and it was here that the m1litary activities of ChampignJ 
began. The problem of supplying the expedition with all the 
1. Can. Arch. Affaires Etrangères, M'moires et Documents, vol. V, 
part 3. Réponses aux lettres de Canada, 30 M'arch 1687. 
2. Can. Arch • .AN. Series B, vol. XII, Mémoire dJI ROJ aux sieurs 
Denonville et de Champigny, Versailles, 30 March 1687. 
3. Can. Arch. AN. Series F3, Collection Moreau de St. Méry, vol. II, i: 
part 1, Mémoire de Denonville, (Quebec) 27 August 1686. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, 
'uebee, 10 Noveaber 1686; DE BAUGY: Journal d'une Expedition 
con~re les Iroquois en 1687, pp 52-53· 
-20-
necessary mânitians, food and equipment was left entirely -. to 
1 
hia. 
In M&1 Denonville vent up to Montreal where he found everything, 
" ••• bien preparé par la diligence de M. de Champigny ••• qui a, 
2 
par son exactitude fait trouver toutes choses en bon estat." 
ShortlJ atter Denonville'• departure six ships arrived at Quebec 
3 
wi th eigb.t hund.red troopa on board. It was, ot course, imposai ble 
tp make use ot them on the campaign at that late date. On May 24th 
Champigny, who h&d remained at Quebec, held a muster parade of the 
troops and militia, then atter bains delayed for eigb.t days by a 
gale, he dispatched them to Montreal, collecting the local militia 
of the districts along their route as he went. On June 7th they 
arrived at the assembly camp on St. Helen's island where Champiguy 
held a review of all the troops and militia. On that parade were 
832 troupes de la marine, 930 militia, plus another hundred habitants 
4 
being used to transport supplies, and 300 ot the mission Indiana. 
For the next tew day s Denonville and Champigny were kept busy 
arranging all the details for the transport of the men and supplies 
and aeeing to it that arrangements were made to have the work on 
5 
the farms of the m.ilitia attended to while they vere away. Within 
6 
a week evet'yth1ng was organized, On June 13th the ar11,1 left Montreal; 
and wi th i t went Champigny • 
It vas qu1te unusual.for an intendant to accompanf the forces on 
1. ~· 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid. 
4. Can. Arch • .AC. Series Cll.A, vol. IX, Champ1SDJ au Ministre, 
Q.uebec, 16 Jul.y 1687. 
5· DE BAUGY: Journal d'une Expedition contre les Iroquois en 1687, 
pp 61-62. ' 
6. Can. Arch. AC. Series Cll.A., vol. IX, Mémoire de l'expedit-ion 
de M. Denonville contre les Taonnont.ouans. 
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an actual. campaign, but Champigny wanted to inspect the fort at 
Cataracoui and to malte aure ths.t the;~ar~q was not held up b7 supplJ 
1 
problems of' ~ sort, once it reached this base. Moreover, his 
predeces~or in office, the sieur de Meulles, bad been severel7 
reprimandee! for not having accompanied La Barre on the earlier 
expedition and had been warned: 
• • • vous ne devez pas manquer en pareille 
occasion d'accoaparer le Sr de Denonville 
pour dom:Ler ordre . tout ce qui regarde la 
subsistance dea troupes, à ce qui peut 
faciliter le succ\s de l'entreprise et faire 
les autres fonctions d'IRtendant .•• 
2 
Ch&mpiSDJ made ver7 sure that auch criticism should not be levellel 
at him; but in doing so he incurred far more damagine; criticiam 
from other quartera. 
One e the main force was past the Cedars rapids, Cham.pigii1 went 
on ahead with thirt7 men in fif'teen canoea loaded vith food supplies 
to malte sure that everything would be ready at Cataracouy for the 
reception of' the arm,y, and ao enable it to continue on into the 
3 
enemy ' s c ountr7 wi th the minimum of del&7. Meanwhile, Denonville 
was doing ever7th1ng possible to prevent the Iroquois learning of' 
4 
his ar113' • s proximity. At. Chateauguay three Iroquois were captured, 
. . 
and two daye af'ter Champigny'a departure the sieur Peré wa~ sent 
out with a detachment to capture another auch group lest they 
should carr1 the alarm back to the Iroquois cantona. Peré captured 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series Cll.A., vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, 
Montreal, 8 June 1687 
2. B.R.H. vol. XXXVI, 1930, pp 235-236, Le Ro7 au Sr de Meulles, 
Versailles, 10 March 1685. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series Cll.A., vol. IX, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 Jul7 1687. 
4. DE BAUGY: Journal d •une EXpedition contre les Iroquois en 1687, 
, 61. 
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four Iroquois with their wives and children; the following d~ all 
l 
these prisoners were sent back to Montreal and lodged in gaol. 
Bhortly afterwarda de Boucherville captured a Cayuga with four women 
2 
and a child at la Galette. 
Whi1e this vas ta.k:ing place, Champigny had not been idle at 
Cataracoui. lfhen he arrived he found that Dorvilliers, the commander 
3 
of the fort, had thinga well organiaed. The intendant saw ·to it 
that a bark loaded with provisions vas dispatched acrosa the lake 
to Niagara, read1 tor the up country torees meeting there under the 
Durantaye, Tonty and Du Luth. That done, he had two other barka 
loaded with provisions for the main force, and two large flat boats 
made ready tor the transport of the swivel guns and other munitions 
4 
acroaa the lake. 
The intendant spent only two days at Cataracouy, but during that 
time an incident occurred which has given rise to a great deal ot 
bitter cri tic ism of both Champigny and Denonville. This vas the 
aeizure of the so called'neutral'Iroquois, living near the fort. 
Since the subsequent controversy over thia action has generated more 
:.:. 
heat than light, the whole matter must be examined in some detail. 
In the first place, the decision to seize these Iroquois, some 
two hundred in all, was.not a deci&ion that could be made by an 
intendant, auch decisions were purely within the spàere of the 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. IX, M'moire de l'Expedition 
de M. de Denonville, (1687) 
2. DE BAUGY: Journal d'UDe Expedition contre les Iroquois en 1687, 
p 71. 
3· ibid. p 80; Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. IX, lhamp1gny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 16 July 1687. 
4. ibid. 
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governor's authority; and from the surrounding circuastances there 
can be no doubt tbat this particular decision was made by Denonville. 
Bow the question must be asked, wa.s Denonville justif'ied in ma.king 
this decision? 
Talting into consideration only the tacts of the military_ .situa-
tion as they vere known to Denonville at that t1me, 1t could be 
argued that he vaa so jut1fied on grounda of m111tar7 expedieney 
alone• First of &11; he had good reason to regard the neutral Iro-
. . 
. 
quois as a potential threat to French securit7 for the Five Nations 
had &lread1 caused MDY of the neutral' s you.ng men to cross the 
1 
lake and j oin forces. vi th them. Alao, he wanted to prevent the 
~ews of the arrival of his arm, at Cataraooui from reaching the 
Iroquois cantons for as lang as possible in the hopes that he 
could catch the 5eneeas unawares and so deatroy them rather than 
2 
have them fade into the forest at hia approach. And second.l7; 
with the tate· of French power in the west he.nging in the balance, 
Denonville had to use every means at his dispoaal to weaken the 
enemy, f'or it must be remembered that lahis was the f'irat major 
campaign by the French 1n a war where the odda ·vere on the Iroquois 
aide. Between f'ive and ten times as great a force is required to 
deatroy a body of enem, guerilla f'1ghters, auch as were the Iroquo1~ 
than i s required to des troy the aame number ot regular troo pa; and 
the total Iroquois forces were about equal in numbera to those of 
3 
the French, not to mention the tact that they were far more adept 
at bush f'ighting. 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU., vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, 
Que bec, 25 August 1687. 
2. N .Y .c .D. vol. IX, p 283, Memoir on the atate of' Canada, (Denonville) 12 November 1685 •. 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Seritt_CllA, vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, i Quebec, 25 August 10~. (Denonville eatimated that the Iroquo s 
could muster between 1500 and 1800 f'ighting men. 
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However, the tact that Denonville had prev1ously received an 
order from the King 1nstruct1ng h1m to aend as many Iroquois 
pr1soners as he could to serve in the French galleys, pute a 
different complexion on matters. Rad he not received that order 
would Denonville still have taken the neutral Iroquois into 
custody? Did he decide to send these Iroquois to the galleys 
betore he captured thea, or did he make this decision after-
wards? The answers to these questions can only be guesaed at • 
CeDtainly, if he had already decided to send them to the·galleys 
at the time that they were captured then, quite apart from the 
question of llilitary expediency, his actions can be regarded. as 
little more than those of & slave trader. It must also be borne 
in mind that in the late 17th century slave trading was not looked 
at askance, if not regarded as exactly an honourable pursuit for 
an officer and an aristocrat. 
Champi.gny's role in this affair is even more difficult to 
weigh 1n the balance. After leaving Denonville and the main body 
ot the army, Cbampigny's party encountered a group of Iroquois 
on an island named Toniata near Cataracoui. Word vas sent back 
to Denonville apprising him of this. Denonville promptly sent 
one hundred mission Iroquois und er Ste. Helene le Moyne to take 
1 
them into custody. Meanwhile, Champigny' a advance party hav1ng 
arrived at the fort and be1ng unaware that Denonville had sent 
le Moyne to capture these Iroquois, it was decided that steps 
must be taken to seize them. 
Someone, perhaps Champigny, perhaps Dorvill1ers the tort's 
1. DE BAUGY: Journal d'une Expedition contre les Iroquois en 1687, 
pp 71-74. 
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commander, or more 11••11 the two or them in concert, then decided 
that the garrison of the fort was not strong enough to capture these 
Iroquois by main rorce, thererore it was decided to reaort to guile. 
Consequently, the Iroquois were invited to come to Cataracou1 for 
1 
a f'east • Champ1g:D1 la ter sent word to Denonville int'orming him 
that theae Iroquois should be on the1r way to the tort. In addition, 
there were some Iroquois settled in the immediate vicinity of the 
tort who were &lao 1nvited to this f'east; of' them, de Baugy, Denon-
ville 1 s aide de camp remarlted, ". • • on ne f'1 t pas grand mal .Y ayant 
. -
longtems qu'ils 1 sont établis; on s'asseure seulement d'eux pour 
- - 2 
les empescher d'avertir leur nation de notre arrivée ••• " When.all 
these Iroquois, some thirty men and ninety women and children, 
were ins1de the walls of the f'ort they vere seized and the men 
3 
amongst them bound and tethered. 
After the departure ot Champ1gnJ, when the main force reached 
Cataracoui, Denonville sent a detachment under Peré to bring in 
another group of neutral Iroquois; this time eighteen men and 
sixty-two women and children were captured, making a total of 
f'itty-one men and one hundred and fifty women and children held 
4 
at the fort, forty-eight of these men being neutrals. 
The question now is, how is one to Judge the part played by 
ChampiSQJ in this aftair? Binee the original decision to seize 
1. DE BAUGY: Journal d'une Expedition contre les Iroquois en 1687, 
pp 76-77. 
2. ibid. pp 73-74. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, Mc&moire de 1 1:b.pedi ti on 
de M. de Denonville, 1687; BELMONT, ABBE DE: Histoire de Canada, 
pp 20-21; Recueil de ce ui s'est ssé en Canada au au et de la 
guerre ••• depuis 1 e 1 2,. pp 12-1 ; 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series Olla, vo1. IX, Mémoire de 1 1Expedition 
de M. de Denonville, 1687. 
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the neutral Iroquois was clearly made by Denonville in the first 
place, the only thing for which Champigny ean be held personally 
responsible is the means he used to capture his particular group 
of prisoners. Thus the issue boils down to this; had Champigny 
ordered the Iroquois seized by foree instead of luring them into 
the fort by guile, then he personally would not have been open to 
criticism for he would have been merely carrying out the governor's 
instructions. However, de Baugy states that the garrison at the 
l 
fort vas not strong enough to capture these Iroquois by torce; 
also, ChampiSQJ needed the men at the tort to get the supply barka 
and flat boats loaded; theretore, in his own defence ChampiSDJ 
could argue that he had no choice but to resort to guile or else 
run the r1sk of those Iroquois crossing the lake and warning the 
eneJDY' ot the army' s imminent arrival. 
In other words, the issue is reduced to a question of ethics; 
and if ChampiSQJ' s action is to be Judged in ethical values then 
they should be the ethical values of his own day, not, for example, 
those of the late 19th century. Contemporary opinion is of but 
little assistance herth Lahontan' s account is of little value; he 
states that the neutral Iroquois"··· ne meritoient rien moins 
que le traitement qu'on leur fit," but confuses the whole issae by 
stating that Champigny sent two or three hundred Canadians who 
...Lt.. 2 
tookAthe neutrals by force. The chevalier de Baugy describes the 
incident in some detail but makes no comment on the methode used 
1. DE BAUGY: Journal d •une Expedition contre les Iroquois en 1687, 
pp 76-77 • 
2. LAHONTAN: Nouveaux Vox ages de Mr. le Baron de Lahontan dana 
l'J.merique SeptentrionaleL vol. I, pp 92-95· 
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1 2 
by Champigny; and Géd4on de Catalogne does the aame. The abb4 
de Belmont is the onl7 person who condemns it; in bitter phrases 
he states: 
En verité, cela faisoit pitié que des 
Sauvages qui estoient comme sous notre 
protect.ion fussent. ainsi pris, ~ill4s et 
encbainez et pris par l'appat dun festin; 
ce qui tut de pia, (1) è'est qu~on envoya 
les hommes l la tin.de la campagne aux 
galères en France, (2) que la pluspart. des 
temaes et enfans moururent de tristesse et 
de la maladie pestilentielle qui se mit dans 
l'habitation. 
3 
It is this question of the eventual tate of the prisoners 
vhich so confUses the issue. There is no evidence to indicate 
that Champig&Q" lmew vhat laheir eventual tate was to be, nor is 
there &QJ evidence to the contrary. In deacribing the incident 
he himself merely stated: · 
Pendant que J'y estois on y aret& un bon 
nombre de sauvages Iroquois qui estoient 
aux environs, crainte qu'ils ne donnassent 
avis de la marche et pour affaiblir d'autant 
nos ennemis. 
4 
If one rejects the concept that the end justifies the means 
thEMJ) so :far as Champigny is concerned, all one can say is that 
the end was not his respons1bility and that the means which he 
employed, although perhaps justified by the exigencies ot the 
military situation, are highlJ questionable on ethical grounds; 
always bearing in mind the tact that the 17th eentury was not 
1. DE BAUGY: Journal d'une Expedition contre les Iroquois en 1687, 
. pp 73-77. 
2. Recueil de ce qui s'est passé en Canada au sujet de la guerre 
••• depuis l'annee 1682. 
3. BELMONT, ABBE DE: Histoire de Canada, pp 20-21 • 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. IX, Champig113 au Ministre, 
Que bee, 16 July 1687 • 
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noted for the parity of its m1litary ethies. 
Having done everything he could at Cataracoui.for the security 
of the army and taken the neeessary measures to prevent its belng 
delayed by the supply problem, Champigny left his commissaire, the 
sieur Gaillard, in charge of the final details and departed tor 
l 
Que bec, being anxious t o get back: be fore the King' s shi pa sai led. 
After his departure and before the arrival of Denonville at the 
2 
fort, father Lamberville reached the army in aafety: and this raises 
another contentious issue which at tiret glanee is little more than 
an enigma. 
In 1695, over seven years after the event, father Lamberville 
gave a very bitter account of the cireumstances surrounding his 
escape from the Iroquois, in a letter to a missionary priest in 
3 
·China. This aecount contains several glaring ineonsisteneies and 
the body of it is retuted by evidence from other sources. Accord1ng 
to .. J.amberville, at Denonville • a behest he persuaded forty Iroquois 
chiefs from all the Iroquois nations. to go t.o Cataraeoui for the 
4 
proposed peaee conference; this despite the tact, as he states in 
his latter, tha.t the Iroquois had been warned by Dongan that the 
French vere preparing for var. He goes on to say that eight o'f 
the Iroquois ehiefs aecompanied him, the others having gone on 
&head, and when this latter group reached.the fort they were seized 
and put in chaine; but some of them eeeaped and returned t o warn 
the chief a accompanying Lamberville. However, LamberVille also 
1. ibid. 
2. DE BAUGY: Journal d'une Expedition contre les Iroquois en 1687, 
pp 77-78. 
~. Jesuit Relations,vol. LXIV, pp 238-258, Lettre du p. Jean de 
Lamberville lun Père Missionaire de Chine, Parle, 23 Jan. 1695· 
4. vide supra, pp 17-18. 
states ~at betore this occurred he had received letters, presum• 
ably from Denonville, warning him to make good his escape by azay 
means possible, as an attack was about to be launched against the 
Iroquois. He then states that the Iroquois chie:t's accompanyins him,. 
. . 
upon learning ot the tate of their compatriote, set him tree as 
they did not wiah to be reproached wi th having killed him when they 
knew that he had acted 1n good tai th. 
The point here is; vas Lamberville acting in good :t'ai th at that 
particular time? He admits'that he then knew the French to be pre-
paring to wage war, hence he must have known that tJ:le proposed 
peace conference vas a mere ruse; yet he does not appear to haye 
warned the Iroquois chiets ot this, tor he states that they learned 
of this from their own men who had escaped the trap. 'rhus it would 
appear that between his receiving the aforementioned letters and 
' his escorta learning ot the tate of their compatriote, he h1mselt 
vas actually acting as an accomplice to their alleged betrayal 
.... e. 
since he couldJa.., but apparentl7 did not,Awarlfllthem that the 
Cataracoui peace con:terence vas really a trap. FUrthermore, 
Lamberville's.statement that torty Iroquois chiets vent to Catara-
coui at hià request and vere there seized, put in irons, and sent 
to the galleys in France, is retuted by evidence from other sources. 
The other accounts agree remarkably closely that between fift7~one 
1 
and titty-eight male Iroquois vere sent down to Montreal. Forty-
2 
eight of these are acc;ounted tor as neutrals; e1ght Five Nations 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, M4m.oire de l'~ition 
de M. de Denonville, 1687; Cbam.pigny au Ministre, Quebec, 
16 July 1687; DE BAUGY: JoUl'nal d'une EXp4dition contre les 
Iroquois en 1687, pp 88-89; BELMONt, ABBE DE: Histoire de canada, 
pp 20-21; JeiUit Relations,vol. LXIII, p 281, R.P.Becheter a 
M. Cabart de Villermont, Qmebec, 19 September 1687. 
2 • Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. IX, Champigey au Iin1stre, Que bEC 
16 July 1687; M4m.oire de l'D:pédition de M. de Denonville, 1687. 
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Iroquois were captured ab ove Chateauguay, seven of them being sent 
1 
strai$ht awa:y to Montreal; 
2 
and at la Galette a Cayuga was captured, 
ma.ki:a.g fif'ty-aeven prisoners accounted for. 
~ossible explanation of the dispar1ty between Lamberville's and 
the other accounts is that the Iroquois whom he claims went to 
Cataracoui at his request were not as guileless as he makes them 
appear and went, not directly to Cataracoui, but to points along 
the St • Lawrence ri ver to observe the œovements of the French, 
some of them being caught in the act. This theory is substantiated 
by d~ Baugy's statement that " ••• (Lamberville) nous assura que les 
quatre premiers Onontagues et le chef des Goyogoins qui avoient 
esté pris n'estoient venus que pour nous épier; ce qui est positif', 
est 4ue l'on trouva dans le sac du chef Goyogouin un lien qu'ils 
3 
ne portent avec eux que pour faire des Prisonniers." 
: 
D• Baugy also states that Denonville "··• a fait relascher le 
fils de la Grande Gueule pour luy marquer qu'il ne manque pas l 
. 4 
sa parole, estant venus pour ce qu'il leur avoit mandé." Another 
t 
likely, and perhaps more cogent reason reason for Denonville's 
releasing this particular prisoner, who happened to be the son of 
: 5 
an Omo~aga Chiettain, was the fact that he hoped to wean the 
Onont:Jagas away from the influence of the Senecas • It was for this 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, Mémoire de 1 'EXPédition 
de M. de Denonville, 1687 .. 
2. DÉ BAUGY: Journal d'une ExP'dition 4ontre les Iroquois en 
1687, p 71. 
3· ibid. pp 77-78. 
4. ibid. p 80. 
5· ibid. 
-
pp 73-74. 
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specifie reasan that he did not send any or the onoDdaga prisoners 
1 
to France. 
Be that as it may, it is quite clear th&t Lamberville'& cam-
plaint that aome thirty to torty Iroquois chiers went to Oataracoui 
on Denonville'& invitation, were treacheroualy seized and later 
sent :to the French galleys, is. qui te erroneous. It JDUst be remem-
' 
bere~ that Lamberville wrote his account over sevan years after 
1 -
the ~vent, and that he was an old man, broken by siekness and the 
terr~ble hardships he had endured; he himself speaks or " ••• le 
2 
peu de Jours qui me reste ••• " Also he felt extremely bitter about 
the ,.ar vith the Iroquois. Thus it is possible that his memor1 
' play~ him talee,. causing him to confUse the capture of the neutrals 
j . 
and ._he alleged epies, with the depu.ties whom· .he supposed h&d 
' 
taken him at his word and gone to Oataracoui. There is ilao the 
uncharitable possibility that Lambervil~s bitterness over the 
war, :tor the coJIDlencement of whieh he held Denonville solely 
responsible, his sympathies being all with the Iroquois, led him 
to d1stort the facts of the case. 
-B~t to return to O~mpigny: on his way back to Quebec the 
inte~ant paueed at Montreal long enougb to organise suppl7 con-
VOJS :tor the army and to inspect the billeting and subsistenee 
i 
arra~ements made tor the treops newly arrived from France, whom 
J 
he oJ.tdered put to work an the farms of the ha bi tante • 
. , 
1. Oan. Arch. AC. Series OllA, vol. IX, Denonville'au Ministre, 
Allie bec, August 25, 1687. 
2. Jesuit Relations, vol. LXIV, pp 238-258, Lettre du R.P. Jean 
de Lamberville l un Père Missionaire de Chine, Paris, 23 Jan. 1687 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 July 1687. 
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Once he bad attended to the most pressing business at Quebec he 
set off on a tour of inspection throughout the colony to make sure 
that the home front was prepared for wbatever the future might hold. 
He saw to it tha.t the troops and habitants were looking after the 
farms of the men away with the army; that the discipline and living 
conditions of the troops were satisfactory; and that they were on 
the alert to repulse any incursions the Iroquois might malte. And 
whilst he vas at it he also inspected the churches and presbyterys 
throughout the parishes. Once ha bad seen to all this he returned 
1 
to Montreal to await the return of the army. 
Meanwhile, Denonville had invs.ded the Seneca coun~ry, but the 
resulte of this campaign proved to be no better than he had expected 
and not as good as he had hoped. A:fter launching one attack from 
ambush the Senecas had fied beyond pursuit. The French had destroyed 
the crops and food supplies in the villages and had then been 
forced to retire from the field. Denonville f'ound it impossible 
to continue on to attack the other cantons owing to the extreme 
fatigue of the troops, the spread of sickness in their ranks, the 
shortage of' supplies and the f'act that the Indian allies,who.were 
never capable of' a sustained effort for very long, were beginning 
2 
to disperse. 
However, the French bad suce eeded in marching an army into the 
most distant of the eneu, cantons, and ths.t of' the most powerf'ul 
of these nations to boot. This in itsel! vas no mean feat and its 
signif'icance vas not lost on the Iroquois. A!ter building a tort 
1. ibid. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. IX, Denonville au .Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 August 1687. 
-33-
at Niagara and garrisontng it with one hundred men in the hopes 
that the Ottawas would use it as a base tor raiding parties against 
1 
the Iroquois villages, the army returned to Montreal. 
Denonville was completely worn out by the time he returned; he 
vas not a young man, it beiDg th1rty years since he had last been 
2 
on active service. Consequently, Champigny took charge ot military 
matters tor the time bètng and in addition to auch normal duties 
as organising supply convoya tor the up country garrisons, he alao 
arranged all the militar,y details necessary to guarantee the 
3 
aecur1ty of the colony during the coming winter. 
Tq add to the colo~ 's troubles, an epidemie ot measles broke 
out, and along with it, the more dread small pox. There were a 
great many deaths amongst the habitants, and the mission Indiana 
were ,dàcimated by the measlea, a disease to wh1ch Indiana h&d :J_ittle 
or no resistance • .A.t Sillery alone one hundred and thirty Indiana 
died and over three hundred of the Sault Iroquois were stricken by 
4 
the disease. Among the victime were the wives and children of the 
Iroquois taken prisoner at Cataracoui who bad been baptised and 
placed amongst the Mission Indiana. Neatly all or them died shortly 
5 
af~e~ their arrival. 
Ot the t1tty-e1ght odd male Iroquois pr1soners, th1rty-s1x were 
6 
shipped to France. The se Iroquois who were actually sent to the 
1. Can. Arch • .A.C. Series ClU, vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, Que bec, 25 August 1687 • 
2. ~-
3-.DB BAUGY: Journal d'une Exp,dition contre les Iroquois en 1687, 
pp 1 ...... - 11 7 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series OllA, vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, 
Quebec, 27 October 1687. 
5· BELMONT, ABBE DE: Histoire de Canada, pp 20-21. 
6. Jeauit Relations, vol. LXIII, p 281. R.P. Becheter à M. Cabart 
de Villermont, Quebec, 19 September 1687. 
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galleya vere eor the most part neutrals; Denonville explained to 
the miniater that some of the prisoners vere close relatives of t~e 
mission Indiana, and that others vere Onondagas whom, as he put it, 
"···nous devons menager pour tacier de les desunir des Sonontouans 
'1 
et pour nous en servir pour negocier si nous en avons besoin." He 
also made it quite plain that he vould verJ much have preferred not 
to send an::r or theae Iroquois to France at all; he told the minister, 
••• Je aouhaiterois fort de ne me 'pas defaire 
de tous ces prisonniers, cependant Monseigneur 
comme vous les desirez,Je me contanteray de 
retenir ceux que Je croiray me pou•o1r estre 
utile et qui ne seront point coupables de 
tous les desordres des autres, si cependant 
~· vous voulez bien les retenir en lieu 
d ou on les put retirer en cas de besoin et 
que dans la suite on puisse venir à un 
accomodement general Je croy que ce seroit 
une chose très utille au pays ••• 
2 
And two months later he stated: "J'ay cru devoir aveuglement obéir 
-
aux ordres de sa M&Jest' en renvoyant tous les prisonniers comme 
3 
J 'ay tait." 
. , 
When the prisoners arrived in France they were sant to the 
. 
galleJs at Marseilles. The minister assured Denonville "··· qu'ils 
manquent de rien," and ordered him to send as many more auch as 
4 
he cou.ld capture during the future· progress of the var • once in 
the galleys, the Iroquois rece1ved religious instruction and extra 
5, 
rations, the equivalent to that given the Senegalese. The minister 
1. cu. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, Que bec, 25 August 1687 • 
2. ibid. 
-
3. Can. Arch. AC • Series ClU, vol. IX, Mémoire de 1' Estat Pr,sent 
del Affaires de Canada, (Denonville, Quebec) 27 oetober 1687. 
4. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Ministre à M. de Denonville , 
Versailles, 8 March 1688. 
5. DO. • Rel. N' .F. vol. I, p 426, Ministre 1 M. 1' Intendant des 
Galères à Marseillea, 1688. 
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of marine also order6d that they should not be ch&ined, nor shaved, 
and in all these respects they were better treated than were the 
Huguenots who had been sent to the galleya following the revocation 
1 
of ·the Eiict of Nantes. Actually, in comparison vith the Jlanner in 
whioh the Iroquois dealt w1th their prisoner;s, they vere treated 
liàe pampered guests. 
When Denonville took stock ot the military situation he tound 
2 
it to be far trom reassuring. Callières a.greed vith him that the 
past cam.paign had been absolu\ely necessary to prevent the ruin ot 
New France, and that two armies vere neecled to finish the var 
3 
quic~y, otherwise it would drag on indetinitely. Denonville 
r 
began making plana for another campa1gn and tor small raiding 
parties to harass the Iroquois, but what weighed most heavilJ on 
his lllind vas 'the defencelesa condition of the oolony. As he pointed 
out to the m1n1ster, it needed only a hundred determined Iroquois 
to 1...,. vaste all the settlements below Three Ri vers. That they had 
not already done ao he could only attribute to the fact that God 
. 4 
must have made them bliiid • 
F4ther Becheter echoed Denonville'& tears; he stated that althouàl 
the var had begun quite auspiciously it vas gravely feared that 
befoJllle it vas over, it vould have eaused the ruin ot part ot the 
coloD3' owing to the fact that the settlements were ao acattered. He 
cla1aed that ever,yone in the colony vas· in agreement that tive 
1. Doc • Rel. N.F. vol. I, p 394, Ministre au R .P. Leroux à 
M4rseilles, Paria, 26 March 1687. 
2. Can. Arch. AC • Series Cll.l, vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, 
Que bec, 25 August 1687 • 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series Cll.A., vol. X, Mémoire du Chevalier de 
Callières au Ministre, 1688. 
4. can. Arch. AC. Series Cll.A., vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, 
Q-qebec, 27 October 1687. 
--·· 
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hundred Iroquois led by Europeans could at any time devastate 
Canada, despite all the precautions that might be tak:en, tor the 
simple reason that no defence was possible a.gainst an ene1111 who 
struck by surprise from the forest, :tilled the men 1n the tields, 
burn~ houses and barns, alaughtered the eattle, then taded back 
into the forest betore the French eould muster torees to repulse 
1 
them,. 
This then vas the situation vith wh1ch Denonville and ChampisnJ 
vere f'aced. The only possible way tha.t they could see· to protect 
the colony above Three Rivera was to build torts in eaeh seign1ory 
and have the habitants live in compact villages close by these 
2 
torts. But to do this p:roperly entailed a complete redistribution 
and reorganizat1on ot the concessions, and this requ1red t1me, 
a tew years at least w1thout the constant threat of' Iroquois 
3 
attacks. For the next two years Denonville and Champigny did their 
beat, but 1t was tar too ambitious a scheme under the c1rcumstances 
and allen both to the topography ot the country and the desires ot 
the habitants. Every habitant wanted his land to border on the 
r~ver, since this was the only means ot communication ia the colony. 
In all their.detence mea.aures the chief obstacle with which the 
gov~rnor and intendant bad to contend was the apat~ and passive 
res1·atance ot the habitants, the very people whom they vere trying 
to protect • The ha bi tanta were accustomed to living on the1r own 
land, with plenty ot elbow room, well removed from their neighbours 
1. Jtauit Relations, vol. LXIII, p 279, R .P. Bechef'er à X. Cabart 
de Villermont, ~uebec, 19 September 1687. 
! 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Serie a ClU, vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, 
Quebec, · 27 October 1687; vol. X, Denonville et Champigny au 
Ministre, Qaebec, 6 November 1688. 
3. Can. Arch. AC • Series ClU, vol. IX, M~mo1re de l'Est at 
Pr~sent des affaires de Canada, 27 October 1687. 
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1 
and with no one to tell them. what to do or when to do it. They 
were opposed to leaving their dispersed hom.esteads and building 
new bouses and barns close to a tort; they had known twenty years 
ot peace and bad torgotten what it m.eant to have the Iroquois 
descend on them like wolves. Denonville and Cham.pigiJJ did their 
beat to overcom.e this aversion on the part of the habitants' to 
~hang1ng their ways but they had little success, and Denonville 
compl.ined bitterly that the Canadians bad auch an independent 
spirit and lack of docility in the face of authority, they were 
2 
harder to govern than were the Indiana. In words that were all 
too prophetie he wryly remarked that perhaps after à few of them 
bad been killed the others would come to realise the urgency of 
3 
the situation. By 1691 the habitants above Three Rivera were 
4 
living close about the torts, but by that time a great many o:r 
them had had their outlying homes and barns burned, and the others 
bad finally seen the ligb.t. 
Denonville and Champi~ did finally succeed in getting torts 
5 
built 1n the more exposed areas, but they could not get the habitazts 
to tate the necessary precautions tor their own safety. Champigny 
gave out muskets to them on repayment - he never was successful in 
collecting for these muskets, something which the minister did not 
1. ibid. 
2. caa. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. X, Denonville au Ministre, Qu.bec, 6 August 1688. 
3· can. Arch • .AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 August 1687. 
4, can. Arch • .AC. Series ClU, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif sur le 
Canada. Champigny, Quebec, 10 May 1691. 
s. Can. Arch. AC. Series Cll.A, vol. X, Denonville au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 August 1688. 
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l 
let him forget in a hurry - and Denonville issued an ordonnance 
just bef'ore the Seneea campaign, warning the people to be on th6ir 
guard against Iroquois raids and ordering that each habitant vas 
to have a musket and at least ten charges of' powder and ball with 
2 
him whenever he went out into the fields. Yet the tollowing 
September, despite all that had happened, many of the habitants 
were taking no precautions at all for the saf'ety of themselves or 
their oattle. Many of them had not bothered to obtain m.uskets for 
their sons or their servants, or to train them in the use of' fire-
arms; others even retused to work on the forts that Denonville had 
ordered built in eaoh seigniory and tried to persuade those who 
were working at this task to give it up. The governor reiterated 
his orders that every male over thirteen years of' age had to have 
a musket and amœJnition and know how to use them and at the first 
sign of the enemy the habitants had to drive their oattle to the 
forts and bring as muoh fodder and grain as they could. The men 
were o4oce more told that they had to work in the fields in armed 
groups; and in addition, every district had to have a signal tire 
prepared ready to give warn1ng to the other settlements. The moment 
auch a signal vas sean, or cannon tire beard from Montreal, avery 
habitant was to take eover at the nearest fort as quickly as possibla 
Anyone f'ailing to obey these orders, Denonville warned, would be 
subjeet to fines or corporal pun1shment at the discretion of the 
1. Catn. Arch. Ac. Series ClU, vol. IX, ChampignJ au Ministre, 
Quebec, 5 November 1687; vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, Montreal, 
6 July 1689; Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 16 November 1689. 
2. Que. Arch. Publications, Ords. Commissions, etc etc des Gouver-
neurs et Intend.s. vol. II, pp 163-164, Ordonnance de M. de 
Denonville, Montreal, 13 June 1687. 
l 
intendant. 
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At the same time, Champigny got after certain habitants who 
had abandoned their concessions for one reason or another. Owing 
to neglect, these lands were covered with stumps and over grown 
with brush which provided perfect cover for Iroquois ambuscades. 
Champigny ordered the concession holders to clear these lands 
without delay, as they were a menace to the safety of the neigh-
. 2 
bour~ng land holders. 
Meanwhile, Denonville was receiving advice from the m1nister 
as to how beat to carry on the war, but no additional troops or 
supplies. Seignelay suggested, on the advice of men who had served 
in Canada, that Denonville should attack the Mohawks and Onondagas 
simultaneously and keep his armies in their country throughout 
the winter. This, he thougnt, would remove the Iroquois threat 
3 
once and for all. Denonville promptly replied that to do this 
would require at least four thousand men, four hundred to five 
hundred flat boats, and a two years supply of food and munitions 
4 
on hand. 
But by the time tbat this last dispatch reached Versailles, 
affa~rs in Europe precluded any thought of sending more troops 
to C~ada. The out standing issues between Louis XIV and the 
Emperor were rapidly coming to a he.ad, and in July 1688 William 
1. ~ue. Arch. Publications, Ords. Commissions, etc. etc. des 
Gouverneurs et Intendants, vol. II, pp 166-168, Ordonnance de M. de Denonville, Montreal, l September 1687. 
2. Qû.e. Arch. Publications, Orda. cowmiaaigna, etc. etc, dao 
GOuverneurs et Intend&nts. vol. II, p 168, OrdDDiDce de M. de 
Champigny, Montreal, 14 September.l687. 
3· Oa.n. Arch. An. Series B, vol. XII, Ministre à Denonville, 
Versailles, 8 March 1688. · 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Denonville au M~nistre, Quebac, 10 August 1688. 
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ot Orange was 1nv1ted by a power:ful group 1n England to replace 
James II o• the throne ot England. In September, Lqpis XlV 
declared war on the Empire and sent his troops on to the middle 
1 
Rhine. Thus Denonville' s statement that large sc ale reintorce-
ments were needed betore the Iroquois could be crushed received 
a curt reply from the m1nister,to the ettect that arrairs in 
EUrope made it impossible tor the King to support the expense ot 
a large scale war in Canada and peace with the Iroquois was, 
2 
ther.tore, eesential. 
This decia10b was perhaps not the beat solution to the problems 
tacing New France, bttt at least it was better than no decision at 
all. Denonville and Champigny promptlJ intormed the m1n1ster that 
in order to enter into peace negotiations w1th the Iroquois, the 
prisoners serving in the galleya would have to be sent back, and 
3 
all. due care talten tor their pby'sical wel.l being en route. This 
4 
the m1n1ster ordered done. Then, through the efforts ot rather 
Lamberville, aeveral Iroquois chiets from the Onondaga, Cayuga 
and Oneida cantona were persuaded to come to Montreal to diseuse 
a peace aettlement. They came, accompan1ed. by one hundred ot the1r 
men, all unarmed. Denonville promised them that he would restore 
the prisoners aerving in the galleys and a peace treaty was then 
drawn up. By the terme ot this treaty all hostilitiea were to cease, 
l. CLARK, G.N.: The Later Stuarts, pp 122-138; TREVELY.AN, G.M: 
Eggland UDder the Stuarta, pp 366-368. 
2. N .Y .c .D • vol. IX, p 395, Extract or Denonville' a, Champif5D1 'a 
aBd Min1ater'a letters, 10 August, 31 October, 6 November 1688. 
3. ~-
4. ibid. 
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and all the French allies were to be included in the terme of the 
treaty, the French were to be free to send supplies to Cataracoui 
wit:b.out let or hindrance, and the three Iroquois nations engaged 
to induce the Senecas and Mshawks to accept these terme and sand 
1 
deputies to Montreal to ratifJ the treaty •. 
By these terme the French obtained all that they could have 
expected under the circumstances. It was a good peace from the 
French point of view for by the very fact that all the French 
allies were to be included, it did far more than merely restore 
the statue guo ante bellum. 'l'he main cause of the conflict eo 
far as the French were concerned had been removed. The Iroquois 
deputies expressed themselves as satistied and atter being feaeted 
and given avery assurance of French integrity they departed, 
prom1s1ng to return shortly with delegates trom the other two 
2 
cantons to ratity the treaty. The main question here is, would 
the Mohawks, and more particularly the Senecas, have agreed to 
auch terme? And bad they done so, how long would they have abided 
by them? 
•ctually, these are little more than academie questions in 
view of subsequent events. Two months after the initial truce had 
been arranged, Iroquois peace delegates from the west were on their 
3 
way down to Montreal; and it was at this crucial point that the 
Huron chief, Kondiaronk, perpetrated his celebrated coup which 
would. bave deligb.ted the heart of Machiavelli himself'. Hearing that 
l.FERLAJD), J ..B ..A.:. Cours d'Histoire du Canada, vol. II, p 174; Jesuit 
Rel.,fL ti ons, vol • LXIV, pp 23B•25B, Lettre du P. Jean de Lamberville 
1 un Pere Missionaire de Chine, Paris, 23 January 1695· 
2. !lli· 
3· ibid. 
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Iroquois peace delegates ~ere on their way to Montreal, and fearing 
that aDJ peace between French and Iroquois would free the latter 
to attack his people, he ambushed the Iroquois party and pretended 
to have done so by order of the French. He purposely released the 
survivors of this ambush and sent them back to ~heir cantons to 
1 
inform their people of this latest example of French perfidy. 
This action had the desired effect, the warlike spirits of the 
Iroquois warriors were inflamed. Despite this, wiser counsels still 
tried to prevail. A considerable number amongst the Iroquois saw 
through Kondiaronk's trick and realised that the French had had no 
part ln it. Some ot the chiers vere even preparing to come to 
Montreal to ratity the projected peace treaty, but Andros, Governor 
ot Nell England, by mingled threats and caJoling managed to dissuade 
2. 
them. It was the combined actions of an ally and an enemy of New 
France that acuttled all hopes of peace. 
But it is extremely doubttul i:f' a peace could have been maintainal 
in anr case, even had it been consummated, for a few months later 
England and France were at war. It is hardly likely that the Iro-
quois could have withstood the pressures which the English colonies 
would have exerted on them and so remained neutral. More partiou-
larly vas this so 1n view of the tact that the one major bone o:r 
contention between the French and the Iroquois, the question of 
control o:r the western fUr trade vas still in issue. There could 
bave been no lasting peace between them with that unsettled; the 
beat that could have been hoped for was an uneasy truce during 
1. i bld; LAHONTAN: .llouveaux Voyages de Mr • le Baron de Lahontan 
· diiS l'Amerique Septentrionale, vol. I pp 189-192. -
2. FERLAND, J .:S ..A:. Cours d'Histoire du Canada, vol. II, pp 179-180. · 
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which the Iroquois, temporarily secure from French attacks, would 
once more have turned their attentions to the French allies in the 
west. 
By the summe~ of 1689 Denonville found himselt in an extremely 
awkward position. The last dispatches from the minister bad informed 
him that war with England was wxpeoted any day and that he was to 
1 
guard against a surprise attack from that quarter. He had also been 
instruoted to negotiate a peace with the Iroquois by all means in 
2 -
his power; but it took two parties to negotiate a peace. He vas 
still. anxiously waiting for the Iroquois to send their peace dele-
gates to Montreal but he bad no certain knowledge of what was going 
3 
on in the cantons. The English he knew were doing everything poss-
ible tp prevent auch negotiations taking place and he vas impatient-
ly awaiting the arrival of the prisoners from France to prove to 
the Iroq*ois that their kinsmen had not all died in the galleys, 
. 4 
as the English at Albany kept rei terating. By July there was still 
no word from the Iroquois and no tresh instructions from the minister 
OB JijlY 6th Champigny wrote: "Nous atendons Mgr avec bien de l'impa-
5 
tienee l'honneur de vos ordres pour cette année ••• " Thus Denonville's 
------------- ----------------------------------------·----- -------
1. N.Y.c.~. vol. IX, pp 393-398, Extract of Denonville's, Champigny's 
and Mlnister's letters, 10 August, 31 October,6 November 1688. 
2. ibid. 
-
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal, 6 July 1689. . 
4. Que. Arch. Manuscrits Relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle 
France, 2 me série, vol. V, Denonville à Mr. de Vallerenne, (Montreal) 24 September 1689. 
s. Can. Arch • .Ac. Series Cll.A, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal, 6 July 1689. 
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and Champig~q 1 s hands were tied, they could only sit tight and hope 
:for the beat. 
To add to their worries disease bad ravaged the colony the pre-
1 
vious year, causing some 1400 deaths amongst troops and habitants. 
And as though all this were not enough, the ot:ficers and men in the 
troupes de la marine were in an almost mutinous mood. ~he morale 
and the discipline o~ these troops was never h1gh even at the beat 
2 1 
o:f times, by July 1689 these essent1a1 military qualities had 
reached a new 1ov. The of:ficers were all highly dissatis:fied because 
they :round themselves stuck in Canada while a major war was being 
:fougbt in Europe with all ita opportunities tor glory and promotion. 
Guer11la war:fare in the :foreste o:r Canada was not to their taste. 
Furthermore, they h~?hot been paid :for some t1me and were owed over 
:f1:fty thousand livres in back pay. Champig~q intormed the m1n1ster 
that although he realized full well that a:f:fairs ~n Europe left 
little t1me to attend to Canada's troubles, he was waiting impa-
~ 
tiently :for the minister's orders regard1ng the :fuDure prosecution 
o:f the war and alao :for the annual supply of funds. In the absence 
o:f these essential sinews o:f war he took steps to leed the troops 
on his own. initiative and by any means at his d1sposal. The ofticers 
he prjevailed upon to do as beat they could until the :funds should 
arrive; but some of the corporals and lance corporala retused to 
carry out their ordera, claim1ng tha.t the o:f:f1cers were w1thholding 
theil' pay. Thenon top o:f all this, Champigny's commissaire at 
1. N .Y. .c .D • vol. IX, pp 393-398, Extract ot Denonville 1 s, Cham-
pigny's and M1n1ster's letters, 10 August, 31 October, 6 Nov-
ambel' 1688; FERLAND, .J .B .A: Coul's d 'H1stoiee du Canada, vol. II, 
p 178. 
2. Vite intra, Chapt el' IV, passim. 
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Montreal, the sieur Gaillard, became involved in a di.-apute w1th 
several captains, ostensibly because they had w1thheld their 
soldiers' pay, but actually,as Champigny bad reason to believe, 
because these officers bad been a little too tamiliar with madame 
Gaillard .. 
Champigny d1d his beat to make Gaillard see reason, explaintng 
to him that this was no time to be tormenting the officers. But 
Gaillard was in no mood to see reason and threatened to resign 
his post unless Champigqr forced tvelve to fifteen officers to 
make ·restitut ion of the ir soldiers • pay • When Ch&mpig111 ordered 
him to take the muster parades of the troops and to report at the 
intendant's usual meeting held to diseuse auch matters, Gaillard 
refUsed point blank to comply until such time as Champigny should 
take steps to put a stop to the officers' alleged malversations. 
Thus ChampisnJ found h1mselt without a commissaire and had to 
hold the muster parades at Montreal himself so far as he was 
1 
able. 
Gaillard then complained of Champigny's attitude to Denonville 
2 
but it is unlikely that he recèt~àd much comfort from that quarter. 
However, once this little tempest had blown itself out Champigny 
bore .Gaillard no malice and inforaed the minister that he was 
will1ng to forget the whole affair as Gaillard was devoted to the 
service, being an honest and conscientioue official whose wite 
3 
was ~eally responsible for all the trouble. When Gaillard crossed 
~~ 
over ·to France two years later, Champigny gave him a very good rec-
ommendation to the minister and aleo gave him his dispatches and. 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. 
Montreal, 6 July 1689. 
X, Champigny au Ministre, 
2. Can. Arch • .AC. Series CllA, vol. 
Quebec, 17 November 1689. 
x, Champigny au Ministre, 
3· Can. Arch. AC • Series C:!U, vol. x, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 17 November 1689-
-46-
a le~tb1' memoir to deliver to the minis ter peraonally, who wa.s 
informed that he could have every confidence in anything that 
Gaillard had to say on Canadian affaire as he was a man of integ-
1 
ri ty and honour • 
This particular incident, although verging slightly on the ludi-
crous, does have sombre undertones; ma.gnanimo•s in spirit though 
Champigny a.ppears to have been, it indicates that something was 
la.cking in the direction of mi~ita.ry affaira. Whether the fault was 
ChampignJ's or Denonville's it is hard to say on the basie of 
Champigny's dispatch a~one. If the officers were withholding their 
- . . 
men's pay then under normù circumstances, regardless of their 
impeeunious situation, they ahould have been subject to stern 
disciplinary action. Champigny makes it clear that he did not 
regard the circumsta.nces as normal; and in any case, auch discip-
linary action wa.s the governor's responsibility. Denonville 
certainly had enough to worry about at that particular time thus it 
may be that ChampigD1 1 s.prudent attitude prevented the situation 
getting out of band at what would have been a most inopportune time. 
Be that as it may, one thing is very apparent, in July when Cham-
pigny wrote his dispatch to the minister both the internal and the 
external affaire of the colony were in rather a bad way. 
Then at the beginning of August, all the dismaying uncertainties 
of the past year were suddenly shattered and irrevocably swept away. 
The Iroquois finally came; but not as peace delegates. During a 
violent hail storm fifteen'hundred Iroquois warriors crossed Lake 
st. Louis undetec~ed. At dawn they swept down on Lachine, burning 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 May 1691. 
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the llooa .. t.eacla aa4 aaaaacl'ing tàe llabit•t• ,.. 414 DOt llaYe 
1 
tille to nee to tb.e aatet1 of the :torts. .Al t.bough the French 
caau.al tiea were DO where near as !l'eat as had at ti rat beea feared., 
2 
aJ14 all tol4 onl.J aome 11x1;J-a1x peraons lost tb.e1r liTes, the 
tero c11;J ot the attack c>read terror in the upper coloDJ • 
M&ll1' Cauadian h1ator1ana place all tlle bl&11e tor this disaster 
oa DenoaY1lle' a ahoulders, but the ertdeace doea l'lOt warrant auob. 
a lla.rah aucl 8\lperticial JudSemeD.t. He unttoubtedlJ collll1tted DlaJQ' 
m111 ta17 aina o:r omission aud comaiaaion: what general llaa DOt? 
BUt one tb.iDS ia certain, 1t ia all too eaa.Y t.o be wise atter the 
e'Yeat, and 1 t ia impossible to .aq w1 th _, degree ot tai:rneas 
that had DeiiOnville clone tb.1a, or clone that, the Lachine massacre 
wolll,d :not haYe occurred • 
Whe or what then, waa reaponaible tor this diaaater? The ert-
d-.ce abowa tb.at •alV" p•ple and lla.DJ' thiDSa were te bl.-e; the 
megat1 Te pol1q ot the ling and hia m1D1atel' at that cru.c1al pel'iod, 
tor they alone oould. •at• pollcJ decisions as to peace and war w1 th 
the Iztoquois, the D8].iah colonies, or &'DlOBe elae; the ld)a'tibJ ot 
the ltabitants wbo pera1at81ilJ zte:tuaed to lleed the or4era iasu.ed 
tor their ow.n protection; this last being aade all the aore d1tt1-
eul t to couteztact cnd.ng to t.b.e talae •••e ot aecuzt1 tJ aseadered 
b7 the earlier peaee aes>t.iationa. But most ot all, t.b.e Lachine 
aaaaacre waa a prodv.ct ot the f'ortlmea ot war. D4IDODY1lle, be1:ag 
cll~•• as goYerliDr w1 th the a111 tarJ 4etace ot the colozq, 
was ot co\lztae teeba1cal}7 reaponaible tor the deteat 81lf'tere4 
bJ' lü a torees. Bltt in the final allal1a1a 1 t 1a d1tt1oal t 
Dl Lelte St • Louis, 014 ap4 1few, p 135 • 
to see how Denonville can be held solely to blame ~ more than a 
governor of New York could be held accountable for the success of 
the French raid on Schenectady less than a year later. 
The issue has been further confused by the fact that Denonville 
• 
received liis recall shortly after the Iroquois attack: but there 
is no evidence whatsoever to support the view that Denonville was 
recalled following the Lachine massacre owing to his mil1tary 
-
inaptitude. In 1688 the minister had stated that the King was 
quite satisfied with Denonville's handling of affaira in New 
1 
France, and the decision to recall him was taken some time prior 
to May 31, 1689, two months and more before the Lachine massacre 
occurred. In the King's latter recàlling Denonville, dated May 31, 
1689, there is no evidence at all to indicate that he was in any 
way dissatisfied with the governor's conduct; in fact, the reverse 
would appear to be the case, for the King states: 
La conjuncture présente de la guerre qui 
est en Europe m'ayant fait prendre la 
résolution de vous rappeller pour vous 
donner de l'employ dans mon armée où je 
suis persuadé que vous me servirez avec 
la mesme application, le mesme zèle et le 
mesme succès que vous avez fait par le 
passé ••• 
2 
Champigny's faith was certainly not sbaken in his friand and 
superior. In July, when rumours first reached Canada that Denon-
ville was to be recalled he protested vigorously to the minister, 
1. N.Y.c.D. vol. IX, p ;96, EXtract of Denonville's, Champigny's 
and the minister's letters, 10 August, 31 October, 6 November, 
1688. 
2. B.R.H. vol. XLIII, 1937, p 315, Le Roi à M. le marquis de 
Denonville, Versailles, 31 May 1689. ( A comparison of this 
latter with the King's dispatch recalling La Barre, who was 
really recalled in disgrace, indicates sufficiently well that 
Louis XIV was not merely being gentle with Denonville.) 
stating that the loss would be the colony' s and that he wished 
with all his heart to remain 1n New France to serve with Denon-
ville for as long as the King was pleased to maintain the marquis 1 . 
as governor of the coloDJ • If' this was a subtle hint that Cham-
pigny wished to be recalled too should the current rumours prove 
to be correct, then it did not have the desired result. When the 
ruœours were confirmed ~ the arrival of Denonville's successor, 
the comte de ~ontenac, Champigny was quite bitter and curtly 
remarked in his disp~tch to the minister: "Il est facheux que M. 
2 
de Denonville s'en retourne lorsqu'il connoist le pays •••• " 
So Denonville left and Champigny was to remain, perhaps 
unwillingly, for another thirteen tumultuous years. It is very 
dif'f'icult to draw aDJ clear eut conclusions from his tenure in 
office during these past tbree years. In the official dispatches 
his role remained def'initely in the background, yet it is apparent 
that during this period he played no small part in the direction 
of ~ilitary and political affaira. He ably seconded Denonville in 
every way he could and took a good deal of' the burden ott the 
governor' s shoulders whenever possible. He certainly played a 
sign1f'icant part in Denonville's campaign~ against the Senecas; 
whether or not this is entirely to his credit is a moot point. The 
only complainte about his administration of' affaira were those of' 
the sieur Gaillard, and the customary protesta from the minister 
atthe high rate of' expenditure on the war, but these last were 
little more than an intendant' s normal occupat1onal hazards. Thus 
1. Ca.n. Arch. A.O. Series CllA, vol. X, Champigny to the Minister, 
Montreal, 6 July 1689. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Champigny al.\ lqnistre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1689. 
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on the whole, one can only conclude that Champigny had acqui tted 
h1mself' reasohably wall during his first three y ea.rs in office; 
and this initiation into the my riad tasks of a colonial intendant 
served him in good stead during the even more trying times which 
he was soon to face. 
CHAPTER tu. 
CHAMPIGNY 1 S INFLUENCE ON MILITARY STRATElYÎ 1689-1698 • 
It was on October 12, 1689, that Louis Buade, comte de Frontenac, 
arrived at Quebec to replace Denonville as governor of the colonJ. 
With his arrival the union and close cooperatio~ that bad existed 
between governor and intendant ended abruptly. Champigny displayed 
no enthusiasm over the prospect of serving under Denonvi.lle' s 
successor; in his dispatch to the minister he remarked dryly that 
he would omit nothing in orâer to live on good terme with Fron-
tenac, " ••• estant-bien necessaire pour le bien du service qu'il 
l 
y ayt de l'union." He can hardly be blamed tor this cool 
attitude; the record of Frontenac's previous administration 1n 
New France was h&rdly likely to inspire any intendant with hopes 
for a pleasant future. 
Frontenac bad been recalled in 1682 because he had quarrelled 
so b1tterly w1th everyone in a position or authority in the 
colony that the administration or affaire became virtually impose• 
ible. In view of this it is to be wondered at that the King ever 
decided to restore Frontenac to his old post. However having 
1• Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol.X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Que bec, 16 November 1689. 
-52-
recalled Deno~xlle he had to send someone in his place. It must 
also be remembered that Frontenac was a godson of Louis XlV, who 
. 
had given the future governor hia own name, and a grandson of 
1 
Phélippeaux, the Secretary of State. 'rhus Frontenac had consid-
erable influence at court as also had his wife, who according 
to certain accounts, had a.great aversion tor him and would 
do everything possible to further his plans provided that they 
J. 
entailed his remaining· out ot France;. 
When the Abbé Tronson, Superior ot the Sulpician order in 
Paris, learned of Frontenac's appointment he promptly wrote to 
. 
Dollier de Casson,,head ot the order in Montreal, to warn him of 
Frontenac' s imminent return to New France. 
Entin M. le marquis (aie) de Frontenac a 
obtenu, par sa perséverance et par les bons 
offices de ses amis, son retour en Canada ••• 
Il a~ eu une audience favorable de sa MaJesté ••• 
il faut de votre part taire ce que vous 
pourrez pour ménager sa bonne volonté et 
ne lui point donner sujet de plainte ••• 
Prevenez bien les esprits at1n que l'on 
ne temoigne pas de la peine du retour de 
M. de Frontenac. Car cela pourrait lui Jtre 
rapporté et avoir de mauvaises suites. : 
Il faut conserver son amitié. Comme il est 
appuyé à la Cour, sa conduite y sera soutenue, 
et les plaintes n'y seraient pas aisément 
escoutées •••• 
3 
Obviously the Abbé regarded Frontenac's appointment with some 
misgivings. His statement that complainte against Frontenac's 
conduct would be ot no avail helpe to make more explicable much 
that later took place in Canada. 
1. STEWART, GEORGE: Frontenac ·and His Times, in Narrative and 
Critical H1storY ot America, ëditëd by JUSTIN WINSOR, vol. IV, 
pp • 317-319 • 
2. ~· 
3 • Can • Arch· Librairie St. Sulpicel Montreal. Lettres de 1 'Abbé 
Tronson, vol. III, Abbé Tronson & M. Dollier de Casson, {Paris) 
1 May 1689. . 
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From his rirst arrival on the scene until just berore his death 
Frontenac's government was disrupted by his constant quarrels with 
s.t" ,..:te. 
Champigny • This unhappy __ ''Of' arfairs stemm.ed from two main sources, 
1\ 
the personalities of the two men and their divergent points of 
view on the affaire of' the colony. Champigny had shown that he 
could get along well with his superior during Denonv1lle's gover-
norsh1p, but the on1y method by which he round it possible to achieve 
any unity or cooperation with Frontenac at al1 was, as with a spoi1Ed 
child, by al1owing him to have all his own way. Refersing to himself, 
in May 1691 he wrote: ".. • souvent i1 faut qu'il ferme les y eux 
pour le bien et la paix qu'il ne conserveroit pas une heure sy il 
. 1 
n'avoit ces dispositions ••• " 
For Frontenac was an extremely vain man, a sup:Deme egotist, 
who could never brook the slightest criticism of' his actions: 
never for a moment could he entertain any doubts that his actions 
or opinions might be unwise or ill f'ounded. He probably had great 
personal charm when he desired to exercise tt, but al1 too often 
this was vitiated by his extreme irascibi1ity; he undoubtedly was 
a very skilled courtier in his relations with his superiors,and 
his dispatches, although always very verbose and self 1audatory, 
are nevertheless exceedingly well written; by ski11ful phrasing 
and the subtle half' truth he could make black appear white when 
' 1 
he so desired. He most certainly had a very strong personali ty, 
but too of'ten his judgement was c1ouded by s·elf interest and 
arrogant conceit. 
The other maJor source of' conf'1ict stemmed from their strobgly 
opposing v1ews on economie and military policies. Champigny a1ways 
contended that New France should be maintained with agriculture 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol XI, Mémoire Instructif' sur le 
Canada. Champigny, Que bec' 12 May 1691• 
and auch industries as fishing and lumbering, rather than the fUr 
trade, for its economie foundation. He, therefore, considered that 
the defenae of the central colony was all important. Frontenac, on 
the other hand, regarded the St. Lawrence valfey oolony as little 
more than an entrep?t for the western fur trade. Thus he vas far 
more eoncerned with ma1nta1n1ng the western posta, not as a means 
for the defense of the central colony but for their intrinsic 
1 
value as fur trading cent ers. 
Their overlapping spheres of authority also served to exacer-
bate these conflicts; there was no clear eut division of powers, 
and points at issue constantly had to be referred to the court for 
settlement. Frequently the m1nister'a decisions in auch matters 
settled nothing. However, in every difference of opinion it was 
decreed that the governor's will vas to prevail; all that the 
intendant could do, even though he bad clear proof that the governor 
was controverting the King's edicta and the good of tke service, or 
encroaching on the intendant's tunotions, was to point out this 
fact to the governor, explain the King's orders governing the case 
and then allow him to proceed without taking any further action 
2 
apart from rendering an aocount of the matter to the King. 
Galling as this was for Champigny there vas nothing he could do 
but submit; on a few occasions when he could stomache no more he 
rebelled and fought back. In every auch case, even though severely 
censured by the m1nister for his temerity, his actions vere sustainEd 
and Frontenac told to mend his ways. However, despite all the 
1. Vide infra, chapter V, for a detailed account of this knotty 
problem. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Instructions que le Roy veut 
astre remise ez mains du Sr de Champigny ••• Versailles, 
31 May 1686. 
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wrangling, the administration of the colony was hever hamstrung 
as it bad been during Duchesneau's intendancy. This was in a large 
-
measure owing to Champigny's more pliable temperament; he gave way 
to Frontenac over certain issues, albeit complaining bitterly all 
~ 
the while,. whereas Duchesneau would have fought to the last ditch. 
In other words, Champigny obeyed his official instructions. 
When Frontenac lan<led at Que bec he immediat ely gave orders · to 
have a number·or boats caUlked; he then obliged the leading citizens 
of the town and a large detachment or habitants to accompany him 
as his personal'escort to Montreal where Denonville and Champigny 
were working desperately to strengthen the defenses of the upper 
, colony. The state of affaire which Frontenac found at Montreal was 
far from reassuring. The people still had not reoovered from their 
terror. Iroquois parties were roaming in the vicinity creating 
constant fresh alarme; the troops as a result vere almost worn out. 
But what disturbed Frontenac most was his learning that Denonville 
had sent orders to Vallrenne, bàe commandant at Oataracoui, to 
destroy this fort and return to Montreal with the garrison and as 
much of the post's supplies as he could transport. From Frontenac's 
letter to the minister it is plain that he vas far more conéerned 
over the abandonment of this post than he was over the destruction 
.1 
and havoc around Montreal. 
He immediately gave orders for a detachment of three hundred men 
with eight months' supplies to set ott tor Oataracoui in the hopes 
that they mignt reach it before Denonville 1s order could be carried 
out. Champigny protested vigorously against this action, wh1ch to 
him appeared the height of folly owing to the lateness of the seaso~ 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 15 November 1689. 
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the certainty tbat the fort would have been destroyed before the 
convoy could reach it and the utter uselessness of the fort in time 
ot war owing to the extrema coat and difficulty of supplying and 
1 
maintaining its garrison. But Frontenac persisted and despite the 
reluctance of the habitants which he attributed to "···le peu de 
~ 
discipline qu'on l laissé glisser parmi les habitans ••• " the 
• 
convoy depart ad on November 6. Betore they had gone two leagues 
they met the garrison of the fort who reported that they had des-
troyed it. There vas nothing tor the reinforcements to do but 
return to Montreal. 
Frontenac vas furious at this and Champignr was rather upset too 
when he learned that part of the expedition's supplies had been 
returned to the King's store in a sodden and semi-ruined condition, 
3 
the damage being estimated at over five hundred pistolles. Frontenac 
claimed that arma, supplies and munitions to the value of twenty 
4 
thousand écus had been abandoned in the tort • This figure must be 
accepted with some reserve since Frontenac, throughout his dispatch, 
was trying to discredit Denonville and Champigny in every way poss-
ible. By the same tOken Champigny' s figures for the coat ot Fron-
tenac's escort to Montreal, which he set at over one thousand écus, 
and the value or the goods damaged in transit back to the K1ng's 
stores, must be regarded sceptically: in addition, auch contretemps 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif sur le 
Canada. Champignr, Que bec, 12 May 1691. 
2. Can. Arch. AC • Series CllA, vol. x:,:.~· Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 15 November 1689. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif sur le 
Canada. Champigny, Quebec, 12 May 1691: The P3stolle vas worth 
11 livres 12 sols; the écu d'or 6 livres; the 'cu blanc ancien 
3 livres 2 sols. 
4. Can. Arch .AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 15 November 1689. • 
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as this provided an excellent opportunity for laàe storekeeper to 
write off anyt;b.1ng that had been m.1ssing or damaged over a lengtby 
period but for which he had no valid means of aocounting. 
For the next seven years the question of the restoration or 
abandoriment of Cataraooui was to be a maJor source of friction 
between Frontenac and Champigny. The vaiue of the fort in times of 
peaoe, or at a later date, is not in issue here; it must be consid-
ered purely in terms of the military situation during the period 
under study. Champigny's opposttion to the fort predates Frontenac's 
arrival on the scene, indeed it appears likely that it was he who 
persuaded Denonville to abandon it in the first place. In 1686 
Denonville, altbough adm1tting that the coat of the fort with a 
garrison of only fifty men was disgraceful, maintained that it, 
along with a fort at Niagara, would make the French Masters of the 
lake, hold the Iroquois in hheck and be of great advantage for trade 
1 
with the Illinois and Ottawa tribes. He even advooated a whole 
chain of posta through the west country; the King approved of this 
policy in pr1nciple but stated tha~ the expense, particularly in 
view of the Iroquois threat, would be prohibitive and Den~nville 
was to restrict himself to building one auch fort a year, the coat 
2 
of the se ~o be kept down to the bare mi.n1mum. The King also expres~r 
z•: ,. 
ed himself as astounded àt the ignorance of those who had chosen the 
aiDe of the fort at Cataracoui·"··· puisqu'ils pouvoient en se 
· retirant de quelques toises occuper tout l'espace qui est entre les 
deux parties du lac, faire passer devant eux une branche •e ce lac 
1. Can • .Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, Quebec, 8 November 1686. 
2 • Can • .Arch. Affaires Et.rangères. Mémoires et Documenta, vol. V, 
Part 3. Réponses aux lettres de Canada, 30 March 1687. 
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1 
et empescher qÙOn ne peut les attaquer par la derriere ••• " 
However, events rap1dly forced Denonville to change his views. 
In 1687 the Iroquois ambushed a. convoy en route to Cataracoui and 
Wt.t"C.. (~'t 2 
supplies worth two thousand French écus. Such things as this were 
A 
bound to weigh heavily with an intendant, responsibie as he was tor 
every livre the King spent on the Colony. Champigny pointed out to 
the Minister the great expense necessitated by these up country 
posta, each hundred weignt of goods costing the King eleven livres 
3 
for transport to Cataracoui. 
By August of the follow1ng year Champigny was more convinced 
than ever that the forts at Cataracoui and Niagara were not worth 
the cost of ma1ntaining them. In this he was greatly influenced by 
the fact that one hundred and -eighty men had died of disease at 
these two forts within the year .. Thus he wrote: 
J;l a fallu ce mois de juillet onze cent 
hommes cent huit batteaux et plus de 
cinquante canots pour porter des vivres 
à Cataracoui pour taire subsister 60 
hommes durant un an, ce convoy esto1t 
compoeé'de eoo:-eoldats et le reste 
d'habitans et sauvages qu'il a fallu 
equiper comme sy ile alloient en guerre, 
sy la guerre continue ce poste sera difficile 
à soutenir. Les avantages qu'on peut tirer 
regardent plustost la traite que tous autre 
chose. 
4 
Denonville, by this time, had arrived at a sim1lar conclusion. 
1. can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Mémoire du Roy au Sieur 
de Denonville, Versailles, 31 May 1686. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA., vol. IX, Champigny au M1nistre, Que bec, 5 November 1687 ~ · 
3. ibid; N .Y .c .D. vol. IX, p 289, Denonville to Seignelay, Quebec, 8 May 1686. 
4. can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal, 8 August 1688. 
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The Iroquois had kept the Ni$gara garrison virtual prisoners; they 
had not dared to venture out to out wood to build themselves decent 
living quartera or to fish and hunt. and as a result, ~eir constant 
diet of salt meat had brought on sourvy. Denonville agreed with 
Champigny that this fort oost far too muoh to supply and required 
far too many men for convoya • He feared that he m1ght have to 
abandon Cataraooui for the same reason. Thus he vas driven to con-
elude that his earlier polioy of maintaining up country posta vas 
impraotical sinoe they drained off too many men at too graat a oost 
1 
and left the oolony open to attack. 
The following year Champigny again complained of the high coat 
of maintaining Cataracoui; des pi te the large convoy :>sent the previous 
' 
year he had bad to send three since, and at great expense sinoe he 
2 
had bad to employ IndiallS who coat more than did the French. He 
was strictly forbidden to make use of corvées for the revictualling 
of this post, the King having stated that he would rather it oost 
him a bit more tban to "···fatiguer et de degouster les habitans 
3 
en les eslqignant de leur trava11 et·de leur commerce." 
Thus the reasons vhy Champigny was so opposed to Frontenao's 
reestablishing the fort e;re seen to be ·based on his conviction that 
its military usefulness by no means Justified the great coat in 
manpower and supplies it required. However, when Frontenac refused 
to listen to any auch arguments Champigny attacked the strategie 
va~ue of the fort. Frontenac claimed that this fort alone Preveàted 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Denonville au Ministre, Quebec, 10 August 1688. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
QIJa' a Montreal, 6 JUly 1689. 
3. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Mémoire du Roy au Sr. de 
Denonville, Versailles 31 May 1686. 
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the English getting the western tur trade, that since the Iroquois 
bad demanded its destruction this alone should have caused Denon-
ville to maintain it, and that its destruction would have a very 
bad eftect on the western allies who now had no sate retreat from 
.. 1 
the Iroquois. 
Denonville bad been terribly afraid lest when the Prench moved 
-
out of Ca,taracou1 the EDglish should move in. This is made abundant-
ly clear in his dispatch to Vallerenne, the commandant at the post, 
ordering him to prepare to destroy the fort but to hold off until 
the beginning of November if possible. He hoped that Call1$res 
would arrive back from France with supplies and reintorcements 
before then, w~ch would enable him to send up a convoy to Valle-
renne. He vas very reluctant to des troy the works of the fort, at 
one point having decided to leave untouched the original works built 
by La Salle and to destroy only the new iùsonry walls which he hlm-
self had had built. But he finally decided against this and instruct-
ed Vallerenne accordingly: 
••• comme Je.crains que les Anglais 
n'occupent ce poste, c'est ce qui me 
fait vous mander de ne rien epargner 
si vous le pouvez faire ••• il vaut 
mieux que la maison soit brul~ et toutes 
1es mura111ea renTera6ea, que d'apprendre 
un jour que l'ennemi s'en est empar~ ou 
que l'Anglais sy est posté. 
2 
In the light of all the evidence available to Denonville, was 
there aD:3 sound basie for his fears on this ecore'f We know now that 
the English made no attempt· to occupy the poet, thue the question 
is largely an academie one, but i t still de serves an answer. Denon-
ville had enough vision to see what a terribly dangerous thing the 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. X, Frontenac au Ministre, Quebec, 15 November 1689. 
2. Que. Prov. Arch. Manuscrits Relatifs à l'Histoire de la 
Nouvelle France, 2me serie, vol. V, Denonville l M. de 
Vallerenne, (Montreal) 24 September 1689. 
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possession or this rort by the English vould be ror New France; 
but he does not appear to have undarstood that the English 
· Colonies wanted, in the main, only to be lert alone, and that 
they had no desira to embark on such expansive military adven-
tures vhich would, 1n their eyes, hava benerited only the Albany 
rur traders. His earlier strugglas in the diplomatie rield with 
Dongan, the Governor or New York, and the Albany marchants no 
doubt led him to believe that all the northern colonies vere 
imbued with their aggressive apirit. In this he ·was in error, 
but it was an understandable error. 
The surpris1ng thing is that Frontenac did not avail himselr 
of this argWII.ent, certainly it would have been a far more. convine• 
1ng one than those which he did use. His statement that the 
Iroquois would claim a aoral victory as a result ot the rort's 
destruction vas quite true, but this ot itselt d1d not Justity 
retaining it; and in all fairness, he should have mentioned that 
Denonville had given the order to destroy the rort~ bef ore the 
1 
Iroquois demand had been received. As tor Frontenac's claim 
that the tort vas the only thing that prevented the English 
getting the western tur trade, it has no ~àâ1â in ract; the 
rort had not prevented the Albany merchanta reaching Michili• 
mackinac in 1686 and again in 1687, it was not· on any direct 
route between the EngliSh colonies and the ottawa and Illinois 
tribes, it was in tact, within the territorJ uaed by the Iroquois 
as hunting grounds. For this same reason it was ot little ~ue as 
a refuge to allied Indiana sinoe there were none in the .. vicinitJ. 
Oronsequeatly, it is ditricult to say what the ettectt ot its 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. x, OhamPiSDl au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1689. 
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abandonment must have been on the up country Indiana. The tort 
was of no val.ue to them, and just as good a case ca.n be made out 
that they were iDdifferent to its destruction as tha.t they were 
greatly disturbed by it. There .is little or no evidence on this 
acore one way or the other. 
The fort per se wa.s of no tactical value whatsoever to the 
,. 
colony as events stood in 1689. The Iroquois waged guerilla war-
tare, not siege wartare; and as OhampiSQ1 pointed out: 
••• ce fort à Justement parler est un~ prison 
pour renfermer une garnison qui n'empesche 
p. as les e:nneiD.is d'aller et. venir sy ce n'est 
à la port'e de fuz il • • • .. 
1 
The onlJ value Ilhat it could have lay not in its four walls but 
in its garrison. Had the French been able to mainta.in a garrison 
there o:f' aeveral hundred men they could have used it as a base 
tor raids on the western Iroquois cantons and so kept th~ on 
the defensive, unable to send out large parties aga.inst either 
thé colony proper or the French allies. But this was just: what 
the French could not do, they could spare neither the men necess-
.ary tor such an enterprise nor the supplie~and as Champigny 
persistently pointed put, it required as·large a force to revic-
tual the fort as iD did for a full soale attaok on the enemy 
villages • .All al. ons the route was one series of rapids af'ter 
another where the Iroquois could ambush convots or else wait 
tor auch a convoy to pass, then attack the colony, so stripped 
of' the bulk of its def'enders. 
Lahontan maintained that for these reasons Denonville bad 
done the right thing by destroying the fort; he wrote: 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Memoire Instructif sur 
le Canada. Champigny, Q,uebec, 12 May 1691. 
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Déja il étoit impossible qu'il pOt entre-
tenir plus longtems la Fort.de ~ontenac, 
ota les vivres commenoofent à manquer. Il 
ne pouvoit le sécour1r qu'en exposant bien 
du monde aux passages des.Cataractes, dont je vous ai parlé tant de fois. Il falut 
donc prendre le parti d'en retire~ la gar-
nison, et de faire sauter ce Fort •••• 
1 
Had the tort been on the main route between the tur trading 
areas and the colony then it would have been of eome strategie 
value, but the Indiana and the French alvays used, even in times 
of peace, the Ottawa river route to avoid the miles of rapids on 
the St. Lawrence. Also, it vas far easier to paddle up the slow 
moving ot,tawa and down the Nipissing than to pad.dle in frail bark 
canoes over the open waters of Laltee Ontario, El-ie and Huron 
where a high wind coald malte travel impossible for daye on end. 
As for ite serving as a base for expeditions fDO~ Montreal 
against the western Iroquois, Champigny claimed that it was of 
little value for this purpoee since auch expeditions could carry 
their supplies with them and in any case had to build a log 
etockade on the south shore of the lake, where they left their 
boats and could as easily leave their supplies there for the 
2 
return journey. Oataracoui, beiiag on the north aide of the lake, 
was obviouely useless for this purpose. During both Denonville'a 
and Frontenac's expeditions auch forte at the point of disembarka-
3 
tion vere bu1lt .. 
In the light of the abbve it is difficult to see why Frontemac 
was so desperately anxi oua to maint ain the. tort at all. costa. 
1. LAHONTAN'! Nouveaux Voyâ!es de Mr. le Baron de Lahontan dans 
l'Amerique SePtentrion e, vo1.1, p 194-195. 
2. Can. Arch. AO.Series CllA, •ol. XI, Memoire Instructif sur 
le Canada. Champigny, Que bec, 12 May 1691 • 
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However, it must be remembered that since he claimèd to be La Salle~ 
1 
principal creditor, he bad a sizable financial stake in this post, 
and as Champigny pointed out, its chier value lay in its use as a 
2 
trading base in time of peace. He could perhaps be excused bad he 
been thinking 1n terms of EU»opean warfare, he never having been 
engaged in an Indian war before, but his previous ten years' 
experience 1n Canada should have been sutficient to make him realise 
that this fort was of little use against the Iroquois. For it could 
no more deter that wily foe than a battleship moored in mid-Atlantic 
could have deterred the German submarines during the recent world 
war. It seems very likely that Frontenac's real motives were not 
those of military and political strategy but of personal vanity 
and an understandable reluctance to have a private investment 
reduced to ruina. 
3 
Having failed in his attempt to restore Cataracoui, Frontenac 
next turned his attention to the Iroquois. The policy which he 
adopted in dealing with these powerful and shrewd tribes was one 
ot appeasement. Early in November 1689 he rel-eased three of the 
1. Q,ue. Arch. Rpt. 1928-1929, p 268, Frontenac à M. de Lagny, 
Que bec., 2 November 1695. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series Clll, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 16 November 1689. 
3· Actually, the fort was little damaged when the garrison aban-
doned 1t. Vallerenne taithfully followed his instructions, he 
laid powder charges at hBe base of all the works, lit lengtbJ 
fuses then hurriedly departed with his men. The reason for this 
proceedure beigg that the moment the mines exploded it was 
feared that all the Iroquois in the vivinity would immediately 
rush to the spot and migbt have caught the garrison before they 
could get away. llhen the French party was some distance dawn 
river they heard a loud explosion and presumed that the tort was 
destroyed; but a few months later a party sent by Frontenac 
discovered that only one of the charges had gone off. 
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Iroquois prisoners sent back from the galleys at Denonville's 
1 2 
request, in the hope that through them he could negotiate a peace. 
Champigny was very dubious that this would do any good since, as 
he said, the Iroquois were hardly likely to make peace on terme 
acceptable to the French after their recent victories and with thé 
English inciting them at every opportunity. He was of the opinion 
that the colony must prepare for war and therefore turned his atten-
3 
tion to having new boats built ready for spring. The day after he 
had written this dispatch, as though to confirm his fears, news 
reached Quebec that a few days earlier one hundred and fifty Iroquo~ 
had ravaged Isle Jesus, burning nearly all the houses and killing 
4 
many of the habitants. 
During the winter Frontenac sent three war parties, not against 
the Iroquois, but against the English settlements. The party that 
raided and burned Schenectady round thirty l4:ohawks in the town. In 
accordance with Frontenac's instructions these Iroquois were not 
harmed, instead they were assured that the French had no quarrel 
with them, only with the Dutch and English. As soon as the French 
had started for home these •ohawks rushed to their village, raised 
a war party and set off in pursu1t. They caught up with a group of 
French stragglers almost within sight of Montreal, killing or 
capturing fifteen of them. 
Nor was this all, when ouonabouchie, an Algonquin memèer of the 
1. Que. Arch. Manuscrits Relatifs à l'Histoire de la Nouvelle Franc~ 
2me serie, vol. V, Denonville à M. de Vallerenne, (Montreal) 
24 September 1689. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Serie.s CllA, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
q,uebec, 16 November 1689. 
3· ibid. 
4. Que. Arch. Rpt. 1927-1928, p 23, Frpntenac au Ministre, Quebec, 
17 November 1689. 
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French party, returned up country he informed his own and the other 
up country tribes of this incident; he also informed them that 
Frontenac had told him and his companions that while they were on 
their way back to Michilimackipac they were not to .attack any 
Iroquois they mignt chance Go meet. This created grave doubts in 
their mtnds as to French aincerity and contributed greatlJ to the 
. 1 
ottawa tribeâ entering into peace negotiations with the Iroquois. 
In the apr1ng Frontenac sent a further peace mission to the 
Iroquois, this one composed of an officer, the chevalier d'Bau, 
an interpreter and two Canadian canoemen~ It was this embasay which 
the Baron de Lahontan claimed he was asked to undertake and firmly 
2 
declined; if he wrote the truth, then he showed far greater perspi-
cacity th~n did Frontenac. The chevalier d'Eau and hia partJ were 
welcomed w1th open arma by the Iroquois; they burned his canoemen 
and interpreter to death over a slow fire and turned the chevalier 
3 
over to the English. 
The fact that Frontenac persisted in his efforts to obtain a 
negotiated peace.1n the face of the above incidents and the contin-
ued Iroquois raids on the colony can only be attributed to his 
groas exaggeration ot his personal influence over them and his 
inability to realise that the economie and military position of 
the Iroquois vis l vis the French was totally different in 1689 
from what 1t had been during his firat administration. He had always 
taken a very paternalistic attitude towards all the Indian tribea 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. XI, Monseignat à Mde. de 
Maintenon, (Quebec 1690) 
2. LAHONTAN: Nouveaux Voya,ges de Mr. le Baron de Lahontan dans 
l'Amerigue Septentrionale, vol. I, pp 205-206. 
3. ibid; Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif 
sur le Canada, Champigny, Quebec, 12 May 1691. 
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and he persisted in regarding the Iroquois as little more than 
rebellious children whom· ·he could restore to a sense of their 
filial duty by mingled cajoling and threats. In a dispatch to the 
minister he made his policy towards them quite clear: 
••• je n'ai fait entamer la negotiation de 
paix avec les Iroquois par les soins de ce 
chef que j'ai ramen' de France, en leur 
faisant dire de ~a part que ce n'est point 
à eux qu'on en veut, quelques choses qu'ils 
aient faites parce que l'on les regarde"comme 
des enfants à qui on a retourné l'esprit, mais 
aux Anglais qui en sont la cause et qui les 
ont engagés à sortir de l'obeissance d'un 
père qui les a toujours aimés et qui ne les 
a jamais trompés, que leur chef était en 
pleine liberté de les aller trouver ·quand 
ils voudraient le redemander de·la manière 
dont les enfante doivent parler à un père et 
non pas comme ils avaient fait ci-devant •• ,. 
' 1 
It is patent from the above that Frontenac either did not under-
stand, had forgotten, or chose to overlook the fact that during his 
previous administration the Iroquois had maintained peaceful and 
friendly relations with the French for the very simple reason that 
they had been fighting a life and death struggle with the Andastes, 
a powerful tribe to their south. It was their victory in this war 
that enabled them to attempt to gain by conquest what they had ear-
11er failed to gain by diplomacy, namely, control of the western 
fur trade. Naturally while the Iroquois were engaged in this struggle 
with the Andastes they wanted no trouble from the French on their 
northern flank. There is no valid excuse for Frontenac' s being 
ignorant of these tacts; Calli~res ceràainly understood the situa-
tion with all its implications, he maintined that there was no hope 
ot negoti$ting peace with the Iroquois ao long as they were being 
-1. Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. XI, Frontenac au ~nistre, Quebec, 30 April 1690. 
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activel;y aupported b;y the English colonies with cheap supplies and 
arme; as he aaw i t, the only way to subdue the Iroquois was by 
force, tt on prendra de fausses mesures tant que l'on espera d'y ... 
1 
reussir autrement," he remarked. And this too vas theburden or 
·. 
Champigny'a letters to the court on the aame aubJect, t'or it vas 
obv1ous to them both that the Iroquois interpreted attempts to 
appease them as signa of French weakneas. This merely encouraged 
them to press the war with greater ardour and at the aame time was 
of inestimable value to them in their attempta'to divide the French 
from their Ind1an allies; by craftily informing the up country 
Indiana that Frontenac was making peace · overtures they bred amongst 
the1r ranks suspicion or the French intentions, and this was con-
tirmed b.J the French military inaction. 
During the sumaer ot 1690 Father Carheil, the Jesuit misaionary 
at Mich1liDI&ckinac• sent a ver7 urgent letter to Frontenac, expla1n• 
ingin. atrong terma.the banetul etfecta that this appeaaement 
policy vas having ·on the up country Indiana. He claimed he had 
alwaya toreaeen that hopes or peace vith the Iroquois would result 
1n nothing but disaater tor·the French. Earlier attempta to make 
peace hav1Dg resulted only 1n the devastation ot Lachine, the 
ottawas now had n~ faith in the abil1tr ot the French to humble 
.the common enem;r. Bat, Carheil vent on, when the Ot.tawaa aaw the 
French engag1ng.in turther peace negotiations atter the deteat 
at. Lachine, the7 became convinced that the French vere too weak 
and cowardly to make war; thus they had decided to malte a aeparate 
peace with the Iroquois on the beat terme they could get and aband-
on the French alliance beeauae this waa what the Frènch vere thtm-
1. C,an • .Arch. AC. Series CIU, vol. X, Mémoire du Chevalier de 
Calliltres sur l' estat present de Canada 1 Mgr. le Marquis de 
Seignelay • ( 1689 ) 
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selves doing. 'fh.ey had already sent peace envoya to the Iroquois 
villages, hence, Carheil added " nos affaires en ces quartiers 
(sont) dans la dernière extremité où elles puissent arriver ••• " 
The ottawas, according to Carheil, wer~itterly critical of ~he 
entire French conduct of the war and particularly of Frontenac's 
. . . . 
freeing the Iroquois prisaners when at the aame time the Iroquois 
were barning their French captives. They accused .the French of tryixg 
to divert the enemJ wrath onto them in order to save their own 
skins and make a separate peace. In the face of all this they were 
astounded that at their last meeting with Frontenac at Montreal, 
he had threatened to abandon them when in actual tact he had already 
tacitly and secretly done· so. 
In closing Carheil apol~gised for speaking so frankly but he 
claimed that the situation was so serious he could not do other-
wise: •• ••• ce qui est certain," he went on, "c'est que si l'Iro-
quois n'est arr~té par la grandeur des affaires qu'on lui fera 
làbas de votre côté ••• il ne manquera pas de venir ici se rendre 
1 
mattre de tout •••• " 
The previous April, Frontenac had sent a large detachment of 
one hundred and forty-three men led by the sieur de Louvigny to 
Mivhilimackinac and he later claimed that it· arrived just in 
time to prevent the Ottawas sending their peace envoye to the 
Iroquois. "Ils ·arrivèrent si à propos~ Missilimakinac," Frontenac 
wrote, "que si ils eussent encore tardé huit Jours, les ambassa-
deurs des Outaouacs tussent partis pour aller trouver l'Iroquois, 
1. Que. Arch. Manuscrits Relatifs à l'Histoire de la Nouvelle 
France, 2me s'rie, vol. V, Lettre de Père Carheil à M. le 
Gouverneur Général, Michilimackinac, reçu à Quebec le 17 
Septembre 1690. 
-70-
lui ramenant tous les esclaves prisonniers qu'ils avaient, et 
1 
mettre la dernière main à leur traité et à leur alliance." 
However, a statement or Champigny's contradicts Frontenac's 
cla1m. The intendant had bitterly opposed the sending or auch a laret 
detachment up~untry in the rirst place, claiming that it stripped 
the colony of too many of its beat men at a time when they were 
sorely needed for its defence, and that the whole attair wae 
mainly a fur trading expedition for the benefit of Frontenac's 
2 
favour1tes. Champigny states: 
Le Sr de la durantaye ancien Capitaine de 
Carignan estably en ce pqs depuis long 
temps qui a est~ fait capitaine reformé 
par M le marquis de denonville et qui a 
commandé plusieurs années au fort de m1ch1li-
maquina avec commission du Roy a esté retiré 
de ce poste l'année dernière, sans que j'aye 
pu en penestrer la raison estant très 
honneste homme et de jugement, fort capable 
de menager les esprits des sauvages qu'il 
a sceu nous conserver malgre les dispositions 
ou ils estoient de faire la paix avec l'Iro-
quois sans nostre participation, ce tut luy 
qui les engagea de dessendre en 1690 au 
nombre de quatre a cinq cens en cent canots 
chargés de pelleteries qu'ils traitterent 
avec les franoo1s. Lors que ledit Sr de 
Louvigny ariva \ Michilimaquina pour relever 
le Sr de la durantay e il trouva les affaires 
en cette banne disposition et les sauvages 
prets à dessendre a' Montreal, et au lieu 
de recevoir des temoignages de la satis-
faction que l'on doit avoir de ce qu'il 
avoit sy heureusement negocié 11 recoit 
sa revocation et son rapel. 
3 
1. Que. Arch. Rpt. 1927-1928, pp 36-39, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 November 1690. 
2. vide infra, chapt er V, part 1, pp 146-149. 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series ClU, vol. XI, Champigay au Ministre, 
Que bec, 10 May 1691. 
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How is one to reconcile these contlicting accounts? First, 
Carhet.l states that the relations wi th the ottawas could hardly 
be worse, then Champigny states that Durantaye had the situation 
under control an~ that when Louvigny arrived the ottawas vere about 
to leave for Montreal with their ture. The likeliest explanation 
seems to be that both statements are exaggerations. The ottawas, 
a very era:f'ty tribe, probably were taking no chances and had entered 
into negotiations with the Iroquois in order to play them ott 
against the French. Such a policy would have had two advantages 
for the Ottawas; it would have averted, at least temporarily, an 
assault on them by the Iroquois, and at. the same time would have 
been caleulated to force the French to abandon their appeasement 
policy and take m1litary action against the Iroquois. If this vas 
their aim then it achieved the desired resulta adm1rably. 
When the ottawas came do~n to Montreal in August with their 
furs, they justi:f'ied their negotiations vith the common enemy on 
the grounds that they had had to think of their own saf'ety s1nce the 
French had themselves been trying, albeit vainly, to make peace with 
the Iroquois. Then they demanded 1è know Just what the French po licy 
1 
towards the Iroquois actually was. When thus put to the question 
by the Ottawa spokesmen Frontenac had to disavow his appeasement 
policy; he denied that he had &If1 intention of making a separa te 
peace with the Iroquois and assured the up country tr1bes that the 
French would press the war against the common foe to the uttermost. 
With this assurance, and af'ter being suitably teasted and regaled 
with presents, the allies departed, prom1s1ng Frontenac that tor 
their part they would harass the Iroquois, as he put it," ••• l'hiver 
1. Can. Arch.; AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Monseignat à Mde .. de 
Maintenon, (Quebec) 1690. 
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et le printemps par de continuels partis, comme je les ai exhorté 
1 
et qu'ils me l'ont promis." 
. 
Thus Frontenac's claim that the detachment he had sent to Mich11-
imackinac under Louvigny was solely responsible for preventing the 
defection of the up country tribes is clearly an exaggeration. Any 
danger of' auch a defection was finallJ removed by Frontenac h1mself 
when the Ottawas forced his hand, causing h1m to change his policy 
towards the Iroquois. But Frontenac could hardly be expected to 
admit this to the minister; turthermore, the sending of Louvigny's 
detachment out of the colony at auch a critical time, particularly 
in the light of subsequent events, was quite contrary to crown poliqr 
which was firmly opposed to the dispersion of the colony's tenuous 
2 
strength by western expansion even at the beat of times • Knowing 
full well what Champigny would have to say about all this in his 
dispatches, Frontenac had to justify the sending of this large 
detachment up country somenow, and to claim for it the preservation 
of the alliance with the up country tribes was perhaps as good a 
means as any • 
It must also be borne 1n mind that in this same dispatch Fronten~ 
informed the court of the attack on Quebec by the Massachusetts' 
naval force under the èommand of Phipps. Actually, this assault, in 
direct retaliation for Frontenac's winter raids on Schenectady and 
3 
the eastern border settlements, was only one part of an intended 
two pronged at taek by land and sea on Montreal and Que bec • While the 
1. Que. Arch. Rpt. 1927-1928, pp 39-40, Frontenac au Ministre, Quebec, 12 November 1690. 
2. vide infra, chapter. v,. part~, passim. 
3. PARKMAN,F: Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV, pp 235-236. 
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:t'leet attacked via the st. Lawrence, a :t'oree o:t' three thousand men, 
~ 
Iroquois and Ebglish colonial militia, was to have attacked Montreal 
1 
via the Lake Champlain and Richelieu River route. Had these two 
· expeditions had better leadership, then the colony would have been 
in very dire straits indeed; but tortunately :t'or New France, the 
Montreal expedition got no :t'arther than Lake Champlain be:t'ore it 
-
had to be ab~oned owi:ng to diaun1ty within the ranke or the 
militia and an outbreak ot amall pox that trightened ott the 
2 
Iroquois. Phipp' a :t'orQe d1d manage to lay siege to Quebec but 
tailed ignominiously in its attempt to capture the'town. 
This victor;y undoubtedly improved morale within the colony and 
must have raised French prestige considerably in the eyes ot the 
Indiana, both allied and Iroquois. But it is apparent that New 
France escaped disaster more by good luck than by good management. 
In any event,the siege ot QQebec caused a heavy expenditure or 
munitions and supplies; in addition to which, out of ten or eleven 
supply ships sent out :t'rom New France in 1690 only three reached 
Quebec, and the Iroquois now began harassing the colony more 
:t'iercely thàn ever be:t'ore, making it extremely di:t':t'ieult to sow 
3 
or harvest the crops. 
It 1s hardlY surpr1s1ng, there:t'ore, that the :t'ollowing w1nter 
· and spring proved to be amongat t;ne most exacting in the colony 1 s 
hi st ory • Champigny had managed to save enough pork and tl our :t'rom 
1. ibid, pp 256-257; Que. Arch. Rpt. 1927•1928, p .41,Frontenac 
au M~istre, Quebec, 12 November 1690. 
2. ibid. 
3. Can. Arc.h. AC. Series ClU, vol • XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 llay 1691. 
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the previous year's stock to supply the troops for two months but 
he had very little munitions left, and like everyone elsa in the 
colony he was gravely· afraid that the English would return by both 
1 
land and sea with stronger forces. 
In the middle or May eight hundred Iroquois descended on 
Montreal and encamped at Senneville, then split up into parties ot 
a hundred or so and roamed at will over the island and the vicinity. 
Twenty-five bouses were burned and three people killed at their 
tiret attack • .Another party attacked the Sulpician' s Mountain 
mission taking thirty-five women and ch1ldren prisoners. Only the 
precautions taken by Calliltres prevented much greater losses, he 
having seen to it that the habitants brought their grain, beasts 
and other movables inside the.torts. Other enemy parties spread out 
trom Repentigny to the Richelieu, leavihg death and destruction 
in their wake, wh1lst the troops and militia remained cooped up 
in their forts unable to make any sorties against the enemy owing 
to lack of supplies. The shortage ot munitions was so severe by 
this time that Champigny was reduced to havlng the lead gutters 
2 
of the houses and lead moulding melted down for bullets. In 
desperation, Vaudreuil formed a party of soma hundred and twenty 
men, otf1cers, soldiers and militia. He sent them from door,to 
door in Montreal begging for a few biscuits, a scrap ot meat or 
a:nyth1ng that the people could spare. That night they crossed.the 
river near Repentigny and tell on a party of thirty Oneidas encamped 
in and around an abandoned house. After an all night siege the 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid. 
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Oneidas were elaughtered with the exception of tive wounded prie• 
1 
oners, three of whom were later burned. 
Before this Iroquois armf finally retired from the eolony about 
one hundred French, men, women, and children had been killed or 
-
captured. This was more than were lost at the Lachine massacre, 
and this time the French bad not been t&ken unawares. Champigny 
went up to Montreal to see what could be done. He found the 
habitants above Three River living in the extremes of misery, the 
whole country ravaged and ruined with the exception of the Boucher-
ville area and the districts where there were stockades into which 
the people could retire. But even here the people had been unable 
to tend their fields or their cattle. He was ahaken most or all 
by the large num.ber or men crippled in the tighting, by the malU' 
women so suddenly widowed who were struggling deeperately to tind 
food tor ·their chil4ren. He also round the Mission Indiana in a 
very bad way, they had been unable to hunt owing to Iroquois att• 
acks and·in two years had lost sixty ot their young men in tighting 
tor the French. To Champigny it seemed ot the utmost importancé 
that these Indiana be given a share ot the presents turnished by 
the Kins lest they become completely discouraged and desert to 
2 
the enemy with whom many of them had blood ties. His stressing 
ot this last was probably owing to Frontenac's bitter prejudice 
aga1net the Sault Iroquois whose services to the French he omitted 
no opportunity to belittle since they were under the tutelage 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Relation des actioas 
qu'il a eu cette campagne entre les tranoois et les sauvages 
anglais. M' sieu Benac. 2 September 1691. · 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 November 1691· 
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1 
and protection or his arch foes, the Jesuite. 
After seeing for himself the desperate condition of the colony 
and the dangerously low morale or the people, Champigny sent an 
urgent appeal to the court for aid. In this appeal he stated: 
On se voit donc de quelle consequence il · ·· 
est de ne ~e plus flater de la paix et 
d'envoyer de france sy on veut conserver 
ce pays les secours necessaires d'hommes 
et de munitions pour pouvoir en mesme 
temps garder les trois principaux endroits 
et aller contre 1 1 ennemy quand il fera 
de pareilles desseintes, il est pre-
sentement le maistre de la campagne et 
empesche d'achever les semances, ce qui 
Jette les habitans dans une grande 
consternation. 
2 
If there is a trace or bitterness in Champigny's reference to 
'peace' it is not to be wondered at. He maintained that the only 
way the Iroquois eould be brought to terme was by force, therefore, 
the King would either have to chastise the English colonies by 
sea or be prepared to wage the war in Canada more vigorously than 
ever. Binee they lacked the torees necesaary to embark on a full 
ecale campaign and destrqy all the Iroquois villages at once, 
they could only carry on a policy or "petite guerre" and by 
means or presenta to the up country and Acadia:n Indiana contin-
ually harass the Iroquois and the English settlements around 
Boston as they had done in the past. At the same time the French 
and Mission Indiana would harass the Mohawks and the English 
towards Albany, and also guard the colonf from attack so that 
l 
the fields could be sown and the crops harvested in satety. In 
order to execute all this, Champigny pointed out that it weald 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1691· 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, M'moire IKstructif sur le 
Canada. Champigny, Quebec, lP May 1691. 
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be neceasary for the King to "··· secourir le pays comme il a fait 
les derniers années par des envoya de troupes, d'arsent, vivres et 
munitions. M. l'intendant a envoyé à Mgr le marquis de Seignelay 
-
dea etats de tout ce que l'on a besoin dans lesquels il n'y a mis 
que les choèes absolument necessaires, il est b6en temps que cela 
arrive avec les habits des soldats qui n'en ont pas eu depuis trois 
ans, les magasins sont vuides et la caisse du tresorier est sans 
1 
argent ••• " 
He then stated that the best that they could do tor the security 
ot the habitants and the well being of the colony was to concentrate 
the people in fortified villages for the duration ot the war as they 
2 
had done above Three Rivera, and enclose Quebec and Montreal with 
strong walls. Quebec in particular needed strong masonry fortifica-
tions, a stake stockade being of little value. He suggested that 
this work could be ettected by using the proceeds of twenty-five 
congés granted each year for the ottawa country and a further 
fifteen congés could be granted for trade with the Illinois; by this 
method forty thousand livres a year could be raised and Quebec 
3 
tortified at no coat to the King. 
There was however, one aspect of sending presents and supplies 
to the allied Indiana that Champigny definitely did not like, and 
that was the use of so many men to transport them and the manner in 
which the goods were distributed. In 1691 Frontenac sent one hundred 
and twenty-eight troops and habitants with six otticers to Michili-
l. ibid. 
2. Champigny'& exact phrase is: "Il ne se peut rien de mieux pour 
la sureté-des habitans et pour le bien general du p~ys que de le 
metre en villages comme on a fat au dessus des trois rivieres et 
de faire de gran4s pleines aux environs pour empescher les sur-
prises et les aproches des ennemis ••• (cependant Jls »auront en 
temps de paix habituer sur les habitations) •••• " 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif sur le 
Canada. Champi!IQ' • Quebec, 10 May 1691 • 
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mackinac and another forty men with six officers to Acadia by boat, 
a vo;yage that would keep them away from the coloey for a year. This, 
Champigny maintained, vas ·far too great a reduction of' the effective 
1 
manpower in the colony. The question of' how many men would suf'fice 
to convoy the Indian presents and supplies up country is largely 
one of' degree; certainly a reasonably strong force vas needed to 
guard against Iroquois ambushes, but there was no need for so many 
men to go all the way to Michilimackinac and remain there inde~in­
itely, most of the men could have returned once the convoy was 
saf'ely past the Chaudière falls since Iroquois war parties did not 
usually venture beyond this point. 
In view of' the tact that one hundred and forty-three men had 
gone up country the ;year bef'ore with Louvigny, Champigny did have 
aome grounds for complaint on this score. And as for the six otficers 
sent to Michilimackinac, Champigny was under no delusions as to what 
they would be doing amongst the ottawaa. He pointed out to the 
minister that during Denonville's term as gove~or no officers had 
been sent to this post and that Frontenac's aix appointees were all 
taking as much trade gooda as were the voyageur cons' holders, 
despite the f'act that as otf'icers they vere strictly f'orbidden by 
2 
the King to enCage in t.rad.e whilst on duty up country • The trip to 
Acadia, he went.on, would accomplish nothing that cou1d not have 
been done equally wall by sending a party overland during the winter, 
and this would have taken only three months and coat the King far 3 . 
lees than would a twe1ve manth boat trip. 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Cht~JD.pigny au Ministre, Quebec, 12 October 1691. 
2. Can • .Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XV6, part 1, K4mo1re du Roy aux 
Sieurs Frontenac et Champ1SDY, Au camp devant Mons, 7 April 1691. 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Q,uebec, 12 October 1691. 
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In tact, Champigny had etrons suspicions that this was mere1y 
another of Frontenac 's priva te trading ventures .. The previous May 
Frontenac had suggested to him that they send a ketch to the river 
St. John in Acadia to take the Indiana a supply of s.mmunition and 
marchandise in trade tor their tura. Champigny refused to have 
anything to do with this, he being tully aware that the captain ot 
Frontenac's guards had a trading post at the place where he proposed 
sending the ketch. This was at a time when the colony was so short 
of supplies that the troops and militia at Montreal did not have 
enough to attack the Iroquois 1n their midst. 
In the face of Champigny's vigorous opposition Frontenac was 
constrained to abandon the idea of sending a ketch, contenting 
himself instead with send1ng a bisoazene and two canoes under the 
command ot a son of the oaptain othis guards. Champigny was wi11ing 
to admit the necessity of supplying the Acadian Indiana with munit-
ions and trade goods to keep them in the French a11egiance and 
prevent the enemy from getting their furs, particu1ar1y at this time 
when the Eng1ish had the upper hand in this area. But, he maintained, 
permi te could be given to Canadian marchants to undertake this task, 
that,after a11, being what marchants were for; and moreover, they 
would travel by the rivera without risking a King's ketch on the 
1 
open sea. 
In his prosecution of the war against the Iroquois Frontenac, 
atter the arriva1 of the supp1y ships in 1691, to11owed the petite 
guerre polioy advooated by Champigny. The Iroquois and the up country 
Indiana had written finis to his attempts to negotiate a peace, and 
the Iroquois were pressing their attacks more relent1essly than ever. 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA,vol. XI, Champigny au M+nistre, Quebec, 
10 May 1691; Mémoire Instructif sur le Canada. Champigny, Quebeo 
10 May 1691. 
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With the fear that the English colonials would return in force to 
attack the colony by sea and by land, wbile the French lacked men 
and supplies to repel suoh an assault and at the same time engage in 
a full scala campaign against the Iroquois villages, this peti~e 
. ~ ~,~ 
guerre po licy of Frontenac 's was a very sound one, lies l" 11 as Champigll' 
had pointed out, it was the only possible policy that they could 
pursue under the circumstances. 
In mid-October 1691, Frontenac began organising a force of five 
hundred troops and mission Indiana for an attack on the Mohawks but 
Champigny was rather dubious as to its chances of success, fearing 
1 
that i t had been left till too la te in the season. By the middle of 
2 
Bovember the expedition was abandoned owing to bad weather. 
Througb.out 1692 the only military activity in the oolony consisted 
of small war parties sent out to harass the Iroquois. Three times 
raiding ~~ois bands were severely mauled when they ventured within 
striking distance of Montreal; this enabled the colony to sow and 
3 
reap its crops in peace. Meanwbile, Louvigny at Michilimaokinac 
reported that the up country tribes had been oarrying the war to 
the enemy, up to eight hun.d.red of these Indiana being out on raids 
at one time; this had resulted in torty-two scalps and prisoners 
4 
being brought in. The enemy casua.lties in all a.rea.s totaled one 
hundred and two killed and torty·-rour ca.ptured, not to mention the 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 12 October 1691.' 
2. Can. A:rch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Qu.ebeo, 12 November 1691. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII, part 1, Frontenac au 
Ministre, 4uebeo, 15 September 1692. 
4. Can. Arch. AC • Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebeo, 5 October 1692. 
English scalps and prisoners brought in by the Abenakis, Canibas 
1 
and Montreal raiding parties. Thus the tide of war was changing 
slightly in tavour ot the French. 
However, there were some people in the colony, Frontenac stated, 
who wanted to see a major expedition launched against the Iroquois 
villages, but he was opposed to this as being too risky until troops 
2 
and supplies arrived from France. Despite this conservative view 
he determined a short t.ime later, to make a full ecale assault 
on the MOhawks. It was decided to make the attack in the depth 
ot winter because the Iroquois themselves only made war when the 
trees were in full leat, thus it was hoped to catch them ott guard. 
As soon as the winter·set in plans were made; Champigny gave 
his orders in good time and by the beginning of January all the 
necessary supplies ot food, munitions, snowshoes; toboggans and 
other equipment were ready. There were some six hundred and 
twenty•tive men in the part.7, all picked men, consisting of one 
hundred soldiers, two hundred Indiana and the rest Canadians, vith 
twent7-three otticers, theotficers comma.nding being all Canadians. 
Frontenac ordered that. no quarter, vas to be shown the Mohawk 
men but that the women and children were. to be brought back to 
Montreal. This raid, in conception, was both dar1ng and sound; 
that its resulta were not commensurate with the tactical skill 
•r its planning·and execut-on was no t'ault ot Frontenac, Callières 
or Champigny. OWing to the m1stortunes of war, the recalcitranee 
ot the Indian allies and a sudden thaw that spoiled food supplies 
eached tor the return journey, what looked in its initial stages 
l. ~· 
2 • Oan. Arch. Series O;l.lA, vol. XII part 1, Frontenac au Ministre • Quebec , 15 September 1692. 
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like being a permanently crushing blow to the Mohawk strength, 
almost resulted in complete disaster for the French forces. As 
it was they were very lucky that any at all got back to Montreal. 
On the long' march home they vent for four or five days without 
food, nearly one hundred and tventy dropped in their tracks from 
fatigue. Two or three did die of hunger before the supplies 
reached them which Calli\res rushed to the expedition from Montreal 
upon hearing of· 1ts pl1ght. Many ot them abandoned their arma, 
they nearly all arrived baok without blankets and only half olad, 
bei:ag barely able to walk. "Jamais misère ne fut pareille, n 
vrote Champigny. 
As one writer , probably Callières, put it, the expedition had 
a happy and glorious beginning and its ending would have been 
equally so had it not been tor ·the Mission Indiana' pity for 
their prisoners and their stubbornnes in insisting on building 
stockades and awaiting the enemy, this gave the Iroquois time to 
bring up re1nforcements, including a great many Engliah and 
Dutch. But this writer claimed that the raid would not be with-
out soma good resulta, three Mohawk villages bad been destroyed, 
and also: 
Ce coup n'a pourtant pas laies' de jeter 
les nations Iroquoises et les Flamands 
dans une consternation g4nérale, chaque 
vill~e craignant pr4sentement pour soi 
le m3me désastre qu'il est arrivé aux Agniers. 
1 
Frontenac, in his dispatches, briefly mentions this expedit-
1. ~ua. Arch. Manuscrits relatifs l l'histoire de la Nouvelle 
France. 1re serie, vol. V, Relation de ce qui s'est passé en 
Canada depuis le mois de S.eptembre 1692 jusqu'au départ des 
Vaisseaux en 16931 ibid. Relation de ce qui s'est passé en 
Canada au sqjet de la Guerre contre les Anglais et Iroquois 
depuis le mois de Novembre 1692, Champigny, Quebec, 17 August 
1693· 
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ion, "fort extraordinaire et tr~s glorieuse," but by· om1 tting 
certain salient facts he puts a very different complexion on 
the whole affair. He states that his expedition had burned and 
sacked three Mohawk villages and taken four hundred Mohawk 
prisoners. He falls to add that all these prisoners escaped 
1 
during the retreat to Montreal. 
During that same vinter and spring the fortifications at 
Quebec vere g1'eatly strengthened in order to repel a threatened 
siege by tan thousand men from Dle;land and Boston. J. strongpoint 
vas constructed on Cape Diamond, a cavalier raised nearby to 
protect the flank, and remparts with gun emplacements built along 
the landward aide of the town with two masonry gateways. The 
defenses of Montreal, Tbree Rivera, Chambly and Sorel vere also 
strengthened. Frontenac and Champigny explained to the· m1n1ster: 
Ces ouvrages ont est' faits avec toute 
la diligence possible dans la pens'e o~ 
nous estions que lee ennemie partiraient 
de Boston le lle de may comme nous en 
avions eu avis. 
2 
J.ll this had oost over.seventy thoueand. livres, monay spent 
with.out authorization .from the minieter; they juetitied this 
great expenditure by stating that the work had had to be dona 
immediately, therefore they had preferred to do it without 
permission rather than wait another year and risk the losa of 
3 
His Majeety's possessions. 
1. Que. Arch. Rpt" 19a:T- 1928 .p 159. Frontenac au lVIlllistre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1693· 
2. QUe. Arch. Rpt. 1927-1928, p 167. Frontenac e~ Champigny au · 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693· 
3· ibid. p 168. 
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Later in the year disturbing reports began to filter dawn to 
Quebec from Michilimackinac that the ottawas were again entering 
into negotiations with the Iroquois. Calli,res hoped that any 
auch moves would be nipped in the .. bud when news of the French 
1 
attack on the Mohawks was received up country. From Acadia the 
. 
news was equally disturb1ng, the Indiana there being reported to 
2 
have begun negotiating a truce .with the Eaglish. This last was 
later contirmed by !berville who sent a dispatoh post haste· from 
the Belle Isle roadstead to report that one Acadian tribe had 
3 
gone over t.o the:;English a11d another was about to follow suit. 
No reasons are given in .s:ny of the dispatches for the threatened 
defection of the ott.awas, but in the case of the A~adian tribes 
a mémoire from the King throws a glimmer ot light on the subjeot.; 
Louis XIV claimed that: 
Celuy qui a esté charg~ du costé de 
Beaubassin et des Mines, (sic) de la 
distribution des presents, a employé 
pour son commerce et • son profit particu-
lier, la poudre qui Y' a esté envoyée. Il. 
faut que les estats de la distribution en 
détail des effets destinez aux Sauvages 
pour la guerre, soient certiffiez par les 
eccléa1ast1ques quand 11 1 en a sur les 
11eux et par les principaux, et non suspects 
de collusion. 
4 
This could only refer to the expedition of the Sieur de 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2. Callières au 
Ministre, Montreal., 30 September 1693· 
2. Can • .Arch • .AC. Series Cl.lA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Q.uebec, :4 Bovember 1693 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Lettre du Sieur 
d' Ibervill.e, Rade de Bell.e Isle, 16 December 1693· 
4 • Que • Arch. Rpt • 1927 •1928, p 14 3 • Mémoire <lu Roy au Frontenac 
et Champigny. (1693). 
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Beaubassin, the captain or Frontenac's guards, sent by Frontenac 
1 
to Aca.dia in 1691. Champigny ha.d complained vigorously at the time 
that: 
••• M. de Frontenac en ces occasions 
d'envoyer des presens aux sauvages, se 
contente d'en taire la demande à x. 
l'Intendant et des choses necessaires 
pour les porter, sans prendre des mesures 
avec luy pour veiller a ce que lesd. 
presens soient donner sans difficulté, de 
quoy l'Intendant n'est nullement intormé, 
et comme les dits presens se donnent de la 
main à la main celuy qui en est porteur de 
la part de M. de Frontenac est le maistre 
d'en user comme il luy plaist et des pelle-
teries que les sauvages peuvent donner. 
reciproquement: il seroit necessaire qu'on 
rend,it compte. a 1.1-intendant de la distribu-
tion g,ui -en eat.t!Lite en luy raportant le 
certificat du.misa1onaire ou de quelque 
autre persœme d 1.equité .proposée pour y 
eatre presente et que ceux qui se donnent 
dans les lieux ou sont les gouverneur et 
intendant tussent delivrez en leur presence 
pour empesCher qu'il n'en soit rien detourné, 
il seroit aussy \~propos de ne pas recevoir 
de prix des sauvages par ce qu'ils croyant 
les franoois interessez, et cela leur donne 
du mepris pour eux • 
2 
It would appear from the Klng'a mémoire tbat Champigny's suspicions 
• 
had not been ill founded. 
In view or the general deterioration or French relations w1th 
the Indiana, Champigny stated that 1t was most important that new 
campaigns be undertaken the tolllowing year against the en~ and 
he also requested that the annual grant of twenty-rour thousand 
3 
livres for Indian presents be cont1nued. Howe~er, despite the 
1. Vide supra, PP 78-79. 
2. Can • .Arch • .AC. Series C1l.A, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif sur 
le Canada. Champigny, Quebec, 10 May· 1691. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series C1U, vol. XII, part 2, Ch&mpigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693· 
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tact that they had received over four hundred recruits tor the 
1 
troupes de la marine in 1693, Frontenac refused to take the 
offensive. The reason tor this inaction was that the Iroquois, 
knowing that the French had received reintorcements and that they 
themselves cou1d expect no aid from the English colonies, had 
sent a peace embassy 'to Frontenac. 
Champigny was very dubious as to the honesty of the~r motives 
but Frontenac was quite sure that they were sincere. Ii October he 
reported that on1y a few recalcitrants amongst the Ononlagas 
remained to be won over before a general peace could be reached; he 
had hoped to affect this before the last boats sailed but now 
"···il faudra remettre à l'année prochaine parce.que, par les 
parOles que leurs derniers députez m'ont apportées depuis trois 
Jours et que J'awois estimé estre absolument décisive, Je vois bien 
-
qu'il reste encore quelque partage dans l'esprit de certaines 
particuliers d'Onontagué, amorcez par les presents et les promesses 
2 
des .Anglois, qu'il faut encore lever, ce qui se fera dans peu .n 
By this time neither the minister nor the King shared either 
Frontenac's optim1sm or his views on military policy. In AiJ:'1l 1695 
the m1nister informed Frontenac that in his opinion the Iroquois 
peace overtures were merely a means to gain a breathing spell in 
order to hunt, obtain tura for trade and to build up their strength 
for fresh onslaughts. This, he maintained, was confirmed by their 
peace negotiations with the Ottawas. In other words, the Iroquois 
had craftily begun to split the forces ranged against them; by 
their negotiations with the French they had been able to sow suspic-
ion in the minda of the western Indiana once more that the French 
were betr&Ying them, and the lack of French military activity had 
1. Que· Arch. Rpt • 1927-1928, p 158 Frontenac au Ministre, Quebec, 25 October 1693. ' 
2. B .R .H. vol. XXXIV, 1928, p 761, Frontenac l M. de Villermont, 
Quebec, 30 October 1694. 
-~-----
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confirmed these fears. Frontenac was told in no uncertain terme 
that he had to es.rry the war to the Iroquois either by a ~ull 
ecale campaign or by smaller war parties and so encourage the 
French allies to continue the war, and since, tor quite a while 
he had been discussing plans for the reestablishment of Fort 
Frontenac he was told that this was no time to be thlnking of 
-
auch undertakings as it would necessitate too great a diversion 
1 
ot his torees. 
The King, in his dispatch, was even more outspoken in his 
criticism or Frontenae's policies: 
- -
••• sa Majesté a esté étonné par (lesd.dépesches) 
de l'année dernière et par les relations 
qui en ont esté envoyez, qu'elle s'est 
passée jusqu'au depart des vaisseaux en 
de vaines negotiations avec les Iroquois 
pendant mesme que ceux cy agissoient pour 
débaucher les sauvages alliée de son service, 
Elle est persuadé que ledit Sr. de Frontenac 
qu1.a connu leur mauvaise toy aura repris 
les premiers erremens des desseins qu'il 
avoit fournie, et Elle espere tousjours 
qu'en leur continuant la guerre, ils 
seront reduits à demander la paix plus 
sincerement qu'ils n'ont fait jusqu'a 
present, à se detacher des anglois qui 
les ont embarqué dans cette guerre. 
2 
Frontenac was also reminded that the King had given it as his 
opinion the previo•s year that the English colonies were not in 
a position to attack Canada and this convinced hlm that the 
Iroquois, knowing the weakness of the English, had opened peace 
talks to pre'Went attacks tlefore they .had had time to prepare 
themselves. He therefore ordered Frontenac to press the war 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII part 2, Ministre à 
Frontenac, Versailles, 16 ,April 1695· 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, ·vol. XVIIpart 2, Memoire du Roy 
au Sieurs Comèe de Frontenac et de Champigny, Versailles, 
14 June 1695· 
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against the Iroqu:O~ s un til they should be w1lling t o sue for' 
peace on French terms. Frontenac had to just1fy the large militar7 
appropriations given him by la.unching a fUll ecale attack, not 
merely remaining on the defensive as in the past; the Indian 
allies, troops:. habitants, all had to be used to bring the war 
l: 
to a successful conclusion. 
Champigny agreed completely with the King's and Pontchartrain'& 
2 
demanda for a more aggressive direction of military affaira; 
but despite the fact that the Iroquois hal disearded their ruse 
of peace negotiations, it having served its purpose, and had sent 
3 
a large war party which ravaged the settlements near Boucherville, 
Frontenac still maintained that the time was not yet ripe for 
a fUll sc ale attaek on the Iroquois villages. He elaimed that he 
. . 
did not have enough troops, this despite the faet that he had 
4 
received an add1tional three hundred troops from France, that 
he was afraid of a maJor attack on the colon, taking place while 
the troops were away, that he.had no entrep~t for supplies, and 
finally, that Denonville's campaign had shown the futil1ty of 
auch enterprises. He maintained 1nstead that the beat means of 
bring1ng the Iroquois to terms was by a vigorous prosecution of 
5 
la petite guerre. Actuall:r, his real reas,on for not wish1ng to 
1. Can. Arch. AN.Series B, vol. XVII part 2, M1nistre à M. de 
Frontenac, Versailles, 16 April 1695· 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal, 11 August 1695; ~· Champign,y au Ministre, Quebec, 
6 ·· N ovember 1695. • · 
3. Oan. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Callières au Ministre, 
Montreal, 't!1 Oct ob er 1695. 
4. Quebec Arch. BPt. 1928-1929, p 302, Mémoire du Roy à Frontenac 
et Champigny, 26 May 1696. 
5. Can, Arch. AO'. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac au Ministre-. 
Quebec, 4 November 1695· 
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invade the Iroquois countey was that he had set his heart on 
l' 
reestablishing Fort Frontenac be:fore he did anything else. 
In the instructions given h1m by the King be:fore leaving :for 
·canada, Frontenac had been given the same power as Denonvil-le had 
2 
had, to abandon or ma1ntain this :fort as he. saw :fit. But in 
1692 the minister had warned him to think twice be:fore doing 
anything in this matter: 
J'ay a adjouster à la permission que Sa 
Majest' vous donne pour le restablisse-
ment du fort de Frontenac, que tous ceux 
qui croyent avoir connoissance du pays, 
ne croyebt pas ce restablissement convenable, 
surtout dans un temps ou a1ant peu de sol-
dats, vous n'en pouvez esloigner du corps 
de la colonie, sans en affaiblir la def':fense. 
Ils disent encore que ce dessein ne pliUVant 
estre executé sans d'extremes despences, on 
n'en tirera aucune utilité considerable, et 
que cela se prouve par l'experience de ce 
qui s'est passé pendant que ce fort a sub-
sisté. C'est pourquoi je.vous prie de ne 
vous point engager a y renvoyer qu'apres 
avoir bien balancé des considerations, et 
vous estre asseuré du auccez sans quoy il 
seroit plus a propos d'y renonwer ou au 
moins de remettre ~autre temps. 
3 
Obviously, the minister was com1ng to share Champigny's views 
in this matter. In reply Frontenac reiterated all his old arguments 
in support of' his tort, plus a :few new ones. This time he claimed 
that anyone who denied its importance did not know what he was 
talking about, vas jealous, and had personal motives of' sp1te. As 
proof' or his assertions he claimed that tor ten years this fort 
1. lbii} can. Arch. Al. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac a M. de 
l',;~· ~ ·~cauebec, 2 November 1695. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XV, Instructions pour le Sieur 
le comte de Frontenac ••• 7 June 1689. 
3 • Can • Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVI parth., Ministre à M. le 
comte de Frontenac, Versailles, April ~692. 
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alone had been responsible tor keeping the peace among the Indiana 
and had enabled the governors to carry the war into the heart or 
1 
the enelDJ country • Since the minister had previously been intormed 
by Callières that it was the Andastes who had kept the Iroquois 
2 
quiet during those ten years, it is not surprising that he showed 
no signa or being persuaded by Frontena.c's arguments. 
However, d~spite the instructions trom the minister and ChampignJ8 
determined protesta, in 1694 Frontenac went ahead with his plans. 
But Just as his expedition was about to leave Montreal an order 
was recei ved trom the King commanding Frontenac to gi ve the Sieur 
.. ' 
d'Iberville over one hundred Canadians tor an attack on Fort Nelson 
3 
on Hudson Bar. This was an order Frontenac dare not disregard and 
it must have galled him greatly since he detested !berville on 
4 
personal grounds. 
The f'ol.J.owing year Frontenac, ref'using t.o let e.IJ1thing stand 
in his way, sent off' an expedition composed of thirty-six officers, 
three hundred soldiers, one hundred and sixty habitants and nearly 
5 
two hundred Indiana to reestablish the fort • Thus i t required 
nearly seven hundred men at a coat of' 16,580 livres 18 sols, plus 
an additional large sum for a second convoy, Just to transport a 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Frontenac au 
Ministre, Quebec, 15 September 1692. 
2. vide supra, PP 67-68. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 5 November 1694. 
4. Ca,n • .Arch. BN. Collection Clail:'ambault, l-8D, vol. DCCCLXXIX, 
fol. 320-338, Frontenac à M. de Lagny, Quebec, 25 Octobel:' 1693. 
5. Can. Arch. AC. Sel:'ies CllA, vol. XIII, Callièl:'es au Ministre, 
Montreal, 27 Octob~r 1695· 
·~·~· 
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l 
year's supplies for a garrison of forty-eight men. The expedition 
-
was only a day's paddle away from Montreal when an urgent dispatch 
was received from the m1nistar telling Frontenac that he was to 
abandon an3 ideas he had of reestablishing the post at this time 
2 
and instead to press the war more vigorously against the Iroquois. 
Some of the Indiana torming the rearguard still remained at Mont-
real but Frontenac retused to send them to recall the expedition. 
He openly admi tted to his tri end M. de Lagey that he had purposely 
3 
disregarded ·the minister• s instructions, and in his letter to the 
m1n1ster wherein he tried to justity his action, atter listing all 
the advantages of the tort for military purposes, he remarked with 
almost·naive trankness: 
J'espere que les avantages qu'on en 
retirera dans les suites me justifieront 
aupres de vous de trop grand attachement 
que J'ay toujours eu a cette pensée ••• 
4 
Champigny was, understandably, Very bitter about this affair 
but there had been nothing that he could do to deter Frontenac, 
as he was caretul to point out to the m1n1ster: 
J'ay cru estre dans l'obligation de luy 
representer les dangereuses suites de ce 
dessein pour l'en detourner, me trouvant 
en cela du sentiment de tous ceux qui ont 
de l'experience dans le service en ce pays, 
mais apres m'avoir dit .que quoy qu-• il tut 
seul de son avis. il estoit dans la reso-
lution de l'executer, je luy ay tait fournir 
toutes les choses necessaires comme vous me 
l'avez cy devant ordonné ••• 
5 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigey au Ministre, 
Montreal, 17 August 1695· 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII part 2, Ministre à M. de 
Frontenac, Versailles, 16 April 1695· 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac à M. de 
Lagny, Quebec, 2 November 1695· 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 4 November 1695" 
5· Can. Arch. AC. Series C11A, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal; 11 August 1695. 
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What disturbed Champigny most vas that the men and supplies 
used tor this expedition could equally vell have been used in 
making an attack in torce on the Iroquois cantons, wh1ch would 
have proved to the allied Indiana that the French vere in earnest 
when they declared that they meant to humble the Iroquois. For 
lack of auch dGtermined action, and upon hearing of the recent 
negotiations of the French with the common enemy, the Hurons and 
Ottawas, as well as the Renards and Mascoutins numbering some 
tvelve bundred varriors who previously had never been anyth1ng 
but friendly to the French, were all negotiating for peace with 
the Iroquois. The situation vas so desperate at M1chilimackinac 
that the commander, La Mgthe Cadillac, who was one of Frontenac's 
protogés, stated definitely that unless the French undertook a• 
full ecale offensive against the Iroquois cantons the western 
1 
allies would be lost, and with them the fur trade. 
In the face of this, not unexpected,ugly situation, Champigny 
did his beàt to bring about a change in military policy: 
C'est ce qui m'engage tous les Jours a 
prier K ~ de Frontenac d'avoir. uniquement 
en veue de faire la guerre tout d'une autre 
manière que par le passé. Un party de trente 
ennemis est venu il y a quatre jours enlever 
huit francois et tuer deux autres a une lieue 
de ••tte ville et ils tenterent en m3me temps 
l'enlevement du fort qui est proche de ce 
lieu la, notre tranquillité au milieu de tout 
cecy me doit taire presumer que les suittes 
en seront fascheuses: J'espere que M. de 
Frontenac prendre de Justes resolutions sur 
le tout, et comme j'en connois l'importance je continuer gy de 1' en pressay. 
2 
1. Can. Arch. ,AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Callières au Ministre, 
~uebec, 20 October 1696; vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal, 17 August 1695· 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal, 17 August 1695· 
When the minister read the dispatches from Canada he wasted no 
time in sending specifie instructions to Frontenac, commanding h1m 
to carry the war to the Iroquois and, the most bitter pill or all, 
ordering that he abandon~e reestablished fort at Cataracoui immed-
iately: " ••• il faut absolument que vous abandonniez ee fort,." he 
wrote, "Ba MaJesté ne vous en laisse la disposition par le memoire 
commun que par honneur, et si vous ae le faii:•es pas. de vous mesme 
vous devez compter d'en recevoir l'ordre positif l'année prochaine." 
And as though to rub salt in these wounds to. his pride, the m1n1ster 
declared that on the King's orders Frontenac was no longer to 
enJoy the prerogative ot appointing or promoting o~ficers in the 
treupes de la marine, the King having decided to malte all auch 
. 1 
appointments personally in tuture. 
The m1nister gave as the reasons tor the King's ordering the 
abandonment of Fort Frontenac: 
••• la depense non seulement de l'exécution 
de ce tort, de sa garnison et·de l'armement, 
mais mesme de celle qu'il taut taire tous 
les ans pour l'avituailler, que, de vous a 
moi, Sa MaJesté ne peut et ne veut supporter; 
pendant qu'on assure que ce tort est hors de 
route des Sauvages d'en hault aux demeures 
des Irocois, ceux qui ne sont pas d'advis 
de conserver ce fort adJoutent encore qu'il 
n'y a pas plus de difficultés en partant de 
Montreal pour aller en droiture aux Irooois 
qui sont au sud, que d'aller à ce fort qUi 
est au Nord, le lac d'Ontario entre eux et 
cela me paroist ainay par les cartes. Ils 
disent encore que les gens que vous auriez 
à envoyer en expédition contre les Irocois 
porteront facilement dans les batteaux et 
les canots leurs besoins pour la campagne· 
et que le lieu d'entrepot qui sera aussi 
celuy de retraite doit astre à l'endroit 
1. Can • .Arch. AN .• Series B, vol. XIX .part 1, Ministre à Frontenac 
Versailles, 26 Mgy 1696. 
du débarquement aux lieux les plus proches 
des ennemis et non de l'autre oosté de la 
rivière. 
l 
A comparison of this statement with Champigny's mémoire on the 
subject shows clearly that the minister was merely quoting the 
2 
intendant' s arguments. However, Champigny does not appea.r to have 
wasted any time in gloating over Frontenac' s discomfiture; instead 
he seem1ngly reversed his views and now gave Frontenac his support 
when the latter deo1ded to disregard the order to abandon this 
much disputed fort. 
This sudden Càange on Champigny'a part was dictated purely by 
the exigenciea of the militar.y situation. He wanted a full scale 
3 
attaok launched against the Iroquois, and obviously the supplies 
already at the fort could be used to good advantage for auch a 
campaign; therefore, in his considered opinion, to have aba.ndoned 
the fort at that juncture after they had gone to all the trouble 
and expense of reestabliahing and stocking it with supplies 
aufficient for nearly two years,would have been akin to throwing 
out the baby wi th the bath water. Thus he agreed to Frontenac' a 
retaining the fort for one year and supported him in this decision 
4 
in their joint dispatch to the minister. Calli\res did not think 
that the reeatablishment of the fort ha.d been justified either, but 
he supported Champigny' s claim that its abandonment would not be 
1. ibid. 
2. vide append.ix B. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigey au Ministre, 
Que bec, 6 November 1695. 
4. Ca.n. Arch. AC • Series CllA, vol. XD, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 26 October 1696. 
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1 
wise under the circumstances. 
Frontenac now had no alternative, in view of the royal command, 
ot the renewed Iroquois attacks on the colony and or the wholesale 
defection of the western allies, but to abandon his peti*e guerre 
policy and undertake a tull scale campaign. Early 1n 1696 prepara-
tions were made to march an army into the western Iroquois cantons. 
Frontenac had tbe good grace to give Champigny his due for the 
manner 1n which the intentant organised the expedition, stating: 
"Il s'appliqua de son coste avec un tres grand soin à preparer 
toutes les choses dont on avoit besoin pour une aussi longue et si 
2 
difficile expedition ••• " On June 14th Frontenac lett Quebec; he 
reached Montreal on the 22nd where he round the necessary boats, 
munitions and supplies all prepared " ••• grace aux soins de M. de 
3 
Champigny ••• " After the expedition had left, Champigny remained 
at Montreal until August 5th, seeing to it that the hay was brought 
in on the surrounding farms and all the other work on the land 
carried out that would ordinarlly have been done by the habitants 
4 
now aw &Y on the campaign. 
As for the campaign itself, it was not as succesful as Frontenac 
had hoped it would be, the villages and food stocks or the Oneidas 
and Onondagas were burned, but as with Denonville's expedition, the 
enemy forces could not be brought to give battle and so destroyed. 
Whether or not Frontenac could have gone on to destroy the Cayuga 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Callières au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1696. 
2. Cao. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Frontenac au Mtnistre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1696. 
3. B .R .H. vol. XXXVII, 1931, p 7l.l, Gazette de France, 5 Jan. 1697. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 18 August 1696 • 
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villàges has been much debated, but this question is little more 
tha.n academie since the damage suf:f"erècl by the Oneidas and Onondagas 
was sufficient to tinally bring all the western Iroquois to terme. 
Thus Che.mpigr.Q''-ls judgement in this matter was vindicated. He 
had hoped tor two things from this expedition; a cessation of the 
attacks on the Montreal area and the prevention of the threatened 
alliance between the French allies and the Iroquois. It is indic-
ative of the extent to which French relations with their allies 
had deteriorated that the latter retused to take any part in the 
campaign. The accusation made by the Ottawas that the French had 
been negotiating for peace with the Iroquois, leaving them to 
fight alone, Frontenac branded as false. In his dispatch to the 
m1nister he tried to explain this awar by stating " ••• qu'ils 
avaient pu facilement voir par toutes les démarches que j'avais 
faites depuis que j'étais de retour en ce PaYS que je n'avais 
. 1 
jamais eu telle pensée." That this is hardly a true statement of 
2 
the tacts is shown by his dispatches ot 1690 and 1694 wherein he 
states that he is hopeful of his peace negotiations with the 
Ir~quois being successtul. It seems to have been psychologically 
impossible for Frontenac ever to admit that his judgement might 
have been at fault, or that he was capable of making a m1stake • 
. 
However, the threatened defection of the up country tribes was 
averted, but it cannot be stated defin1tely that Frontenac's 
campaign was alone responsible for this. Betore the French expedit-
ion had left Montreal a party of Ottawas, who had spent the winter 
hunting in comp&QJ with a large party of Iroquois, treaoherously 
1. Que. Arch. Rpt. 1928-1929, p 309, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebeè, 25 October 1696. 
2. :!!.9:.! supra, pp 67, 86• 
-97-
ambushed their erstwhile compa.nions as soon as they parted to 
return to their respective homes. The ottawas killed fifty-one 
. 1 
of the Iroquois party ·and took thirty-four prisoners. It is just 
possible that this act of treachery was conceived following reports 
of Frontenac' s impending campaign, but i t. is more likely that the 
Ottawas would have carried it out regardless; the temptation to 
score an easy.and sare victory over their ancient foes would likely 
have been too much for this most untrustworthy of tribes to resist 
in any event. 
Be that as it maY, there is no gainsaying that Frontenac's 
camps.ign restored French prestige in the ey es of the up country 
tribes and effectively curbed once and for s.ll, the despers.te 
s.ttempts of the Iroquois to divert the western fUr trade from 
Montreal to Alb&QJ via their cantons. 
As for its ensuring the security of the central colony, in 
this respect Champigny' s hopes were completely justified. The 
western Iroquois now knew that they were bes.ten and nothing 
remained for them but to obtain·the beat peaoe terms they could. 
In 1687 when Denonville had waged a similar campaign they had been 
able to riposte with a savage attaek on the eolony two years later. 
But then the Iroquois had been at the peak of their strength and 
they had received from .Albany considerable aid and oomtort whioh 
had,to a large extent, nullified the effects of the French attack. 
By 1696 their strength was only a shadow of what it had been in 
i687; nine years of var had talten a terrible toll a.mongst their 
elut 
ra.nks. The high_.hopes they had_..of winning over the ottawas and 
1. Que. Arch. Rpt. 1928-l929r p 312, Frontenac et Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebeo, 26 October 1696. 
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Hurons hs.d vanisheQ., and wh11st their own losses could not be 
replaced they saw no diminution in the strength of their main foe 
who received replacements from France. In 1688 the white population 
of New France had been 10,523; in 1695, desp1te heavy losses as a 
. 1 
result of war and disease, this population had increased to 12,786. 
Furthermore, when the Iroquois appealed to .Alban;y for succour 
2 
following Frontenac' ~ampaign, they received none at all. It was 
all too obvious to them that they had nothing to gain by continuing 
hostilities and everything to lose; thus in 1697 the four western 
cantons sent ~eace delegates to Montreal. 
But Frontenac, having been duped once by auch peace overtures, 
regarded this latest move with great suspicion; "··· Je ne croy 
pas m' estre trompé en vous disant qu'ils n'y a pas grande confiance 
. 3 
à prendre en tout ce qu'ils proposent," he wrote to the minister. 
The peace negotiations continued to drag on,while in the forest; 
men still fleshed their weapona; but to all intenta and purposes 
this, the last and the greatest of the Iroquois wars was over. They 
had tinally been humbl.ed. 
Not until. 1701. was the peace consummated at the most impressive 
Indian council New France had ever seen; delegates from every nation 
came down to Montreal tor weeks ot teasting, oratory and shrewd 
bargaining. But Frontenac, who loved the pomp and circumatance ot 
auch occasions more than anything else, was not there. 
1. Oaaada - Bltre&11 et S'tatiaUee, Demegra;p}IJ BraucJa, Ottawa, 1.942. 
Oh:roMlog1cal liat of CaJ'ladiaa Oensaaea. (Daia ia a rertaiea of 
the tip.rea givea in wl. IV ot the 1870-lSn cenaa). · 
2 • DOCUII•t&1'7 B1at.o17 of tàe State et llew York, ••1· I, pp 207-226, 
P&Pera relatiq to the Ceunt de Frontaac' a expedi t1oa asatnat 
the oaoadasas, 1696 • 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Frontenac au Ministre, Quebec, 15 October 1697· 
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In November 1698, Frontenac abruptl7 ceased his quarreling w1th 
the Intendant. Taken suddenl7 111 wh1le seated in an arm chair in 
his bedroom, the old govern.or recognised that this was the end. He 
made his peace w1th Champigny, then asked hlm to see to it that the 
execution. of the provisions of his will should be expedited and his 
servants cared tor in a f1tt1ng manner. He gave Champigt11 a crucifix 
given h1m b7 his s1ster, Madame de Montfort, which he had alwa7s 
treasured. To madame de Champigny he bequeathed a reliquaire conta1n-
l 
1ng.rellcs wh1ch he considered rare and very prec1ous. 
Champigny was deeply affected by the death of Frontenac, despite 
all that had passed between them. This is made most abundantly 
clear in his d1spatch to the m1n1ster, where1n he wro~e: 
••• Mr. le Comte de frontenac mourtlt le 28e du 
mois de novembre dernier, avec les: aent1mens 
d'un •er1table chrest1en; vous aurez peut 
être de la peine a croire, Mgr, que je sois 
&ussy veritablement et aussy sensiblement 
touché que Je le suis de sa mort apres tous 
les demeslez que nous avons eu ensemble, 
cependant 11 n'est rien de plus vray et ou 
en est persuadé, auss7 11 n '7 a Jamais eu 
que les dif'ferens sent1mens.que nous pouvions 
avoir pour le service du Ro7 qui nous ont 
brouillé, car de luy a mo7 comme particulier, 
nous n'en avons Jamais eu, Il en a usé d'une 
manière si hoan~te a mon egard pendant sa 
maladie ... que. je serois tout a rait ingrat, 
si je n'en avoir de la reconnaissance, le 
petit testament qu'il a fait, dont je vous 
envoye~cop1e, en est une marque, ~e fais 
exécuter et je puis vous assurer que j' a7 
un tres grand soin des interets de Madame 
la comtesse de frontenac. 
2 
It 1s almost as thougn he were surpr1sed at the depth ot his 
1. Can • Arch. AB. Series F3, Collection Moreau· de St. Méry, vol. 
VIII Part 1, Testament de M. le comte de Frontenac, Quebec, 
22 November 1698. 
2. Can. Arch• AC. Series Cll.A, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 22 December 1698. 
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own feelings. However, he was no hypocrite; in this same dispatch 
he maltes it plain that the past nine years have lef't their mark. 
Deeply moved as he undoubtedly was by the death of' Frontenac, he 
very definitely did not want to endure again the trouble that he 
had had during this gowernor's per1od of office; thus he asked of' 
the minister: 
• • • la principal le grace que j 'a:y a 
vous demander, Monseigneur, est de nous 
envoyer un gouverneur qui n'ait d'autre 
but que d'executer les ordres du Roy afin 
que je puisse agir avec luy de concert et 
avec la deference que je luy devra,y, mais 
toujours pour e&ecuter vos ordres, car en 
verité Monseigneur, il est rude a un homme 
qui veut bien servir le Roy, de voir le 
contraire, et il me semble qu'un gouver-
neur et un intendant ne devroient Pa~•oir 
d'autres veues pour cet effet; prenez la 
peine de vous faire representer nos instruc-
tions et donnez ordre qu'on les suive, afin r 
que je puisse vous f'aire~connoitre par lâ 
l'attachement que J'aY pour le Roy mon · 
maitre et mon souverain et meriter l'honneur 
de v~tre protection •.• 
. 1 
Clearly expressed here is the credo of' Champigny, an intendant 
whose abiding aim in lif'e was only to execuile}tlle desires of' the 
Xing, as expressed by his minister, and who was alwa:ys sorely 
distressed that other royal of'f'icials sometimes did not seem to 
share this view. 
But now the question must be asked; to what extent did Champigny 
influence militar7 policy in New France? In the f'irst place it 
must be stated that the f'raming of' military policy was theoretically 
not one of' the intendant's duties. During his first three years in 
the colony, Champigny's views were no doubt received with respect 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 22 December 1698. 
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owing to his close friendahip with Denonville; but this ceased 
abruptly with the arrival of Frontenac. 
"Il est important que le gouverneur et l'intendant agissent en 
toutes choses de concert et d'intelligence comme Monsr. de denon-
ville et M. de champigny ont toujours fait ••• il n'en a Pas esté 
de mesme depuis le changement de gouverneur, M. de frontenac a 
1 
voulu tout faire Par lui seul, n wrote Champigny in 1691. When 
Frontenac refused to allow Champigny any say in mil1tary policy, 
he at the same t1me depr1ved hlm of all respons1bility in these 
matters and thereby gave the intendant a free reiJ:i to crit,ic1ze. 
And cr1t1c1ze Champigny eertainly did. Thus, in some respects the 
intendant was ak1n to a man watching a chess game; auch an onlooker 
can always see aeveral elever moves that have escaped the notice 
of the actual players. 
However, in the main Champ1gDJ's m1litary judgement was sound; 
on those questions where he disagreed with Frontenac, his views 
were later proven to have been correct. His v1ews on Fort Frontenac 
were certainly sound; his disagreement with Frontenac's peace 
negotiations with the Iroquois 1n 1690, and again in 1694, was amply 
Justified by subsequent events, and his demand for a more aggressive 
m111tary policy in 1695 was proven correct, despite Frontenac's 
m1sg1vings, byfthe success of the campaign the follow1ng year .. 
In this latter case the query might well be raieed as to 
whether this campaign would have had the same success 1n 1695 as 
it had in 1696. The answer to this question lies in the histor1cal 
"no man's land" of "1fu. But the Iroquois were no stronger 1n 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif sur le 
Canada, Champigny, Quebec, 12 May 1691. 
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1694 or 1695 tha.n they were .in 1696, in tact they made good use 
ot the respite to recuperate their strength, and also, an earlier 
campaign would very likel.y have enlisted the support of the up 
country tribes. Nor were the French forces a.rrr stronger in 1696 
than they had been the previous year, for by 1695 they had received 
all the troops from France that they we:re going to receive. Thus 
on the face of it, Ohampi8Jl1 1 s judgement would seem to have been 
correct in November 1695 when he stated, " ••• noua (devons) ••• 
prendre la resolution de ne plus songer qu'a leur destruction en 
allant chez eux a force ouverte • • • on aurait porté un grand coup 
sur eux, si au lieu de retablir le fort de CataracoUJ, on- avait 
esté d·ans leur PaJ'S sans que la depense eut esté beaucoup plus 
1 
grande que celle de retablissement •.• " 
However, the very tact that Champigny's views in these matters 
were later proven to be correct, by the same token, shows that he 
had be en unable to influence mili tary policy. But his f'ailure in 
t~s respect is not to bis discredit, for if the minister of 
marine encountered great dif'ficulty in bringing about a change in 
the governor's military policy, what hope was there of the 
intendant's so doing? The only thing that Champigny was able to 
do was to give the miniater the benefit of his opinions on 
Frontenac's conduct of military affaira; the ultimate decision 
on policy then rested with the minister; thus only to the extent 
that Champigrd>' s dispatches intluenced the viewa of the minister 
can he be said to have inf'luenced m111 ta.ry pol1cy 1n a.rrr wa:r. 
Pontchartrain, however, took a long t1me, several yea.rs 1n tact, 
1. Can • .Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champi~ au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 lfovember lé$5. 
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before he began to àct on Champ1gny's counsel, notably 1n for-
b1dd1ng, albeit va1nly, Frontenac to reestabl1sh the fort at 
Cataracou1 and in command1ng hlm to carry the war to the Iroquois 
by ~ major campa1gn. 
It 1s not perhaps the most rewarding experience in the world 
to have come so far only to reach a negative conclusion, but the 
facts must be faced, and these show clearly that the influence of 
ChampisnJ on militar.r policy from 1689 till the close of the 
war was almost negl1gible. 
QHAPTER IV. 
MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INTENDANT. 
Althougn Champigny,as intend&at, had little direct authority or 
responsibility 1n the formulation of military policy, he did have 
a great many duties of a strictly ~ilitary character. In time of 
war this was one of the most important of the intendant's functions, 
he being responsible for paJing, feeding and clothing the troops, 
supplying them with arma and munitions, arranging for their billets 
and, when necessar.r, tor their hospitalization. He also had to 
allocate materials and labour for work on the fortifications as 
well as transport and supplies during military campaigns. Sinee he 
was allotted only a set sum each year tor war and general adminis-
tration, the manner in which he utilized theae funds had no small 
bearing on the conduct of milita.ry operations. 
However, it was the governor who decided how beat to use the 
available men and materiel, as Champigny once reminded the m1nister, 
pointing out that it was "••• M. de Frontenac qui est le maistre de 
faire faire des ouvragea qu'il desire, et après j'ay seulement le 
l 
soin de les faire faire a meilleur compte qu'il est possible." 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 October 1691. 
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In .all auch matters the governor was supposed to conter wi th the 
intendant; once a decision to underta.ke m1litary measures had been 
reached by the governor, the intendant provided or allocated the 
1 
necessar,y supplies and kept the governor informed as to their coat. 
In short, the intendant or New France performed the military 
runctions which 1n the modern Canadian Army would be carried out 
by the Service Corps, Pay Corps, Ordinance Corps and Quartermaster 
General' s Department. He also had certa.in responsibili ti es ak1n to 
those of the presen~ daJ Department ot Veterans' Affaire; he 
. 
settled retired sold1ers on the land, pleaded to the court for 
pensions for d1sabled otficers and their widows or orphans, and on 
occasion he settled the estates and executed the wills of soldiers 
2 
who died while on active duty. He had to look after the prisoners 
of war and at the close of hostilities he arra.nged for their return 
in exchange for French nationale captured by the enemy. Finally, the 
war once officially over, he acted as something akin to a War Assets 
Corporation, disposing of surplus war equipment by sale to private 
persona. 
During Denonville 1 s te~ as governor he and Champigny cooperated 
to the ru11est extent in ~e oonduct or m111tary arfairs. However, 
wh en Frontenac arri ved in the colony he made i t qui te clear from 
the beginning that he intended to make all decisions of a m1li tary 
J 
nature himself, without consulting the views of the intendant. This 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Frontenac et Champig-
ny au Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693. 
2. The troupes de la marine who diei at Niagara and Cataracoui 
between September 1687 and the end of August 1688 had made their." . 
wills request1n.g that their debts be paid and n ••• à faire prier·· 
Pl' • dieu pour eux, J' a,y tait executer cela, ayant fait pa,yer 
leurs debtes et le surplus a est4 donné à l'hopi tat. et aux F..gl.isel .. 
Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Champigny au M1nistrè, 
Montreal, 6 July 1689. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol.~, Mémoire Instructif sur le 
Canàda, Champigny, Quebec, 10 MaY 1691. 
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irked Champigny considerably but there was little that he could do 
about it; teohnically, Frontenac was within his rights, although he 
had been told in his official instructions tha.t he was to work "en 
1 
concert" with the intendant in all things. However, Frontenac resi;,.o' 
tricted Champigny' s:frole in m.ilitary af:f"airs to the point that the 
intendant once accused ~. governor of' treating him "···comme un 
2 
commis de tresorier qui doit rendre compte à son maistre ••• " But 
by so doing Frontenac allowed Champigny far greater scope ~r crit-
icism of military matters; thus Champigny was extremely critical 
of certain abuses during Frontenac' s régime whereas he had pleaded 
extenuated circumstances to excuse these self same abuses during 
3 
Denonville' a rule. 
One of Frontenac's tiret acta upon his arrival in the colony 
was to give orders :f"or the billeting of the troops in their winter 
4 
quartera. Champigny considered that in so doing, Frontenac had 
poached on the intendant's sphere of duties. He maintained that it 
was quite sufficient for the governor to a.llocate the companies to 
their respective quartera and to order the habitants to accept the 
troops billeted on them: it was, he felt, the intendant'a job to 
regulate the manner in which the troops anould be lodged, fed and 
pa,id; this being exactly what Frontenac had ta.ken upon himselt to 
do via his ordonnances. When he informed the minister of this 
l.Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XV, Instructions pour le Sr le 
comte de Frontenac •••• Versailles, 7 June 1689 • 
2. ca.n. Arch. AC. Series· Ol~.A, vol. XII part 2, Frontenac au 
Ministre, Quebec, 25 October 1693. 
3· Vide supra, chapter ·II, pp 44-46. 
4. Que • .Arch. Rpt. 1927-1928, p 21, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 15 November~l689. 
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contret·emps Champigny hastened to add, wi th rather subtle irony, 
that he had no obJection whatsoever to hav1ng his work dona tor 
him by the governor but he did not w1sh the min1ster to think tàat 
he was shirking his duties by shrugging them ott on to Frontenac' s 
1 
shoulders. This incident clearly shows the very tine line tha.t 
divided the respective military spheres of' the governor and 
intendant. 
One of' the maJor problems with which Champigny vas f'aced in 
military matters was the excessively high rate of' wear and tear to 
equipment during campaigns in the· Canadian bush. This vas something 
tha.t the minister, comtorta.bly esconced at Versailles, and perhaps 
thinking in terme of EUropean parade ground soldiering, never 
suf'ticiently appreciated. When the minister criticised Champigny 
severely f'or wha.t he considered to be the intenda.nt's excessive 
demanda on the mili tary funds, Champigny more tha.n once beca.me 
exasperated. In 1693 he informed the minister in no uncertain terme 
and in great detail, of the rea.sons for the high oost of military 
operations in New France, stating that auch expenditures eould not 
be redueed "···que moins de vouloir abandonner absolument le 
2 
colonie et la laisser en proye aux ennemis ••• " It wa.s not the pay 
of the Canad1ans or Indiana going on campaigns wh1ch oost so much, 
s1nee they rarely received any cash, but the food, arme, munitions, 
moccasins, snow-shoes, sleighs, boats, canoes and all the other 
things necessary for long and arduous trips: 
••• voila Mgr ce qu'il faut fournir pour ces 
equipemens en general et ensuite entrer dans 
le particulier pour considerer les besoins 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Que bec, 10 May 1691. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, quebec, 4 November 1693· 
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de Chaque françois et sauvage qui est 
commandé, aux uns Il faut des capots à 
d'autres des couverts chaque un selon sa 
necessité entrant pour cet effet jusque 
dans le moindre detail ce que Je m 1 aplique 
de retrancher et diminuer autant qu'il est 
possible, mais on fait des detachemens de 
sauvages si souvent, qui sont autant 
d 1 equipemena à faire, qu'il est impossible 
parlant de consommations~de ne pas faire 
beaucoup de depence. Il faut aussy faire ~ 
faire une infinité de.cources dans la colonie 
à 1' acadie, à Missilimaquina et autre pa;rs 
d'en haUlt, accueillir les sauvages et les 
bien traitter lors qu'le viennent s'offrir 
pour s.ller en guerre et à leur retour, 
entretenir les canots, batteaux et les 
autres bastiments éonstruits pour la garde 
des Rivières et des passages autour de 
Montreal .ai tout cela et une Infini té 
d'autres depences ••• pouvoieDt se faire 
sans tonds et dans un pa,ys nouveau et a 
moitié ruiné par les guerres, ce seroit une 
secret admirable que je desirerois de tout 
mon coeur avoir trouvé pour le contente-
ment de sa Majesté et vous estre agréable. 
1 
For an intendant to send such a stinging retort to the m1nister 
required not only some degree of moral tortitude but also a deep 
conviction of the justice of his case. Although it is highly doubt-
:f"ul if this parti cul ar di spatch did very much to al ter Pontchartraid.& 
views on colonial expenditure, it certainly shows very clearly the 
• vast ecope of the intendants duties, requiring as they did, not so 
much far reach1ng decisions as meticulous attention to detail. 
The _,stem 1n New France of feeding, clothing, lodging and PaY-
ing the troops was auch as could all too easily, and all too 
frequently did, give rise to grave abuses. It was one of the primary 
duties of the intendant to see to it that these abuses were, so far 
as was in his power, eliminatèd or at least curbed. And to this 
taak Champigny devotèd a good deal of his time and energy; so much 
1. Can. Arch. AC • Series OllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, 4 November 1693· 
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so in tact, ~at at times one would be inclined to accuse him of 
officiousness were it not more likely ~at his running feud with 
Frontenac is at the root of some of his more carping criticism. 
The intendant did not have a large body of officials to assist 
him, as are to be round in modern m11itary organizations; the 
captains of the companies were 1argely responsible for what little 
administrative work there was to do, they received the moneys for 
the PaY and maintenance of their men, and i t was up to their sense 
of duty and their private conscience whether or not the men under 
their command received their due. Obviously auch a system was 
prone to abuses. 
Owing to these abuses and such things as high priees and scarcity 
of supplies, Champigny frequently took matters out of the hands of 
the ca.ptains and looked a.fter them h1mself. He wa.s not exceeding his 
authority by so doing, in many cases he d1d so merely because diffi-
culties a.rose with which the capta.ins could not cope. 
On the whole, the troupes de la marine sent out to New France in 
the seventeenth century were a rather poor lot, lacking training, 
discipline and the stamine. necessary for eampaigning in Canada. One 
explanation ror this wa.s a.dvanced by the abbé Belmont who rema.rked: 
"Il est vr&Y que le Roy a.voit voulu donner un détachement de veilles 
troupes, mais comme elles dépendaient de M. de Louvois, la jalousie 
de M. de leignela7 fit qu'il aimât mieux cette misérable recrue de 
l 
milice ••• " Nor .were the ot"ficers much better, too mal'lY ot them 
being concerned more with diverting the PeY of their men into their 
own pockets than wi th their training or the maintenance of good 
l. BELMONT; ABBE DE: Histoire du Canada, p 20. 
1 
d1 sc ipline . 
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It was the Canadian mi li ti a wh1ch bore the brunt of the tighting 
throughout the war. Frontenac relied mainly on the habitants tor 
the prosecution ot the petite guerre, while the majority ot the 
regular soldiers were used largely tor garrison duty or as a labour 
torce on the land and tor work on the fortifications, or were 
employ ed as artisans in the towns. Thus the rather paradoxical 
situation arose ot the habitants being called out to repulse ene~ 
war Parties, or go on detachments into the enemf country, while the 
regular troops remained at the habitante' tire aides and worked 
their tarms. Needless to se:y the habitants were not at all happy 
about this arrangement. In 1691 Champigny wrote to the minister: 
Il est tres tacheux pour les pauvres 
habitans de ce pays, de se voir continuelle-
ment commander pour la guerre pendant que la 
plus grande partie des soldats ne le sont 
pas, ils n'ont point encore refus' de marcher 
mais ils sont reduits dans un est at sy 
miserable aussy bien que leurs familles 
que je croy qu'il est de consequence de les 
menager d'une autre manière crainte de les 
rebuter et de les jeter dans le desespoir, 
m' e:yant mesme paru dans mon Aernier voyage 
qu'il y en avoi t de très mecontans de ce 
qu'ils es toi ent toujours commandez pendant 
que quantit' de soldats travailleraient. 
2 
It must be noted that Champigny here otfers no solution to the 
problem, but then, this was more the governor' s responsibility 
tha.n the intenda.n~s • 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series Cll.A, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebee, 12 November 1691; vol. XII Part 1, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebee, 10 November 1692; An· Series B, vol. XVII part 1, M'moire 
du Roy aux Srs • Fr on tena.e et· Champigny, ( 1694) ; AC • Seri es CllA, 
vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 24 October 1694; vol. 
XV, Frontenac et Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 19 Octobel' 1697; 
vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 14 October 1698. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series OllA, vol.. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 November 1691· 
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There were some Canad1a.ns recruited into the troupes de la 
marine and Frontenac stated that these men had rendered incompar-
ably greater service ~an had the French soldiers who were, he 
declared, of little use for campaigning in the buSh and for river 
. 1 
travel until they had had several years' experience. In the 
closing years of the war Champigny stated that there were tewer 
than three hundred, or even two hundred, ot the troops fit to 
march on campaigns in the buSh, but when travelling by boat or 
ca.noe some seven hundred could be pressed into service; " .... on 
ne scauroit disconvenir que ce ne soit de tort meChantes troupes 
et que les ha bi tans ne vallent incomparablement mieux pour la 
2 
guerre, plhur les voyages et pour les autres fatigues ••• 11 
As a result of the troupes de la marine being of little use tor 
the petite guerre they were used as a labouD torce and their being 
so employed turther reduced Jùleir m111tary ettectiveness, thus it 
was at one and the same time both cause and affect, a vioious 
circle; and this awkward situation baffled all Champigny' s efforts 
to bring about effective reforme. 
The system of ueing soldiers as labourera was inauguraj,ed by 
Champigrl7 1 s predecessor, de Meulles. In the spring of 1685 this 
intendant had f'ound himself' f'aoed with a very awkward situation: 
he had no f'unds with which to pa,y the troops. However, there was 
a serious shortage ot labour in the colonf during the spring 
sowing owing to sickness and death among the more able bodied 
habitahts who had aecompanied the governor, La Barre, on his 
abortive campaign against the western Iroquois. De Meulles solved 
1. Can. Arch. AO. Series OllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1695· 
2. Can. Arch. AO. Series 011!, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 14 Oetober 1698. 
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bath problems by allowing the soldiers to hire themselvea out to 
the habitants and so be ensured of their keep, and P&Y for their 
labours, until f'unds should arrive from France. The habitants were 
permi tted to hire the soldiers but were forbidden to pa:y them more 
than ten to twelve livres a month; they also had to feed their 
hired help on feast da:ys and SUnda:ys as well as on work1ng da,ys, 
and the sold1ers were forbidden to wear their un1torms whilst so 
1 
employed. 
A tortn1ght lat er de Meulles amended his ordonna.nce to permit 
soldiers who had a tra.de to work by the da;y, and tho se habitants 
who required help only for short periode, to hire sold1ers at a 
daily rate instead of by the month. The soldier tradesmen were to 
be paid not more than fitteen sols per da;y, over and above their 
board, and the habitants were torb1dden to PS:S them any more on 
2 
Pain of a ten livre tine. However, many ot the troops were unable 
to find work owing to old age or other disabilities, and once the 
spring sowing was tinished the habitants had no further need for 
extra. help; consequently, de Meulles had to inaugura te wha.t he 
tondly thought would be the tempora.ry expedient ot card monay in 
3 
order to paJ the men. 
Once inaugurated, this system of hiring out the troops quickly 
led to serious abuses. The soldiers greatly preterred working tor 
l • Pub • Arch. Prov • Que • Ordonnap.c es, Commi sai ons, Edits etc etc 
des Gouverneurs et Intendants! vol. II, pp 96-97, Ordonnance de 
M. de Meulles, Quebec, 28 Apr 1 1685. 
2. Pub. Arch. Prov. Que. Ordonnances! Commissions, Edits etc etc 
des Gouverneurs et Intendants, vo . II, pp 104-105, Ordonnance 
de M. de Meulles, 15 May 1685. 
3. Pub. Arch. Prov. Q,ue. Ordonnances, Commissions, Edits etc etc 
des Gouverneurs et Intendants, vol. II, pp 112-115, Ordonnance 
de M. de Meulles, 8 June 1685. 
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wages on farms or in the towns to serving in their companies; and 
their officers encouraged it since the men were perfectly willing 
to for ego their army pay in ex change for their freedom. Not only 
were they released from the onerous military discipline by so doing, 
but they had a considerable financial incentive as wall since at 
this time the Paf or the non-commissioned ranke was as follows; 
sergeants 17 livres 5 sols per month, corporals 10 livres 1 sol 
1 denier, lance eorporals 7 livres 17 sols 7 deniers, and private 
soldiers 6 livres 9 sols 1 denier, and from the pay of each of 
these ranks a deduction of 3 sols 9 deniers per day or 4 livres 
1 
10 sols per month was made to pay for his rations. Thus, the 
private soldier at the end of each month round himself with exactly 
1 livre 19 sols 1 denier which he could call his own. And at this 
2 
ti me brandy coat over 20 sols the jug •. 
De Meulles had ra.ised the lid on a m1li tary Pandore.' s Box and 
Champigny, despi te his beat efforts, was never able to close i t 
again. Thus in 1691 he complained bitterly to the miniater: 
Il est constant ••• que lors qu'il est 
necessaire de commander les troupes pour 
aller contre l'ennemy, il ne se trouve 
qu'une partie des soldats et les autres 
sont à travailler chez des habitans avec 
permission de leurs capi ta.ines qui ne 
sont pas sy soigneux de les faire trouver 
dans ces occasions que lorsqu'on les passe 
en reveue, le capitaine ne leur donne 
permission de travailler que dans la. veue 
de proffi ter de la paye, et le soldat qui 
gagne 20 a 30 s. par jour avec sa nourriture 
1. vide appendix C. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA., vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Q,uebec, 4 November 1693. 
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se garde bien de se plaindre qu 1 on la 
luy retient. 
l 
The situation was further aggravated by the fact. that the 
of fi cers were rarely to be found wi th their companies, the Canadian 
officers and thoae having wivea in the colony remained continually 
at their homes. Despite the fact that Champigny gave strict orders 
to the sieur de la Touche, his commissaire at Montreal, no~to 
include on the rasters any officers who were absent from their 
companies unless on detachment, the situation did not improve as 
this new order merely resulted in their turning up on muster parades 
2 
to receive their pa,y and then returning to their homes. One officer, 
the sieur de Bubercaze, demanded that the commissaire should give 
a day 1 s notice bef ore calling a must er parade and in this he was 
supported by Frontenac. The sieur de la Touche, who was seemingly 
a very conscientious official, claimed that this delaY was intended 
purely " ••• pour avoir le temps de faire venir les soldats travail-
lanta au profit du Capitaine sans quoy il ne les aeroit pas 
3 
travailler et les auroit toujours prêts à sa garnison." 
One result of these abuses Wes that the few men who did remain 
at their posta had to do all the guards and fatigues for their 
4 
absentee comrades and bec ame complet ely worn out. In 1692 Cham.;. 
pigny again stated that all the companies were alwa,ys up to strength 
when passing in review before himselt or the commissaire but that 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series Cll.A, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 November 1691· 
2. ibid. 
3 • Can. Arch. AC • Series CllA, vol. X.V, Mémoire du Sr . de la Touche, 
(Montreal) 15 October 1697· 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series Cll.A, vol. XII part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebee, 10 November 1692. 
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this was never the case when they were oalled out for a campaign. 
In order to remedy the situation he craf'tily intormed the minister 
that, "Il seroit necessaire l>!gr d 1 en ecrire fortement a Mr le comte 
de frontenac et a moy afin que l'on pust par cette voye faire 
connoiatre les intentions du Roy et y remidier, voila ce que le 
1 
bien du service m'engage a vous mander." 
Strictly speaking, these abuses were a matter of' discipline 
and as auch were not wi thin Champigny' s province, this is evidenced 
by his asking the minister to send the necessary orders for their 
reform, for he laoked the necessary authority. However, the ef'f'ects 
of' these abuses were far reaching and created problems with which, 
as intendant, he had to cope. Finance being his particular province 
he was responsible for paying the troops and for seeing to it that 
the King received full value for his money. He was also f'aced with 
the social and economie ef'fects of the military disorders, for as 
intendant of police he had to maintain good order in the colony. 
But what perhaps distressed Champigny most of' all about this situa-
tion was that he considered the habitants to be the backbone of' 
the colony: when a habitant was killed or crippled it took some 
eighteen years to replace him, whereas the troupes de la marine 
were expendable and could conceivably have been replaced within 
the yeàr by f'resh draf'ts from France. 
Unfortunately for Champigny's peaoe of' mind he received little 
cooperation from the governor in this matter. Frontenac continually 
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maintained that the extent and effects of these abuses were being 
1 
greatly exaggerated and certainly it is not likely, relations 
being what they were between Champigny and Frontenac that the 
former would be given to understatement. However, Frontenac' s 
tolerat1on ft the situation which Champigny so vigorously con-
demned is evidencerlby the reasons which he gave for the troops 
having missed campaigns: 
···$1'1 y a eu des hommes passez presens 
aux reveues qui n'aYant point marché aux 
expeditions cela n'est arrivé que dans 
quelques commandement imprevues, ou il y 
a eu des soldats escartez dans les costes 
qui n'ont pas pu estre avertis ou bien de 
la part des officiers qui leur donnent la 
liberté de travailler chez les habitans 
Ils n'ont pas pu les faire trouvez assez 
tost pour aller dans les occasions, mais 
on ne touche plus dans ces inconvenients 
en ne permettant pas aux soldats de 
s'ecartez ••• 
2 
In other words. Frontenac rather nai v ely advanoed as an excuse 
tor the troops not being used on campaigns, one ot the maJor causes 
of this abuse. He claimed that he was using his authority to check 
3 
this sort of thing whenever necessary but it still conüinu•d right 
on to the end or his tenure of office despite the Xing's threat 
that if the situation did not improve and the officers begin to 
4 
show a grea ter awareness of their duty, he would replace them all. 
Actually, this was a particularly hol1ow threat since a great many 
ot the otficers would have liked nothing better than to be recalled 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series allA, vol. XII part 2, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693; vol. XIII, 
Frontenac et Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 5 November 1694; 
vol. XIII, Frontenac • au Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1695; 
. vol. XV, Frontenac et Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 19 Oct. 1697· 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693· 
3· ibid. 
4. can. Arch. AJI. Seri es B, vol. XVII part 1, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Srs. Frontenac et Champigny, (1694). 
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to France, there being frequent complainte from the King that 
too many officers were being given theiB congé to return to 
l 
liürope. 
What made it so extremely d1fficult to curb these abuses and 
restore good order and discipline amongst both officers and men 
was the system of pgying tne'troops. There was no elaborate 
accounting system, avery so of~en a muster parade was held by the 
intendant or his commissaire, heads were counted and checked against 
the rolls and the captain received an amount sufficient to PaY the 
number of men in h1 s compa:n.y present or accounted for. When i t is 
also taken into account that the officers were anything but over 
paid - in 1700 lieutenants and capitlines reformés received 60 
livres a month, enseignes and lieutenants reformés 40 livres and 
2 
enseignes reformés 30 livres - it is easy to see how great would 
be the temptation to add to their incomes by any aeans possible, 
particularly in view of the high coat of living in Canada. Thus 
when a situation arose whereby the men were quite willing, in 
most cases, to forego their pgy in return for hheir freedom to 
work for wages, only ver,y strict discipline and a h1gh sense of 
duty amongst both off1cers and men could have prevented their 
tak1ng advantage of i t • 
Despite all Champigny's efforts, by 1694 the discipline of the 
troo pa showed no improvement and he informed the m1n1ster: "Nous 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1694; vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 November 1695; Que. Arch. Rpt. 1928-1929, p 263, 
Ministre au comte de Frontenac, Versailles, 22 July 1695· 
2. Can. Arch. AC.Series CllA, vol. XVII, Mémoire sur la réforme 
des Troupes en Canada, 1700. 
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avons un plus grand besoin que jamais d'ordres severes pour la 
l 
discipline des troupes tant pour les officiers que pour les soldats~ 
The abuses were now so fiagre.nt tha.t the bishop, never the most 
circumspect of men, finally stepped in and ordered the clergy to 
refuse absolution to any captain known to be withholding his men's 
PaY. This action did not do a.nyone any good; the King, natura.ll7 
enough, took the attitude that the bishop was trying to usurp the 
civil authority, particularly when an officer as notable as the 
sieur de Vaudreuil was refused absolution by the curé at Ste. 
Anne 1 s, and biShop st. Vallier was politely but firmly informed 
2 
not to meddle in things which did not concern him. 
In discussing this situation in a dispatch to the minister, 
Frontenac admitted the possibilit7 of the bishop' s having grounds 
for claiming that some officers were withholding the PaY of their 
men, but added that he had received no complainte from the troops. 
Actually, Frontenac was doing little more than begging the question 
here, since the troops, even had they so desired, did not dare to 
lodge complainte against their superior officers. But Frontenac 
went on to saY, " ••• nous ne manquons pas de prendre garde a ne pas 
abandonner les soldats à la cupidité des officiers si elle estoit 
excessive et les obliger de le faire en cela la justice qui leur 
3 
est deue." The operative clause here is "si elle estoit excessive"; 
thus, the governor appears to have had no objection to the abuse 
1. Can • .Arch. AC. Seriee CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 24 October 1694. 
2. can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII part l, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Srs. Frontenac et Champigny. (1694) 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac et Champigny 
au 1~nistre, Quebec, 5 November 1694. 
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in pr1nc1ple, merely to its being carried too far. However, some 
of the off1cers were not content w1 th mere1y reta1n1ng their men '.s 
army pgy, they also demanded a share of the wages the sold1ers 
rece1ved from the1r c1v1lian emp1oyers and retused to release them 
\ l 1 
from their mi li tary duties unless they first agreed td·. this· 
ChampisnJ' eventually despaiBed of being able to iQ!prove matters; 
had the soldiers been wil11ng to lodge complainte aga1nst. their 
officers and demand redress of grievances, then the intendant could 
have taken action, but this the men consistently retused to do; 
"quoyque je le demande et que je le fasse demander par le 
Commissaire à la teste des Compagnies lors des reveues, au 
contraire les soldats temoignants tous ~tre contans, je connois 
le mal sans y pouvoir aporter le remede, je sçay m~me de plusieurs 
soldats que quand je leur ferois faire justice, ils rendraient 
leur pgye aussitôt pour n'~tre pas gehennez et avoir la libert~ 
. . 
d'aller travailler, de sorte que le remede ne se peut trouver que 
~ 
dans là parfaite droiture des Capitaines. n 
In this last phrase Champigny put his finger on the crux of 
the whole matter. A complete shakeup of the officers' corps was 
requ1red and the strictest discipline enforced for all ranks; 
but auch things were not wi thin the intendant' s authori ty, only 
the governor could take auch action. Thus, Champigny came up wi th 
the proposition that, under the circumstances, the beat way to 
curb the abuses in the troupes de la marine and at the same time 
convert them into a more effective fighting force, would be to 
permit the men to marryt Binee the majority of them were now 
labourera rather than sold1ers, it would advance the development 
L. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XY .. ~, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 19 October 1697· 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au ~nistre 
Quebec, 14 October 1698. 
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of' agriculture in the colony to permit them to marry and settle 
down on the land of' their own. Those soldiers who had done this 
heretof'ore had eventually become fit enough for active service in 
the Eetite guerre; by adopting this plan, Champigny pointed out, 
the King would gain a usef'ul f'igh.ting man, as i t was usually the 
habi tanta who were called. out for auch ca.mpaigns rather than the 
regula.r troops. Furthermore, the King would make a sizable f'ine.n-
cial saving as he would be spared the expense of' the soldiers' PSJ' 
and upkeep. The only persans who would be opposed to auch a plan, 
Champigny rather cynically suggested, were the of'f'icers who would 
thus be depri ved of' their men 1 s Pe3 which they had come to regard 
1 
as a persona! perquisite of' their office. 
On the face of it, it seems rather paradoxical that these 
troops anould be regarded as of' little military value until they 
lost hheir m1litary statua and were converted into habitants, 
whereupon they beca.me uaef'ul f'ighting materia.l. Although it might 
seem that Champigny had his tongue in his cheek when he proposed 
auch a schema, the tact remains that it had a good deal to 
recommen4 1t, considering all the peculiar exigencies of' the 
Canadian m111tarr situation. 
However, when Callières succeeded to the post of' governor he 
promised that he would make i t one of' his principal tasks to 
restore the troops to a proper footing. As he put it: 
••• en leur faisant faire tout ce qui est 
du devoir de celles qui sont les mieux 
dissiplin~es, et il se propose que Ba 
· Majest~ en sera dans peu de temps pàeine-
ment satisfaite, soit en empechant que les 
Compagnies se repandent en divers lieux, 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 13 October 1697. 
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sans enfexcepter les of'fi.ciers qu'il y 
assujetera comme les soldats, soit Par 
les exerci ses qu' 11 prendra soin de leur 
faire faire souvent, et par l'uniformité 
de leurs habits, et au surplus nous les 
employ erone aux ouvrages que nous trouve-
rons les plus utiles au service du Roy et à 
la Colonie. 
1 
There is some evidence to Show that this was no idle boast, as 
for instance when Louvigny, whom Callières had appointed to command 
at Cataracoui, began engaging in the fur trade • .As soon as Callières 
beard of this he sent a party to the post to arrest Louvigny and 
2 
one ether officer, and bring them back to Quebec to stand trial. 
It is also notable that as soon as Callières took command 1n the 
colony,Champigny's complainte about military abuses cease. This is 
of course, purely negative evidence, and there are two likely 
explanations: Callières ma;y actually have put an end to the dis-
orders, or else with the demise of Frontenac, Champigny may have 
felt no particular urge to complain further about auch th1ngs. 
Another abuse which Champigny tried to curb wa.s that wh1ch is 
nowada.Ys referred to in the vernacula.r as 'padding' thJ,:-r~lls. 
Champigny himself was not above suspicion on this score, the King 
at one point suspect1ng that he was ask1ng for PaY and a.llowances 
fot\nore troops than were actually in the colony. To make qui te 
sure that this was not the case, the King ordered Champigny to 
send detailed statements of the troop musters showing where the 
men were stationed and anY decrease in numbers from one muster 
1 
Parade to the next. It is d1ff1oult to see how this could have 
l.can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 20 October 1699. 
2.B.a.H. 1928, vol. XXXIV, pp 746-749, Callières au Ministre, 
Quebec, 7 Novembel' 1700; Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVIII, 
Callières et Champigny au Ministl'e, Quebec, 18 October 1700. 
3-Can. Arch • .AN· Series B, vol. XVI Pa!'t 1, Mémoire du Roy au 
Srs. Frontenac et Champigny, (April 1692) 
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prevented. the intendant f'alsifying his accounts had he so desired 
but to the bureaucratie mind of Pontchartrain, the m1n1ster of' 
. 
Marine, the only anawer to auch a problem seems to have been to 
swath i t in a few more yards of red tape. 
In 1691 Champigny requested the minister to sand an order 
forbidding the inclusion on the company. rolls of' cadets under 
sixteen years of age who were not actually serving in the compan-
ies, as he was continually being pestered by various interested 
1 2 
parties to do this. The order was promptly forthcoming but 
Frontenac paid only lip service to it, and despite its reiteration 
3 
by the minister in more forcetul terme Frontenac still refused 
to comply, pleading that the number of auch cadets was very small 
and Jùa.at they would aoon hav.e attained the requisite sixteen years 
4 
in any case. 
However, this was a very small affair compared to the trans-
. 
· gressions of the governors of Montreal and Three Rivera who were 
detected submitting muster rolle for complete garrisons without 
so much as a single soldier actually being on duty, valets and 
workmen being listed as auch in their stead. Champigny quickly put 
.. 
a stop to this by ordering the treasurer's office to deduct the 
amount of the missing garrison's Pa1 from the following year's 
5 
salaries of the erring governors. 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 10 May 1691 • 
2. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol.. XII part l, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 15 September 1692. 
3. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII part l, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Srs Frontenac et ChampignJ, (April 1694) 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac .et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 5 November 1694. 
5· can. Aren. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Q.uebec, 24 September 1694. 
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On one occasion Champigny is reputed, perhaps e.POorypha.lly, 
to have perm1tted the inclusion of a dog on a garrison's ration 
strength. This pa.rticular dog was used to carry messages back 
and forth between the forts a.t Champly and PrUrie de la Madeleine 
when the Iroquois wa.r parties made it too dangerous for one of 
the garrison to malte the trip. The sieur de Bergères, commandant 
a.t Chambly and the dog' s owner, a.sked the intendant for permission 
to draw a regular sold1er 's rations for the dog, since the animal 
was doing a soldier' s work. Champigny aclmowledged the justice or 
this claim ùd the dog was duly li sted on the company rolle und er 
the name of Monsieur dit Niagara. What Champigny perhaps did not 
lmow was that for several years after the death or Monsieur dit 
Niagara his rations were still being drawn; each time there was 
a muster parade the dog was represented as being either off carry-
1 
ing d1 spatches or el se busy hunting rats. 
Eut to get away from the more negative aspects of the inten-
dant's work, in some m1litary matters Champigny made important 
changes in the existing system in order the better to cope with 
local but serious problems. Instances of auch changes were tho se 
he effected in the feeding and cloth1ng or the troops. Normally 
the troops rece1ved a subsistance allowance as part of their PaY 
and foraged for themselves, but they could not possibly have 
fed themselves with the priee of food as high as it all too 
frequently was in New France. To overcome this d1ff1culty 
Champigny bought up food 1n bulk in the colony when the priee 
was low and issued 1t to the troops, deducting 1ts cost from 
their PeY. This relieved th"e plight of the soldiers and coat 
1 • Recueil de 
uerre ••• 
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the King nothing except a slight charge ror the storage ot the 
1 
grain. 
For the duration of the war this problem ot providing food tor 
, 
the troops at low coat was one of the intendants most trying tasks. 
During the winter of 1690-1691, owing to poor crops and arrival 
of so tfftl shi pa from France, Champigrzy round hi mael! wi th food 
auppli es on ha.nd bar ely sutfic1 ent ror one mon th. Thus he and 
Frontenac had to d1stribute the troops throughout the countryside, 
billeting them on the habi ta.nts and pgying the latter the same 
2 
amount as would have besn g1ven the troops for their subsistance. 
That particular year the scarcity of food was so bad that Champigny 
had to d1stribute quantities of pork and flour to the habitants 
as wall as to the troops,and priees were so h1gh that the coat of 
the 1nd1vidual soldier's rations was twice the 3sols 9 deniers 
~ -
deducted from his pgy. .Af'ter the harvest, which ha.d been very 
late owing to prolonged rains, was brought in, the priee ot wheat 
4ropped from 12 livres the minot to 4 livres 10 sols. However, 
this sharp drop in priee was in a large measure the result of 
flour sh1paents received from France. Champigny promptly took 
advantage of the lower priee to buy in a supply sufficient to 
4 
feed the troops for six months, but he had to be very caretul 
when mak.ing auch purchases 1n the colony to prevent the hs.bi tanta 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. ~. Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal, 6 JuJ.y 1689; vol. XI, Champigny au Mtzlistre, Quebec, 
10 May 1691; vol. XV, Frontenac e"E Champisn7 aü M1nistre, 
Quebec, 19 October 1697· 
2. Can. Arch. AC • Series CllA, vol. XI, Relation de ce qui s'est 
Passe§ de plus considerable en Canada depuis le 27 novembre 1690 jusqu'au novembre 1691. 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 1! October 1691. 
4. ~· 
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l 
trom hoarding their grain in order to drive up the priee. 
Throughout the war years the oolony lived from hand to mouth; 
Champigny was never sure of having adequate food supplies for 
more than a tew months at a time and he was oontinually having 
to appeal to the minister for meat and flour to be sent from 
2 
France for the troops. The main reasons for this were the 
Iroquois raids, the emphasis that the oolony plaoed on wheat 
growing in an untavourable soil and olimate, the latter being 
3 
too oold and wet, and inetticient pioneer farming methode. A 
contributing factor was the tact that the bulk of the grain 
harvested in the late summer was not threashed until mid-winter, 
hence grain shortages frequently did not become apparent until 
4 
then. 
Sometimes,owing to the non-arrival of food ships,Cha.mpigny 
had to elte out the troo pa' tl our ration wi th stocks of peas and 
5 
Indian corn purchased locally. He claimed that one ree.son tor 
the non- arrival of food supplies from France was the fact that 
all too often they were sent in ships that were too small and 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Qu.ebec, 19 October 1697. 
2. Can. Arch. AC • Series CllA, vol. XII part l, Champigny au 
1-iinistre, Quebec, 10 November 1692; vol. XII part 2, Frontenac 
et Champigny au Ministre, Quebeo, 4 November 1693; AN Series B, 
vol. XVII part 2, Ministre au Begon, Versailles, 9 February 1695 . 
AC. Series CllA, vol.. XIII, Frontenac et ChampiSXQ' au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 November 1695; vol.. XV, Frontenac et Cha,mpigrl1' au 
Ministre, Quebec, 19 October 1697· 
3. BURTON, F.W: Tb.e Wheat SUlpl:r of New Fz=ance, in Proc. & Trans. 
Roy. Scty. Cda. Tb!rd Ser es, vol. XXX, 1936, pp 137-150. 
4. ibid. 
5· can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part l, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1692. 
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very unsea.wortbJ, a.nd he suggested to the minister tha.t one good 
f'lûte could carry more tha.n four auch small ships a.nd at far lese 
1 
expanse. He also frequently compla.ined of being overcharged for 
flour shipments and 1\hat mu ch of the pork and flour recei ved was 
or very poor quality, which meant tha.t he ha.d to charge the troops 
so much for the usable portions that it took practically the whole 
2 
of their PaY • 
In 1693, in order to bolster the morale of the of'ficers, who 
ha.d been having a rather lean time of it for the pa.st two or three 
yea.rs owing to the dearth of supplies and consequent hign priees, 
Champigny f'urnished them wi th two Juge of' brandy each per mon th 
a.t 20 sols the JUS• However, he wa.s caref'ul to point out to the 
minister tha.t he had managed to ma.ke a sma.ll profit on this 
3 
arrangement; and when a f'ew years later the off'icers began claim-
ing this faveur as a rignt due their rank, Champigny curtly 
inf'ormed them tha.t only the poorly paid Junior officers who were 
frequently detached with Indian war parties were entitled to this 
4 
privilege. 
The peculiar charaeter of wa.rf'are in the Canadian bush, not to 
mention the severity of' the climate, necessitated changeA in the 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC~Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Frontenac et 
Champigny au ~nistre, Q,uebec, 15 September 1692. 
2. Can. Arch. AC • Series CllA, vol. Xll part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 21 Spptember 1692; Champigny a.u Ministre, 
Quebec, 8 October 1692; vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 24 Oct&ber 1694; Champigny et Frontenac au Ministre, 
Q,uebec, 5 November 1694; AN. Series B, vol. XVII part 2, 
Ministre à Begon, Versailles, 22 January 1695. 
3· Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Cê-ampigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1696. 
type of uniform issued to the troupes de la marine. The style 
worn by these troops prior to 1690 is not known but in that year 
a uniform modelled after the type of clothing worn by the coureurs 
1 
de bois was adopted. In this connec ti on Champigny had to keep a 
very close check on the issue of these uniforme and other valuable 
oommodities, auch as blankets. With the Indiana willing to pey a 
few beaver skins for a good blanket or coat, the reason for this 
is obvious; n ••• si on donne des couvertes aux s<liats touteà les 
fois qu 1ils en souhaitteront, 11 he wrote to the minister, "plusieurs 
2 
officiers en demandront tous les jours ••• " 
Until 1687 the ca,ptains of the troupes de la marine supplied 
the soldiers under bheir oommand with some articles or olothing, 
suoh as boots, sbirts and stockings; at a priee of course. Cham-
pigny had not been in the colony long before he remarkeâ. that 
the officers were issuing their men with olothing of very poor 
quality and that in the outlying posta they supplied none at ali. 
To remedy this Champigny purchased a stock of the necessary 
clothing and issued it to the troops as required, deducting the 
3 
oost from their pey. Once adopted, this system was retained, at 
least tor the duration or the war. 
One factor which did not make Champigny 1 s task any easier was 
the minis ter' s seeming lack or any sense or proportion. De spi te 
the tact that supplies worth hundreds or thousands of livres were 
1. Ca,n. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVI part 1, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Srs comte de Frontenac et de Champigny, (1690) 
2 • Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1696. 
3,. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, ChampigiJY au Ministre, 
Quebec, 5 November 1687. 
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lost at sea en route from France, sometimes through sheer negli-
1· 
gence, Champigny was still severely castigated tor some trivial 
expenditure which he had regarded as necessary but which the 
minister claimed was merely extravagance~ When one hundred and 
tifty Basque tishermen were stranded in the colony atter the 
capture of their fishing vessel at Isle Jercé by the English, 
Champigny was obliged to keep them from starving during the w1nter 
until they could get a Ship back to France. This he did by putting 
2 
them on the troupes de la marine' s ration strength. He wa.s later 
intormed in no uncertain terme tha.t he had had no business doing 
auch a thing; to have given them " ••• quelque chose pour les aYder 
subsister ••• n would have been quite sufficient, the m1nieter 
3 
aseerted. Champigny patiently explained that he had included 
them on the companies' muster rolle merely to simplify the account-
ing, and tart1y added tha.t he could not poseibly have given them 
lesa than he had without running the risk ot seeing them die of 
4 
starvation betore hie very eyes. The minister also took exception 
to Champigny's having issued some old clothing to a party of sick 
5 
soldiers being 1nvalided back to France. He demanded to know by 
virtue of what order or instructions Champigny had taken 1 t upon 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 15 September 1692; vol. X.V, 
Champigny au Ministre, Qijebec, 13 October 1697· 
2. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Seriee C11A, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 May 1691. 
3. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVI part 2, Ministre à ){. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 28 March 1693. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693. 
5. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 5 November 1689. 
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l 
lûaaelt to 1aaue oat tlûa cloth1JJ.S• 
!'.b.eae two part1eular 1nc1denta ab.ow olearl7 the Yer!T cloae 
cheell: aa1JJ.ta.1ne4 oYer the act1v1 t1ea ot tbe 1atendant 'b7 the 
miDi a ter. For au intendant to diaplaJ a1J'3' ai go. a ot 1n1 t1at1Te 
wh.atiiO.,.eP waa autt1c1et to 1nrt te the a1n1ater' a 1amed1ate 
cenaure • 
.&1 thous\'1 1 t waa the govel'llOr' a prerosat1Ye, or clutJ, te ··.allo• 
2 
oate quartera te the troopa, the bUlet1D.! arraJlS•enta 1a the 
colollf requ1re4 110 11 ttle aupel'Viaion on the part ot the int-.4.-t • 
1'b.e bulk ot the troopa were atat1one4 in a;o.d abo1lt Montreal, e1 tller 
in the Tari oua tort a o.r wi thin the wwn 1 taelt. Qn te a tew ot 
the otticera al14 •en were billetecl OD the hab1 tallta who wePe 
requ.irecl to prond.e atPaw tor a mattreaa, a ceoll:1q pot aud the 
uae ot the t1replace, tb.e 10ld1era hanns to briDS in their ahare 
' ot the t1rewo4. 1!ûa iDTolTed a seocl a&D1 thiqa wlûch tell 
w1 th1D. the aphere of duttea of the 1nte4allt !! J011ce. auch aa 
aettl1zag coaplainta and !Cerall7 aee1Dg to 1 t that the qate11 
worll:ed aaootb.l.J. !here ia a a1nsuJ.ar lacll: ot retereace to fi1J1 
cl1tt1cult1ea or prolDl•• in tbia eoanection in the ott1c1al 
eorreapondenoe ûriD! OhaaP1PJ" 1 a temare ot office. lfhether or 
DOt thia ia owiq to the tact that no auch pro'blema aroae as a. 
reiiUl t ot ett1c1cc7 on the pattt ot the.1atea4ant ia not launm.. 
UntortlU'I.&telJ, the ooua aold1era haYe lett no wr1 tta reaorcla 
l· CaJJ.• &roh. AO • 8e1'1ea allA, Tel• X, Bltrait d.ea Lettrea de 
DenonT1lle et Cb. .. pipy le 20 aou.a't, 31 oetobPe, 6 DOYealDre 
1688, (a&l'liaal cou-.t,); JJJ. 8er1ea B, Tel· XV, 111D1atre à 
Oh&11Jd6Dl, Veraa1llea, 1 Mar 1689. . 
2 • C&ll• .A.l'eh • .A.C • Sel'iea. Cll.A., Tel. XI, OhaapigDJ' au JU.Diatre, 
Que'bee, 10 Ma:r 1$1. 
:5 • Q•e • .A.rch. Pultlieat1ona. Qàfl!&•t•a Q!uia§iona. If 'tt ttc 
tH tlet GouTera.eê:f et, Inttn4:âf'' 'f'Ol• II, pp 1.05..;.fo , Oren• 
nance d.e x. d.e M 1 .. , M'ontl'e , 15 11111 1685; Or&nmanoe de 
M. de DiœnTille, Montreal, 15 Octo'ber 1685 • 
and the commissioned ra.nks found more important things to d1souss 
or complain about in their journals. There is just one brief 
mention in a d1spatch from Champigny and Frontenac to the effeot 
that some of the officers had not been too pleased with the 
billeting arrangements 1n the colony; upon their return to France 
they had complained at the court or the prim1 tive conditions under 
wh1ch they had been expected •o live. Frontenac and Champigtcy' 
informed the m1n1ster.that these officers had no Just cause for 
complaint, as most of the people were redueed to sleeping on 
straw, only the wealthier people had proper beda and very few of 
1 
them enjoy ed the luxury of sheets. 
There were of course, no military hospitals in the eolony; 
soldiers who fell sick or were wounded on eampaigns were cared for 
in the hospitals run by the religious orders at Q.uebee and Montreal. 
This thrust a dus]. respons1b1lity on the intendant' s shoulders 
for he had not only to see to 1t that sick or wounded aoldiers 
received adequate hospital treatment, he also ~ad to make sure 
that the hospitals themselves, since they were essential to the 
well being of the entire colony, were able to runct1on without 
undue let or hindrance. This at times meant that Champigny had 
to rob Peter to Pàl Paul, and when the m1n1ster became aware that 
someone was being robbed he showed no concern for Paul, only tor 
Peter. 
All the soldiers had a deduction made from their PaY to cover 
the coat ot s:ny hospital treatment they m1ght need; this being 
somewhat akin to the present day Blue Cross hospital plan 
financed by pe;r roll deductions and employer contributions. 
1. Qan. Arch. AC. Sari es OllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac èt Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1695. · 
.. ..,.., 
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However, owing to the intlated priee or food and other gooda in 
the colony, this deduction came nowhere near covering the coat or 
a soldier's hospitalization expanses. so the hospitals received 
a supplemental grant trom the King for each sick aold1er - this 
would be altin to the portion paid by employers in the af'orementione d 
present day Blue Croas acheme. The hospital at Quebec thus rece1ved 
an additional two sols per daY, but the one at Montreal rece1ved 
six sols eleven deniers. 
The moment the m1n1ster saw this dispar1ty ln the accounta he 
demanded an explanat1on. Champigny just1t1ed the higher grant to 
the Montreal hospital on the grounds that this institution bad 
suffered veey heavy damages from a f1re two and a half yea.rs before. 
He also 1nf'ormed the m1n1ster that for aome t1me he and Frontenac 
had be an g1 ving th1 a ho spi ta.l finaneial a1d out of the1r own 
pocltets, wh1ch had workeèl out a.t over twenty sols per da,y for each 
sold1er. 
Then to malte matters worse, the hospital lost a whole year's 
supplies when the ship, le Belliqueux, was sur.ùt a year af'ter the 
f'1re; thus, much as Champig:D3' would have liked to reduce lùle oost 
of caring for the sick troops at Montreal to the same level as 
that paid at Quebec, he could not do so wi thout thereby forcing 
the rel1g1ous to close the doors of' the hospital. In cloeing, he 
promiaed the minister tha.t he would do everyth1ng he could to 
reduce this expense, and since the priee of goods bad begun to 
l 
drop with the end1ng of' the war, he had hopes of' being succestul. 
Throughout his 1ntendancy Champigny was continua.lly under f1re 
f'rom the min1ster for the ecale of' his expend1tures on the war and 
t · Can • Arch· AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 13 October 1697; vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
~uebec, 14 October 1698. 
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particularly for his expenditures on the eolony's ~ortifications. 
When he first a:rrived in the oolony the forti:fications or Q.uebec, 
Three Rivera and Montreal were adequate against little more than 
Indian attacks. In 1691 he st~ed that it was " ••• absolument 
necessaire d'achever la cloture de Quebeo, de faire des retranchmens 
dans la place, couvrir les redoutes, racomoder les battr1es, en 
faire de nouvelles, faire une nouvelle palissade aux Trois Rivières 
•.• et achever la fosse qUi est wtour ~e Montrc5al, nous avons 
commencé de faire faire les dits travaux, la conservation du pa;ys 
1 
dependant de la sur etc§ de ces endroits ••• " 
In th1 s work Champigi\V found himself in the unfortunate pos1 ti on 
or having to reconoile, at one and the same time, the governor' s 
demande for expansive defense projects and the m1n1ster•s complainte 
about his extravagance. The m1n1ater demanded that the habitants 
should bear their share of the oost ot auch worke; both ChampiSQJ 
and Frontenac vigorously olaimed, in etfect, that to get b~ood 
2 
out of the proverbial stone oou.ld not be more diffioult. However, 
3 
ChamPiSDl did succeed to a li mi ted degree in this respect. 
The intendant had to keep not only a close watoh on the workmen 
and contractors building the fortifications - when heavy rains 
damaged a taulty maeonry gate at Quebec he compelled the oontractor 
~ ' to repair i t - but also on the governors as well. At Montreal, 
ChampiSQY suddenly discovered that Callières had spent between 
eight and n1ne thouiand livres on a dam and a fort. Calli~res 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Seriee CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 10 May 1691. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, ChampiSQY au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 Ma;y 1691; vol. XII part 1, Frontenac au :ktnistre, 
Quebeo, 11 November 1692. 
3. Can. AroJJ. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 10 MàY 1691. 
4. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigey au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 24 Ootober 16,94. 
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claimed tha.t by mea.ns of the dam he would be able to flood the 
"" land arop.d the town in time of atta.ck; untortunately the dam d1d 
not work. As for the tort, i t was constructed on a sma.ll hill at 
the eastern end or the town but here too th1ngs went wrong, tor 
l 
the ground crumpled awa:y around the t'oundations. 
The construction of all these works was accompanied by constant 
quarrels between Champigny and Frontenac, for although they were 
of one accord asto the necessity for strengthening the coloQJ's 
defences, they disputed bitterly over the relative importance of 
certain works. On the landward side of Quebec the only defence 
work waa a wooden palisade which Champigny stated would barely 
suffice to protect the town against a:n Indian attack. He was very 
mu.oh lf'raid tha.t the ED.glish m1ght return to repeat the assault 
they had made in 1690, therefore he wanted the town • s landward 
defences strengthened. He also considered it essential to fortity 
Cape Diamond since a battery of cannon here could rake the entire 
2 
town. But Frontenac had somewhat different ideas, as he made 
plain in unrestra.ined language to his frien4l de LagQJ: 
Il ·faudroit avoir veu toutes les ruses, 
et les finesses dont il s'est servir pour 
retarder la closture de l'enceinte des 
murailles du fort, que J'avois resolue des 
l'automne derniere, comme l'endroict qui 
me paro1sso1t le plus necessaire a fort1-
f1er ••• puisque c'estoit un redu1ct pour 
assurer ma personne, et oe qu'il 1 avoi t 
de gens plus considerables dans le PaYs, 
et tous les jours me faisoit oster des 
ouvriers et des manoeuvres pour les 
employer ailleurs, afin de retarder du 
1. Oan. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 24 Ootober 1694. 
2. Oa.n. Arch. AC. Series dllA, vol. XII part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1692. 
moins ce travail s'il ne le pouvoit pas 
empecher tout a faict, ce qui marque une 
grande indisposition de coeur pour moy ••• 
1 
Despite auch differences of' opinion, by 1697 Q,uebec was declared 
to be im.pregnable against any attack the English colonies could 
2 
conc ei vably malte aga1nst i t • As for Montreal and Three Rivera, 
3 
new palisaades were raised around the two towns, this being all 
that circumsta.nces would perm1 t. And in this work Frontenac had 
grudgingly to ack:nowledge that nx. 1' Intendant n'a rien oublié ••• 
4 
pour y garder toute 1 'economie qui a:• y devoi t observez. u 
During the course of' the war Champigny mentioned to the 
m1nister the fa.ct that the upkeep of the English prisoners and 
tho se ransomed from the Indiana was prttving to be qui te an 
expansive item; he therefore suggested tha.t they should all be 
5 
shipped over to France for safekeeping. The minister did not 
receive this suggestion with enthusiasm but curtly ordered the 
intendant to stop pampering them, claiming that there was no 
excuse for it considering the WaY that the English were treating 
6 
their prisoners. 
In February 1698, a delegation from the English colonies 
1. Can. Arch. BN. Series B Nl/8D, Collection Clairambault, 
vol. DCCCLXXIX, fol. 320-338, Frontenac à. M. de LS81'lY, 
Quebec, 25 October 1693. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Relation de ce qui s'est 
Passé de plus remarquable ••. 1696 •.. 1697 • 
3. Que. Arch. Rpt. 1928-1929 p 106, Front.enac et Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 15 September 1692; Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, 
vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, Montreal, 11 August 1695. 
4. Can. Arch. AC .. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Frontenac au 
Ministre, Quebec, 25 October 1693. 
5· Can. Arch. AC~~Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Frontenac et 
Champigny au ~nistre, Q,uebec, 15 September 1692 . 
• 
6. Can. Arch. AN. Series BJ. vol. XVI0part 2, Ministre à. M. de Champigny, Versailles, ~a March 1 9-'. 
... ~,.... 
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arrived at Quebec to inform the governor that peace had been 
signed in EUrope and to repatriate the EngliSh prisoners held 
by the French. Frontenac gave parmi a sion for the se last to return 
home with the J%lglish delegation but he and Champigny then found 
1 
themselves f'aced wi th a very awkward problem. During their 
captivity a majority of these English nationale had embraced 
the Catholic religion and they now expressed the desire to rema1n 
in New France. When one considere the bleak, harsh religious 
climate of the Puritan colonies at this time, this apoetasy is 
not so remarkable as it might at first appear. 
Be that as it may, the governor and the intendant then took a 
step which is perhaps more remarkable than was its cause, they 
ordered that the Engl.ish children under twelve years of' age 
could not be given their freedom of choice in this matter; 
despite the ardent desire of' the majority of them to remain in 
New France and reta1n their adopted religion, they were all 
sent pack· Why? Because it was held by the governor and the 
intendant that ch1ldren at that age la.cked the discernment 
1 
necessary to make auch sn important decision. 
Champigny requested the m1n1ster to issue the necessary orders 
to have the English accord the asme treatment to their French 
prisoners. At the same time he studied WaYs and means to ef'fect 
the repatriation of the French nationale. Since they were known 
to be scattered throughout the northern colonies, it was feared 
that i t would be no easy task to locate them all. The Messieurs 
de st. SUlpice at Montreal of'f'ered to send a member of their 
order, who spoke fluent Engliah, to search tor them and they 
------------------------------------ ---------- ------------
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 July 1698. 
a.sked for two canoes wi th sevan or eight soldiers as escort and 
1 
a Royal commission. However, before a.vailing themselves of this 
offer, Champigny and Callières sent the sieur de la Vallière and 
fa.ther Bruyas on this mission, with the reservation tha.t should 
they have no success then the Sulpicians would be encouraged to 
2 
send their party. 
Now, with the war officially over and the Iroquois willing to 
come to terme, Champigny had but one major task of a military 
nature left to perform, the disposa.l of the surplus military 
equipiJlent • As of J anuary lst 1699, he had stocks on hand in the 
King's store t~ the value of 214,727 livres, most of it of no 
turther use to the Crown. Champigny suggested that he should sell 
as much of these goods as possible and use the proceeds to dis-
charge old debts; for once, a suggestion of the intendant's met 
3 
with the minister's unqualified approva.l. So ended Champigny's 
war time responsibilities. 
All in all, the minister had no great cause for dissatisfaction 
with the job that his intendant ha.d done in New France during some 
twelve yea.rs of war. Actua,lly, the military duties of the inten-
dant did not require much in the wa:y of' far reaching decisions, 
it reqUired more a meticulous attention to detail. The intendant 
was not so much the driver of the military machine as the engineer; 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, Que bec, 12 July 1689 • 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, C9.llières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 20 October 1699· 
3. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XXII Part 2, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 5 Ma,y 1700; IC· Series CllA, vol. XVIII, 
Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 15 October 1700. 
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he had to be constantly t1nker1ng with it, constantly pouring oil 
on points where friction developed, repairing breakages, pleading 
for replacements, and making do somenow with the old worn out 
parts when new ones were not forthcom1ng. Bome of the mili tary 
problems which he struggl.ed hard to resolve proved to be too great 
for his talents, hampered as he was by a very limited author1ty. 
His was a tha.nkless taak, even a heart break1ng one at times, 
but throughout Champigny' s intendancy there is no evidence at all 
or any m1l1tar.y operation ever being hampered by negligence or 
inef:ficiency on ChampigDJ' s part. There can be no doubt that, 
whatever his shortcom1ngs, the m1li tary success which :New France 
enjoyed during those long years of war vas in no small measure 
due to the tireless efforts of this intendant. 
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OH.APTER V. 
COMPACT OOLONY VERSUS WESTERN !XPANSION. 
PA,RT I. 
The title of this chapter is, of necessity, an over simplification; 
however i t serves to bring into focus more clearly eeveral complex 
issues wi th which CRaœp1gl'.11 was involved throughout his intendancy. 
It was not so much a conflict between adherents of two opposing 
policies as au attempt by thé crown to regulate the fur trade in 
the beat interesta of the colony as a whole, and of powerful fur 
trading interests to, circurnvent all auch regulation in order the 
better to pursue their own private economie ends. These fur 
trading interests which ao bitterly opposed Cha.mpigny's a.ttempts 
to implement the regulations did not have as the1r chief the 
founding of a French empire in the west, they were interested 
only in garnering the maximum number of pelta from the Indian 
tribes. Had large numbera of French settl'ers moved into the fur 
trading areas with the intention of forming permanent settlements, 
the fur traders would most assuredly have placed every obstacle 
in their path: and by the sa.me token they fought against encroach-
ments=•rt 1 by their economie and pol1t1ca.l rivale in the Jalglish 
colonies and by the Iroquois allies of the Jmglish. Thus they can 
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be said to have preserved the foundations of a potential French 
Empire in the west in very much the same wa:y as Engl.i sh marchants 
preserved the foundations of the British Empire in India and the 
east. 
The French crown was not opposed to the f'Ur tra.de per se, since 
f'Urs were almost the sole source of weal th in the colony, but 
merely to the economie and social abuses wh1eh it engendezted. The 
main aim of crown policy was to consolidate the central colony on 
a fiztm economie and social basie rather than to have i ts strength 
dissipated over half the continent. 
The King in 1686 was strongly opposed to f'Urther Fztench expan-
sion into Jùle heart of the continent in quest of f'Urs and he 
instructed Champigny accordingly: 
Plusieurs Particulie!'s habitans de Canada 
excitez par l'esperance du proffit qu'ils 
trouvaient dans le commeztce des pelle-
teries avec les Sauvages ont entrepris en 
different temps des deaeouvertes wers le 
PaYs des Na.doussiou:x et autres endroits 
de l 1Amer1que Septentrionale, mais comme 
••• sa Majesté n'estime Pas que ces decou-
vezttes soient advantageuses et qu'il vaut 
bien mieux s 1 aPPliquer à la cultuzte de la 
terre dans lee habitations deffrichées 
Elle ne veut point qu'on continue à leu!' 
donner de oee permissions ••• 
l 
Originally the Hurons and Algonquins had brought their tura 
dlbwn to Montreal, Three Rivera and Quebeo. At !v1:ontreal a regular 
f'Ur fair had been held each year, but gradually this had fallen 
into desuetude owing to the dispersal of the north-western tztibes 
by the Iroquois and as a result of foztestalling by coureurs de 
bois ~d the garrieons of the up country poste. All too often 
1. Can • .ABch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Instruction que le Roy veut 
eetre remise ez mains du Sr de Champigny ••• versailles 31 MaJ 1686. 
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this f'orestalllng was organised by the very of'fioials who were 
supposed to be preventing auch abuses: Frontenac during his first 
administration:.;and Perrot, gov,ernor of Montreal, being among the 
1 
worst offenders in this oonnection. 
With the governors so engaged it is small wonder that large 
numbers of the habitante, being determ1ned to obtain their share 
of the fUr trade profits, no longer waited for the Indiana to 
come to them but instead went to the Indiana' country, their aanotts 
loaded with trade goods. The exodus of these coureurs de bois from 
the oolony, particularly since they were of necessity the most 
active and enterprising amongst .the habitants, had a very deleter-
ious affect on the colonial economy; farms were abandoned and some 
of this cleared land gradually reverted to its original wild st·ate, 
and attempts by the orown to toster such industries as fishing in 
.Acadia and along the at. Lawrence met with continual frustration 
3 
and failure for the same reason. 
In vain attempts to rectify this situation, in 1666 and agiin 
in 1678, the King iasued edicte forbidding all trade with the 
Indiana outside the colony on pain of a two thousand livre :fine; 
but these edicte we.re rendered ine:f:fective since those a~prehended 
either went unpun1shed or were let off with light fines. Conse-
1. WARDLEWORTH,E: Parrot and the Isle Parrot, (McGill M.A. thesis} 
chapt er V, passim. 
2 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Instruction que le Roy veut 
astre remise ez mains du Sr de Champigny •.• versailles, 31 MaY" 168é; 
AC· Series CllA, vol. IX, Denonville au Ministre, Quebec, 
25 August 1687; vol. X, Denonville et ChampigrlY au M+.nistre, 
Quebec, 20 August, 31 October, 6 November 1688. · 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 November 1686. 
4. Edits. & Ords. vol. IIIp 249,:mtit du Roi, Versailles, MeY 1681. 
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quently, in 1681 the King issued two fresh edicta, the one 
granting a general amnesty to the coureurs dà bois provided they 
l 
returned to the colODJ, the other order1ng that aD'3' coureurs 
de bois refusing to avail themselves or this amnesty wére to be 
appreb.ended and given the lash and branded with the fleur de lis; 
tor a secon4 offense ther were to be sent to the galleys for life. 
At the time that these edicte were issued, the governor and 
intendant were also empowered to grant Jointly twenty-tive congés 
3 
a year for trading up country. Each congé permitted the recipient 
to send one canoe ma.nned by three men wi th three to four thou sand 
4 
livres 1n trade goods. The King hoped that by means or this whip 
and carrot policy the coureurs de bois would be persuaded to 
return to the colony and abandon their dissolute WaYs. 
This change in policy was slso a tacit admission that it was 
impossible to entorce a complete ban on up country trading and 
the crown had now reconciled itself to trying to reduce the 
numbers so engaged by this licensing system. It was also the 
King 1 s avowed intention that all the habi tanta shoUld have a 
chance in turn or reaping legally the aame profits as the coureurs 
5 
de bo1 s were doine; in defiance o:t the law. Obv1ously, the success 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid. 
2 
3. Can. Arch. AB. Series B, vol. XII, Instruction que le Roy veut 
estre remise ez mains du Sr de Champigny ... versailles 31 May' 1686. 
4. Can. Arch. AO. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire concernant le 
commerce de traitte ••• ahampigny, Quebec, 11 October 1691. 
5· Que. Arch. Manuscrits Relatifs à l'Histoire de la Nouvelle 
France, 2me serie, vol. V, Denonville au Ministre, Quebec, 
8 MaY 1686. 
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of the congé system depsnded entirely upon the honesty of the 
colonial officials and their abilitJ to ~arr7 out effective measures 
against abuses. 
or course, it was not possible for all recipients of congés to 
make the arduous journey up country by canoe but those incapable 
of so doing, if they had or could borrow the necessary CaPital, 
could equip a canoe with trade goods and hire voyageurs to act as 
their agents, or they could sell the congés outright. The usual 
selling priee of congés during Champigny' s time was one thousand 
to eleven hundred livres each. Thus they were a means to reward 
persona whom the King, or the governor and intendant,considered 
deserving; so it was that the sieur Riverin was granted six 
congés to help dfdreJ" his expanses in establishing a fishing 
1 
station in Gaspé, and at Champigny' s instigation the hospital 
2 
at Montreal was also granted six. 
However, i t ia easy to see how, in the hands of unscrupulous 
officials, these consés could accentuate the very abuses they 
were intended to curb. Certainly the King was far from enthus-
iastic over them; he informed Champigny that the permission to 
issue these Passe·.ports was granted more on suffrance tha:n as 
something that he considered good for the well being of the col-
orry. Champigny was instructed to conter with the governor as to 
whether or not they were really necessa.ry and to reduce their 
3 
number as muchas possible •• 
Champigny was completely in accord with the crown's desire to 
1. Can. Arch. JJI. Series B, vol. XII, Instruction que le Roy veut 
estre remise ez mains du Sr de Champigny ••. versailles 31 MaJ' 1686. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire concernant le 
commerce de Traitte ••• ahampigny, Quebec, 12 October 1691. 
3. Can. Arch. AN· Series B, vol. XII, Instruction que le Roy veut 
estre remise ez mains du Sr de Champigny ••• versailles 31 MaY 1686. 
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consolidate the central colony in the st. Lawrence valley rather 
tha.n to have i ta strength weakened and i ta growth stunted by 
western expansion. In 1691 he stated: 
La plus im~a.nte affaire et de laquelle 
depend absolument le soutien, la conserva-
tion et 1' aggrandissement de la colonie, 
est de faire deservir et mettre en valeur 
les terres concédées depuis trente lieues 
au dessous de quebec Jusqu'à dix lieues au 
dessus de la ville de Montreal nord et sud 
et à eet effet tenir exactement la main à 
ce que l'on ne s'étende Pas d'avantage soit 
en paix soit en guerre et qu'il n'aille pas 
dàns les-:pa;ys éloignéz en differentes nations 
sauvages un au say grand nombre d'hommes comme 
par le passé ••• ce qui denuij le PaY~ des prin-
cipales forces et des gens qui travailleraient 
le mieux à la terre. 
n est bien tacheux que la j eunnesse Cana-
dienne qui est vigoureuse et de grande fatigue 
ne puisse presque rien gouter que ces sortes 
de voyages ob. ils vivent dans les bois comme 
des sauvages et sont des deux et trois ans 
sans pratiquer aucuns sacremens vivant dans 
une oy si vi té et le plus souvent dans une 
misère extraordi•aire, quand une fois ils 
sont accoutumer à, cette vie ils ont peine à 
s'attacher à la culture des terres et ils 
demeurent dans une extreme PatrVreté, fesant 
beaucoup de depenses quand ils reviennent. 
1 
Deonville was of bee same opinion in this matter; they both 
claimed that: "La traitte du castor dans le bois a esté le premier 
mal de la celonie ce commerce aYant dissipé les habitants et 
2 
empesché le deffrichement des terres." The clergy too, and par-
ticularly the Jesuite, had alwa,ys maintained since the daYe of 
Bagard that their missionary work was continually set at naught 
by the activities of the coureurs de bois and the garrisons at 
the up country por;sts; they too desired that the French should 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Memoire Instructif sur 
le Canada. Champigny. 10 MaY 1691. 
2. Ca.n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. X, Denonville et CHampigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 20 August, 31 October, 6 November 1688. 
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remain in the central colony and let the Indiana bring their 
tura down to Montreal, as had previously been their custom, 
dont les pauvres françois et habitans profiteraient aussi 
1 
bien que ceux qui sont aisez.n 
Denonville did his beat to implement the crown's policies in 
this matter. During Frontenac' s and La Barre' s administrations 
. -· 
some familles had come to regard the copgés as being granted by 
the King solely for their benefit and to the exclusion of every-
one el se in the colony. Consequently they had been very ira te 
when Denonville distributed the congés to the deserving poor 
2 
rather than to tho se who had abused auch privileges in the past. 
But wi th Frontenac 1 s reaPpointment as governor all at'èempts to 
curb the economie and social abuses engendered by the fur trade 
were frustrated. 
There is no direct evidence that Frontenac engaged in the fur 
trade for his own private profit, nor did Champigny ever directly 
accuse him of having so engaged. There is, however, a great maas 
of cibcumstantial evidence which clearly shows that he used his 
official position as governor in every way possible to assist 
the o:ffioers oommanding the up country posta, severa.l of whom 
were his appointees, to reap the maximum profits from this trade 
in tura. All his actions and declarations show clearly that he 
had made the private interests of this select group his own, a 
group composed of auch men as the Tonty brothers, la Forest, 
la Motte Cadillac and Louvigny, all of them officers in the 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII Part 1, Les Pères 
Jesuites du Canada à Mgr de Pontchartrain •. February 1692. 
2. Que. Arch. Manuscrits Relatifs à l'Histoire de la Nouvelle 
France, 2me serie, vol. V, Denonville au Ministre, Quebec, 
8 May 1686. 
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troupes de la marine and as auch forbidden by the King to 
engage in the fur trade. lt 1a d1ff1cult therefore to see why 
Frontenac, the governor of the colOJ:JY, should so ignore the King 1 s 
edicta which he had sworn to ênforce, unleas he were deriving 
considerable financial profits from so doing. 
The only other explana.tion would be that although he did not 
derive any personal profit from the fur trade, he had the f1nanc1al 
interests of, these junior officers ao much at heart that he was 
w1111ng to g1ve them avery assistance, both legal and illegal. 
Frontenac 1 s v ani ty was 1ndeed great, ma.king him eas1ly 1n1'luenced 
by flattery, so much so that this poss1b1lity cannat be d1sm1ased 
out of hand. Had he been a wealtbJ man in his own right this 
explanation would aPPear more plausible; but he was not, hence 1t 
is hardly 11kely that he aided and abetted these his protogéea 
for purely altru1stic reasons. And even so his actions would be 
only slightly lese reprehensible, not merely because they were 
contrary to the King 1 s edicta, but bec au se they ha.d auch 
dire resulta for the coloey in both the economie and m111tary 
spheres. 
Stemming from this, for nine long years, throughout the course 
of the war, a bitter struggle went on between the intendant and 
the governor. By the terme of h1 s comm1 sai on and the tenor of 
his instructions, Champigny could do very little to prevent 
Frontenac 1 s d1sregard for the King' s edicta. He could only ramon-
strate with Frontenac and when this proved no deterrent his sole 
recourse was to report the facts to the m1n1ster, then wait till 
the following year for a reply, knowing full well that Frontenac's 
influence at the court was auCh that he h1mself would, in all 
probab111ty, receive little but abuse for his pains. T1me and t1me 
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again he received replies wherein the m1n1ster gave i t as hia 
and the King' s opinion that the main source or all. the trouble 
1n the col.ony atemmed rrom Champigny' s being at logger-heads 
with Frontenac. There is undoubtedly an element or truth in this; 
even sucn dirfer1ng personalities as the abbé Tronson and the 
1 
Baron de Lahontan were in agreement here, but in actua,li ty the 
' King and hia m1nister were conf'uling cause and errect. C."Rampigny 
d1d ever;ything he could to check the abuses of Frontenac and his 
clique for three main reasons: he considered 1t his official 
duty to implement the King' s wishes, he was profoundly convinced 
that Frontenac's actions were detrimental to the beat interesta 
of the coloDJ, and last but rar from least, Frontenac's exceed-
ingly high handed treatment ot him were aurficient to have 
arouaed the ant;agonism of even the most amenable of intendants. 
Within the first few months of his return to New France, 
Frontenac made i t plain that his views on the tur trade were 
diametrically opposed. to those of the inten~t. His initial 
attempt to restore his old fort at Cataracoui having met with 
ra11ure, in APril 1690 he recalled la Duranta,ye, the commander 
at M1ch1limackinac, tl ••• qu'il ne croyait pas à sa devotion ... " 
2 
and appointed. the sieur de Louvigny to command in his stead. 
Durantaye, a capitaine reformé in the troupes de la marine, had 
been a eaptain in the Carignan-Salières regiment and was wi thout 
a doubt one of the beat ofricers in the colony • In 1684 he had 
gone to the aid or Tonty at Fort St. Louis when the Iroquoià 
1. 
d' 
2. Instructif sur le 
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laid siege to the post and in 1687 he had persuaded the up country 
1 
tribes to J oin Denonville' s exped1 ti on against the Benecas. He 
had used a considerable sum out of his own pocket for the mainten-
2 
ance of his post and good relations with the Indian allies. 
Louvigny, on the other ha.nd, was a merchant, owning stores at 
MOntreal and Quebec, to whom Frontenac had recently given a 
commission in the troupes de la marine. Wïth Louvigny when he 
left for his post went a detachment of one hundred and forty-
three meu. Frontenac claimed that this large detachment was 
necessa.ry to prevent the Ottawa Indiana sign1ng a separate peace 
3 
with the Iroquois, but Champigny stated that fif'ty men would 
have been qui te adequate for this ta.sk and tha.t the sending of 
. 4 
this deta.chmant wa.s primarily a private fur trading venture. 
In his ordonnance governing this expedition Frontenac stated 
tha.t to prevent a recurrence of Past abuses and disorders the 
detachment was to be com.posed only of men having tura cached up 
country wh1ch they wished to bring back, and each man was to 
take only fifty livres worth of trade goods in addition to his 
personal equipment which was 11m1ted to one duffle coat, three 
shirts, one musket, four pounds of powder, ten pounds of shot, 
food, and four jugs of brandy. The sieur de Louvigny was ordered 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693; PEASE AND WERNER: The 
French Founda.tions 1680-1693, vol • I, p 60 . -
2. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA,- vol. XII, part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693. 
3. can. Arch. AN· Series F3, Collection Moreau de St. M,ry, vol. 
VI, part 1, Ordonnance de Frontenac, (Montreal) 8 April 1690. 
4. ibid, Remarques f'ai te par l'Intendant sur la di te Ordonnance. 
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to inspeot the oanoes bef'ore lea.ving Mont:real to ma.ke su:re the 
l 
men did not exoeed theae amounta. 
It had been distinctly laid down by the King tha.t all congés 
2 
and permissions were to be issued Jo1ntly by the gove:rnor and 
intendant, or rather, the governor could decide to whom th~ 
should be granted, in consultation with the intendant, and they 
had to be visaed by the latter who wa.s to aee to i t tha.t the 
recipients did not abuse their privilege by ta.king more than 
3 
one oanoe ma.nned by three men. In the case of this partioula.r 
detaohment Champigny knew nothing at all about i t un til i t was 
brought to his attention by publio report. He promptly o:rdered 
his deputy at Montreal, the sieur Gaillard, to inspeot the canoes 
of the detachment. D~te the beat efforts of his deputy, 
Champignf late:r discovered that Louvigny himself had managed to 
take three thousand and eighty-three livres ten sols worth of 
tra.de goods in excess of the amount he had declared, and included 
in this contraband ha.d been two hund:red and six juge of brandy. 
Louvigny la.ter smuggled down to Mont:real ten bales of castor ~ 
robes over and a.bove the four thousand five hundred livres worth 
which he openly sent down to h1 a wife wi thin a month of h1 s 
4 
reaching Miohilima.ckinac. Furthermore, Champigny stated, this 
l. Ca.n. Arch. ,AN. Series F3, Collection Moreau de St. Méry, vol. 
VI part 1, Ordonnance de Frontenac, (Montreal) 8 APril 1690. 
2. Permissions, as distinct from congés, were issued to office:rs 
and troops sent out ot the colony on mili tary duties;·-uzüike 
conesés there was no li mit to the number of auch perm1 ssions 
the governor could issue since techlically this depended upon 
the exigencies ot the m111 ta.ry si tua ti on. 
3. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Instruction que le Roy veut 
astre remise ez mains du Sr de Champigny, Versailles 31 MaY 1686; 
AN. Series F3, Collection Moreau de at. Mér,y, vol. IV, Ordon-
nance de M. de Denonville, 29 June. 1686. · 
4. Can. Arch. AN. Series F3, Collection Moreau de at. Mér,y, vol. 
VI, Remarques faites par l'Intendant sur •.• (l'ordonnance de 
Frontenac, 8 AP:ril 1690) 
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detachment, supposedly sent to carry munitions and supplies to 
the Indian allies in order to dater them .from dealing with the 
Iroquois, had been so loaded with goods to be traded for their 
private profit that they had abandoned en route Part of the 
l 
muni ti ons .from the King 1 s store. This is borne out by the fact 
that whan the up country Indiana came down to Montreal with their 
tura the following August the chief' of' the Hurons ata.ted that he 
2 
and his men had come to obtain lead and powder. He would hardly 
have come some three hundred leagues to obtain these commodities 
had they been available to him, as a f'ree gif't from the King, at 
3 
M1 chilimackinac • 
Champigny' s d1spatch telling of' these irregulari ti es very 
likely passed en route a mémoire from the King containing strict 
ordera that the regUlations governing congés and military detach-
ments were to be rigidly adhered to. The King also rei terated 
that the intendant wa.s to visa all congés and see to i t tha.t the 
holders d1d not abuse their privileges, and most significant of 
41-1, he sta.ted: 
Sa MaJesté ••• ne veut pas que les officiers 
et Canadiens qui seront employez pour la 
guerre avec les sauvages, fassent sous ce 
Pretexte aucun commerce, ny portent autre 
chose que ce qui est necessaire pour leur 
entretien et subsistance et pour donner un 
exemple auquel tout le monde se puisse 
conformer, Sa Majesté ne veut Pas que ledit 
Sieur de Frontenac et de Champigny entrent 
par eux mesmes rf1 par leurs domestiques dans 
aUCun commerce à. la reserve de celuy des 
1. CBJl. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif' sur 
le Canada. Ch&~~~.pigny • Quebec, 12 Ms,y 1691 • 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Monseignat à Mde. de 
Maintenon. (Quebec 1690) 
3. Vide supra, chapter III, pp 69-72 , for a fuztther discussion 
of' thi a incident • 
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pesches. 
Sa Majesté estant encore bien aise de 
leur dire qu' El:le est persuadée qu'il n'y 
a rien de plus necessaire pour appliquer 
les Canadiens à la culture des terres et 
à la pesche que de leur retrancher les 
moyens d 1 aller dans la profondeur des 
bois ou ils contractent un libertinage 
qui les detourne des employa plus utiles 
à eux et à la Colonie. 
1 
It is doubtf'ul if even this mémoire would have daunted 
Frontenac, but shortly before i t arrived he allowed another six 
officers to go up countr7 accompanied by voyageurs, their canoes 
2 
all heavily laden with trade goods. 
Champigny' s own solution for the social and economie ille 
which the colony was heir to was the rather unimaginative one of 
enforcing the eocisting regulations. In a lengthy mémoire on the 
subject he advocated nothing radically new but he did suggest 
modifications of the existing system which if put into practise 
might well have had positive resulta. He wrote: 
Ces Grands PaYs eloignés d'ou provient 
tant de pelleteries doivent de droit 
être, en general, à tous les habi tans 
de cette colonie et cependant on com-
mence à les donner, des Illinois sont 
à deux particuliers, d'autres demandent 
les Miamis, d'autres les Sioux, ainsi 
du reste et chacun de ces prétendus 
proprietaires se f'a.i t un Royaume de 
son canton. 
3 
l.Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVI Part 1, Mémoire du Roy aux 
sieurs Frontenac et Champigny, AU camp devant Mons, 7 APril 1691. 
2 .can. Arch. AC. series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 October 1691. 
3 .Que. Arch. Manuscri ta Relatifs à 1 'Histoire de la Nouvelle 
France, 2me serie, vol. VI, Mémoire concernant le commerce 
de tra1 te entre les Frs.I19ais et Sauvages dans les PaYs eloisnées 
des OUtaouacs Illinois Miami a et autres Nations. (Champigny) 
Quebec, 12 October 1691. 
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As a result of this, Champigny claimed, these favoured few 
were able to obtain all the tura of these nations and the tribes 
beyond them; thus the rest of the habitants were deprived of the 
benefits which they would enjoy were the Indiana to come down to 
the colony to tra.de as Jm.ey had done in the past and as they 
l 
would again if only twenty-five consés a yea.r were issued. 
As for the up country posta, Champigny suggested that only 
the one at Mich111mack1nac needed to be maintained with a 
commanding officer and garrison. He considered that this comman-
dant and his men should be allowed to take tra.de gooda up country 
w1 th them to a value equ1 valent to their PeY and allowances, to 
be gra.hted to them for twelve or e1ghteen months in advance. The 
profit they would malte on this amount of trade gooda, Champigny 
cla.imed, would more than compensa.te them for the high oost of 
transporting their supplies up country but, he warned, the men 
would have to be strictl.y forbidden to leave the environs of 
their post, otherw1se they would alwaYs be off on trading exped-
itions in the bush and never on duty • And should the King deem 
1 t beat to retain the posta in the Illinois and Mi amis country, 
2 
t.he same regulations would have to be en:forced there. 
In theory this would appea.r to be qui te a sound schema,. 
requiring no revolutionary changes in the existing system which 
would have been beyond the power of the au tho ri ti es to enforce, 
but in actual1ty it was quite impractical as its success would 
have depended entirely on the a,ppointment of post commandants 
with a devotion to duty sufficient to prevent them taking advan-
tage of heir situation. Champigny, by this time could have been 
l. ibid. 
--
-152-
under no delus1ons as to the type of officers Frontenac Chose 
for auch commanda; thus his recommandations must be regarded as 
little more than a pious hope. 
The truth of this was aJDPlY shown the following year when the 
King ordered Frontenac and the intendant to entorce all these 
reforma which Cb.aJDPisnY had recommended, v.ri th the exception of 
reducing the number of up country po sts. The King saw very clearly 
that if the number of men perm1 tted to go up country on one pre-
text or another were not reduced and if those who had to go up 
for m1litary purposes were not prevented from taking with them 
large quantities of trade goods, then the Indiana would have little 
time for waging war with the Iroquois, being instead continually 
engaged in the fur trade. The fact that the bulk of the furs 
com1ng down from up country at this time were castor sec d 1 été is 
a good indication tha.t the tribes were garnering furs during the 
summer months; this being the season of the year for war parties, 
the trees being in full le$! providing adequate cover for the 
Indian style of fighting. 
One· paint~upon which the King gave very defini te orders, orders 
which ran counter to Frontenac•s private interests, was that those 
receiving congés were to tra.de wherever they wished without let 
or hindrance. Frontenac was warned not to grant concessions or 
to give orders to his officers or to anyone else empowering them 
l 
to exolude congé holders from any area except Tadoussac. 
In his replies to the m1nister, Frontenac alwgys claimed that 
he was adhering strictly to the latter of the King's instructions 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVI Part 1, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Srs. Frontenac et ChaJDpigny. (1692) 
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regarding congés and the up country posta; complainte that his 
oonduct of affaira was governed by his private interests in the 
fur trade were, he vehemently asserted, nothing more than cavils 
1 
instigated by his enemies the ecclesiastios. How far removed he 
waa from PaYing even so muoh as lip service to the King's instruct-
ions he clearly demonstrated in the la te summer of 1693. His 
actions at this time also made it olear that it was impossible 
for Champigny to check h1m ef'f'ectively in any Wa.Y. 
Early in September word reaehed Quebec that one h'tmdred and 
eighty-seven canoes of' ottawa Indiana had arrived at Montreal 2 . 
with eight hundred thousand livres worth of' beaver pelta. 
Frontenac and Champigny 1mmed1ately went up to MOntreal together. 
Three or f'our daYs after th.eir arrival Frontenac inf'ormed Cham-
pigny that he intended to sand one hundred and forty-six men up 
country wi th the Ottawas when they returned in order to reinf'orce 
the existing posta and to garrison new ones. 
Champigny remonstrated with Frontenac over sending so many men 
3 
up country in contradiction to the King's orders and at a time 
when thef were sorely needed for the defence of the colony, but 
when Frontenac flatly sta.ted that i t was a matter of' m111 tary 
necessi ty CÎÎampigny had to concede the point. He was very d1 s-
"~ 
turbed, however, when he 1earned that the members of' the detach-
ment vere treating their m11itary permits as congés, se11ing them 
pub1ic1y in the streets of Montreal for one thousand to eleven 
l.Can. Arch. AC. Series Cl1A, vol. XI, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1691; vol. XII part 1, Frontenac au Ministre, Quebee, 15 September 1692; vol. XII part 2, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ministre, Quebee, 4 November 1693. 
2.Ca,n. Arch. BN. Series B Nl/8D, vol.DCCCLXXIX, fol. 320-338, 
Collection Cla1r$Wbeault, Frontenac à M. de Lagny, Que. 25 Oct.l6~ 
3 • Can. Arch. AN • Seri es B, vol. XVI part 1, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Srs. Frontenac et Champigny, (1692). 
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hundred livres each, and that those actually going up country 
were loading their canoes with as much trade goods as they would 
hold. Champigny sent his secretary to ask Frontenac how this 
came about and was prompt1y inrormed that the members or the 
detachment had his permission to take all the trade goods they 
wished, and as tor his permissions being sold as cong,s, he only 
wi shed th at one could sell them for rorty thou sand livres instead 
of a mere one thousa.nd. 
Champigny then drew up an ordonne.nce which was nothing more 
tha.n a repitition or the King's edicte governing military detach-
A 
ments and other s going up country. Before promulaating i t he 
showed it to Frontenac who, arter keeping it for four or five 
daye, intormed Champigny that he had no intention of enforcing 
any auch terme; he particularly objected to the clause prohibit-
ing the transport of brandy up country which Champigny had 
included in accordance with a strict interpretation or the King's 
1 
rather ambiguous order or 1679. Champigny deleted or watered 
down some clauses to please Frontenac but stubbornly refused to 
remove the ban on brandy; then he promulgated this revised 
2 
version or h1 s ordonna.nce. 
Frontenac promptly riposted by pub li shing an ordonna.nce of 
his own 11 ••• pour expliquer celle du Sieur de Champigny du onze 
7bre 1693 sur ce qui doit ~tre observé Par ceux qui ont obtenu 
des congés pour monter au pais des OUtaouacs et autres nations 
3 
éloignées." In his ordonnance Frontenac stated that since 
1. Edits & Ordonnances. Vol. I, pp 235-236, Ordonnance du roi qui 
défend de porter de l'eau-de-vie aux bourgades des sauvages ••• 
(Versailles) 24 May 1679· 
2. Can-Arch. AN· Series F3, vol. VII part 1, Collection Moreau de 
St. Méry, Ordonnance de M. de Champigny, Uontreal, 11 Sept .1693. 
3. Can. Arch. AN-Series F3, vol. VII part 1, Collection Moreau de 
St. Méry,Ordonnance de Frontenac, Montreal, 12 Sept. 1693· 
compl1 ance w1 th Champigny' s orders would delaY the departure of 
the detachment and also: u ••• nous nous sentons obligés d'eclaircir 
la plus grande partie des articles de ladite ordonnance et (les 
ordonnances) de Sa Majesté et 9ter Par là tous les scrupules qu'on 
pourroi t avoir de tomber dans une désobeisance à. Ses Ordres •.. " 
As for the King' s order that the intendant be given a declar-
ation of the quanti ty and sort of goods being taken by the party, 
Frontenac stated that he would not forbid compliance with this 
order but that in his opinion: " .•. elle nous parois.se inutile et 
qu'elle ne puisse produire que des longueurs fort préjudiciables 
au commerce et au service du Roy, aussi bien que la visite de 
verification desdi tes declarations. n 
Having effectively scuttled that royal edict he then threw 
into discard the King's order forbidding officers and troops to 
take trade goods up countr7 for an amount greater than their 
PaY and allowances by declaring that: " .•. nous nous sommes 
trouvés de necessité de leur accorder une liberté un peu plus 
étendue qu'elle ne semble leur être donnée Par 1' ordre du Roi .•. " 
The re strivtions on the transporting of brandy up country he 
abrogated completely, stating that he was sure His Majesty had 
never intended to deprive his subjects of the right to barter 
brandy wi th the Indiana any more than e.ny other commodi ty. 
Before the promulgation of Frontenac's ordonnâPce soma meàbers 
of the detachment had submitted to the intendant liste of the 
goods they were ta.king, but atterwards none of them would do so. 
Wh en C~ampigny sent his deputy to Lachine to ask: the sieur de 
Tonty for a declaration of his marchandise he received no satis-
faction whatsoever. Tonty and the members of his party retused 
point blank to comply with the intendant' s demand, stating tha.t 
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unlike ordinary congé holders they could not be required to 
furniSh auch a declaration since they were going to their con-
cession, granted them by the King, just as private persona 
viaiting their own estates had no need of congés or permissions 
but only of a passport signed by the governor, aince the latter 
l 
was entitled to know who came in and went out of his government. 
Thus all that Champigny could discover waa that fifty-five 
canoes had gone up country, all loaded to the thwarts with trade 
goods, and that in addition to this they had contrived to load 
the Indiana' cano es wi th a cargo of brandy. The cano es of the 
soldiers had been so laden with merehandise that they had had 
no room for the Indian presents and Frontenac was obliged to rush 
to Lachine in the middle of the night and work till dawn organ-
ising two more canoes with their voyageurs to transport these 
2 
goods. It wa.s undoubtedly this contretemps to which Frontenac 
referred in his letter to de Lagny when he guardedly rema.rked, 
"Je tus ••. obligé d'y aller le lendemain toute la nuict pour lever 
3 
quelques di ffi cul tez qui restoient encor es •.• n 
It is plain from the above tha.t Frontenac regarded the K1ns' s 
edicta as nUll and void whenever they contlicted with his own 
interests. It is also plain that there was virtua,lly nothing 
Champigny could do about tb.is state of affaira. He had done 
everything in his power as intendant to execute the King' s edicta 
but the greater authority of Frontenac and his determination to 
let nothing stand in his WaJ' had effeotively cheok-mated C~am­
pigny at every turn. 
1. can. Arcb.AJ.Series B Nl/8D, vol-DCCCLXXIX, fol. 320-338, 
Collection Clairambault, Frontenac à de Lagny, Que. 25 Oct. 1693. 
2. ibid; Ca.n. Arch.· AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny 
au Mfnistre, Quebec, 4 Bovember 1693· 
3· Can. Arch. AN-Series B Nl/8D, vol. DCCCLXXIX, fol. 320-338, 
Collection Clairambault, Frontenac à de Lagny, Que .25 Oct. 1693 · 
Frontenac' s trea.tment of congés as little more than largesse 
to be distributed to his favourites, despite the King's ver,y strict 
orders that no more than twenty-five be issued under a:ny pretext 
1 
whatsoever, is clearly shown in his letter to h&s friend de Lagny. 
After explain1ng that on orders from the court he had had to 
expedi te the issuing of consés to the Mon~treal hospital and to 
two other persona, he off handedly remarked u ••• que cela ne tirer-
oit à aucune consequence, que s '11 y en avoi t quelqu'autre dans 
des besoins si presantes qu'on cruet leur devoir accorder quelque 
2 
grace, on les feroi t Passer sous le nom de detachement •.• " 
Champigny, of course, took a very narrow view of Frontenac' a 
habit of giv1ng permissions for voyages up country to a favoured 
few. The previous spring the sieur d'Argenteuil had gone up country 
wi th four cano es; i t was true, C~ampigl'l1' adm1 tted, that d' Araen-
teuil carried dispatches from the governor to the post commandants 
but, he added ironically, these were very pleasant dispatches for 
the bea.rer since they enabled h1m to ma,ke a profit of between 
twelve and eighteen thousand livres on the trip. And the following 
September this same officer received two fresh permissions: "Il 
est bien t'acheux, u wrote Champigny, ude voir faire toutes ces 
graces qui sont la plus grande partie pour une seule famille du 
PaYs· qui est celle du Ca,pit~ine des gardes de M. de Frontenac dont 
trois officiers qui ont mon~é sont, pendant que de pauvres familles 
3 
rrs_ ont aucun part. n 
l.Ca,n. Arch. AN-Series B, vol. XVI part 1, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Sieurs Frontenac et Champigny. (1692) · 
2.can. Arch. JN.Ser1es B,Hl/8D, vol.DCCCLXXIX, fol. 320-338, 
Collection Clairambault, Frontenac à de Lagny, Que. 25 Oot.l693· 
3 . C an. Arch. AC . Seri es CllA, vol • XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693. 
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EVen Lahontan held that som~ething should be done about auch 
things. He stated that there was an infini ty of disorders in 
Canada that needed to be re:formed, one auch being to " ... ordonner 
aux Gouvern.eurs Généraux de ne pas vendre de congez pour aller 
l 
en traite chez les ~vages des gltands Lacs. 11 
Champigny never a.ctually accused Frontenac of trafficking in 
congés or permissions but he d14 so accuse Monseignat, Frontenac's 
secreta.ry. Accord1ng to reports received by Champigny, Monseignat 
had been making very large prof! ts on these congés, having reoeived 
as much as two thousa.nd livres from one man for procuring him the 
2 
means to trade up country. When the m1n1ster, in reply to Cham-
pigny' s charges, stated that he would have to have more defini te 
proof of Monseignat's peculations, Champigny replied that Monseig-
nat ha.d admitted being 1n partnership with a coureur de bois 
named Le SQeur whom Frontenac had allowed to go up country with 
four oa.noe loads or trade goods " ••• qui sont autant de congéz. n 
Monseignat had also stated, Champigny claimed, that Louvigny had 
agreed to give him five hundred livres a year in return for 
Frontenac's g1v1ng Louvigny the command at Mlchil1mack1nac, but 
that he had only rece1ved pgyment for the first year. Louvigny' s 
wife confirmed this to Clhamp1gny, add1ng that her husband had no 
intention of honouring this obligation. Champigny was not at all 
v1ndictive towards Monseignat, having no quarrel wi th the man 
persona].ly, as he made plain by his closing remarks to the 
mini star: " ..• comme il m'a d'ailleurs toujours paru assez honneste 
homme, estant même convenu franchement de la vente et qu'il a eu 
1. LAHONTAN: Nouve'IUX V oz ases de Mr le Baron de Lahontan dans 
l'Amerique Septentrionale, vol. II, p 82. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Ch8)llpigny au 
~~nistre, Quebec, 4 November 1693· 
-159-
de la peine de ce que voua avez eacrit à M. de Frontenac il y 
a lieu de croire qu'il ne s'engagera plus dans de Pareilles 
l 
entreprises •.• " 
Meanwhile, Frontenac had not been idle, madame la comt~sse 
de Frontenac having placed in the handa of the minister a lengthy 
mémoire defending her husba.nds actions in connec ti on wi th the 
granting of consés and permissions and a.t the same time accuaing 
2 
Champigny • s secretary of malversations. Champigny, when informed 
of this, labelled the charge as completely false, adding that so 
far from enga.ging in trade, hia secretary intended to retire into 
a mona.stery as. soon as his replacement could be brought over from 
3 
France. Wh ether or not th1 s last should be regarded as a !!2!! 
seguitur it is difficult to Ba3'· However, the m.inister does not 
appear to have been greatly concerned over this battle of the 
secretaries; he merely informed Frontenac that he should tell 
Champigny what he had heard aegarding the intendant' s secretary, 
" .• -afin qu'il y remidie s'il y a lieu, n and concluded by dryly 
remarking, "Je dois vous dire en mesme temps qu'il y a eu divers 
advis que le vostre a interest dans la pluspart de ces congez ou 
4 
parmi sai ons, affin que vous y preniez garde de prez • " 
During the course of the larger conflict between Champigny 
and Frontenac over the up country posta an issue arose of far 
greater cons~uence than the peculations of their secretaries. 
·- 1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, ChampigDy au Ministre, 
Quebec, 24 October 1694. 
2. Can. Arch. AN .series B, vol. XVII part l, Ministre à Frontenac, 
Versailles, 8 Ma:s 1694. 
:; • Can. Arch. AN .series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 24 October 1694. . 
4. Can. Arch. ~. Series B, vol. XVII part l, Ministre à Fron-
tenac, Versailles, 8 Mgy 1694. 
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This was Frontenac's granting or the entire Illinois trade to 
Tonty and La Forest as a private monopoly. The fort at Bt. Louis 
des Illinois had been founded by Frontenac's old associate, La 
1 
Salle, who se principal credi tor Frontenac claimed to be; thus 
the governor definitely had a vested interest in it. Tonty and 
La Forest had later obtained this concession from the King, 
" ••• aux termes et conditions portées par la concession qui lui 
2 
(La Salle) en a été faite •.• n 
In a very lengthy and revealing let ter to his friend de Lagny, 
the intenda,nt de commerce, Frontenac wrote: 
Joubliois de vous dire qu'il (Champlhgey) 
est fort animé contre mrs de la forest 
et de Tonty ••• Il se plainct •.• que dans 
les congez que JaY donnez ••• je naY Pas 
voulu oster une clause que de tout temps 
Ja.Y inseré dans ceux que Ja.Y expediez, 
quil seroi t permis a ceux qui les exploi-
teront, dr aller traiter dans toutes les 
nations eloignées, a l'exception de 
celles qui sont dans lestendue de la 
traitte de Tadoussac, qui aPPartient au 
Roy et a mrs les fermiers, et dans le 
district du fort St. Louis des Ilinois, 
attendu le privilege que sa majesté en 
avoit donné a feu mr de la Salle, aux 
droicts duquel mrs de la forest et Tonty 
sont presentement. 
3 
He i s here clearly giving de Lagny to beli eve th a.t La Balle 
had been granted monopoly rights but nowhere in the terme of his 
4 
concession was a:tJ1' mention made of such privileges; on the 
1. Que. Arch. Rpt. 1928-1929, p 268, Frontenac à JI. de Lagny, 
Quebec, 2 November 1695· 
2. PEASE & WERNER: Illinois Historie C llection, vol. I, 
pp 230-234, Lettres Patentes de Sa Ma est qui confirment 
l'Arret cidessus de terres y mentionnées, 14 July 18f0. 
3. Can. Arch. AN· Series B, Nl/8D, vol. DCCOLXXIX1 fol. 320-338, 
Collection Clairambault, Frontenac à de Lagny, Que. 25 Oct 1693. 
4. M.URPHY, EDMPND ROBERT: Benn de Tonty, Fur Trader of' the 
Mississippi, pp 69-70. 
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contra~ it was speci~ically stated that he was not to prevent 
l 
gp:y one who so desired ~rom trading in the area. FUrthermore, 
in 1692 the King ordered: 
Ceux qUi obtiendront lesdits congez 
pourront aller au PaYs des Nations 
a.lli4es que bon leur semblera sans 
exclusion d'aucunes, sous quelque pr'-
texte que ce puisse estre, Sa Majest4 
ne voulant pas que le Sr de Frontenac 
donne aucune permission ny ordre aux 
o~ficiers et autres pour les Pa1S 
esloignez avec facult4 d'exclure ceux 
qui auront lesdits congez, à la reserve 
de la trai tte de Tadoussac qui tait 
partie du bail de la ferme de Sa Majest4. 
2 
Frontenac, in his latter to de Lagny, was patently trying to 
obscure this when he wrote: 
Mr de Champigcy pretend qUil n' est parl4 
dans ses ordres que de la traite de 
Tadoussac, et quainsy le ~ort de St. 
Louis et les Ilinois ny doive Pas estre 
compris, quoi qu'il scache que dans la 
lettre commune quon nous ecrivit lannée 
derniere, il soit marqu4 expressement, 
que le Roy entend que ces deux mrs 
jouissent des memes privileges, quil 
avoit accordez a feu mr de la Salle, ce 
qui ~aict voir, que pour leur nuire, il 
faut qu'il eust deja ecrit la dessus, car 
sans cela on ne seroit point avisé de 
nous donner cette explication ••. 
3 
Here Frontenac is doing little more tha.n to ta.ke the King's 
statement out o~ its context and twist its meaning, for what 
the King actuallY said was: 
l.Ca:n • .A;rch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 5 October 1701. 
2 .ca:n. Arch, AN. Series B, vol. XVI Part l, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Srs de Frontenac et de Champigny, (1692) 
3.Ca:n. Arch. AN-Series B, Nl/8D, vol. DCCCLXXIX, fol. 320-338, 
Collection Clairambault, Frontenac à de Lagny, Que.25 Oct.l693· 
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Le Roy aYant accordé aux Brs. de la. forest 
et Tonty l'esta.blissement du :t'ort St. Louis 
des lllinois qu'a. condition de le faire 
valoir et maintenir aux termes de la. con-
cession qui en avait esté fait au :t'eu Br 
de la Balle, et surtout à la charge de 
mettre en action les Illinois et les autres 
nations voisines contre les Iroquois, Sa 
Majesté veut qu'ils donnent ausdi ta Srs de la 
Forest et Tonty les ordres nécessaires sur 
ce sujet, qu'ils tiennent la main à les 
faire exécuter, et à s'en faire rendre 
compte pour en informer exactement Sa Majesté. 
1 
Qui te obviously the King did not have the gra.nting of 
monopoly privileges in mind here, as Frontenac w.ould have had 
de Lagny believe. However, he counted on his influence at the 
court to sustain his actions; thus he requested de Lagny: 
(Champigny) les (Tonty and La Forest) menace 
encore de le f'aire tout de nouveau mais ils 
esperent quaiant vostre protection comme 
ils s' ~:flattent ils n • auront Pas beaucoup 
a !aPprehender ... 
Je vous seraY obligé sy vous Voulez bien 
Informer Monsieur le premier et ma femme de 
Ce detail afin que sJls en entendaient Par-
ler Ils puissent y repondre, mestant contenté 
de leur marquer La chose en General et en 
Eerivant encore plus simplement a Mr de 
Bontchartrain. 
2 
The following yea.r, in a lengthy mémoire, the King stated 
that in this matter Frontenac and Champigny were to govern them-
selves by " .. -la teneur des lettres que (Tonty and La Forest) 
ont obtenu et par ce qui s'est pratiqué du vivaJ>.t du Sr de la. 
Salle aux droits duquel Ba. Majesté les a mis, son intention est 
3 
que lesd. Brs de Frontenac et de Champigny I.."Y conforment ••• " 
l.Que. Arch. Rpt. 1927-1928, p 83, Lettre du Roi au Gouverneur 
de Frontenac et à l'Intendant Bochart Champigny,(7 APril 1692) 
2.Can. Arch. AN-Series B, Nl/8D, vol. DCCCLXXIX, fol. 320-338, 
Collection Clairgmbault,Frontenac à de Lagny, Que.25 Oct. 1693· 
3 .Que. Arch. Rpt. 1927-1928, p 96, Mémoire du Roy au Gouverneur 
de Frontenac et à 1' Intendant Bochart Champigny. 
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Thus, in affect, Frontenac received tacit permission to continue 
Tonty and La Forest' s Illinois monopoly . 
All told, 09ampigny's detailed eaposé of Frontenac's complete 
di sregarà for the royal edicta had no immediate effect whatsoevar, 
except to bring the wrath of Pontchartrain down upon C~aJilpigny 1 s 
own head for ever having made auch charges 1n the first place. To 
Frontenac the m1n1ster contented h1mself with repeating the same 
instructions and injunct1ons governing the fur trade and up 
country posta that the King had been in the habit of making for 
1 
the past few years. The intendant, however, received a blistering 
latter from the m1nister in which the entire responsibility for 
all. the disorders in the colony was placed squarely on his 
Shoulders. The m1n1ster said: 
•.• il est bi en f ascheux que vo stre 
division avec M. de Frontenac tienne 
les choses en tel estat, que le service 
de Sa Majesté en souffre et que vous ne 
remediez Pas aux desordres comme vous le 
pouviez faire réciproquement si vous 
agissiez de concert, et en union, et que 
vostre mesintelligence ne fust Pas entre-
tenue par de petites Passions fomentées 
par les mauvais esprits, et les personnes 
interessées qUi vous approchent, par les-
quelles vous vous laissez entraisner. 
2 
Champigny was then warned that if he d1d not eradicate in the 
future the bi tterness that he had shown towa.rds the governor and 
work in close harmoDY' with h1m, then he woUld be seriously j eop-
ard1sing all his hopes and prospects for advancement in the King' s 
service. His accusations aga1nst Frontenac, the m1nister went on, 
were proof of nothing but Champigny 's own chagrin. Then, wi th a 
:L. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII Part 1, Ministre à 
Frontenac, Versailles, 13 March 1694. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII part 1, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 8 MaY 1694. 
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ty'pical Pontchartrain touch, he stated that if Champigny had bad 
certain knowledge of auch disorders i t was his duty to di eclose 
them and justi1'y his accusations; " ... sa Majest4 n'exige point 
de vous quand Jllle a eu la bontt§ de vous exhorter 'â une bonne et 
sincere union, de d1sst.muler ce que vous pouvez sc;avoir contre 
1 
son servi ce." 
It is d1fficul t to see just wha.t marmer of proo1' the mini ster 
could have expected Champigny to provide to back up h1 s charges, 
which had certainly been specifie and detailed enough; the 
intendant could hardly have been expected to produce a written 
conf es sion signed by Frontenac • How ev er, i t i s cl ear from the 
tenor of the m1n1ster's letter that Frontenac's supporters at the 
court bad wasted no time in bringing their influence to bear. In 
the face of this there was nothing that Champigny could do but 
turn a blind eye to Frontenac' s evasions of the royal edicta 
governing the fur trade. Consequently, for the next four years 
Champigny did little more than hint that these edicta were not 
being observed as strictly as ~igbt be desired. 
Despite bis circumspeot1on so far as Frontenac's conduct was 
concerned, in 1695 he did put forward rather radical proposals 
for reforming the administration of the up country posta, which, 
if a.dopted, m1ght well have helped curb the chrome abuses and 
d1sorders. 
He suggested that since there were so many Frenchmen at these 
posts, both coureurs de bois and sold1ers, what was needed to 
see that they d1d not abuse their privileges was an honest man at 
1 
ea.ch post who would act as a deputy of the intendant. This deputys 
1. ibid. 
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duties wou1d entail distributing the presents to the Indiana, 
paying the garrison and issuing them with clothing, dispensing 
justice, and above all, seeing to it that the King's orders were 
carried out. The maintaining of auch an official at the posta 
eou1d be effected at no coat to the King, ChampiSQJ claimed, by 
allowing him to have a canoe load of trade goods sent up each year, 
~ 
or, if the King did not wish to enter into trade except for his 
A 
sustenance, he cou1d be given the proceeds of one congé wh1ch 
1 
wou1d be worth seven hundred and fifty livres in French money. 
ChaœpiBQJ eonsidered that the appointment of auch deputies would 
be well worth while if for no other purpose tha.n to inform him 
2 
of illegal enterprises at theae posta. 
Actual1y, al.l that this plan amounted to vas the transference 
of much of the authority at these posta from the governor's 
juriadiction to that of the intendant. EVen auppoaing that 
Chaœpign.y could have a,ppo1nted deputies wi th a singular devotion 
to duty and no desire to avail themse1vea of the ample apportun-
itiea to enrich themselves, this could have resulted only in the 
creation of a sim11a.r situation at these posta to that which 
existed at Quebec, that 1s, of' conf'l1cts between commandants and 
the deputy intendants. ChaJDpigiJY' s proposal could, under the 
exiating circumsta.ncea, have provided little more than a check 
on the commandera, but he considered that it would be wall worth 
while for this reason a.lone. The only really effective wgy tha.t 
honest adm1n1 atra.t1on could have be en obtained at the up country 
1. The French livre was at a twenty-five percent premium in 
New France. 
2. Can. Arch. AC· Series C11A, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 November 1695· 
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posta, as elsewhere in the colony, would have been by the appoint-
. ment o'f honest men as post commandera, and had that been done 
there would have been no great need for the suggested deputies. 
However, Champigny rec ei ved no acknowledgement from the court 
that his proposa.ls had even. been received, let alone considered. 
Instead, in mid-summer 1696, with the arrival of the first sh1ps 
from France came an order from the King which must have shaken 
everyone in the colony to the core, from the governor down to the 
low11est of the coureurs de bois. 
This dispa.tch ordered Frontenac, immediately upon 1 ts receipt, 
to suspend the acceptance of all bea.ver pel ts at the bureau of' 
the Farm unt1l f'urther orders. Frontenac was now strictly f'or-
bidden to grant tillY congés or permissions for the car:rying of 
trade goods to the Indiana under 8P9 pretext wha.tsoever: and 
furthermore, the minister added, the King had ordered him to 
inform Frontenac that he would be held personally responsible 
l 
for any actions contrary to these instructions. 
By August l8th the bureau of' the Farm had ceased to a. cc ept all 
2 
beaver pel ts. 
One ea.n well imagine wha.t must have been the state of mind of 
the fur trading fra terni ty, ind.eed of the en tire colony, while 
they waited for a ship to bring some clarification from the court 
as to what the f'ate of the fur tra.de was to be. When in October 
the King' s orders fi§;ùly arrived soma groups in the colony must 
have been highly gratified, but others, ma.inly those who had 
1. Can. Arch. AN.Series B, vol. XIX part 1, Ministre à M. d.e 
Frontenac, Versailles, 4 APril 1696. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Que bec, 18 August 1696 . 
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gained the most from Frontenac's fur trade policies, ware sore 
di stressed. 
The King now ordered tha.t all the up country posta be a.ba.ndoned 
with the exception of Tonty and La Forest's post on the Illinois; 
they were allowad to retain their post only on condition tha.t they 
did no trading whatsoevar in beaver pelta. There were to be no 
congAs or permissions issued but those having mercaandise or ture 
up country ware to be allowad to sand eanoes to bring these goods 
baek, provided that precautions were ta.ken to see to i t that they 
did not use this as an excuse to sand up fresh supplies of trade 
goode. 
The King gave two main reasons for these drastic restrictions; 
the insupportable expense of supplying the up country Indiana with 
p:resents and arma when they could not be :relied upon in the war 
wi th the Iroquois, and his desire to concentra.te all the French 
in the central colony in order that they might be a.va.ilable for 
its defence and, as a result of this, that trading in the depths 
of the bush by the cou:reurs de bois ehould end once and for all. 
From now on, the King decreed, the Indiana were to bring their 
furs down to Montreal, as had been their custom in the Past, so 
that the trade which had been usurped by the coureurs de bois 
for the sole benefi t of a few would be resto red to all the mer-
chants and habitants,and all would have an opportunity to share 
1 
in the profits. 
Accompanying these orders was a rather bleak dispatch from 
the minister to Frontenac. After sgying that he had nothing to 
add to the King' s orders, he warned the governor: 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XIX part 1, I'1émoi:re du Roy pour 
les Srs. de Frontenac et de Champigny, Versailles, 26 MaY1696. 
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Vous devez prendre garde que celuy que 
vous aurez à regler en general et en 
particulier ne puisse servir de pretexte 
aux interests et à des desseins particu-
liers au prejudice des ordres et de 
l'intention de Sa Majesté que Je ne 
pourrais ampescher que Sa Majesté ne 
vous en rendist responsable. 
1 
It is qui te obvious here tha.t Pontchartrain is warning Frontenac 
that he can no longer merely PaY lip service to the King' s orders 
and rely •n his influence a.t the court to protect and sustain 
h1m. 
The only WaY to ascerta1n a.ll the reaons why Louis XIV decided 
on auch a radical chanae in policy would be to know what went on 
at the meetings o~ the Council of State when the question was 
discuased. This information is, unfortunately, not available, 
but all the information wh1ch i a av ail able maltes i t qui te clea.r 
that the change wa.s dictated largely by economie necessity. The 
old policy had not ha.d the resulta desired by the King; during 
the preceiding f'ifteen yea.rs there ha.d been no diminution in the 
numbers of the coureurs de bois, agriculture was not f'lourishing, 
nor were auch industries as fishing and lumbering showing any 
signa or healt.:by growth. The war was, or course, ma1nly to b1ame 
for this but the dra1nill8 off into the ever expand1ng fur trade 
orso much of the colony's manpower, initiative and capital was 
also thought to be a ver.y considerable factor. 
However there can be little doubt that the principal reason 
for the King's action was the tact that by 1696 the French beaver 
trade was virtually b~rupt. This situation had se?eral causes 
stemming from events which occurred over a span of years on both 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XIX Part 1, Ministre à M. de 
Frontenac, Versailles, 26 MaY 1696. 
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sidas of the Atlantic; tnus over soma of them the colonial officials 
could have had no control whatsoever. 
The CompanJ of the Farm was obliged to accept at fixed priees 
all the beaver pelta brought in to their agents in New France, 
and down to 1689 tbis monopoly was j ealously guar6ed by the 
Compa.ny. The main market for these pel ts was the French hat 
making industry and the amount i t could absorb was limited. Further-
more, the industry had been upset by auch things as the Revocation 
of the muet of Nantes, which had caused a great man,y skilled hat 
maltera to leave the country; also, the war in Pllrope had disrupted 
normal trade channel a and so reduced the French export market. 
However, these were little more than contributory factors to 
an unheal thy economie situation. The main cause of the ba.n.kruptcy 
of the French beaver trade was that the market was completely 
glutted wi th poor grade castor sec. The French hat maltera needed 
three castor ~ to one castor ~ for the manufacture of their 
hats, bence they could not absorb this great flood of castor ~' 
1 
nor could i t be disposed of on the foreign market. 
Champigny, in 1694, pointed out that the amount of castor .§.!.2. 
co ming down to Montreal w as now four times what 1 t hq,d been betore 
the French began to exploit the trade of the Illinois, Miamis 
and adjacent areas, and, he added: 
81 on demande pourquoy aurefois il y 
avoit plus de gras que de sec, c'est 
que les franoois ne le cherchoient pas 
avec tant d' av1d1 té qu'ils font aujour-
dhu1, Il n'y a point de nations a cinq 
ou six cent lieues d' j cy ou il ny aYt 
des tranoois avec des marchandises pour 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Mémoire pour le castor, 
Champigny, Quebec, 26 Octobre 1694; SUr le Mémoire de Mr. de 
Champigny concernant le Castor. Sans lieu n1 date. 
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les traiter avec les sauvages a. mesure 
qu'jls tuent leurs castors ••. 
... s'jls s'en trouve a.ujourdhui un 
si grand nombre de mechant, ce n'est 
que l'on a esté negocier avec les 
nations du sud ..• 
1 
He al.so pointed out tb.at the beaver trapped 1n these southern 
Parts d1d not have as heavy or as fine a fur as those from the 
north, and also, ow1ng to the m1lder climate these In41ans had 
never made the skins into robes and worn them as d1d the Algon-
quins and Hurons, thus they supplied little or no castor .5.!,U, 
only poorly dressed sec wh1ch wa.s " ... tres mal a,prastez et gros 
2 -
de cuir .•• " 
As early as 1687 there had been complainte in ::&llrope that the 
beaver trade was being glutted as a. result, not only of greater 
exporta from Canada, but of cheaper beaver being dumped on the 
3 
French market by the lMglish and Dutch marchants. Then in 1689 
eight hundred thoueand livres worth of fure were brought down 
to Montreal; owing to the war thià~was the first auch convoy 
4 
eince 1686. 
The Company of the Farm wa.s far :from plea.sed when thi e huge 
Shipment reached France; they managed to dispose or soma rour 
5 
hundred thou sand livres worth to the Rolland marchants, but at 
1. Can. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XIII, Mémoire pour le Castor, 
Champigny, Quebec, 26 October 1694. 
2. ibid. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, Memoire touchant le 
commerce de Canada, 1687. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
· Quebee, 5 October 1692. 
5. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII Part l, Mémoire sur le 
prix et la consommation des Castors. 1692. 
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1 
a priee considerably lower tha.n normal. The following year they 
ha.d much greater ea.use for compla.int; one hundred thousand écus 
worth of beaver were brougb.t down by the up country Indiana and 
another two hundred thou•and livres worth were brought down later 
r, 
in the yea.r by the coureurs &e bois. rn reporting this to the 
mini ster, Frontenac remarked: " ... dans une année aussy pleine de 
troubl.es •.• on verra le commerce fleurir ..• n'y aYant 3 am.ais eu 
pen4ant dix ans que j' a1 esté paisible de ce PaYs, de flotte de 
canots qui tJOnt descendu en une seule :t'ois plus nombreuse ny 
~ 
plus chargés de castors." 
In 1692 the Company of the Farm claimed that if the existing 
situation continued they would have enough beaver pelta to supply 
the market for the duration of the next Farm lease, which could 
. 
only mean the complete ba,nkruptcy of the Farm if li mi ts were not 
l.Ca,n. Arch. AC· Series C11A, vol. XI, Pontchartrain à Frontenac, 
Versailles, 3 July 1690. 
2.Can • .Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 November 1690; The silver écu was worth 3 livres 
2 sols, the gold écu 6 livres. -
The figures given here cannot be taken as representing the 
gross a:mount of beaver or of turs of all types being shipped 
from Canada, they represent merely the tura brought down in 
the y early :f'ur brigades from up country; i t i s very likel.y 
that a fair amount of furs were hrought down in odd canoe loads 
quite a.Part from these convoya. 
C are has been taken to specity whether the figures quoted 
represent beaver alone or furs of all types. It must also be 
pointed out that all the figures represent livres worth of furs 
or beaver, not livres weight. some statistics quoted in the 
standard books dealing wi th the fur trade are woef'ully mislead-
ing owing to a ohronic contusion between livres weight and 
livres money. Just how misleading this can be is obvious when 
i t i s realised th at the average beaver skin weighed about li 
to 2 pounds, and was aold to the Company at rates varying 
between 5 livres 10 sols and 1 livre 15 sols, depending on 
the quali ty • 
aet to the .-llllt the OollpaJV shov.l4 l»e requ1re4 w take • 'fhe7 
atate4 tb.at tb.e fore.tp. market mw took onl7 a •all aJIOUDt at a 
TertT low priee 8134 the Frcch hat matera were aalti:a.g oDl.7 h.alf as 
llaJ:IJ ha ta as foraerl.7, the Span1ab. aarket ha'Ying been lo at ov1ng 
ta the diaor4el'a of tb.e Mavalde aJ14 the W&l'• '!he Pal'ia hat aakera, 
t.Jutee qv.artera of wboa we!'e !"111ne4, eould DOt ••• ao!'e t.lrlaJ:t. ten 
thouaan4 !!!.J wo!'th of beaTe!' per 7ear; aJld te &44 t.o the Coap&J31'' a 
trou~lea, the b\llk ot the beaTe!' atore4 at La BDohelle llad been 
l 
raiaed b7 Tel"'lin. 
Deapite oont1n11ed 4Man4a b7 the o:roWJl tb.at the pver~~er and 
intendant av.at entoroe tb.e edicta sove!'Jû.ng the tu.r tra.cle &114 ao 
rectaoe tb.ia avalanche of beaTe!', i t atill went on. In 1$3 between 
aeTen ~ e18ht blmd!'ed tbouaau.4 li Trea worth of l>eaver, plw.a aoae 
2 
left oTer troa otb..er Je&l"a, were ab1ppe4 troa Qu.ebee. BJ tb1a 
t1ae the e1 tu.at1on waa 10 d~Qerate that tb..e King, in 1694, tr184 
1io set the Quebec llerchaJlta to ab.ip tb.eir lteaTer d1reot to HollaJld, 
provi4ed t.bat pree&1lt1ona cou.ld. be talte for the aeeu.r1 t7 ot the 
3 
ahip a; thia beiDS ·rather neceas&17 a1nce lPraaee and the Hetb.erlaada 
were at var at tbia t1ae. 
Bowever, the CalladiaD merchauta were loatll to ava11 th•aelvea 
of th1a opportwû t7, aud 1». a1J1 oaae the &arl7iDg trade wae in the 
4 
handa ot tb.e La Bl:)ohelle aerohaJJ.ta. !~lere 1a al80 the taetor that 
the Cana.cl1am.a reall7 had 11 ttle 1ncent1Te to und.ertalte auch 
1. Oan· .&roh • .&0. Ser1ea Cll.A., Tel. XII part l, ••moire au.r le 
prix et la oenao1111ation 4ea Oaatora, 1692. 
2. Oall• Arch • .&O. Seriee CllA, v•l· XII part 2, Prentenao et 
OhaaJdSD7 &11 111n1atre, Clllebeo, 4 lloYeabezt 1693. 
3 • 01Jl • .troll.. llf. Seriea B, TOl. XVII p&!'t. 1, M4ao1re à Re7 au. 
Sieuzta FNntenac et Cb.•Pit5D7 • (1694) • 
4 • 0 al1 • .&roh. AC • Serie a Cll.&, TOl • XIII, Frontenac et ChaJIPiW 
&11 M11l1atre, Quelaec, 5 Nev.aher 1694. 
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adventures when the Company of the Farm was obliged to purchase 
at set priees, all the bea.ver which they brought in. 
In 1694, one hundred and four cano es loa.ded wi th furs came 
1 
down from Michilimaokinac alone, and the following year CallièDes 
reported that a brigade of ninety oanoes br1nging furs worth 
2 
nearly four hundred thousand livres had come down from up country. 
Thus, by 1696 the Company of the Farm found itselt stocked with 
three and a half million livres worth of beaver whioh i t could in 
no wise dispose of, and the prospect before ft of seeing this 
a.mount 1norease " •.• encore à proportion d'année en année, si on 
3 
ne peut y a.porter remede." 
In the face of a situation auch as this the surprising thing 
is, not that the King took auch drastic action, but that he did 
not do so muoh sooner. 
The question must now be asked, could Champigny have done 
anything to prevent this 81 tua.tion from arising? To this the 
answer can on1y be no. New France was trea.ted by the orown as 
merely a.nother royal province, the governor and the intendant 
being little more than administra.tors cha.rged with executing 
poli ci es emana. ting from the King or his m1n1ster some three 
. 
thou sand miles awgy. Champigny, therefore, could only recom-
mend changes in the existing policies and auch changes as he did 
recommend were largely ignored, Thus all. that remained for him 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Callières au Ministre, 
:Montreal, 19 October 1694. 
2. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Callières au I~nistre, 
Montreal., 27 Ootober 1695· 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol: XIV, Considerations ~énérales 
sur le commerce de castor en Canada. Mémoire pour M d AgUesseau, 
1696. 
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to do wa.s attempt to enforce the existing la.ws and in this he 
was continua.lly frustrated by Frontenac. 
There ca.n be no doubt that ha.d Champigny recei ved the full 
cooperation of Frontenac in enforcing the ex1st1ng edicta 
govern1ng the fur trade the now of bea ver pel ta would have 
been d1m1n1shed. It is no accident that the vast increase in 
this commerce occurred 1mmed1ately after Frontenac's arr1val 
in the colony; every ca.noe load of trade goods wh1ch Frontenac 
perm1tted to go up count:r-t' contrary to the royal edicta meant 
that two canoe loada of beaver pelta came down to Xontreal ·.,soma 
t1me la ter. But even had Frontenac ab1ded strictly by the let ter 
of h1 a orders the amoun t of tura co ming down to the colony would 
still have been 1n excess of the amount the French market could 
have absorbed. In the west and north west both the French and 
the Indian traders had tapped vast new markets amongst distant 
tribes who were a.%d for Elropea,n goods. Even 1f all the coureurs 
de boi a had returned to the colony and the fur trade had then 
been carried on solely at a r-Iontreal fur fair as the King and 
Champigny desired, the Ottawas and other Indian middlemen would 
a till have brought down far more furs than had reached the 
colony prior to 1689. 
Champigny does not a,ppear to have realised a.ll the economie 
and political implications of the situation when he stated, in 
1695, that the surest way to reduce the prodigious quantity of 
beaver would be to ma.ke certain that only .twenty-fi'l'e canoes of 
1 
trade goods went up country each year. Being a very conscientious 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 November 1695. 
royal official, Oha.mpig:ey wa.s perhaps too ineensed by Frontenac' a 
flagrant disregard for the King' s edicta to see the problem in 
i ts truly epie proportions. .AnY siza.ble reduction in the beaver 
trade, al though it would have solved the immediate problem of 
the glutted. market 1n France, would at the same time have created 
economie and political problems in Canada which would have been 
even more serious and much more d1fficul t to reconcile. In the 
political sphere it would have necessitated a complete reorienta-
tion of the French relations wi th the up country Indiana, and in 
the economie sphere, the crown would have been. faced w1th a 
bankrupt colony • 
The French were astride a tiger, and the King and his officials 
a,ppear to have realized this only when they tried to dismount. 
CH,APTER V. 
COMPACT COLONY VERSUS WESTERN EXP.AUBION. 
PART Il. 
The reaation to the roy al edict or 1696 vari ed rrom aPProval on 
principal to claims tha.t its implementation would result in 
nothing less than the total ruin or the colony. 
Frontenac, na.turally enough, was particularly bitter a.t the 
turn events ha.d ta.ken; he rought vdîgorously, like a. dog· who has 
seen someone snatch aWaY his bone, to have the ed1ct cancelled, 
and when he tailed in this he d1d everything possible to circum-
vent i ta execution. He re.fUsed to admit tha.t the Company ot the 
Farm had any Just cause to be either bankrupt or over stocked 
wi th beaver, ;:La.iming that " .•. ils ne peuvent avoir perdu ny 
estre dans aucune avances depuis huit années de leur terme, ce 
qui leur reste de castor n'estant que le prorfit qu'ils ont 
manqué de taire par le peu d'ordre qu'ils ont donné pour sa vente 
et distribution, et le peu d'intelligence ou d'application qu'ils 
1 
ont pour ce commerce." He turther maintained. that the Company 
could easily have disposed or their surplus bea.ver by reduoing 
their priees a little, whioh in turn would have lowered the priee 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 Ootober 1696. 
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The King promptly replied that he had had just auch an audit 
made of the Farmer' s accounts and it established beyond doubt 
the very opposite of that which Frontenac claimed; and for his 
turther information, the King added, i t was qui te plain that the 
2 
main cause ot the troubl.e stemmed from di sorders in Jm.e col.ony. 
The'Great Debate 1 had begun. On one aide was Frontenac and 
his tur trading triends, men like La Mothe Cadillac, 'l'onty and 
La Forest, and on the other, the Jesuite and Denis Riverin, not 
to mention the King himselt. Champigny at tiret took an intermed-
iary pos1 tion, he tried to etfect a compromise arrangement but 
events soon forced him into the camp ot Frontenac' s opponents. 
The arguments of Frontenac' a clique were based very largel.y 
on self interest. The aba.ndonment of the western poste meant the 
end of their private .fur trading. To them New France had only 
one rai son d • être, namel.y, ture. La Mothe Cad1ll. ac maintained 
that Canada should be treated as two complementary colonies, 
" ••• 1. 'une dans le pais d'en haut, et 1.' autre en bas, cel.l.e cy 
sans l'autre, seroi t un corps sans arme •.. " He dism1ssed as 
doomed to failure from the start all attempts to establish 
f1sh1ng in the Gulf of St. Lawrence as a major industry: u ••• ce 
projet est digne d'un Riverin qui ne prend jamais que la super-
l.. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 26 Ocotber 1.696. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII part 3, Mémoire du Roy pour 
les Srs. comte de Frontenac et de Champigny, Versailles, 
27 APril 1697. 
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fi cie d'un projet qu'il ne sauroi t même executter .... " And as for 
agriculture, he claimed that there was ho hope for the colony here: 
Il faut donc se retrancher uniquement à 
la culture des terres, cella est bon en 
effet mais il est bon d'examiner si pour 
ce seul endroit cette collonie se sou-
tiendra, et quand bien elle produiroit 
antant de bled que les deux meilleures 
provinces de France il faut savoir si 
cella luy donnera occasion de faire un 
commerwe suffisant pour sa subsistance, 
il faurdroit que le bled fui bien rare 
dans le monde pour resoudre les negotians 
a venir en Canada pour en faire des car-
gaisons, il est pourtant certain qu'on ne 
peut pretendre autre chose des productions 
de cette basse collonie, joignons a celle 
cy la collonie d'en haut et vous verrez 
que les deux ensemble pourront fournir un 
corps parfaitement bien animé, qui peut 
donner de belles et bonnes esperances, et 
fournir par leur reunion un solide étab-
lissement. 
In conclusion he cla1med that the only true source ot weal.th in 
New France wa.s :furs, i t was only this commodi ty that would at tract 
business men to the colony and enable i t to PeY for its importa 
1 
from France. 
As a piece of special pleading these arguments are all qui te 
cogent, except for one thing, they are based on the premise that 
there would alwaYs be a stea.dy market for all the tura that 
Canada could produce. 
Frontenac used very si mil ar argument:a in his brie:f for the fur 
trade. He claimed that the coureurs de bois were not a losa to 
the colo.ny' a econo:my since they would never submi t to working on 
the land anywaY; and as for developing agriculture he dismissed 
it by stating that in good times enough grain was grown to feed 
the colony and the troops, but that during the war i t was impossible 
to farm more land, there being a great many seigneuries which had 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Mémoire écrit Par 
l'officier envoyé par le comte de Frontenac comma.ndèr à 
M1 s silimaldna en 1694. 
-179-
had to be abandoned owing to Iroquois raids. Attempts to estab-
li sb. a f'i shing induatry could not hope to succeed, he claimed, 
owing to the laclt of' salt 1n the colony, and qui te a.Part f':rom 
this, it would require a number of' naval vessels to cruise in 
the Gulf' to protect the f'ishing boats from l!hglish privateera. 
In conclusion he made his usual claim to the ef'fect that he was 
the most disinterested person in the colony so far as the fur 
trade waa concerned but that he was conv1nced the King's edict 
would prove impossible to carry out, no matter how much vigilance 
1 
was employed. 
Frontenac and La Motte Cadillac both asserted most vehemently 
that if the up country po sts were aba.ndoned and all the French 
wi thdrawn from the bush then the allied Indiana would imm.ediately 
malte peace wi th the Iroquois and take th.eir furs to the English; 
once these tribes discovered that they could get h1gher priees 
for their furs, better quality goods and unlim1ted supplies of' 
run\by trading with. the !l'lgl.ish, their economie and political 
2 
a.llegia.nce to the French would be destroyed f'orever. "Que devien-
droi t cette basse colonie," demanded Cad1lllac, 11 si toutes ces 
nations se rangeait contre nous. il f'audroit bientot songer à 
chercher un autre asile, et la aulture des terres seroit pour 
3 
lors bien '4mutile • 
Denis Ri verin, one of the most f'ar sighted men in the colony, 
submitted very convincing arguments in reply to those of' Frontenac 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1696. 
2. ibid; vol. XIII, Mémoire écrit par l'officier envoyé Par le 
ëO'iiite de Frontenac commander a' M1ss111mak1na en 1694. 
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and Cadillac. He deelared that the only WaY the beaver tra.de 
could be restored to a sound economie basie would be for the Fa.rm 
to "l' as\"a.t la main à. la vente de ses castors •.• " and for the 
King to ban completely all trading in the bush. Were the King 
to do th1 s, he claimed, the Indiana would again bring their :rurs 
down to the colony and 'both they and the French would thereby gain. 
The Indiana would receive twice as much trade goods in the colo~ 
for their :rurs as they were accustomed to receive up country, owing 
to the high coat of freighting goods to the poste and a.lso beca.use 
of the excessively high profit which the coureurs de bois extorted 
from them. The French would malte lees prot"i t by trading wi thin 
the colony but i t would be bo th prompt and sure sin ce a.ll the 
riaks and labours of tra.nsporting the :furs and trade goods would 
be borne by the Indiana, and turthermore, everyone would be able 
to share in these profits and not just tho se who ma.naged to get 
a. congé. 
The exi sting glut of castor sec would be eliminated, he ma.in-
tained, because the Indiana would bring 1lown only enough :furs to 
ob tain their needs and these ture would be of better 'flUa.li ty as 
the Indiana would have time to dress them properly and malte them 
into robes, whereas in recent years, with the coureurs de bois in 
their midst, their pelta were wrenched out of their hands as soon 
as they were traPped, this being the reason for the shortage of 
castor &:..u and wby the castor .!.!.2. was so badly dressed. 
Ri verin disagreed w1 th tho se who claimed that the up country 
posta were necessary to hold the Indiana in the French 1nterest 
and to prevent the Elgl1sh captur1ng the beaver trade. He went 
so far as to recommend lett1ng the Engl1sh have the Illinois 
-181-
beaver as these pel ts were of little value and were a glut on 
the market in any case. Basides, the Engli sb. had an easy route 
to the Illinois country, whereas the north country, where lay 
the better furs, was practically inaccessible to them. EVen 
supposing that th~ French could, with a large military force, 
keep the English traders or their agents away from the Illinois 
country, would i t be prudent to do so, he demanded? Wohld i t 
be prudent to go seeking, arma in hand and at great expanse, the 
very things whioh were a liability both to trade and to the state'l 
He next made a strong plea for the development of auch industries 
as fishing, lumbering and agriculture, all of which could flourish 
in the colony wi thout there being any need to abandon the fur 
trade entirely. In short he wanted to see New France develop 
along similar economie lines as had the English colonies and the 
main thing preventing th1 s, as he and many others saw i t, was the 
fur trade. He summed up th1 s situation very neatly in saYing: 
Il y a de quoi travailler en Canada; 
mais personne *e s'y pense et on n'y 
cherche que des castors qui deviennent 
aujourdhuy la seule cause de son peu 
d'avancement, a,pres a.voir été celle dè 
son établissement; et cela par ce qu'on 
f'a,i t un mauvais usage des choses, ce qui 
donne des idées desavantageuse d'un paya, 
dont la conservation est d'une grande 
importance à l'estat. 
1 
It is very difficult to Se::/ whether or not Riverin wa.a correct 
in his claim that a Canadian mixed economy would have developed 
in a heal thY' fashion once the cancer of the western poste waa 
removed. In the first place, this could only have been a long 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Mémoire du Sr. Riverin 
sur la traitte et la Fermé des Castors du Canada, Paris, 
10 February 1696. 
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range effect, and in the second, these posta were not a.bandoned, 
hence one can only imagine wha.t might have resulted ha.d they 
been. NrY auch turn of events would have postula.ted an economie 
challenge to the Ca.nadi ans and to the poli ci es of the crown; 
whether or not their response to this challenge would have been 
adequate is a moot point. 
But the political consequences of abandoning the western posta 
are something that can be estimated with a greater degree of 
certainty since these effects would not have been long range but 
immediate. Frontenac and h1 s supporters claimed th at auch a move 
would resul t in the up country Indiana immed,iately forming an 
alli ance wi th the Iroquois in order ei ther to go to the Bhgl.i ah 
with their furs or for the Engliah traders to come up to them. 
The opponents of' Frontenac' s policies den1ed this, claim1ng that 
the se tribes would not desert to the Engli ah but would bring 
their ture down to Montreal as they had done in the Past. 
It is undoubtedl.y true that i t was very convenient for the 
up country tribes to be able to obbain their supplies at the 
French poste rather tha.n journey all the WaY to Montreal for . 
them. However, had the Ottawas and other tr1bes at aJX1 t1me 
really desired to form an alliance wi th the Iroquois, there was 
11 ttle or nothing that the French ga.rrisons and coureurs de bois 
at Jmese po sts could have done to prevent i t. The beat answer 
to Frontenac' s claim in th1 s respect was gi ven by the mini star 
h1mself': 
••• quand a ce qu'on d1 t qu'ils pouvoient 
rassembler les françois qui esto1ent dans 
les bois pour faire corps avec eux contre 
ces Sauvages en cas de besoin .•. Quelle 
poss1bilit~ y a-t-il de rassembler des 
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gens qui sont a 10, 20 et 30 lieues 
les uns des autres. Il est bian plus 
vrgysemblable si les Sauvages avoient 
eu le dessein de s'unir a nos ennemis 
ils auroient coupé la gorge a tous les 
franoois qui estoient dispersez parmy 
eux que de leur donner le temps de se 
joindre pour se battre ensuitte contre 
eux. 
1 
The up country tribes could not have taken their furs directlJ! 
to the E:lglish, nor could the English traders have gone to them, 
for the simple reason that the IrOquois would not have permi tted 
i t. It is ha.rdly likely that after :fighting these bloody wars 
:for some fi:fty years, the Iroquois would have allowed themselves 
to be by Passed and elim1nated féJ\rm the fur trade entirely. 
French-Iroquois relations were very much of a paradox, for 
al though the Fr,ench were :fighting desperately to keep the Iroquois 
awa:y from the :fur trade, in actual tact i t was only the geographie 
and economie position of these Five Nations, completely blocking 
as they did all contact between the ]!)lglish market and the up 
country tribes, which preserved the fur trade for the French 
despite the much h1gher priees of their marchandise. 
That this fa.ct was recognized a.t the time by at least one 
resident 1n Canada is evidenced by an anoeymous mémoire whose 
author rema.rked: 
•.• les Iroquois qu1 sont entre eux et 
nos sauvages ne souffriront jamais qu'ils 
leur passent sur le corps pour aller 
tra1tter avec ces derniers; c'est pour cela 
qu'ils nous ont fait la guerre, et ils en 
useroient de mesme avec les Anglois. 
2 
1. Ca;n. Arch. AN.Series B, vol. XX Part 1, Ministre à M. de 
Frontenac, Versailles, 21 MaY 1698. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Mémoire sur les 
aff aires du Canada., 1696 • 
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EVen Pontchartrain reoognized the speciousness of Frontenac' a 
arguments in this matter, as he showed when he wrote: 
On a voulu nous faire aPPrehender que 
les Sauvages nos alliez ne se joignent 
aux Iroquois pour nous faire la guerre 
si nous cessons d • al.ler trai tt er avec 
eux dans les bois. Je vous advoue que 
je n'en comprends Pas bien la raison et 
il me paroist que noue devons en attendre 
un Jffet contraire. 
1 
The King was even more definite in his viewe on this point: 
Les Sauvages des Parties d'ob le meilleur 
castor provient sont plus à porter du 
Canada que de New York, les Outaouacs-
ont interest de ne pas souffrir que les 
Anglais ny les Irooois leur ostent leur 
commerce tant qu'ils le pourront faire 
avec les Franc; ais dans la. colonie. Il 
Para.ist encore moins à craindre que les 
Sauvages du Nord puissent porter leur 
castor aux Anglais Parce qu'il faudrait 
qu'ils traversassent les Irocois qui ne 
le souffriraient Pas de leur costé, et 
qu'ils fussent dix-huit mois dans ces 
voyages avec les dif'ficultez des saisons 
et des portages. 
2 
Another argument frequently advanced by Frontenac was that 
on at least two occasions the Hurons and Ottawas had entered 
into negotiations wi th the Iroquois and that i t wae only the 
Pl'esence of the French a.t Mlchilimackinac that had caused these 
negotiations to be broken off. Actua].ly, this argument ie little 
more tha.n a contusion of' cause and eff'ect. The Hurons and Ottawas 
had entered into negotiations with the Iroquois in 1690 and aga,in 
in 1695 only as a result of actions on the part of the French. 
In 1690 they had done eo as a result of the French def'eat at 
3 Lachine and of the subsequent Peace negotiations wi th the Iroquois; 
1. Ca;n. Arch. AN· Series B, vol. XX Part 1, Ministre à M. de 
Frontenac, Versailles, 21 MeY 1698. 
2. Que. Arch. Rpt. 1928-1929, p 304, Mémoire du"Roy .•. pour 
Frontenac et Champigny, Versailles, 26 MaY 1696. 
3. Ca;n. Al'ch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Min1stl'e, 
Que bec, 6 November 1$5. 
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thia a1 taatio:n had fngb.:teed th• 1nto negot1at1:ng for peace 
th.•aelvea leat theJ be lett to f1gllt alo:ne. In 1695 theJ had 
eT en atroDSeP Peaaona, tor not oDl.J' vaa J'ronteaac beiag pl.led 
bJ the Iroq1101a peaoe :tee1era, wbich the 1attep •ad• alll'e the 
up coWlti'J tri'bea llearcl about, bu.t theJ vere h1!lllJ 1nceaaec1 
v1 th. the French :tor aoud eoonoll1c reaaoaa. BLe Frea.ch traders 
had. 't.epn t.a:pp1J18 the diat•t aarketa of the Ottawa•· 
In 1$5 Oh.-p18J17 reportecl. that !o:atl", alo~ v1 t.h t.liO aolèliera 
troa M1.cb.111aack1aac anct .,.e coure\lra d.e bo1a had aade a trip to 
the J.ald.nabo1ne coUDt!7 ••• tiTe had.recl 1eap.ea to 'Ule aertll of 
Lake Saper1or, 1B the hopea of reaP1D6 ri cher prof1 ta, " ••• cette 
nation n' a1&1lt :tait encore aucun oo•e:rce aTec D.Olla, ce q'lli ne 
' 
peut aen1r qu • a aup.ente:r le noa'bre d:u. Caator et faire Ul!le 
1 
p1lla graJlcle 41ve:ra1on dea rranoo1a .• 
!!le danSer inherent 1n thia a1 tuation waa far sreate:r than 
Cha:lllP1snJ :real1zed at the tiae. 'Ble JU.ch111aaok1aac Inti&D.a took 
an extr•elJ poor Tin of tbia att•pt to el1111nate th• aa 111441.-
men an4 triecl to preYent 1iheae distant tri 'Dea, v1 th. wlloa theJ ha4 
long trade4, froa 4eal1DS d1reotlJ v1 th the French. 'l'h1a led to 
fr1et1on, bloo4èecl. and open warfa:re between the Ottawaa a:nd. their 
old. Ollatoaera. llatm-all.T, thia coa'b1ne4 v1 th ll'renoh 11111 ta17 
1nact1oa asa.tnat the Iroquois, •. • .qui 4ep\11a 4811X &Jla nowa aT01ent 
2 
•••' d.e 1' eaperaaoe de la paix • • .• aa one obaeneP put 1 t, e.,.aecl 
the Ottavaa and SUNna tD be ex:tr•el.y b1 tter aDd to Wl'll au 
att~nt1Te ear t.o the Iroq•1a propoeala ro:r peace and. a tl'ade 
1. Can. Arch. AC • Seriea Cl1.l, TOl• XIII, Ch&DlP1!Dl .. Ministre, 
Q11e~eo, 6 NoT•ber 1$5 ~ 
2 • C &1'1 • APoh • J.C • Serie a C11J., TOl • XIV • 11111011'8. Collllleroe d1l 
C •• to:r de Canada, 1696 • lii!Yo14 a11 Sr ct' J8'1•••••. 
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alliance. 
The Ottawas and the Hurons wanted the French as commercial 
pa.rtnere, not as rivale, and this attempt to f'oreetall them 
destroyed the whole basie for the alliance. It is not to be 
.->ndered at then, that al though the Ottawas treacherously ambushed 
the Iroquois with whom they had lived and hunted on amicable terme 
during the winter of 1695, they still refused to lift a finger to 
aid the French in Frontenac' s campaign against the Ononda.gas and 
1 
Oneidas. 
Thus the evidence indicates that these up country poste, when 
commanded by Frontenac's appointees, were more a political, econ-
omic and mi li taey liabili ty than an as set. The garrisons at these 
posta were far more interested in their private fur trading than 
in pro secuting the war against the Iroquois; in fact, the J esui ts 
claimed that ma:ny of the French coureurs de bois had fled the 
colo:ny to Michilimackinac " .•. pour eviter la guerre qu 1 on a avec 
2 
les iroquois ... " Nor were the officers at these poste ~ better 
than their men, if' a.nything the11lr trading activities had a far 
worse eff'ect on Indian relations than did that of the troops or 
the coureurs de bois, as no lees an authori ty tha.n Nicholas Perrot 
pointed out when he wrote: 
Ils s' a,pperQoivent que les Commandants 
trai ttent comme les autres avec eux; car 
la coustume des chefs, parroy les sauvages, 
est de donner gratuitement, et la chose 
leur paroit d'autant plus odieuse. 
3 
l.Que. Arch. Rpt. 1928-1929, pp 308-318, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1696. 
2 . C an. Arch. AC . Seri es CllA, vol • XII part 1, Les pères Jesuites 
du Canada à I,/fgr. de Pontchartrain, February 1692. 
3-PERROT, NICOLAS: Mémoire sur les MOeurs, Coustumes et Relligion 
des Sa,Uvases de 1 1 Amerigue Septentrionale, p. 150. 
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Despi te all Frontenac' s arguments as to the m1li tary and 
1 
politica.l necessity of mainta.in1ng these posta, it wa.s he hlm-
self who gave the game aw eY wh en he wrote that if Tonty and La 
Forest were forbidden to engage in the beaver trade then there 
would be no point in their reta1ning their post on the Illinois 
and he had no doubt that they would, in auch circumsta.nces, 
2 
abandon i t. 
Louis XIV lost no t1me in making it qu1te plain to Frontenac 
what he thought of this parti cul ar argument: 
Ba Maj esté a esté surpris d' aPPrendre 
qu'a,pres avoir insisté comme ils ont 
fait sur la necessité de conserver les 
poste·s de Mi ss1limaquinat et des Ydam1s, 
ils les a.:rent abandonnez sur le fonde-
ment que les officiers et soldats n'y 
pouvaient subsister sans faire la tra1tte, 
Cette rai son a paru bien foi ble a Sa MaJesté 
et elle 1' a persuadée plus que toute autre 
de la veri té de 1' ad vis qu'on luy a donné 
que c'estoit plustost pour satisfaire a 
l'avidité de quelques officiers que la 
necessité de conserver le PaYs que ces. 
establissements a.voient esté fa.1 ts •.. 
3 
However, al though 1 t i s clear that at that parti cul ar time 
these posta were a very dubious assat to the French, to have 
suddenly abandoned them as the King demanded would have been a 
very risky venture 1ndèed. For Years the Indiana had been 
dependent on them for goods wh1ch they could no longer do w1thout; 
to demand that these up country tribes Should suddenly reorga.nize 
1. Ca.n. Aroh. AC. Series Cll.A, vol. XIII, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1694; vol. XIV, Frontenac au Ministre, Quebec, October 25,1696; vol. XV, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 15 October 1697. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Frontenac et Champigny, 
aU l~istre, Quebec, 19 October 1697· 
3· Ca.n. Arch. AN· Series B, vol. XX Part 1, Mémoire du Roy à 
Frontenac et Champigny, Versailles, 21 MaY 1698. 
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their economy, wi th Montreal a few hundred leagues aWaY, as i ts 
focal point, was to risk upsetting the entire relationship between 
the French and their savage allies. Gra.nted that this problem 
might not have been so serious bad the King' s edicta been ca.rried 
out in the past, still, neitber Past actions nor tbeir ef~ects 
could be undone overnéght by the sudden stroke of a pen. 
Indian relations were the governor's province and not the inten-
dant ' s; thus Champigny, al though he re ali sad the inherent dangers 
of this situation as well as anyone in the colony, could have sat 
back and done nothing; sa,ying in affect to Frontenac: 'Y ou b:rougbt 
this problem down on your own head, now cope with it as beat you 
ma,y.' Considering how much he had suffe:red at Frontenac' s bands 
in the past 1 t would have been qui te understandable had he done 
so, and it would he.a very stern judgement that would condemn h1m 
for it. But ChaJDpigny, first last and alwa,ys the conscientioua 
royal official, d1d not succomb to the temptations of human fra.ilty 
so easily. Instead he informed the m1n1ster: 
... je suis obligé de voua representer, 
Mgr, que la declaration de sa Majesté 
me pa.roit bien forte en quel,ues artic-
les et qu'elle pouroit causer la ruine 
de ce pgys, ce qui fait que Je prends 
la liberté de vous dire que l'on poura.i t 
prendre en cela un millieu qui seroi t de 
conserver seulement deux postes chez les 
Outaouaca et de donner vingt-cinq congez 
a l'ordce (sic) avec plusieurs restric-
tions que je n' aY pÛ mettre dans la 
lettre Commune, M. de Frontenac ne les 
a,yant Pas agrées. 
l 
The two posta which Champigny advoca.ted reta.ining were VJ.chil-
imackinac and st. Joseph des I·üam1a, and at each post he proposed 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1696. 
that there Should be a garr1aon of tenor twelve sold1ers w1th 
an officer in comma.nd who·:<would receive his a,ppo1ntment d1rectly 
from the King. Those receiv1ng the congés would be obliged to 
register at the bureau of the Farm in Montreal, declare their 
merc&andise and have i t aud1 ted by the controleur, then deposi t 
bail to guarantee their returning to the colony within the 
stipulated eighteen months. This last was obviously intended to 
prevent men, once up country, from having fresh supplies of trade 
goods sent up to them clandestinely; this being one d1sorder that 
had been a.ll too prevalent in the past. 
At both posta there was to be a commissaire who would check 
the marchandise the men brought with them against their audited 
declaration. Ea.ch congé holder would be requ1red to :bransport 
two hundred weight of marchandise from the King' s stores and 
hand i t over to the comm1 ssaire a.t one or the other of the posta. 
This official' a dut1es were also to include Pa.Ying the officers 
and men, holding frequent mua ter par ade a of both troops and congé 
holdera to prevent their roaming far and wide, and of distributing 
the King' s presents to the Indi9lls a.ccording to the wi Shes of the 
oommanding officer who would certify the accounts along with the 
1 
resident missiona.ry. This last was intended to put an end to 
the old practise of the post commandera, who ha.nded out the King' s 
presents to the Indiana and received siza.ble gifts of furs in 
2 
return1 which they treate4 as perquisi tes of their office. 
1. ibid. 
2. Que. Arch. Rpt. 1927-1928, p 81, Lettre du Roi au Frontenac 
et Champigny, (7 APril 1692); p 143, Mémoire du Roi au Fron-
tenac et Champigny, (1693); Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, 
Frontenac et Ohampigey au Ministre, Quebec, 19 October 1697. 
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~ampigny considered that this same commissaire anould also 
adjudica.te in any squabbles which might arise between the French 
and the Indiana. In othe:r words, he would have au tho ri ty over 
all matters eoncerning justice, police and finance, and would be 
expected to perform much the same duties ~~d have the sa.me author-
1 ty as ha.d the aub-in tendant or commissaire a.t Montreal. 
The main purpose of these posta and their small ga.rrisons, 
Champigny explained, would be to keep a close check on the Indian 
tribes, making sure that they :rema.ined in the French alliance by 
mea.ns of diploma.cy and the King' s presents; and a.t the same time 
it was to be made quite clear tha.t the King desired them to gain 
the fUll benefi ts of the trQ.de wi th the more distant tribes and 
that in order to affect this they would have to bring their furs 
down to Montreal,· where they would get far better priees for them 
1 
th an they had in the Past wh en dealing wi th the cou:eeurs de bois. 
Thus, both the economie and poli tic al aspects of this vexing 
problem would, a.ccording to Champigny, have been reconciled. 
This was much the same plan as Champigny had advocated on 
2 
previous occasions, but this time it was more detailed. There 
is no doubt that it had a great deal to recommend 1t, designed 
as it was to check specifie abuses. Its etfectiveness in doing 
so would have depended entirely upon the appointment, as commiss-
aires and po at commandera, of men of pro bi ty who at the a ame ti me 
had both· skill and experience in dealing with the Indiana; and 
auch men were scarce. 
The orux of the whole schema was, however, whether or not the 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebee, 25 October 1696. 
2. vide supra, pp 164-165. 
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up country tribes would have brought their furs down to Montreal? 
This i s pur ely an a.ca.dem1c question since i t wa.s never put to the 
test, but all the a.vailable evidence inclines one to believe tha.t 
they would have dona so. The only drawback to auch an arrangement 
from the Indiana point of view was tha.t it wa.s much more convenient 
for them to obta.in their trade goods up country than to take their 
furs all the way to Montreal. But their only other market would 
have been the Iroquois middlemen and over the years they had shown 
that they much preferred to deal wi th the French. Under Cham-
pigny' s plan they would a till have been able to obta.in their 
immediate neoessities at the up country posta from the congé 
holders. 
EV'en when all the trading had be en done up country, i t was 
frequently the up oountey Indi ans who brought the furs down to 
Montreal for the coureurs de bois. Thus i t seems likely that they 
would have been willing to do so on their own a.ooount, particularly 
in view of the faot that they would have reoeived better priees. 
There was also the added inducement that these fUr brigades 
would have been the occasion for a great conference at Montreal, 
and the French were Past masters at the art of arranging suoh 
conferences wi th all the oolour, pomp and oeremony which alwaYs 
so greatly impressed the Indiana. 
However, most of C~ampigny' s recommandations were ignored by 
the King. When he had digested the flood of protesta and mémoires 
that followed his first stringent ediot, he agreed to modity it 
somewhat, and in doing so he made a recurrence ·or the old d1 sorders 
inevitable. He now oommi tted the grave error of making his poli oies 
-192-
more restrictive but of lea.ving the very men in charge of imple-
menting them who ha.d been responsible for the old policies being 
so ineffective. He refused to mod1fy his ban on the congés and 
all trading up country but he perm1 tted the retention 'of the posta, 
wi th their ga.rrisons, a.t Michilima.ckina.c and St. Joseph des Miami a 
as wall as a.t st. Louis des Illinois, to ma.inta.in pea.ce amongst 
the Indiana. He forba.de the up country ga.rrisons to engage in 
allY trade under aJJY pretext whatsoever; the intendant wa.s instructed 
to provide them with supplies adequate for their aubsistence and, 
the King warned: "Sa Majesté veut bien les advertir qu 1 elle s'en 
prendroi t a eux, ai par les moyens qu 1 elle ne peut prevoir, El.le 
aprenoi t qu'elle eu eluda at 1' execution." He concluded by aga.in 
sta.ting that Tont1 and La Forest could retain their post only on 
cond1 tion tha.t no trade in beaver pel ta were to be carried on 
1 
there or in the vicini ty. 
When this d1spatch reached Q.uebec Champigny must have realized 
that the old troubles were bound to a tart all over a,gain. They 
were to begin sooner than perhapa even he could have expected. 
On August 29th 1697, La Mothe Cadillac came down to Montreal 
from Michilimackinac accompaJlied by aixty-two canoes of coureurs 
. 2 
de bois and thirty-fi ve cano es of Otta.wa.s. Cadillac was prevented 
from returning up countey by his being involved as defendant in 
a law suit before the Sovereign Council arising from his activities 
at Michilimackina.c, and when this had been settled he went over 
3 
to France on priva.te business. The sieur de Ton ti, a capitaine 
1. Gan. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XIX part 3, Mémoire du Roy pour 
les Srs comte de Frontenac et de Champigny, Versailles, 27 APril 
1697. 
2. Ca;n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Callières au Ministre, 
Quebec, 15 October 1697. 
3 • Vide supr!j, chapter VIII. 
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ref'orm~, and brother of the Ton ti who was co-owner wi th La Forest 
of the Illinois post, was then a,ppointed by Frontenac to command 
at M1chilimack1na.c in Cadillac' a absence. 
Champigny was not Jm.formed of this by Frontenac and only 
heard of Ton ti' a depa.rture when the sieur de la Touche, Champig:D1 • s 
deputy a.t Montreal, wrote to inform him that Tont1 ha.d left for 
M1ch1limackina.c accompa.n1ed by five Montreal marchants. Severa.l 
others in the town had tried to follow their examp1e but had been 
prevented by the authorities. Accord1ng to the King's d1spatch 
of MaY 8th 1694, no perm1 sai ons were to be granted for travel up 
1 
country wi tb.out their first being viséd by the intendant. Cham-
pigny therefore reported this case to Frontenac and asked him to 
order that this party be pursued and forced to return to Montreal 
wi th their effects. He might as well have saved his breath for 
Frontenac merely informed h1in that these men had gone up country 
2 
by his orders and that was all there was toit. 
At that time Champigny had no evidence that Tonti and his com-
panions had taken any trade goods wi th them, but, he acidly rema.rked. 
i t wa.s oontrary to all epod sense to believe tha.t five marchants 
would lea.ve their families and their shops merely for the dubious 
pleasure of pa.ddling a capitaine reformé some three hundred leagues 
up country. However, he subsequently lea.rned that the Recollet 
ga.t;at Montreal had been left oonven1ently open one 
1. Ca,n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XV, Cha.mpigD3' au Ministre, 
Quebec, 13 October 1697. 
2. ibid. 
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night and aevera.l wagon loads of mercha.nd.ise had been transported 
down to Lachine on the pretext tha.t the goods were for up country 
Indiana who could not transport the l.oads by canoe owing to the 
1 
river be1ng too low. 
Champigny learned from the sieur Dupré, a Montreal me.l'chant, 
that twenty-five to thii'ty men , in addition to the five merohants, 
had go ne up country wi th Ton ti. This sa.me DUI'ré adm1 tted to 
ChaJD.pigny that he had supplied Tonti wi th three thousand livres 
worth of marchandise, but claimed that he had asked and received 
Callièrès' permission befo.l'e doing so; he also informed the inten-
dant that several other Mont.l'eal merchants had supplieà Tonti with 
six ca.noe loads of t.l'a.de goods. In the t'ace of th1 s, Was i t any 
wonde.l', Champigny asked, that everyone in the colony now .l'ega.l'ded 
the King' s ed.ict banning the congés and all up countey trading as 
2 
a dead latter? 
He subsequently d.iscovered that Tonti's marchant companions, 
the si eu.l's Arnault, Boudor, Charly, Blondeau and la Rose, had 
ma.na.ged to have large amounts of mercha.ndise conveyed for them 
by coureurs de bois and Indiana; A.l'naul t for an amount of' twel ve 
thoueand livres, Boudor for fourteen thousand, Charl.y for eight to 
nine thousa.nd, la Rose for five to six thousand, Blondeau fOI' a.n 
indete.l'minate a.mount; the othe.l's in the Pa.l'ty had also taken large 
amounts, on which, Champigny had been inf'ormed, Tonti was to receive 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid; Champigny au Minist.l'e, Quebec, 25 October 1697. 
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l 
fifty percent of the profits. This total a)Jlount of goods baing 
almo at as much as would normally have been taken up country by 
twenty-five congé holdera. 
Both Champigny and Frontenac cla.imed tha.t Tonti a.nd La Forest 
could not, and would not, ma.intain their poet a.t at. Louis des 
Illinois if they ha.d to a.bide by the King' a order tha.t they for ego 
all trading in beaver, as the coat of ma.1nta.1ning the post under 
2 
auch conditions would be prohibitive. Champigny added that i t 
wa.s inevitable that were the se men permi tted to rema.in in the 
Illinois countr,y they would have a monopolp on the western trade 
and would rea.p immense profita. He also pointed out tha.t they ha.d 
a store at C~icago and another at Michilima.ckinac, and that two 
of their canoes had been pillaged by the Illinois when they ilried 
to carry goods to the Sioux who were at war wi th the Illinois and 
Mia)Jlis. aome of the coureurs de bois trading wi th the Sioux had 
a.ided them in their war wi th the Mi amis, which ca.used Champigny 
to fea.r tha.t the latter tri be might uni te wi th the Iroquois in 
self defence. Thus, conditions were just as ba.d, if not worse, 
than before the King' s ban on up country trading had been issued; 
La Forest was a.t St. Louis dea Illinois, his Partner Tonti had 
gone to the Assinaboine countey where bea.ver was most abunda.nt, 
Ton ti' s bro th er commandecl at }ft chilimackinac and his cousin, the 
sieur de L1 et te, now was in charge of their poet at Chicago in 
the Miami s country. "Voua n'ont," said Champigny bi tterly, 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Cha)Jlpigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1697. 
2 . Can. Arch. AC . Seri es CllA, vol . XV, Frontenac et Cha)Jlpigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 19 October 1697; Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 13 October 1697. 
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"qu'un mesme esprit et qu'un seul interest tendant uniquement 
l 
a la trai tte · 11 
A month atter the departure of Tonti for Michilimackinac the 
sieur d'Argenteuil was sent up country as commander of a party of 
voyageurs who had been granted permission to retu:rn to Michil.-
imackinac to fetch back their peltries. This Party too had taken 
up several canoe loads of tra.de goods, the sieur d 1 Arfgenteuil 
having himself a full canoe load, included in which was a barrel 
of brandy'. ,_It was all too aPParent, Champigny bi tterly remarked 
that the prevention of auch abuses was beyond the powers of an 
2 
intendant " ... qui a peu, au point d'auto ri té, de le faire seul." 
It was quite evident to Champigny that Frontenac ha.d no inten-
tion of enforcing the Roy al ed1ct ordering all the coureurs de 
bois to return to the colony. The King had permi tted Frontenac 
to determine how mu ch time tho se up country should be allowM il). 
3 
which to return to the oolony and the minister had warned him 
not to use this as a pretext for the furthering of his priva.te 
3 
interests. Although Frontenac and Champigny issued an ordonnance 
in 1697 ordering all the men up country to retu:rn by· September 
4 
of the following yea.r at the latest, Frontenac round one excuse 
after another to Justify his unwillingness to have the ordonnance 
5 
aarried out. Champigny reminded the minister that he had done 
1. ibid. 
2. ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 27 October 1698. 
:J. Ca.n. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XIX Part 1, Mémoire dJl Roy pour 
les sierus de Frontenac et de Champigny, Versailles, 26 MaY 1696 
4 . Ca.n. Arch. AC . Seri es CllA, vol • XV, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 19 October 1697· 
~. Ca,n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, __ Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 13 October 1697; vol. XVI, Cllampigny a.U Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 July 1698; Champigny au M!nistre, Q.uebec, 14 Oct. 
1698; Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 27 October 1698. 
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all he could to implement the King' a ed1ct but on.ly Frontenac 
could enforce ita execution since the officers and garrisons at 
l 
the po sts were under h1 s authl\>1 ty . 
The reason Frontenac gave for not enforcing his own adict was 
that some of the coureurs de bois had threatened to mutiny were 
they ordered to return, and others had demanded that they be 
allowed to rema1n up country until the following year as they had 
not f1n1shed their trading. Champigny pointed out that this 
re sul ted from the large amounts of trade goods that had be en 
smuggl ed up to them during the pa.st year. He stated that the 
ed1ct should be enforced, cla1m1ng that even if some of the men 
d1d refuse to obey 1 t and d1 spersed into the wilderness to avold 
arrest, 1 t would be far better to abandon them and force the rest 
to return tha.n to permit them all to flout the K1ng' s express 
orders. Tho se who refused to accede to the King' s comma.nd, 
Champigny stated, only d1d so because they were qui te sure that 
they could get awgy wi th it; if a firm stand were not ta.ken now, 
he warhed., and these men were allowed to go unpunished then all 
hope of remedying the abuses and d1 sorders of the past would 
v ani sh • As he put 1 t: 
Les tranooi a qui desobeissent et qui se 
reval tent ne le font gue pa.rce qu'ils 
croyent que les choses seront tolerées 
comme par le Passé dans ce qui a 1 est fait 
contre ces mêmes ordres, a mon égard ai 
j'avoia eu une autorité aufisa.nte, Je 
peux vous repondre que le Roy n 1 auroi t 
Pas ces justes sujets de mécontement. 
2 
1 • Can. Arch. AC . Seri es CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 July 1698. 
2 · Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 27 October 1698. 
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However, to Justify hia retusal to comply in either the spirit 
of the let ter wi th the King' s edict, Frontenac could well have 
pleaded that his actions were governed purely by temporary exped-
iency, for i t was asking a great deal to expect what was tantamount 
almost to an economie revolution to be put into effect over night. 
There vere two parties to the :fur trade, the French and the Indiana, 
auch a radical change in policy could only have been made to work 
ef'fectively by first explaining the need for i t to the up country 
tribes, also the advantages a.ocruing to all concerned, and thus 
obtaining their acquiescence in, and support for, the new policy. 
The policy makers at Versailles do not a,ppear to have considered 
these factors at all; on the other hand, there is no evidence 
whatsoever that Frontenac made any attempt to induce the up country 
Indiana to bring their f'urs down to Montreal. 
Had Frontenac's intention in allowing so many men to go up 
country wi th canoe loads of trade gootls, been merely to prevent 
axry dislocation of economie and poli ti cal relations wi th the 
Ottawas and other tribes whilst the new policy was explained to 
them and their cooperation obtained, then Champigny would most 
likel7 have supported auch actions. He had shown in the pa.st h1 a 
w1ll1ngness to modif'y the court' a poli ci es when he fel t that the 
best 1nteresta of the colony demanded auch modifications, and 
bad Frontenac shown a1l'1 willingness to abide by the api rit of' the 
royal policy, ChaJD.pigny would most probably not have demanded that 
it be carried out to the latter. But when it became apparent to 
him th. at Frontenac and h1 s junior of'f'icers were intent on nothing 
lesa than the complete scuttling of' the ban on up country trading, 
th.ere was little or nothing that he could do to stop i t except to 
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sta.te the tacts of the case as he sa.w them to the minister and 
hope that this time he would not be castigated tor his Pains. 
The court did not make the intendant' s task arry ea.sier when 
i t was gullible enough to grant a coureur de bois named Le SUeur 
permission to exploit some lea.d and copper mines which he claimed 
to have discovered in the Sioux country. Frontenac was ordered 
to allow Le SUeur to take up to twenty or twenty-ti ve men wi th 
him from the colony to work these mines, but they were not to be 
allowed to do any fur trading; Le sueur himself was permi tted to 
trade in menues pelleteries only, and if he or his men were caught 
wi th ~ beaver pel ts in their possession these furs were to be 
1 
confisca.ted and burned. 
Champigny promptly wrote back that Xnowing Le SUeur, he was 
qui te sure the copper and lead which Le sueur claimed to have 
2 
discovered wa.s covered wi th tur and ha.d a. broad flat ta11· Was 
i t logical, Ch91Jlpigny asked, that this man, who was only a simple 
3 
voyageur,would undertalte to lead fitty men at his own expense 
soma seven or eigh.t hundred lea.gues from Quebec merely to hunt for 
mines of which he had no certain knowled.ge, and merely for the 
privilege of trading in menues pelleteries? The very fact that 
Le Sueur had a.sked permission to undertake this prospecting trip 
immediately atter the suppression of the congés was enough to 
4 
malte Ch91Jlpigny very suspigious. 
1. Ca:n. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XIX part ·3, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 28 APril 1697· 
2 . C an. Arch. AC . Seri es C11A, vol • XV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 13 October 1637. 
3· Although the minister had specified 20-25 men, it aPPears.that 
he asked Frontenac for perm1 ssion to talte 50 and was granted i t. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Seri es CllA, vol. XVI, Châll1Pisn1 au Ministre, 
Quebec, 14 October 1698. 
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Conclusive evidence was not long in :forthcoming that Le SUeur 
was not only trading in bea.ver but also supplying the coureurs de 
bois up country with brandy aP.d other tride goods, and so long as 
these men had marchandise avail&ble they re:fused to retu:rn to the 
1 
eolony. Al though in 1699 the King revoked the permission he-:-had 
2 
given this "p:rospector11 i t by no means spelled the end of Le 
3 
sueur' s trading a.ctivities in the west. 
By this time Champigey was :forced to conclude that ha, had made 
a bad mistake ,in recommending to the minister that the posta at 
Michilimackinac and St. Joseph des Mi amis be retained wi th small 
garri sons. Had h1 s other recommandations been accepted, things 
might have been different; but i t was now all too clear to hlm 
that so long as these up country posta were retained with no 
check on the aUthori ty or actions of the officers in charge, i t 
would be impossible to curb the major disorders which the :fur 
trade was heir to. His compromise p:roposals for the retention 
of these two poste, provided that specifie measures were taken 
to make sure that the King' s orders were carried out, had been 
largely ignored by the King aP.d the minister of marine. The 
royal permission to retain the posta without the imposition of 
any o:f the measures advocated by Champigny for the prevention 
of the old abuses had resul ted only in these di sorders remain-
ing as :flagrant as before. The :fact that no more congés could 
1. ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 14 October 1698; Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 27 
October 1698; vol. XVII, Callières et Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1699· 
2. Can. Arch. ~-N. Series B, vol. XX Part 2, Ordre du Roy pour 
revoquer leL),permission accordée au Sr. le SUeur d'aller 
:fouiller des mines, Versailles, 27 MaY 1699· 
3. vide infrs, cha,pter V, part 3, pp 211-215. 
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be granted merely meant that Frontenac's friends had a tighter 
control than ever before on the fur trade; they could take unlim-
ited supplies of trade goods up country on one pretext or another, 
whil st others were ruthlessly excluded. Thus, when a Montreal 
marchant na.med TUrpin was overheard to sa:s that he was th1nking 
of going on a trading trip to the west, the town major promptly 
1 
threw h1m into ga.al . 
Champigny now realized full well tha.t so long as these up 
country posta remained under Frontenac' s control there could be 
no hope of putting an end to their constant drain on the central 
colony' s manpower and resources; but he d1d not dare suggest to 
the minister that the best wa:s to implement the royal policy would 
be to recall Frontenac and a,ppoint someone in his place who would 
obey the King' s orders. At the same time he fel t very strongly 
that decisive action of some sort was needed. The measures which 
. Champigny now suggested to the mini ster were the culmination of 
all the pent up anger and frustration which ha.d been aPParent in 
his d1spa.tches for the Past two yea,rs. 
Actua.lly, his recommandations were nothing more nor lesa than 
the prohibitive measures whioh had been oontained in the King' s 
decree of 1696, and which Champigny himself, at tha.t time, ha.d 
regarded as too drastic. But the events of the Past two years 
had made him rea11ze as never before, that to give wgy an inch 
to Frontenac resulted only in his taking a Yard. Champigny now 
decla.red that the only solution to the problem wa.s to forbid · '!' 1 
absolutely all the French from going up country under any pretext 
wha.tsoever, including Le sueur wi th his fifty men, and Ton ti and 
La Forest wi th all their men in the Illinois country. The only 
1. Ca,n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 27 October 1698. 
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exceptions to this, the only men to be permi tted up country at 
all should be the missiona.ries, since i t was certain that they 
never enga,ged in trade. Th.e missionaries were trusted by the 
Indiana, C{.fa:mpigny stated, and for this reaaon they would have 
no great di ffi cul ty in retaining the se allies in the French 
interest, especially since the Indiana knew that the "black 
robes" were not there to fleece them as the others had done, 
1 
but were interested only in their we1fare. 
Some historia.ns have c1aimed tha.t Cha:mpigny wa.s undu1y influenced 
- 2 
by the Jesui ta, and by lifting these 1atest proposals of his out 
of their historical context they 1end support to auch a c1a1m; but 
when all that went before, as we11 as much tha.t fo1lowed, is taken 
into account, i t is clea.r that auch assertions a.re ba.sed on the 
f1imsiest of evidence. Throughout his intenda.ncy CQ.ampigny's 
main aim was to ca.rry out the King' s orders to the beat of his 
abili ty, and i t is qui te obvious that he did not advocate this 
policy for the western fur trade merely because i t was one wi th 
which the J esui ta were 1n agreement. In actual fact, the po1icy 
of the crown had for ye ars be en very simila.r to tha.t of the J esui ta, 
if for rather different rea.sons. The J esu1 t.s wanted the French 
kept out of the west for social and religious reasons, the crown 
mainly for economie onesr both groups had continually stressed 
thei r desire to see the central colony strengthened rather than 
to have i ts assets d1ssipated by western expansion. It is qui te 
likely tha.t Champigny was on good terme wi th the Jesui ta, at 
1. ibid; Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 14 October 1698. 
2. PARKMAN, F: Frontenac gad New Fra.nèe under Louis XIV, pp418-419; 
KINGSFORD, WILLIAM: The Histoey of Canada, ypl. II, pp 212-2~3, 
302-303, 326-328; LORIN, H: Le Comte de Frontenac, pp 424-425, 
429-433. 
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least there is no evidence to the contrary, and to some historians, 
notably, Kingsford, Pa.rk:man and Lorin, this is sufficient to da.mn 
him A priori in the ayes of all right thinking men. But from 
the mere fa.ct that both he and the J esui ts were bi tt arly opposed 
to Frontenac's views on the western fUr trade, it does not necessar-
ily follow that Cb.ampigJ:l1 was unduly intluenced bf the members of 
the J a suit order; at least if i t do es, then by the same token so 
must have been Denis R1 verin, Pontchartrain, SeignelaY, Colbert 
and Louis XIV, amongst ethers. Fa. th er Carhedl, the J esui t mission-
ary at Ydchilimackina.c, maltes i t very clea.r in a latter he wrote 
to Champigny just before the latter aailed for France in 1702, 
that his views on the fur tra.de and those of the intendant were 
far from being synonymous, Oarheil being pa.rticUla.rly opposed to 
1 
Champigny' s a.dvoca.cy of a. resto ration of the old congé system. 
However, regardless of any influence the J esui ts ma;y or maY 
not have had on Champigny, or even if they had, whether or not 
this was reprehensible, his proposais for a total exclusion of 
all laY Frenchmen from the up country areas met wi th no better 
reception a.t the court than had his previous proposais. In 
short, they were 1gnored. This could not have surprised Champigny, 
he must have been used to auch things by thi a time; and in 8JlY 
case, it is more than likely that he never expected his proposais 
to be ta.ken serioualy, but advanced llhem, wi th his detailed 
reasons for so doing, more to empha.sise the fact tha.t the abuses 
and disorders in the fUr trade were growing worse instead of 
better, than for any other reason. 
1. J esui t Relations, vol. IXV, pp 189-253, Père Oa.rheil à. Champigny, 
M1ch111mackinac, 30 AUgust 1702. 
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Be tha.t as i t mgy, when Frontenac died in November 1698, the 
whole controvarey over the western ~r trade subsided. It sub-
sided not so much beca.use one of the major protagon1ats ha.d been 
removed from the scene, but beca.use new issues arase which over-
sha.dowed and obscured the struggle between those who, like Fron-
tenac, regarded the central colo:tJY as a mere entrepôt of the 
western fur trade, and tho se who, like Champigny, wanted to 
concentra. te French act1 vi ty wi thin that central colony. Whether 
the latter policy could have succeeded 1s debatable, but 1 t 1s 
very clear that aJJY chance 1 t might have had of succeeding was 
effectively stifled by Frontenac and his supporters, despite 
the beat efforts of Champigny. 
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CH,APTER V. 
COMPACT COLQNY VERSUS WESTERN EKP ,AN SION • 
PMTIII. 
"A la mor'b de Louvois commence la troisième 
époque du gouvernement;: personnel de Louis XIV. 
Les grands ministres et les grands capitaines 
avaient disparus ou allaient disparaitre. 
La machine roula encore quelque temps d'impul-
sion. Mais t9 t aPrès le::: tuf se montra; les 
fautes, les erreurs si multiplièrent: laC> 
décadence arriva a grands PaS····" 
l 
With the aPPOintment of Callières as governor, Champigny's task 
was in some respects made easier, for the attitude of the new 
governor towards the fur trade was in marked contrast ·to that of 
. .. . 
Frontenac. Relations between Callieres and Champigny during the 
four years that Champigny remained in the colony were certainly 
not as harmonious as they might have been. They quarreled vigor-
ously and wrote complaining letters to the m1nister about each 
other' s at ti tùde and conduct, but these squabbles were· a.ll in a 
very m1nor key compared to what had gone before; there wa.s never 
al.lY major disagreement between them over ma.tters of policy. Most 
of their disputes seem to have ha.d their origin in the conflicting 
personali ti es of the two men. Callières was inclined to be a mar-
tinet; for Years he had been accustomed to giving orders to his 
subordina.tes who had no alternative but to obey. When he became 
governor he tended to be a bit too autocratie for Champigny' s 
taste; and i t is qui te likely tha.t his frequent a.tta.cks of gout 
1. CHERUEL, A: L'histoire de l'administration monarchique en 
France_, p 387. 
d i d  n o t  i m p r o v e  h i s  t e m p e r .  A l s o ,  i t  m a y  w e l l  h a v e  b e e n  t h a t  
C h a m p i g n y  h a d  f o u g h t  s o  h a r d  a n d  f o r  s o  l o n g  ag~nst F r o n t e n a c  
t h a t  h e  h a d  l o s t  t h e  k n a c k  o f  a c c o m o d a t i n g  h i s  v i e w s  t o  t h o s e  o f  
h i s  i m m e d i a t e  s u p e r i o r .  I n  a l l Y  e v e n t ,  t h e  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  b e t w e e n  
t h e s e  t w o  o f f i c i a l  a  w e r e  n e v e r  o f  a n y  g r e a t  c o n s e q u e n c e .  
H o w e v e r ,  c h a n g e s  t o o k  p l a c e  a t  t h i s  t i m e  w h i c h  h a d  m u c h  m o r e  
f a r  r e a . c h i n g  e f f e c t s  t h a n  c o u l d  h a v e - b e e n  c a u s e d  b y  a  m e r e  c h a n g e - -
o f  g o v e r n o r  a t  Q u e b e c .  T h é s e  c h a n g e s  w e r e  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  b y  e v e n t s  
w h i c h  o c c u r r e d  b o t h  i n  E U r o p e  a n d  i n  N o r t h  A m e r i c a •  T h e  m o s t  
i m p o r t a n t  o f  t h e s e  e v e n t s  w e r e ;  t h e  e n d i n g  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  w i t h  t h œ  
I r o q u o i s ;  t h e  f o u n d i n g  o f  a  n e w  F r e n c h  c o l o n y  a t  t h e  m o u t h  o f  t h e  
M i s s i s s i p p i  b y  ! b e r v i l l e ;  t h e  a b a . n d o n i n g  o f  C o l b e r t '  s  o l d  m e r c a n -
t 1 1 1 s t  p o l i c y  f o r  N e w  F r a . n c e ' a n d  t h e "  a d o p t i o n  o f  a  n e w  I m p e r i a l i s t  
p o l i c y  ih:-N.o~th A m e r i c a  b y  L o u i s  X I V .  A l l  t h e s e  th1ngs~ c r e a t e d  
n e w  i s s u e s  f o r  t h e  , , g o v e r n o r  a n d  t h e  i n t e n d a n t  o f  N e w  F r a n c e - t o  
g r a p p l e  w i  t h ,  a n d  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  m a d e  i  t  v i r t u a l l y  i m p o s s i b l e  
f o r  t h e m  t o  c o p e  w i t h  t h e  o l d  p r o b l e m s .  
T h u s ,  s o  f a r  ' a B  t h e  f u r  t r a d e  a n d  F r e n c h  p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  t h e ·  
w e s t  w a s  c o n c e r n e d ,  c o n d 1  t i o n s  r a . p i d l y  d e g e n e r a t e d  i n t o  a  a  t a t e " "  
b o r d e r i n g  o n  a . n a . r c h y  .  C a l l i è r e s  a n d  C h a m p i g n y  d i d  t h e i r  b e a t  t o  
b r i n g  o r d e r  o u t  o f  c h a o s  b u t  w i t h  v e r y  l i t t l e  s u c c e s s .  T h e y  w e r a :  
o f  o n e • a . c c o r d  i n  t h e i r  a . t t i t u d e · t o w a . r d s  t h e  f u r  t r a d e : ;  t h a t  i s  
t o  s a . Y ,  C a l l i è r e s ;  l i k e  C h a m p i g n y ,  w a . n t e d  t o  i m p l e m e n t  t h e  e d i c t a : .  
b a ; n n i n g  u p  c o u n t r y  t r a d i n g  b y  t h e  c o u r e u r s  d e : c  b o i s  a n d  t h e  g a r r i -
s o n s  o f  t h e  w e s t e r n  p o s t a .  
C a l l i è r e s  w a s t e d  n o  t i m e  i n  m a . k i n g  i  t  p l a i n  t h a t ·  h i s  a . t  t i  tud~ 
t o w a r d s  t h i s  i l l e g a l  a c t i v i t y  w a s  q u i t e  diff'é~ènt t o  t h a t  o f  h i s  
p r e d e c e s s o r .  I n  t h e  s u m m e r  o f  1 6 9 9  t h e c h i e f s  o f  t h e · O t t a w a s  
came down to Montreal for a conference. They a.nnounced that 
they intended to malte wa.r on the Sioux and a.sked Callières for 
French assistance. It took a.ll of the governor's persuasive 
powers. to dissuade them, even tempora.rily, from auch a course of 
action, which could not have be en any thing but detrimental to 
French interests in the west. However, as the Otta.was were 
lea.ving for up country Callières lea.rned tha.t they were taking 
quantit1es of tra.de goods ba.ck with them for the coureurs de 
bois a.t M1chilimackina.c. He and Champigny immedia.tely called a 
conference of all the chi.efs and a.sked them to hand over this con-
traband and also name the marchants who ha.d supplied i t. The 
Ottawa.s surrendered two balea of goods worth about twelve hundred 
livres, and a.fter Champigny had officially confiscated it in the 
name of the King, Callières presented i t to the Ottawas as a 
rewa.rd for complying with his request. This action impressed 
the Otta.wa.s very fa.vourably and they promptly sent a ca:noe in pur-
suit of some of their men who had left earlier, they caught them 
up soma three leagues from Montreal and returned wi th another 
two bales of marchandise, which Wqs likewise confiscated and 
d1st.ributed on the spot a.mongst the Ottawas. A rew deYs la.te.r · 
the two marchants who had supplied the marchandise were heavily 
1 
fined by Champigny . 
Thi a incident must not only have served to enha;nce the Ottawa.s' 
opinion of the new governor but also to impress on the :Montreal 
marchants that they would have to be at lea.st more circumspect 
in future. "Je t1endra,y exactement la main," Callières a.ssured 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Callières au Ministre, 
Q.uebec, 20 October 1699. 
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the mini star, " a empecher ces sortes d'abus, afin d' o ter les 
moyens à ceux qui auraient dessein de rester dans ces pais là, 
1 
d'y pouvoir demeurer." 
Tha.t Callières meant wha.t he sa.id wa.s la.ter shown by his 
stern trea.tment of Louvigny, who had been made commander at Fort 
Frontenac, and his ~de, Perottière. The Iroquois envoya, when 
they came to Montreal to d1scuss pea,ce terme, ha.d a.sked that a 
stock of merchand1ae be mainta.ined a.t this po at for their con-
venience, as they did a good deal of their hilnting in that vicin..; 
i ty. Callières and Champigny had granted this request, seei~ 
in i t a mea.na to wean the Iroquois a,wgy from the :Ellglish in tares\-, 
and sent a supply of tra.de gooda from the King' s store up to the 
2 
fort. 
Then, in the spring of 1700 a party of mission Iroquois returned 
from their winter hunting with no furs, having tra.ded them all at 
Fort Frontenac, and so were unable to discharge their debts to 
the Montreal marchants who had ex.tended them credit. A short 
time later Louvigny sent aeveral canoe làads of ruer down to 
I"iontrea,l •. When Callières hea.rd of this ha immediately had the 
f'ura seized then sent a.n officer up to the fort and had Louvigny 
3 
and Perottière brougl't down to Quebac under close arrest. These 
two officers were subsequently tried by the Sovereign Council, 
round guilty, and sent over to France to be dealt with as the 
4 
king saw fit. 
1. ibid. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVIII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 18 October 1700. 
3 • ibid; B .R.H. vol. XXXIV, 1928, pp 746-749, Callières au 
Ministre, Quebec, 7 November 1700. 
4. ibid. 
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Al though the se two incidents made i t qui te plain th a.t the 
governor intended to enforce the edicta govet>ning the fur trade, 
mere intentions were not enough. For the previous nina years 
these edicta had been, to e.ll intenta and purposes, a. dead let ter. 
!·!en like Tonty, La Forest, La Motte Cadillac, and the ethers 
-
who had enjoyed Frontenac's protection, had been a.llowed to ma.ke 
a mocker,y of all attempts to curb the up country fur trade. If 
the officera of the troupes de la marine paid not even so much 
as lip service to the Kings edicta, then there Was very little 
hope of the coureurs de bois pa,ying any attention to them. J.J:lY 
possibili ty there m1ght have been of Callières and Champigny 
eventually being able to put a stop to the up country fur trade 
v ani shed completely wh en a new si tua ti on aro se; a si tua ti on which 
was very di sturbing for the colony of New France since 1 t ra.dically 
al te::-ed i ts en tire relationship wi th the west. This was the foun-
dation of a French colony at the mou th of the Mississippi by 
!berville. 
As ea.rly as AUgust 1688, when La Salle' a brother arri ved at 
Montreal with news of their discoveries, Champigny voiced the 
fears of many in the co~ony when he stated that this could harm 
New France by causing many of the habi tanta to leave for the new 
area sinca furs were reported to be more plentiful there and river 
1 
communications ea.sier. Before the founding of this new colony, 
Montreal had been the base for all ac ti vi ty in the· west, tra.de 
goods want up country from :r-1ontreal and to this town the furs 
were sent back. When the coureurs de bois decided to come out of 
the bush there was nowhere for them to go but to Montreal unless 
1. Can. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Mon treal, 8 August 1688. 
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they tur:ned tra.itor and went to the English colonies. Thus when 
they refuaed to heed the ordera of the governor and intendant 
they knew tha.t they ran some risk of being brought to account 
whenever they returned to civilization. But wi th the founding 
of the M1 sai ssippi col oey the coureurs de bois were no longer 
sol ely dependent on Montreal as their base, and as a resul t, the 
wri t of the governor and intendant at Quebec now virtua1ly cea.sed 
to run in the west. 
In September 1699 ah~pigny reported tha.t the French traders 
who still remained up country were returning in amall parties once 
they had finished their trading and he had hopes that before long 
they would all return, w1 th the exception of certain libertins 
who, he had been advised, intended to take refuge down the I~saiss-
1 
ippi at the post established by Iberville. The following year 
Callières sent one of the Tonti brothers to r~chilimackinac to 
order all the French traders to return to Montreal but only twenty 
did so, a.nother eighty-four refuaed to come back. Callières and 
Champigny were convinced that the main cause of this disobedience 
stemmed from the fact that these renegades could too easily elude 
justice by deca.mping ta the Mississippi colony. To ma.ke ma.tters 
worse, these men had taken their furs with them, tura which were 
not a.ctually theira, belonging by righta to marchants in New 
France, and ha.d sold them to Iberville who ha.d aupplied them with 
more trade gooda. Callières and Champigny pleaded with the King 
to order Iberville to round up these outlaws and send them to 
2 
the galley s. 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Que bec, 21 September 1699 . 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVIII,· Calliè!"es et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 18 October 1700; Callières au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 October 1700. 
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The over riding fear in the m1nds of the governor and the 
intendant was that the new colony would uaurp the western fur 
trade of New France. As Callières put it: 
•.• d'ailleurs si Par le Misissipy le 
comerce des pelleteries, et principalement 
du castor qui est presque le seul de la 
Nouvelle France, est enlevé et detruit, 
que deviendra cette pauvre colonie? 
1 
Callières asked th-at the new colony be pla.ced under his official 
2 
jurisdiction so that he could prevent auch an eventuali ty; just 
how he was going to do this he do es not malte clear. The King, of 
course, rej ected tb.i s request on the grounds that i t would be 
much ea.sier to sand his orders directly from France to the new 
3 
colony rather than via Quebeo. This incident affords a very good 
axample of the fa.ct that the actual government of the French 
colonies resided at Versailles, the resident governor and intendant 
being nothing more tha.n administrators. 
The inherent wea.knesses of this government by remote control 
were further exacerbated by the aPParent gullibili ty of the King 
and the mini star or marine. Wi thout consul ting Callières and 
Champigny, the court policy maltera gra.nted to a. Ca.na.dian, the 
sieur Jucherea.u, permission to ta.ke twenty-four men in eight 
ca.noes from Montreal to the Mississippi to establish. a buffalo 
4 
hi de ta.nnery, a.nd a.t about the same time Le SUeur wa.s regra.nted 
1. Ca.n · Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVIII, Callières au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16.-0ctober 1700. 
2. ~· 
3 • Can • Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XXI.I part 4, Ministre a.u Callières-1 
Versailles, 31 Ma,y 1701. 
4. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 5 October 1701. 
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1 
the right to trade in the Scioux country for menues pelleteries. 
Callières and Champigny bluntly informed the minister that 
auch things as this would mean nothing more than the economie 
ruin of New France. They were convinced that Juchereau 1 s Party 
would grab all the furs they could la.Y their hands on and so 
engross a large alice of the up country trade; for if this was 
not Juchereau's intention, why then, they dema.nded to know, would 
he take his supplies to the Mississippi via Canada which entailed 
great expanse when he could have gone the re. much more easily by 
ship direct from France? Furthermore, why would Juchereau recruit 
men in Canada to establi sh his ta.nnery when any one in the colony 
who wanted to establish auch an enterprise had to import experi-
enced tannera from France? However they had no alternative but to 
2 
abide by the minister' a orders and let Juchereau' s Party go. 
The case of Le SUeur was even more exasperating, for just the 
previous year, in 1699, the governor and the intendant had informed 
the minister tha.t this ma.n had smuggled a large supply of brandY 
to Michilimackinac, traded 1 t for beaver pel ts and had thereby 
ca.used great disorders amngat the coureurs de bois and the 
3 
Indiana. When Le SUeur' s wife presented Callières wi th a latter 
from the minister ordering tha.t Le SUeur and his a.ssociates be 
permitted to take a stock of marchandise to the Scioux country 
which they ha.d ha.d stored at Montreal for the paat two yea.rs, 
1. Can. Arch. NJ.. Series B, vol. XXII part 2, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Sieurs Chevalier de Callières et de Champigny, (1700). 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Callières et·: Champigny 
au Ministre;· ~uebec, 5 October 1701. 
3. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series··CllA, vol. XVII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 20 October 1699· 
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the governor made a. few inquiries before ac.ceding to the mini star' a 
arder. He discovered that this marchandise consisted of two 
hundred muskets and since to get to the S4ioux countey the voy-
ageurs had to traverse the territories of the French allies who 
were at war wi th the s+ioux, he --made Le SUeur' s associa tes sub-
sti tu te other goods for the muskets. Had he not done so, he 
explained to the mini ster, the French allies would have accused him 
or double dealing and all his efforts to end the hostili ti es 
1 
between these warfing tribes would have been brought to nought. 
Callières and Champigny did not have to wai t very long to 
have their worst suspicions confirmed as to the real intentions 
of Jucherea.u and Le sueur. 'I!b.e. sieur Boishebert whom Callières 
had sent .to Michilimackinac to report on candi ti ons up country, 
wrote that the disorders were worse than ever; Le SUeur had sent 
five hundred beaver robes down to the Mississippi colony in one"' 
year, the en tire countryfwas flooded wi th marchandise qoming up 
from this settlement, and Juchereau had sold a large quanti ty of 
brandy to the coureurs de bois, obta.ining at least aix hundred 
beaver robes for i t. Boi sb ebert stated th at when he tried to 
enforce the governor' a· orders he was greeted wi th nothing but 
sardonic laughter and threats. "Il est tr~s avantageux Monsieur, 
et honorable pour moy, n he wrote des:pondently, "d'astre chargé de 
vos ordres mais il est aussy très facheux de n'avoir pour toutes· 
2 
foraes que du papier· et de lancre pour les faire executter ." 
1. Ca.n • .Arch. AC. Series C11A, vol. XIX, Callières au Ministre, 
Quebec, 31 October 1701 • 
2. Can . .Arch. AC. Seri esc· CllA, vol. XX, Boishebert à Callières, 
Michilimackinac, 30 August 1702. 
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'!he go'Vernor and intendant later learned that Juchereau had 
managed to smuggle twelve thousand livres worth of beaver down 
1 
to Sillery. 
Before Boishebert' a report had reached Q.uebec they had info:rmed 
the minis ter that the ai tua.tion in the west was completely out or 
hand. ~e congés had been sp.ppressed, they stated, in the belier 
tha.t this would reduce the amount or beaver being traded up country, 
but inatead, there were more traders there now than ever before, 
and without this bring1Dg much in the waY of profit to New France, 
" ••• toutte la tra.itte n'étant que pour le sueur, les coureurs de 
bois, et pour les sieurs de la· forest et de ton ti qu'on dit qui 
ne se contentent Pas seulement de la :faire aux Jlinois, màia 
2 
encore dans tous les autres endroi ta de ces contrées." 'What waa 
even worse, some or the coureurs de bois had crossed the mountains 
in to the Caro linas to trade w1 th the Engli sh where they had be en 
3 
all too well recei ved. 
The only thing that Callières and Cha.mpigny could see to do 
wa.s to establish the Wa.ba.sh river as the demarcation line between 
New France and the new colony a.t the mou th or the Misai saippi, then 
to establish a chain or posta no:rth of this line on all the rivera 
flowing into the M1 ssissippi to p:revent the cou:reurs de bois from 
4 
trading wi th the :E:lgli ah· 'lhe Compagnie de Canada also a.sked the 
mini ster tha.t auch posta be established, and in a.ddi tion they wa.ntelJ 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XX, Callières et Beauharnais 
au Ministre, Quebec, 15 November 1702; AN· Series E, Finance, 
vol· MDCCCCX:XIII, t 345, .. Phelypeaux à. Champigny, Versailles, 
30 Mgy 1703. 
2. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Callières et Challpigny 
au Minisire, Quebec, 5 October 1701. 
3. ibid. 
4. ibid. 
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garri soned forts at Oui skonsing and amongst the Stioux to stop 
1 
Le Sueur and o thers from trading in beaver pel ta. 
The fact that Champigny aubscribed to these proposals 1nd1cates 
that he now regarded the old policy of confining the fur trade to 
the central colony as virtually moribund. However tha.t policy, 
to all intenta and purposes, had been abandoned by Louis XIV when 
he sanctioned the establi shement of Iberville' s colony at the 
mou th of the Mississippi. flle King informed Callières and 
Champigny that he had done · so beca.use i t had become " ••. d'une 
necessi té ind.i spensable pour empeacher la pro grez que les Angloi s 
••• ont commencé de faire dans les:,terres qui sont entre eux et 
2 
ce fleuve •• ·" 
. This was the irony of the French po licy; they wan ted to keep 
the English awaY from the west and so e:ngross the furs of most 
of North America., y et under the exi sting market cond.i tions they 
could dispose of only a. part of the great maas of beaver pel ta 
which they recei ved ea.ch yea.r. On the one hand they peti tioned 
the minis ter to have the droit de quart removed so that they 
3 
coUld compete with the Fll.glish on a more even footing, and on 
the other they oomplained vooiferously tha.t they had far too 
4 
much beaver. As Denis Riverin put it: 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series OllA, vol. XIX, La Direction de la 
Compagnie de Canada S).l Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1701. 
2. Oan. }.rch. AN. Series B, vol. XXII part 4, Mémoire du Roy au 
Callieres et Ch~pigny, Versailles, 31 MaY 1701. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Seri es ellA, vol. XIX, La Direction de la 
Compagnie de Canada. aJl Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1701. 
4. ibid. 
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•• ·Jamais il n'y eut une si grande 
quanti té de Castors, la Colonie en 
est accablée et ses afai:r:-es se trouvent 
par cette raison reduites à la faoheuse 
eoct:r:-emité d'implorer les Secours de Sa 
Majesté pour eviter de suoomber Entière-
ment. 
1 
'lhua i t a,ppeara th.at the Company • a fears as to the consequences 
of this dire economie situation were exceeded only by their 
fears lest what was a source of acute embarrassment to them, 
might p:rove to be of some value to their rivals, the Engliah. 
I t wa.s all too clear that the old policy of trying to aurb 
the up ooun try fu!' trade had fa1led completely. The situation 
beoame so bad that by 1705 Denis Ri verin stated that the only 
wa:y out of the d1lemma would be for the French to stop buying 
beaver pelta entirely until the glut on the market wa.a disposed 
of. This, of course, inev1 tably meant that the Indiana would 
take their tura to the Eng11sh; but Riverin wa.s not in the least 
perturbed by auch an eventuality, in tact he proposed that the 
French ahould themselves hire the Indiana to take the great 
maas of surplus beaver to the Engli ah traders. Th1 a, he elaimed 
would bring Pitsperi ty back to New France s1noe Engliah gooda 
and hard cash woUld be far more benef1o1al to the colony than 
were the Compan,y's bills of exchange which were not redeemable 
until two yea.rs atter the date of issue. Nor would this mean 
the losa of the trade in menues J2elleter1es as the French Pa1d 
higher priees for these :t'urs than d1d the ED.gliah. And as for 
the frightful prospect of the l!ngl1 ah cornering the beaver 
trade, there was no cause for alarm here, he stated, since if 
the Etïgli ah d1d corner the market i t would merely resul t in 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series OllA, vol. XXI, Mémoire sur les congés 
de faire la trai tte des pelleteries chez les nations sauvages 
de Canada, (Rive:r:-in) 12 APril 1703. 
their being flooded with beaver and so in as bad an economie 
po si ti on as were the French. In BX!Y case, he concluded, the 
French beaver tr.,ade was completely ba;nk:rupt so they m1ght just 
1 
as well sal v age as much as they could from the economie debris. 
Perha;ps the chief fiaw in this radical scheme was the fact 
that nei~her the King nor the mini ster of marine coUld ev er have 
been expected to give it a moment's serious consideration. 
In 1702 Champigny retu:rned to France. Bec au se the problems 
of the fur trade were st111 unsolved when he left Canada i t would 
not be correct to conclude that he had therefore failed in his 
duties as intendant. He had been charged w1 th the administration 
of policies, not w1 th their formulation; and even when he did 
suggest methode whereby some of the di eorders m1ght have been. at 
least checked, his recommandations were larg~ly ignored. He had 
been in complete accord wi th Colbert~ s old policy of strengthening 
the central colony by divers1fying i ta economy, ma,king i t self 
sufficient so far as was possible, and of curbing all attempts 
to exp and weatwards which denuded the colony of i ta main strength, 
its manpower. It is a mot point whether or not this policy 
could have succeeded. even under the most favourable of circum-
stances; Champigny had believed that 1 t could, and he had done 
his beat to enforce i t, but his efforts had been continua,lly 
frustrated by factors over wh1ch he had no control; factors auch 
as the actions of Frontenac, the crown' s ma,king exceptions to 
i ts own edicta for no better rea.son tha.n to sa.tisfy the desires 
of persona having enough influence in court circles, and finally, 
the abandonment of the compact colony policy in favour of 
western expansion. 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XXIII, Raisons du mauvais Etat 
des affaires de la Colonie de Canada· Ri verin, Paris, 27 Jan -17Q5 
It wa.s the adoption of this imperialist policy which marked 
the beg1nn1ng of the end for Hew France, for as Champigny ha.d 
clearly seen, no matter how far French control might spread 
th.rough the west, in the final analy s1 s th.1 s control wa.s depen-
dent on the strength of' 1 ts main base, the central colony on 
the st. Lawrence. NlY threa.t to th1 s area meant tha.t the French 
hold on the west wa.s immedi a.t ely 1mper1lled. But so :t'ar a.s the 
French policies towards the western fUr trade were concerned, 
Champigny, throughout his sixteen years a.s intendant of New 
France, had been 11 ttle more tha.n a. volee ceying in the wilderness 
of' Versailles. 
VIFfl OF QUE13EC AS I T W AS WREN 
CHAMPIGNY ARRIVED. 
Inaet from a map dra.wn by 
Franquel1n 1n 1688. 

--219-
CHAPTER VI. 
ECCLESIA§TIOJJ;. AFFA!RS AND THE 
BRAlfDY QUESTION • 
Et comme le devoir principal et essentiel 
est de satisfaire à ce qui regarde la Religion 
et que de la depend la benediction qu'on d.oi t 
attendre du Ci el sans laquelle ri en ne peut 
avoir un heureux-,_succes, Sa Majesté veut que 
ledit sieur de Champigny tienne la main à ce 
que Dieu soit bien servy dans l'es tendue de 
la. Colonie •••• 
1 
By 1686, when Champigny arrived at Quebec, the great wave of 
religious enthusiasm that had swept over France earlier in the 
century, had begun to recede; gallicanism was now growing and 
Ultramontanism was on the wa;ne. The age of the great Jeauit 
marty as and of auch m1 ssionarY fervour as had re sul ted in the 
founding of Montreal, was now all but over. From this time on 
the h1 story of New France has an increasingly more secular 
aspect to 1 t. DU.r1ng Champigny' s 1ntenda:ncy the struggle 
between clerical and secular au tho ri ty did t'lare up on one or 
1 
two occasions, but by the beginning of the l8th century, at 
the time of Champigny' s recall, the old embers had pretty well 
burned them selves out. 
1. Oan. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Instruction que le Roy 
veut astre remise ez mains du sieur de Champigny .•• 
Versailles, 31 MaY 1686. 
---.:::\ .. /-
A great deal bas been written about these conflicts, and 
much stress laid on what is sometimes claimed to be the attempts 
by the church to dominate the government of the colony. Yet little 
mention is made of the fact that the civil government exercised 
a good deal of authority in the internal management of church 
affaira. The agent of this authority was, of course, the ubiqui-
:bous intendant. 
Before leaving to 'take up his post in New France, Champigny 
bad received detailed instructions from the King governing his 
l 
powers and his duties towards the church. Just as in the instruct-
ions governing secular affaira, they were in certain matters 
both detailed and precise, and in otaers, broad, vague and sweep-
ing. In other words, much was left to Champigny's discretion; but 
always with the unwritten proviso that he would have to answer to 
the King or the minister of marine for all his actions. 
Thus he was told that he must accord all due deference to the 
bishop of Quebec and give him every assistance in religious 
matters; however, should any disputes arise between the bishop 
and the clergy, or the bishop and the governor, he wa.s to do 
everything possible to reconcile their differences. He was 
instructed to give the Jesuite every assistance in their work 
but to see to it tha.t they did not try to carry their eccles-
iastica.l authority too far. He also had to aid the Sulpicia.ns 
and the Recollets in any way possible but a.t the sa.me time he 
was warned that should the latter group at any time show a want 
of respect for the bishop, he had to make it clear to them that 
they must submit to their bishop's orders on pain of their 
l. ibid. 
forfeiting the King's protection. 
More specifically, Champigny had to make a detailed report on 
the numbe~ of clergy in the colony, the number of churches and 
their type of construction, the number of parishes and the area 
included in each one, whether the h~bitants were receiving ade-
quate spiritual support, and in general, report on everything 
concerning the state of religion and the church in the colony. 
The King was most anxious that the church in New France 
should become self supporting at the earliest possible moment. 
He pointed out to Champigny that the Sieurs Denonville and 
de Meulles, and the abbé de Chevrières - bishop Saint Vallier -
had previously reported that fifty-one curés were needed to 
cater to the spiritual needs of the colony and that a minimum 
of four-hundred French livres was required for the support of 
each curé. This meant a total outlay of 20,400 livres, but the 
tithes raised only 6,196 livres towards this total. Champigny 
was therefore instructed to examine closely whether or not it 
was possible for the colony to raise a greater sum than this 
without over-taxing the habitants, either by raising the tithe 
from one twenty-sixth to one thirteenth, or by increasing the 
amount of land under cultivation. 
One point upon which the King placed great stress was the 
establishment of cures fixés, that is, having curés appointed 
permanently to their parishes who thus would not be removable 
by the bishop at will. In order to affect this the King made 
a grant of 8,000 livres each year and he claimed that this 
should suffice for thirty-six curés. Evidently he expected 
that the difference between what each curé would thus receive 
and the four-hundred livres required for his support would come 
out of the parish tithes. However, the King was careful to stipu-
late that this 8,000 livres grant should be distributed by the 
intendant en concert with the bishop. Champigny was also instructed 
to see if there were any persona in the colony sufficiently well 
off to undertake to build new churches of stone in return for the 
King' 8 favour. And finally, he had to make very sure that no 
heretics entered the colony, and that any already settled there 
were converted to the true faith without delay. 
This last clause entailed no great effort for the new intendant. 
Shortly after Champigny's arrival in the colony, Denonville 
reported that there were no members of the'reformed religion' 
amongst the Canadian habitants and that of ten or twelve such 
amongst the troops, seven or eight had been con~erted during the 
past winter. Steps were being taken for the conversion of the 
others, he added, and he asked that the Ktng should accord these 
recent converts some reward in recognition of their judicious 
1 
action. Apart from the presence, a few years later, of protest-
ant prisoners from the English colonies, no more is heard of 
heretics during Champigny's intendancy. 
In his first report on affaira in the colony, Champigny found 
nothing to complain of so far as the clergy were concerned. They 
none of them were lacking in respect for the bishop so far as he 
could see, nor did it appear that the Jesuite were meddling in 
things outside their proper sphere. He stated that he was doing 
all he could to induce the seigneurs to build stone churches and 
had promised any who did so the droit de patronage. As for raising 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Denonville au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 November 1686. 
the tithe to one thirteenth, he stated that he bad discussed this 
with Denonville and the bishop and they had all agreed that this 
1 
could not be done, at tbat time, without over-taxing the habitants. 
However, a few years later, in this same connection he pointed 
out to the rninister that " les ecclesiastiques ne payent point d~ 
dixmes de leurs »erres et qu'ils le devraient faire possedans les 
- 2 
plus belles au pa.;ys ." 
Nor did he have mach success i~~~Ï:!ng the more substantial 
people of the colony to build stoneA A few were built during the 
first four or five years of his intendancy but when the K1ng 
revoked a grant of 3,000 livres he bad been in the habit of making 
for this purpose, tbat marked the end of auch construction. 
Champigny pleaded for the reinstitution of the grant but seemingly 
3 
without success. In 1699, with the war over, the Ktng again 
demanded that efforts be made to bave stone churches built. 
Champigny and Callières replied that they were doing all they 
could in this connection and if they found that the seigneurs 
were not cooperating " •.. soit par faute de moyens, soit par 
manque de volonté, nous laisserons M. l'Evesque dans la pleine 
4 
liberté dexercer en cela son zèle." It is not known whether or 
not this dire threat was ever carried out. 
When Champigny came to tackle the problem of establishing 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1686. 
2. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire instructif sur 
le Canada. Champigny. Quebec, 10 May 1691. (The ita.lics are 
Cha.mpigny's) 
3· ibid. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 20 Octobre 1699· 
the curés on a permanent footing in their parishes, he encountered 
if not active opposition on the part of the bishop, at least a markEd 
lack of cooperation. Since the bishop enjoyed the privilege of 
appointing the curés to their permanent parishes upon their first 
1 
being so established, everything depended on his taking this 
initial step, which he was seemingly very reluctant to do. This 
may wall have been owing to a rather understandable reluctance to 
relinquish his power of appointing, removing and changing curés 
from one area to another as he saw fit; but even with the beat 
will in the world the bishop still could not have established as 
many curés on a permanent footing as the King desired, for the 
2 
simple reason that there were not enough priests available. 
~...any of the clergy in the colony had to be kept moving around 
from their principal parish to outlying missions, otherwise sorne 
scattered communities would have been deprived of spiritual aid 
almost en ti rely • 
It was not the easiest problem in the world to reconcile, 
nevertheless, Champigny felt that the bishop was not doing all 
that he could, and in 1689 he asked the minister to explain the 
King's wishes to the bishop personally in the hopes that.th1s 
3 
would bring about a change in the latter's attitude. If the 
minister acted upon this suggestion it had no affect and Cham-
4 
pigny's repeated requests were st111 1gnored by the bishop. 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII, part 2, Frontenac au 
Ministre, Quebec, 25 October 1693· 
2. GOSSELIN, Abbé AUGUSTE. L'Eglise du Canada. vol. I, pp 187-189. 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. x, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1689. 
4. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, col. XVI, part l, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Srs. Comte de Frontenac et de Champigny, Au camp devant Mons, 
7 April 1691. 
The King, upon hearing of this, declared himself to be highly 
surprised and he instructed Champigny to approach the bishop 
again and this time to make him understand that unless something 
were done in the very near future the royal grant of 8,000 livres 
1 
for the upkeep of the cures would be discontinued. 
However, since the bishop was crossing over to France that 
same year, Champigny refrained from brandishing this financial 
club over his head. Instead he deftly handed the problem over to 
~ 
the minister by asking him to see if he couldAsomething about it 
while the bishop was at the court. It was, Champigny atated, of 
great consequence to the colony that the curés should be perma-
nently established and thereby ensured of a living income, and 
an end brought to the habitants' suffering a continuai change of 
2 
their priesta. 
Evidently the min1ster's efforts, if any were made, met with 
no better success than had the intendant's for the following year 
Champigny stated that despite the fact that the bishop kept prom-
ising to take some definite action, and had recently established 
two permanent cures, this was far from sufficient. The only way 
to get something done in this matter, Champigny suggested, would 
be for the minister to order him not to pay out the King's grant 
the following year unless the bishop took steps to establish twelve 
auch cures, as he had assured the intendant he would do. Champigny, 
who was obviously out of patience by this time, was reasonably 
sure that this would force the bishop's hand, and once these cures 
1. ibid. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 May 1691· 
bad been appointed it would, he stated, be a relatively easy task 
to ascertain the income each curé could expect from the tithes and 
so determine how much of a supplement to this amount would be 
1 
needed from the Royal grant. 
Nor was Champigny at all satisfied with the mannar in which 
this grant was being distributed to the clergy. It was his view 
that these funds should have been paid into the hands of the clergy 
directly by the treasurer in accordance with a statement drawn up 
by the intendant and the bishop who were to decide conjointly how 
much each curé should receive. While the bishop had been away in 
France Champigny bad drawn up this statement himself for the 
guidance of the treasurer, but in previous years the bishop had 
been in the habit of drawing the 8,000 livres and doling it out 
personally. The curés had informed the intendant that they would 
much prefer to receive their grant from the treasurer rather than 
from their bishop, Champigny therefore asked the minister to give 
hlm a specifie order to have the funds paid to the clergy directly 
2 
and not to the bishop in future. 
Despite all these financial worries, Champigny was still careful 
to point out that the continuance of the Royal grant was most 
essential as it would be impossible to maintain a sufficient number 
3 
of curés in the colony without it. 
1. Can. :Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Frontenac au 
Ministre, Quebec, 11 November 1692. ( Although the authorship 
of this dispatch is attributed to Frontenac, from internal 
evidence lt ls quite clear that it was actually wrltten by 
Champigny • ) 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid; Frontenac et Champigny au M+nistre, Quebec, 15 September, 
1692. 
A rather bitter financial dispute arose between the bishop 
and the Seminary at ~uebec over the disbursement of 4,000 livres 
which were granted each year for the upkeep of this Seminary and 
for the maintenance and repair of church buildings. The Seminary 
claimed that it should receive this fund and the bishop demanded 
that it be paid over to him to be doled out as he thought beat. 
Champigny was of the opinion that 2,000 livres should be granted 
to the Seminary and that the ~her 2,000 livres should be used 
for the maintenance of the church buildings with himself and the 
1 
bishop allocating the funds for this work. In reply to Champigny's 
request that this matter be clarified, the minister, in his typical 
fashion, informed Champigny that he was to keep a close check on 
the disbursement of the funds, "(qu'elles) soient employées à 
l'usage, et pour les personnes et les choses auxquelles elles 
sont destinées." He then delivered himself of a lengthy lecture 
on the neàd to reduce the expenditures for the church and have it 
wholly supported by the tithes so that the Royal grant could be 
2 
done away with entirely. 
The bishop continued to insist that he should dole out the 
funds to the Seminary; Champigny was equally insistent that he 
should do nothing of the kind and pleaded with the minister to 
settle the matter once and for all. "Je vous prie Mgr.," he 
wrote, 11 de vouloir prendre la peine de nous marquer à l'un et 
à l'autre comme vous desirez que cela se fasse à fin de lever 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif sur 
le Canada ••• Champigny. Quebec, 10 May 1691. 
2 • Can • Arch. AN. Series B, vol. mi part. 1, Ministre à. M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, -April 1692. 
1 
toutes dificultez." 
The King fin~lly decided that the Quebec Seminary should 
receive one third of the 4,000 ~vres and the bishop the other 
2 
two thirds. But again the wording of these instructions was 
vague and ambiguous so the bishop still insisted that the Semin-
ary shoUld receive its share of the grant from hie h~nds. So 
once again Champigny demanded of the minister a clear eut decision 
3 
"pour esvi ter toutes les contestations qui arrivent •••• " 
One thing which made Champigny's task here much more diff'icult 
was the tangled relationship between the Seminary and Frontenac 
and the Bishop. Frontenac never passed up an opportunity to 
berate the members of the Seminary; anyone who happened to be at 
odds with them he immedi~tely supported. rn.hile Champigny was 
complaining that the bishop was not merely taking no steps what-
soever to establish permanent cures, but had actually refused to 
grant severa! curés, "d'une eminente vertu, 11 the grant from the 
Royal funds which they had been accustomed to receive for severa! 
4 
years, "ce qui a beaucoup consterné les peuples," Frontenac was, 
at the very same time writing to the minister in praise of the 
bishop. "Je ne doute point," wrote Frontenac, "que M. l'Evesque 
n'execute ••• ce que le Roy désire, le trouvant très disposé à 
faire ce qu'il croire estre de l'intention de sa Majesté de 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Seriee CllA, vol. XII part 1, Champigny au 
~Unistre, Quebec, 10 November 1692. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
r~inistre, Quebec, 4 November 1693. 
3. ibid. 
4. ibid. 
1 
l'avantage de la colonie, et du bien de son diocèse." He then 
went on to deliver one of his virulent attacks on the members of 
the Seminary, placing all the blame on their shoulders for the 
trouble that had arisen between them and their bishop. He claimed 
that he was doing all he could to reconcile the two parties to 
2 
the quarrel, but his actions consisted more of fishing in the 
troubled waters than of pouring oil on them. 
Right down to the end of his intendancy, Champigny tried hard 
to persuade the bishop to establish more permanent curés but he 
never had much success. At the same time he continually pleaded 
3 
with the minister not to stop the annual grant of 8,000 livres. 
By 1698 however, he had to admit that it was impossible to establish 
any more curés fixés; he explained to the minister that he was still 
doing all he could to persuade the bishop to establish them but 
that the situation no longer permitted the bishop to do so, for 
owing to the recent death of several priests there was a very 
grave shortage of clergy in the colony. He then rather qualified 
this statement by expressing the opinion that it would be far better 
if soma of the priests in Quebec were to be sent out to the country 
parishes as several districts were receiving no spiritual aid at 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Frontenac au 
Ministre, Quebec, 25 October 1693· 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au M1nistre, 
Que bec, 24 October 1694; vol. XV, Champigny au Ministre, Que bec, 
13 October 1697; vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 
14 October 1698; vol. XVIII, Callières et Champigny au Ministre, 
Q.uebec, 18 October 1700; Callières et Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 5 Oetober 1701. 
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all. One such he specifically mentioned was the fort at Chambly 
1 
where a priest was badly needed for the garrison. 
During the next few years this shortage of priests became 
worse rather than better. With the end of the English and Iroquois 
war and the beginning of the greatly increased French activity in 
the vast Mississippi valley area, many priests were leaving the 
central colony and others were making ready to do so. Just as 
the coureurs de bois were flocking there for the abundant furs, 
the clergy were most anxious to found missions in the same regions 
2 
and so reap a rich harvest in soule amongst the western tribes. 
The only solution to this problem that Callières and Champigny 
could see was to bring out more priests from France, establish 
them in the parishes on a permanent basis, and so prevent them 
3 
running off to the west. 
Even the Sulpicians at Montreal were anxious to take part in 
this western evangelization, but the wiser counsels of their 
superior, the abbé Tronson, vetoed any auch desertion of their 
primary charge. As that saintly old cleric put it: 
1. ibid. 
L'entreprise que fait Mgr de Québec d'une 
mission aux Akanças ne peut être que l'effet 
d'un grand zèle surtout l'entreprenant dans 
un temps où 11 a tant besoin de prêtres en 
Canada. Je souhaiterais que nous en eussions 
assez pour lui en fournir un grand nombre, 
mais voyant que vous en manquez même à ce 
que vous dites à. Montréal, quelle apparence 
2. Can. Arch.AC. Series CllA, vol. XVIII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 18 October 1700. 
3. ibid; vol. XIX, Callières et Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 
5 October 1701. 
à songer à de nouveaux établissements. Noua 
aerions ravi d'avoir part à une ai bonne 
oeuvre, mais il faut que noua satisfaisions 
premièrement à nos principales obligations. 
Noua sommes chargés de Montréal. Dieu nous 
demandera compte ai noua y avons fait tout 
ce que nous avons pu, et si nous y manquons, 
ce ne aera pas une bonne excuse de dire que 
nous avons travaillé à une nouvelle mission. 
1 
It was the duty of the intendant to keep a close check on the 
finances and administration, not only of the secular clergy but 
also of auch groups as the Ursulines, and in doing ao Champigny 
again had trouble with the bishop for he highly diaapproved of 
Mgr. Saint-Vallier's ardent desire to round new religious estab-
lishments in the colony. In 1699 he informed the minister: "Il 
me parait bien necessaire, Mgr, de presser M. l'Evesque d'aug-
menter le nombre des Cures fixés et de faire desservir plusieurs 
paroisses ou les peuples manquent de secours spirituels, ce sont 
des ouvrages qui demandent son aplication plus fortement que les 
2 
établissements nouveaux, à. quoy il s'atache." 
The immediate cause of Champigny's disapproval was the biahop's 
recent establish~t of two new religious institutions, the 
Ursulines' at Three Rivera and the H8pital General near Quebec. 
Of the former establishment Champigny claimed that it had no 
financial foundation or means of support other than the amounts 
which the bishop gave it from day to day, yet the bishop waa 
taking in more and more poor girls as novices. The intendant 
gravely feared that with auch a ahaky financial backing it was 
1. Can. Arch. Librairie de St. Sulpice, Montreal. Lettres de 
l'Abbé Tronson, vol. V, no. 220, Tronson à M. Dollier de 
Casson, (Paria) 1699. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 May 1699· 
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1 
highly probable that 1 t would founder in the very near future. 
As for the new hospital at quebec, ChaJD.pigny vigorously opposed 
this undertaking. 'Ihe bi sbop had wi thdrawn several of the religious 
from the Hô tel Dieu to staff the new enterpri se. ChaJD.pig:ny and 
Frontenac had agreed to his ta.king four of these nuna wi thout 
their being perma:nently separated from their mother house, but 
the bishop had disregarded this condition and had ordered more 
members of the order to move into the new ho api tal and ha.d made 
of 1 t an entirely separate commun1 ty. Thus only ten or twelve 
nuns remained at the Hô tel Dieu which, Champigny claimed, was far 
from being sufficient to care for the large number of patients 
which they had· 
Champigny advised the minister that the religious should be 
returned to the Hôtel Dieu and an order iseued forbidding two 
auch ho spi tala in the same locali ty. Furthermore, he po1nted out 
that the bishop was admitting novices into the new hospital, girls 
who were in no wise capable of ad.m1n1stering auch an institution, 
and this, he claimed, was not only contrary to the rules of the 
order but would, unless a stop were put to i t, immediately resul t 
in the colla,pse of the HÔtel Dieu for la.ck of sta.t'f. "Et le. 
2 
colonie en eoufrira extra.ord1na1remen t," he warned. 
De spi te Cha.mpigny' s oppo si ti on the bishop proc eeded w1 th the 
establishment of his new institutions. At Three Ri vers he purchased 
a fine bouse and fifty arpents of land for the Ursulines; from 
this land the religious were to gain part of their subsistance, 
1. ca:n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 Ma.v 1699. 
2. ibid. 
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he also prom1sed them an add1 tional thousand livres a year f'rom 
1 
his renta in France. However, hi a new hospital at Quebec he was 
f'orèed to abandon by order of the King. Y et he still ref'Used to 
give up hope of i ts ul timately being established and continued 
to ma)re plans accord1ngly. Champigny, reinforced by the King' a 
decision, refused to hea.r of it and was made to feel the bishop's 
marked displeasure in consequence, something which does not 
2 
appear to have upset the intendant unduly. 
When Champigny first arrived in the colony he had paid a 
courtesy call on the mère.§ hospitalières of the Hôtel Dieu; the 
mother superior, in commenting on this in the .Annales of the order, 
remarked: "Il nous promit sa. protection avec une bonté qui luy 
3 
étoit naturelle.'' '!hat this was no idle promise ChSlilpigny had, 
by this t1me, amply demonstrated. 
As for the Ursulines a.t Three Rivera, the minister finally 
instructed Callières and Cha)llpigny to exaJD.ine the order' s revenues 
and if they sufficed for the upkeep of the existing number of 
girls, then they were to perm1 t no more to be adm1 tted and the 
King would issue letters patent ci ting this number as the author-
ised establishment of the order. Should they decide tha.t there 
were too many :t'or the revenues of the order to support, then no 
letters patent would be forthcom1ng un til e1 ther the number of 
4 
girls was reduced or thei:r revenues increased. 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Calliè:res et Champigny 
au Ministre, Q.uebec, 20 October 1699. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Se:ries CllA, vol. XVIII, Ch&lllpigny au Ministre, 
q.uebec, 15 October 1700. 
3· JUCHEREAU: Les Ann&les de l'Hôtel Dieu, p 224. 
4. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XXII Part 4, Ministre au sr. 
d'Auteuil, Versailles 1701) 
Q.uite apart from his administrative and financial jurisdiction 
over certain affaire of the church in the colony, the intendant 
also had something to say when he felt that the clergy were not 
discha.rging their spiritual duties adequately. In the lower town 
of ~uebec, the most densely populated area in the colony, there 
was a. church which had been built pa.rtly at the expanse of the 
local townspeople. This church was, of course, the one now known 
as Notre Dame des Victoires and Champigny had a particular inter-
1 
est in it since it was he who had laid the corner stone. Maas 
was said at this church at an early hour in the morning and aome 
of the old and infirm people 1n·th~icinity for whom the stiff 
climb to upper town was very difficult, particularly in winter, 
had asked to have a maas celebrated in the lower town church at 
2 
a more convenient hour. Champigny accordingly passed their request 
on to the minister: his relations with Mgr. Saint Vallier being 
rather sour at that particular time, there was little chance of 
his being able to persuade the bishop to accord the people of 
lower town their desired maas. Unfortunately, it is not known 
what the outcome was in this matter, however the very fact that 
the people went to the intendant to make their desires known in 
this connection indicates to some extent the wide sphere of his 
a*thonity, or at least of his influence, in church matters. 
Champigny also complained of the fact that although the King 
made an allowance of three hundred livres a year to have maas said 
at the intendant's palace, the bishop deprived him of this grace 
on the main feast da.ys of the year and on Sunda.ys during a good 
part of the summer months. Champigny wanted maas said at his 
1. GOSSELIN, Abbé AUGUSTE. L'Eglise du Canada. vol. I, p 57. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 14 October 1698; vol. XVII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1699· 
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palace not only on Sundays and feast days but avery day; he con-
sidered that this was necessary not only because the Sovereign 
. Council and the provost court held their meetings there, but also 
persona were held prisoner in the palace cella. Furthermore, he 
maintained that it was a great convenience to the infirm people or 
the quarter, which was now thickly populated, who had difficulty 
in walking up the hill to the parish church, particularly during 
l 
the winter. 
To the present day secular mind this demand of Champigny's 
may seem to smack of sanctimonious snobbery, and there may have 
been something of this about it. But it must be remembered that 
in the seventeenth century, and still today for that matter, a 
great many lay catholics heard mass said wvery morning; not to 
have dona so would have offended their keen sense of the fitness 
of things. Unfortunately it is again not known whether or not 
the minister agreed with Champigny that the bishop was depriving 
him of his just spiritual perquisites. 
Despite all these differences, Champigny seems to have kept 
on quite good terme with the bishop most of the time and even 
when he was at odds with him, he still never failed to acknowledge 
2 
the bishop'a zeal and particularly his great charity. In this 
respect Champigny was quite outstanding amongst the colonial 
officials, for the bishop had not been in the colony long before 
he had alienated everyone, both lay and religious, in a position 
1. ibid. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1692; vol. XII part 2, Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693; vol. XVIII, Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 15 October 1700. 
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of authority. For a while Frontenac had been very sympathetic 
towards Mgr. Saint Vallier and had wryly commented that one group 
in the colony was no more anxious to have a strong bishop than 
1 
a strong governor. However this entente cordiale was brusquely 
shattered by the troubles over the Mareuil case and the bishop's 
rabid accusations against Callières followed by his placing of 
the Recollets at Montreal under an interdict. 
The story of these fracas, which disrupted the government of 
the colony for the best part of a year, is too involved, too 
lengthy and too well known to require retelling in detail here. 
But while they la.sted they were very turbulent tempests in the 
colonial tea eup. The main cause of the trouble was a sudden 
clash of personalities between ~~r. Saint Vallier, Frontenac 
and Callières. Throughout this small ecale Fronde1Champigny, 
who appears to have realised that it is impossible to reason 
with unreasonable people, very wisely remained in the background 
as muchas possible. 
However, in the trouble between Callières and the bishop he 
did try to arrange a settlement. This quarrel broke out when 
Mgr. Saint Vallier, whose imagination seems to have run riot, 
informed the superior of the ?1ontreal Recollets that the latter' s 
sister was maintaining illicit relations with the governor of 
Montreal and ordered the superior to put a stop to it. Next, 
the bishop visited the Montreal Recollets and claimed that the 
governor's prie-dieu had been given a more honourable place in 
their church than had his own. He promptly ordered the governor's 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Frontenac au ïliinistre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1691. 
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prie-dieu removed to what he regarded as its proper place. Upon 
discovering this, Callières had his prie-dieu replaced, declaring 
thst if the bishop dared to touch it again he would post sentinels 
over it. The bishop then placed the Recollets' church under an 
interdict. Callières immediately published a personal mandement 
declaring that the bishop had over-stepped the bounds of his author-
ity, had insulted his, Callières: person by false accusations 
and that the interdict was null and void, being without just cause 
1 
and contrary to the privileges enjoyed by the Recollet order. 
Champigny's proposals for a settlement of the dispute were 
regarded as completely unacceptable by Frontenac and Callières 
since they required Callières to give ground and by doing so 
2 
admit that he had gone too far. This was the view later adopted by 
the minister's legal adviser who declared that the bishop's charges 
were so injurious and scandalous that they would require public 
reparation we~e it not that the authority and prestige of the 
bishop must be maintained at all costa as a matter of principle. 
On the other hand, it wa.s stated that Callières had "passé les 
bornes légitimes," since he had no authority to pass judgement 
3 
on a bishop's interdict. His efforts at mediation ha.ving failed, 
Champigny informed the bishop that he wanted nothing more to do 
4 
with the whole affa.ir. 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series F3, vol. VII part 2, Collection t-1oreau 
de St. Méry. Extraits des procedures faites au canseil Royal 
de 1,uébec depuis le 1er Fevrier 1694 jusgues au 20~me Octobre 
suivant. 
2. ibid. 
3· ibid. 
4. ibid. 
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However, when the Recollets reopened their church and adm1n1s-
tered the sacrements in defiance of the bishop' s interdict, Cham-
pigny reali sed that th1 s could only make matters worse for all 
concerned. He promptly sent the Recollets a copy of the order 
1 
he had received from the King, which stated: 
Sa Majesté veut pareillement qu'il donne 
pro tee ti on aux Recollets esta.bli s a 
Quebec, et s'il leur ar ri voit de ma.nquer 
en quelque chose au respect qu'ils doivent 
audit Sr abbé de chevrières, il doit avec 
prudence leur faire connoistre qu'ils 
doivent se souemettre a ses ordres, mais 
Sa Majesté espere que cela n'arrivere pas 
leur aYant f'ai t expliquer de sa part 
qu'une pareille conduite ne pouvant que 
luy estre tres désagreable, (et) les 
priveroit de ses graces ... 
2 
When this had no eff'ect, Chsmpigny took no further action, there 
being little or nothing tha.t he could have done even had he been 
so inclined . 
Then some t1me later, on the eve of the bishop' e departure for 
France, the bishop dined w1 th the intendant and madame de Champigny. 
V.lhile they were at dinner certain of the Recollets called to see 
the bishop, and throwing th.emselves at his f'eet, asked for his 
blessing and for peace. St. Vallier replied that he gave them 
his blessing glad1y, but pea.ce rested with them, and since their 
views were so opposed. to his, unless they changed their views, 
peace would be dif'ficul t to a.chieve. The Recollets answered 
that the other clergy in Montreal were treating them as heretics 
and schismatics and wanted to burn down the1r church. Th1 s struck 
1. Can. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 27 October 1694. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Instrction que le Roy veut 
estre remise ez maine du Sr de Champigny ••• Versailles, 
31 Mar 1686. 
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the bishop as being f'unny, he burst out la.ughing and told them 
tha.t if they had their church burnt down they would just have to 
rebuild i t aga.1n, but that no one had the right to trea.t them as 
heretics; as schismatics perhaps, since they refused to recognize 
him a.s the leader of their church, but not a.s heretics. Th1s 
did not plea.se the Recollets at all and they brusquely quitted 
the room in a high dudgeon. Champigny quickly followed and tried 
1 
to remonstrate w1 th them, but to no ava.il. 
Champigny realised full well that he could expect little or 
no thanks from a:nyone for his attempts to reconcile the warring 
factions. So f'ar as this dispute between the Recollets and the 
bishop is concerned, it is impossible to saY where his sympathies 
la,y; but as intendant his duty was clear, he ha.d to preserve 
order in the colony, and his instructions were explici t enough 
regarding the obedience of the Recollets to their bishop. In 
this issue Champigny was like a mi li tary commander who ha.s to 
back up the autbori ty of his subordinates for the sake of the 
maintenance of good discipline, even tbough he might diaagree 
wi th the manner in which his subordinates used their authori ty 
at times. He himself' satd, " ••• si on peut imputer a. M. 
1 'evesque quelque entreprise au dela des bornes en ce que je 
viens d 1 avoir 1 'honneur de vous marquer, ceux qui ont fa.i t 
des fautes n'ont pas moins mal fa1 t et n 1 en meri ttent pas 
moins le chatiment, autrement il n'y aura plus n'y ordre n'y 
1. Can. Arch. AN· Series F3, Collection Moreau de St. Mér,y, 
vol. VII part 2, 'EXtraits des procedures faites au Conseil 
Royal de Québec depuis le premier Fevrier 1694 jusques au 
20ème Octobre suivant. 
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1 
regle .•• ·" 
That there was not trouble of a similar nature involving the 
8Ulp1c1ans at Montreal maY we11 have been due to the d1sereet~ 
beh.ind the sc enes activi ti es of the intendant. T.here were 
frequent comp1a.1nts by residents of Montreal that some members 
of this semina:ry were over zee.lous and far too narrow in their 
views, and that th.1 a had created a great deal of resentment 
a.mongst their pari shi on er a. Their superior in Pari a, the abbé 
Tronson, several times wrote to them instructing them to moderate 
their at ti tude. In 1689 one of the se pri esta ha.d pub1ic1y refused 
communion to a lady because he regarded her ela.borate coiffure 
and the SaY ribbons on her dress as marks of a too offensive 
2 
va.ni ty • The abbé Tronson ordered that a priest cou1d only caution 
against such things in the priva.cy of the confessional and should 
never do more than this without the direct instructions of his 
3 
bishop. 
In 1692 the abbé Tronson wrote to Dollier de Casson, the head 
of the Y'...ontreal Sem1nary, telling him tha.t the Montreal priest a 
were a.ga.in being too severe. In this let ter he li sted their 
ex cesses in great detail and ci ted psrticular cases; he remarked 
that they had be en in the habit of nam.ing people publicly from 
1. Ca,n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny a.u Ministre, 
Q,uebec, 27 October 1@4. 
2. Can. Arch. Librairie de St. SUlpice, Montreal· Lettres de 
1 • Abbé Tronson, vol. IV, no 434. Tronson à M. de Colombière, 
(Paris) 7 June 1690. 
3. ibid. 
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the pulpit and commenting on their supposed faults, that they 
had most indiscreetly refused communion to soma parsons and 
threatened others with similar treatment; they had also laid 
down the law governing womens' dress and had refused communion 
to many of them merely because they were wearing lace on their 
garments, and they had even gone so far as to publicly criticise 
certain of the colonial officials. All this, the abbé Tronson 
declared, had got to stop, adding that " ••• ces pratiques ne 
peuvent avoir que de mauvaises suites, qu'elles feront toujours 
plus de mal que de bien, et que toutes ont été ici universelle-
ment improuvées ••• Je crois que par·trop grande chaleur que l'on 
ft ~ 1 
a fait paraitre ~a fait plus de mal que l'on n'~n a empêché •••• " 
All this detailed information had been supplied to the abbé 
Tronson by his relative, Champigny. There can be no doubt that 
it was far better that an end should have been made to auch cler-
ical excesses by a directive emanating from within the order 
1tself rather than to have had the secular authorities make an 
issue of the matter. Certainly the abbé Tronson was grateful 
for the discreet part Champigny had played in this connection, 
as is evidenced by his informing the intendant that: 
J'ai bien de la joie de ce que vous avez 
eu la bonté de me marquer que ce grand zèle 
qui a été quelquefois trop loin est mainte-
nant plus modéré. Vous voyez en cela le fruit 
de vos avis qui m'ont donné lieu de leur 
écrire amplement sur cette sévérité et de 
leur faire connaitre que l'on désapprouve 
universellement ici ces excès inusités et 
ces conduites à'une morale outrée fort peu 
à ramener les pécheurs ••• si vous avez, 
Monsieur, quelque autre avis à me donner, 
1. Can. Arch. Librairie de St. Sulpice, Montreal. Lettres de 
l'Abbé Tronson. Tronson à M. Dollier de Casson, (Paris) 1692. 
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soit pour ce qui regarde la conduite de nos 
Messieurs, soit pour ce qui concerne le bien 
de l'Ile, je les recevrai toujours comme une 
marque de votre bonté et pour eux et pour 
moi •••• 
1 
There was one very contentious isse in New France in respect to 
which Champigny was adamantly on the sida of the clergy. This was 
the sale of brandy to the Indiana. The clergy were vehemently 
opposed to this and Champigny did everything in his power to 
limit the trade. The Indiana drank for only one reason, to get 
drunk; and once drunk they committed the most abominable excesses, 
behaving more like ravening beasts than human beings. Once they 
had tasted the fiery liquor they would do anything to get more. 
Soma of the coureurs de bois took advantage of this and many an 
Indian awakened from a furious debauch to find that he had, 
whilst drunk, traded away his wh•le winter's catch of furs for 
a few juge of brandy and had nothing left with which to purchase 
his next year's supplies. 
Nor was it only the missionaries who vouched for the evils of 
the brandy trade; du Lhut, a capitaine reformé in the Troupes de 
la Marine declared that after ten years experience amongst the 
up country tribes: 
je n'ay jamais veu traiter d'eau de vie 
qu'il ne soit arrivée de grand desordres 
jusqu'a voir le père tuer son fils et le 
fils jetter sa mère dans le feu et que je 
soutiens que moralement parlant il est 
impossible de traiter de l'eau de vie dans 
les bois et dans les missions etrangères 
sans s'exposer a tomber dans ces malheurs •••• 
2 
1. Can. Arch. Librairie de St. Sulpice, Montreal. Lettres de 
l'Abbé Tronson. Tronson à M. de Champigny, (Paris) 4 April 1692. 
2. Gan. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Attestation du 
Sieur du Lhut ••• sur les désordres que cause l'ivrognerie des 
sauvages de Canada. 
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But the greed of many of the coureurs de bois was far greater 
than their concern over the terrible effects that brandy had on 
the Indiana, for with a few jugs of this liquor they could obtain 
more furs than with a whole canoe load of other trade goods. 
Consequently, men like La r-:othe Cadillac fought tooth and nail to 
prevent any ban being applied to this trade. Cadillac was perhaps 
the most vociferous of all in his opposition to any auch limitation. 
In a lengthy mémoire on this subject, written whilst he was 
commander of the post at Michilimackinac, he advanced avery argu-
ment he could think of in favour of the unrestricted trade in 
brandy. He claimed that the men at this post had to live on a 
diet of fish, meat and corn and that brandy was essential for 
their digestion; that the air was penetrating and corrosive and 
without a tot of brandy on a morning they would all be a prey to 
disease. Next he appealed to legal arguments; were not the French 
at Michilimackinac subjects of the French crown, and if so why 
should they be the only men in the Kingdom deprived of the salace 
of brandy? 
As for denying it to the Indiana because they were too often 
cheated of all they possessed while under its influence, or because 
it led to great debauchery, Cadillac denied that auch events ever 
occurred. And as for brandy undoing the work of the missionaries, 
he claimed that this was nonsense since those Indiana who did not 
touch brandy were no better Christiane than those who did. He 
further claimed that the real reason why the miss1onaries were so 
opposed to giving brandy to the Indiana was beaause it interfered, 
not with their evangelism but with their own illicit fur trading 
1 
activities. 
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Cadillac's arguments are very specious and prove only one 
thing, that he was a hypocrite. 
The policy of the Crown towards the brandy traffic was itself 
rather inconsistent, in so far as it willed the end but for several 
years refused to will the means. In an ordonnance of May 24th, 1679, 
the King had forbidden the taking of brandy out of the colony into 
2 
the forest for the purpose of inèbriating the Indiana. This 
ordonnance proved to be quite ineffective. In 1689 Denonville and 
Champigny banned the retail sale of brandy in Montreal for two 
months at the time that the Sault Indiana were moved to the immed-
iate vicinity of the town for defence purposes. They claimed that 
such a ban was necessary to put an end to the gross disorders 
caused by the Indiana in the town who had come to regard every 
3 
private house as a tavern, and seemingly not without rea.son. 
The King however, refused to make any change in the ordonnance 
of 1679, stating that it wa.s not his intention to depr1ve his 
subjects of the advantages they derived from the trade except to 
chastise severely those who as a result of the immoderate use of 
brandy became violent, and by so chastising, deter them in the 
4 
future. The reason advanced for this dubious policy wa.s tha.t 
were more severe restrictions to be placed on the liquor trade, 
1. Que. Arch. !-1anuscrits Relatif à. l'Histoire de la Nouvelle 
France, 2me serie, vol. VII, Le Sieur de Lamotte Cadillac 
au Fort de Bua.de sur l'Isle Missilimakina, 3 August 1695· 
~ 
2. Edits & Ordonnances. vol. I, pp 235-236. Ordonnance du Roi, 
24 May 1679. 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1689. 
4. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XV, Mémoire du Roy aux Srs. 
Denonville et Champigny, Versailles, 1 Yay 1689. 
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1 
then it would merely fall into the hands of the English. 
Denonville denied this, stating that the Indiana would not go 
to the English for liquor were the French to deny it to them. He 
was certain that the Indiana would not want it if they did not 
see it and the more reasonable of them wished that they had never 
2 
seen it. This was an issue that had been hotly debated in the 
colony for many years and was to be as hotly debated for many 
years to come. Since an effective ban on the trading of brandy 
with the Indiana was never enforced during this period it is 
impossible to say whether Denonville's assertion is right or 
wrong. It seems likely that some of the Indiana might have been 
willing to go all the WaY to the English settlements just to get 
drunk, and it seems just as likely that the majority whould have 
lacked the inclination when it entailed such a journey and inevi-
tably produced such dire resulte for them. One thing is certain, 
curbs on the brandy trade had a far better chance of achieving 
their purpose in the seventeenth century than they had several years 
later after the Indiana had become habituated to its use. To them 
it was as disastrous in both its immediate and its more lasting 
effects as is hashish to the white races. 
However, the court paid no heed to Denonville's mémoire and 
concerned itself instead with curbing the attempts of the clergy 
to stop the brandy trade. In this connection Champigny and 
Frontenac were ordered to see to it that the ecclesiastics remained 
strictly within the limita of their office lest the liquor marchants 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire de M. de Denonville 
concernant le Canada, January 1690. 
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1 
should suffer a decrease in their commerce. The bishop was also 
informed that he had to see to it that his priests did not trouble 
the consciences of the people on this score. "Il est certain," 
wrote the minister, nque les sujets du Roy ne peuvent faire de 
commerce en Canada si utile au Royaume que celuy du vin et de 
l'eau de vie et qu'il n'y en a point en quay ils ayent un si grand 
2 
avantage sur les Anglais et les Hollandais." When the bishop 
suggested that a tax of fifteen sols the barrel be levied on 
importa of brandy and wine, the proceeds to be used for the 
benefit of the poor, the minister agreed that "les riches doivent 
nourir les pauvres, 11 but rejected the proposai as being likely 
3 
to have a deleterious effect on trade. 
Champigny reported in 1691 that the vaguely phrased ordonnance 
of 1679 was capable of many interpretations. Some in the colony 
claimed that it did not apply to the Indian villages in the colony 
or at Michilimackinac. Champigny thought differently, claiming 
that the sale of liquor should be a.llowed only in Montreal, Quebec, 
4 
Three Rivera and in establishments within the colony proper. 
Two years later, the King took cognisance of the fact tha.t the 
unlimited sale of brandy to the Indiana could have undesirable 
consequences and ordered Frontenac and Champigny to enforce the 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XV, Ministre à M. de Champigny, 
Versailles, 14 July 1690. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XV, Ministre à M. l'Evesque de 
Quebec, Versailles, 14 July 1690. 
3· Can. Arch. AN. Series B, Vol. XVII part 1, Ministre à M. de 
Frontenac, Versailles, 8 fvf..ay 1694; Ministre à M. l' Evesque 
de Quebec, 8 May 1694. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 May 1691. 
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1 
1679 ordonnance more atrictly. The following year, 1694, the King 
iasued a new ordonnance ordering that men going up country could 
take only enougb brandy for their own peraonal use on the journey 
and left it up to the governor and intendant to decide how much 
2 
this ahould be. Champigny, after conferring with Frontenac, 
iaaued an ordannonce which stated that men going up country could 
3 
not take more than thirteen jugs of brandy each. rl.hen La Motte 
Cadillac, who ha.d come down to Montreal, was returning to Michil-
imackinac Champigny gave him a copy of the ordonnance to be prom-
ulgated a.t this post and charged him with seeing to its execution. 
However, this wa.a not to Ca.dillac's liking a.t alland instea.d of 
publishing Cha.mpigny's ordonnance he poated one of his own devising, 
4 
which merely forba.de a.nyone to inebriate the Indiana. 
When Champigny heard of this he immediately took the matter up 
with Frontenac and wa.s bla.ndly informed that Cadillac had acted on 
the governor's instructions. "Et les choses en demeurent là," 
5 
added Champigny. There waa nothing that he could do about this 
situation: if Frontenac persisted in frustrating the King's 
ordonnances, Champigny had no recourae but to report the fact to 
the minister. And this he did, repeating once more the baneful 
6 
resulta of the unlimited trade in brandy with the Indiana. 
Nevertheless, Champigny did not a.dvocate a total prohibition 
1. Q,ue. Arch. Rpt. 1927-1928, :1-iémoire du Roy au Srs. Frontenac 
et Champigny, 1693· 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1695. 
3· ibid. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 November 1695· 
5. ibid. 
6. ibid. 
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of brandy for the Indiana; he agreed that in certain conjunctures 
it was necessary to let them have a limited amount, but he main-
tained that in auch circumstances the brandy should be issued as 
a present from the King and with all due care being taken that they 
1 
did not get out of hand. A system such as this had much to recom-
mend it; the only trouble being that so long as the up country 
post commandera were so actively engaged in the fur trade for their 
own account, there was little hope of their paying more than lip 
service to any orders that would have reduced their profits. 
When Callières became governor of the colony he supported the 
intendant in his efforts to curb the worst abuses of the brandy 
traffic. During the great Indian peace conference at Montreal 
Callières placed a complete ban on the sale of all liquor in or 
2 
near the town and this undoubtedly contributed greatly to the 
successful conclusion of the conference. One can well imagine 
what would have transpired with hundreds of Indiana from every 
tribe and nation, both friend and foe, encarnped together, had 
brandy been available. 
The King was seemingly quite impressed by Callières action, 
and this coupled with the continual barrage of mémoires to which 
he had for years been subjected by the opponenta of the brandy 
trade, persuaded him to order that no liquor was to be given or 
sold to the Indiana under any circumstances for a period of two 
years. Callières was ordered to punish anyone contravening this 
1. ibid. 
2. Gan. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XXIII part 1, Mémoire du Roy 
au Sr. Chevalier de Callières. (1702) 
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order with severity, but at the same time the governor was 
empowered to rai se the ba.n should he find that i t was proving 
harmful to tra.de in the colony or was having any other deleter-
1 
ioua effecta. However, by the time this directive reached 
Quebec, Champigny was msking ready to retum to France, h1 a 
auccessor, Eea.uharnois, having already arrived. 
There wa.s no easY solution to the problem of the brandy trade. 
It wa.s closely integrated w1 th the fur trade and since during 
Champigny' s intenda.ncy the economie and social problems inherent 
in th1 s larger issue were found incapable of solution, the 
accompa.ny1ng moral and religious problems also rema1ned unsolved. 
Champigny did his beat for sixteen long years to see that "D1eu 
soit bien serv:f," but inev1 tably he round i t impossible to serve 
two masters well, God and mammon, for 1 t was no less than this 
that had be en required of hlm. 
1. ibid. 
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CH,APTER VII . 
TRAJ)E AND INDUSTRY . 
The greatest obstacle to economie development in New France during 
Champigny' s intendancy wa.s, of course, the war. Wi th the upper 
colony being continually ravaged by the Iroquois, wi th New Engla.nd 
privateers lurking in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and French convoy s 
carrying supplies to the colony being ca,ptux:ed or sunk by the 
Fllgli ah fleet, there was little hope of much in the WaJ' of indust-
ri al expansion te.king place. .And there were other na.tural handi-
caps wh1ch werê beyond the ca:paci ti es of f!iJJ3 intendant to overcome. 
There was the ha.rsh climate wh1ch restricted nearly all economie 
act1vi ty to sevan months out of the twelve. There wa.s the colony' s 
geographie isolation, its sources of supply and the markets for 
i ta few exporta being thousands of miles awaY and completely eut 
off for nearly half the y aar. .Another great handicap wa.s the 
smallness of the population and the concomitant la.ck of both labour 
and ca.pi tal. But the grea.test handicap of all was the fur trade 
which drained the colony' s meagre supplies of labour and ca:pi tal, 
as wall a.s its incentive for all other types of enterprise. 
The policy of the crown, so long as SeignelaY was minister of 
marine, was clear; he wanted to see New France standing on 1 ta 
own feet, its economw based sol1dly on agriculture and such 1ndust-
ri es as fi shing and lumbering; and producing wi thin the colony 
i taelf all the neèesai ties of lite, i ts own cloth and clothing, 
i ta own food and even i ta own wine. As the King put i t: 
•.. cette Colonie ... ne sera jamaié solide 
tant qu'elle ne pourra Pas subsister Par 
Elle mesme, et qu'on ne pourra tirer du 
pais ce qui est absolument necessaire 
pour la vie. 
1 
In his official instructions Champigny had been told to do 
everything possible to increaae the quantitt, qua,lity and diversity 
of the colony's agricultural production. This he round to be no 
eaay ta.ak. One of the major difficul ti es, he claimed, wa.s the 
laziness of aome of the ha.bi tanta who were sa ti sfied to grow enough 
for their immediate needs wi th no thought for the morrow, and as 
a resul t, were reduced to the extremes of misery by the all too 
2 
frequent crop fa.ilures. '!he major cause of auch erop fa.ilures 
wa.s the fact that the grea.test emphasis was pla.ced on the ra.ising 
of wheat; the aoil and the climate, which was too cold and damp, 
3 
b eing un sui ted to th1 a gr ain . 
In an attempt to diveraiy the colony• s e.g'J!I'icultura.l production, 
Champigny aaked that aix barrel a of flaX seed and a supply of hemp 
aeed be sent to the colony. He sta.ted that when he received the 
requested seeds he would distribute them himself and go out to 
1. Can • Arch. jJ. Series B, vol. XII, Mémoire du Roy aux ars 
Denonville et Champigny, Versailles, 30 Ma.rch 1687. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif sur le 
Canada· Champigny, Quebec, 10 MaY 1691. 
3. BURTON, F .w: The Wheat Supply of New France, in Proc. Trans. 
Roy. Scty. Cda. Third Series, vol. XXX, 1936, pp 137-150. 
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the habitants' fa.rms to malte sure they were sown. in the right sort 
1 
or soil. He also tr1ed to get the habi tanta to rai se sheep ror 
wool by promising them congés and marriage dowries as an induce-
ment. The re·ason why he wàs so a.nxious to have fla.x and wool 
raised, was the high priee of clothing in the colony. "L'habitant 
seroit heureux," he stated, "s'.il n'estoit pas obligé d'achepter 
des estoffes et des thoilles de france qUi coutant jcy le double 
ce qui les oblige d'employer presque tout ce qu'jls ont a s'en 
2 
fournir." 
Three years la.ter Champigny reported that both the flax and 
3 
the hemp were doing qui te well. But the fact tha.t auch plants 
would thrive in Ca:nadian soil was not of itself sufficient, for 
by 1695 only a rew habi tanta around Quebec were willing to rai se 
hemp, and only enough to supply their own needs. Thus Champigny' s 
hopes of even tu ally having an exportable surplus of this commodi ty 
4 
v ani shed, and a.t the end of his intendancy he adm1 tted that i t 
was a hopeless task trying to force the habitants to grow hemp 
5 
for the market. 
Throughout the war years the colony was dependent on food 
supplies impol'ted from Fl'ance; in only one yeal', 1694, is thel'e 
any record of the!'e having been an expol'table surplus of grain. 
As luck would have i t, this surplus coincided wi th a crop fa1lure 
1. ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1686. 
2. ibid. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Champigny au Ministl'e, 
Quebec, 16 November 1689. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 November 1695. 
5. Can. !l'ch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Q;uebec, 5 October 1701. 
a;nd severe :famine in France. Consequently, Champigny allowed 
gl:'a.in to be expoJ:'ted to FJ:'a.nce a:nd flour to the West Indies. This 
decision was something of a gamble since a crop failure the follow-
ing yeaJ:', necessita ting hea.vier impol:'ts than usual fJ:'Om France, 
would have bJ:'Ought the wrath of the minister down on his head. 
Howevel:', Champigny took this risk because had he not done so the 
SUZ'PlUs in the colony would have caused the priee to drop consid-
era.bly, and he wa.s afraid that the habi tanta would beoome di scour-
1 
aged upon receiving so little for the PJ:'Oduct of their labours. 
The mini ste!', al though acknowledging that the King was plea.sed 
that Canada had finally ma.naged to produce a surplus, could not 
re:f'J:'a.in fJ:'Om wal:'ning the intendant not to J:'isk lightly the export 
of' auch etaples lest a subsequent shortage should cause priees to 
2 
soar. Champigny must have breathed a sigh of relief the :follow-
ing YeaJ:' when, despi te the usuaà heavy rains, the OJ:'OP proved 
adequate and ena.bled h1m to buy up a y ea.r' s supply for the tJ:'Oops 
3 
at forty-five sols the minot, this being a,pproximately the same 
- 4 
priee as it had sold :for during the previous yeaJ:'. 
One of the main obstacles to the development of agriculture 
was, o~ course, the fur trade. It was extremely diffioult to 
keep the youth of the country on the land when the lif'e of the 
coureur de bois of'fered auch irresistable attractions to the 
more adventurous spiitits• Denonville gave Champigny his full 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 5 November 1694. 
2. Ca.n. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII Pal:'t 3, Ministre à M · de 
Champigny, Versailles, 4 June 1695· 
3. ca;n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal, 11 AUgust 1695 • 
4. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Callières au Ministre, 
Montreal, 19 October 1694. 
----·-*""P""','t~" .. 
-254-
1 
support in a.ttempting to keep the se men in the colony, but 
with the a.dvent of Frontenac this cooperation was notably lacking. 
However, when the war came to an end agriculture b@lgan to revive; 
2 
new land was wrested from the forest, particularly around i-iontreal, 
as discha.rged soldiers took up concessions and the sons of habitants, 
'ttho had remained on their fathers 1 farms for securi ty reasons, 
3 
began to clea.r land of their own. 
Second only to a.gri cul ture in the stress laid on i t by the 
crown , was the fishing induatry. The King even went so far as to 
give the governor and the intendant his consent to engage in this 
4 
trade themselves, the only auch activi ty tha.t was permi tted them. 
However, this ind.Ustry ca.n, by no stretch of the imagination, be 
described as flourishing by the end of the seventeenth century. 
Champigny spared no pains to stimula te i t, claiming that i t was 
•• •.• le commerce le plus avantageux qu'on puisse jamais faire dans 
5 
cette colonie ... " but his beat efforts met wi th seant success. 
The main reasons for these negative resulta were, the lack of 
capital needed to outfi t fishing vessels, the remo:beness of the 
beat fishing grounds from Quebec and the even greater remoteness 
of' poteàtial. markets, tha lack of salt supplies ln the colony 
and the lack of initiative displaY ed by most of the Canadia.ns 
owing to the greater attractions of the fur trade. 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1686. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Seri es CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire Instructif sur le 
Canada. Champigny • Que bec, 10 MaY 1691 . 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVIII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 18 October 1700. 
4. Ca,n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII Part 1, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ydnistre, Quebec, 15 September 1692. 
5· Ca,n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XII, part 1, Frontenac et 
Champigny a.u Hinistre, Quebec, 15 September 1692. 
The man who deaerved most of the credit for the early develop-
ment of commercial fiahing in New France waa Denia Riverin, who 
wi thout a doubt waa one of the most enterprising and :far seeing 
men in the colony. Born at Toura about 1650, Ri verin fi rat came 
to Canada as seoretary to the intendant Duchesneau, and a :few 
1 
years later he was a,ppointed agent of the Compa.ny of the Farm. 
When he first began hia fishing establishments in the colony, 
R1 verin recei ved the King' s support and financial backing to the 
extent of two fur trade congés a year for a period of three yeara. 
The se congés were worth a thou sand livres each in Canad1 an funda 
. 
and Ri verin used this ca;pi tal to import equipment and trained 
2 
fi sherman from France. 
Champigny had received eocplicit instructions to give Riverin 
avery assistance and to encourage others in the colony to follow 
3 
his example. Unfortunately for both New France and Riverin, the 
latter's strenuous efforts to establish sedentary fishing stations 
along the St. Lawrence were constantly dogged by ill luck. In 
1687 the boat and a large stock of fishing equipment that he had 
had sent out from France was ca,ptured by an English privateer. 
Yet he refused to be discoura.ged and continued with his plans 
4 
for cod and whal e fi shing • 
Champigny had high hopes for the whale fishing and he did not 
take kindly to being told by some Basque fishermen that the St. 
Lawrence whales were too small and their blubber too difficul t 
1. B .R .H. vol. XLIV, 1938, P 153, ROY,P .-G: Netea atil' D•1t 
R1Ter1n. 
2 • APPend1x A, pJ?S 
3· ibid. 
4. B.R.H. vol. XXXIV, 1928, pp 73-74, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 November 1688. 
to render down. He promptly ha.d s,..ma.ll wh ale, which ha.d been 
ca.ught a.t Cap Tourmente, rendered down, and when i t produced 
over twenty-five barrels of very good oil he wa.s sa.tisfied tha.t 
1 
the Ba.sques were m1 sta.ken. Ivieanwhile, de spi te h1 s he avy lo ases, 
R1verin continued his efforts. In 1689 he sent out twenty boats 
which returned wi th a good catch and th1 s stimulated some of the 
Quebec marchants to send out boats on their own account. R1 verin 
formed a partnersh1p wi th three of these marchants to esta.blish a 
fishing and trading station a.t Belle Isle, and another in New-
foundland, ChaJilpigny and Denonville ha.ving grantad them land con-
cessions in these areas. But the most that Champigny could saY 
of all this activity was that "le pauvre Riverin fait de son 
2 
mieux." 
For the next few years R1verin st:ruggled to malte a. success of 
both cod and whale fishing, the orown continued to give h1m its 
3 
support but this ba.rely oompensated him for his losses. In 1695 
his bark wi th a. tul.l catch was captured in the Gulf by a New 
4 
England privateer; despite this blow he retused to be discouraged, 
and the following year he bega.n malting plans for a.nother whaling 
base which he estimated would eventually employ some five hundred 
met1as there was good pasture s;nd arable land in the area he ha.d 
selected. What was needed, he stated, wa.s a few master whalers 
l. ibid. 
2. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series OllA, vol. X, Champigny au M1n1 stre, 
Mon treal, 6 July 1689. 
3 • 0 an • Arch • AC . Series ellA, vol • X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1689; vol. XI, Mémoire du Roy aux Frontenac 
et Champigny, (1690); vol. XII part 2, Frontenac et ChaJilpigny 
au Ministre, Quabac, 4 November 1693· 
4. Ca,n. Arch. AC· Series CllA· vol. XIII, ~amp1gny au Ministre, 
Que bec, 6 November 1695. 
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a.nd fishermen to instruct the Ca.nadians, also a few ca;nnon for 
1 
defence against privateers. 
By this time quite a fsw Canadia.ns were engaged in fishing in 
2 
the Gulf and the crown continued to give them considerable support. 
In 1699 Champigny asked that the sieur Viilré, a member of the 
Sovereign Council, anould be gra.nted four thousa.nd livres worth of 
fishing lina which he needed to expand his business. The sieur 
Vitré specialised in porpoise a.nd whale fishing a.nd Champigny stated 
3 . 
that he had had fair success at i t. The Kfng was quick to grant 
. 
this request but Champigny was far from pleased to discover that 
4 
the line had been charged to the funds of the colony. However, 
the sieur Vitré a,ppears to have put this fish line to good use for 
in 1701 his boats brought in seventy whales a.nd he had hopea of 
5 
doing even better than this in the future. At about this time 
too, a group of Ca.nadig,ns founded a fishing base at Mount Louis 
and Champigny advanced them supplies of flour, on a repaYment 
basis he hastened to assure the minister, sufficient to see them 
6 
through the winter. 
In 1692 Champigny and Frontenac themselves went into the fishing 
1. B .R .H. vol. XXXVI, 1930, pp 178-180, Mémoire de Denis Riverin, 
Paris, 28 JanuarY 1696. 
2 .can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, Vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 November 1695. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 20 October 1699· 
4. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVIII, Callières et Champign,y 
au Ministre, Quebec, 18 October 1700. 
5· Can. Arch. Ac· Series CllA, vol. XIX, Calli~res et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 31 October 1701. 
6. can. Arch. AO. Series CllA, vol. XVIII, Champigny au Ministr' 
Quebec, 15 October 1700. 
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business, ostensibly to encourage others to follow their example, 
The sieur d' !berville had captured an English sbip which the 
intendant had returbished and fi tted wi th new masts. Champigny 
and Frontenac informed the minister that they, in pertnersh1p with 
the sieurs La ChesnaYe and Pachot, would be willing to PaY for the 
oost of this returbishing if the King were to grant them the boat 
1 
to be used for fishing on the Grand Banks. The King agreed to 
2 
this and gave them the ship, whereupon they rechristened it the 
St. Louis and sent i t off to Plaisance for a cargo of fi sb., then 
3 
across to France for supplies. They made no secret of the tact 
4 
that they hoped to malte a goodly profit out of the enterprise; 
but in this they were sor ely disa,ppointed, for wi thin little more 
tha.n a year the sh1p was captured by the English and Champigny 
bemoa:ned the tact that he had thereby lost soma four thousand 
5 
livres. 
The depredations of these pri vateers, who ventured to wi thin 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 15 September 1692; Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1692. 
2 · Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVI part 2, Ministre à. M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 28 March 1693· 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII Part 2, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693; Champigny a.u 
Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1692. 
4. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Fronèena.c et 
Champigny a\l Ministre, Quebec, 15 September 1692. 
5. Ca:n. Arch. AC . Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 November 1695. 
l 
fifty miles of Quebec .i tself, were a constant menace not only 
to the fi shing industey but to commerce in general .. In 1694 
two Enslish brigantines cruised in the Gulf all summer, Ca,p-
2 
truing a French f'lO.te, the St. Joseph, and a fish1ng boat from 
Quebec. The capture of the St. Joseph alone meant a losa of 
3 
nearly one hundred thousan4 écus. Champigny and Frontenac 
suggested that a rendezvous anould be established at the mouth 
or the St. Lawrence where etraY sh1ps could wa1 t and proceed up 
the river in convoy as far as Tadoussac. They also wanted a. 
frigate to escort the convoya and clear the Gulf of priva.teers, 
this fr1gate to be based permanently at Quebec so tha.t i t could 
4 
be used to protect the fi shing boa.ts as soon as the ice went out. 
The m1nister acceded to this request and sent the friga.te La 
Bouffonne to Quebec. The governor and intendant quickly d1scov-
ered tha.t if noth1ng el se the sh1p wa.s aptly nallled, for i t proved 
to be qui te useless for this particular job. It wa.s one of the· 
oldest ships in the service, wi th a rotten hull, a.nd drawing so 
m:uch wa.ter i t could not run close to shore for fear of running 
a.ground. Champigny and Frontenac promptly asked tha.t i t be 
replaced by one of the frigates ha.ving a ehallower draft, that 
5 
were being used on Atlantic convoy duty; but this request f'ell 
l. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 October 1698; (Fifty miles being talten to be the 
equivalent of the twenty leagues mentioned by Frontenac) 
2. A flûte was a long,na.rrow, high sterned cargo vassel origin-
ally. designed by the Dutch. 
3. Ce.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 5 November 1694. 
4. ibid. 
5· Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac et Champigny, 
au Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1695· 
on deaf ears. Champigny did his beat to get rid of this floating 
white elephant as he found that i t co at an exorbitant amount for 
repaira and maintena;nce and was of no use whatsoever in the tricky 
coastal waters of the st. Lawrence; but Frontenac rather lik:ed the 
idea. of having a f'rigate under his command, he would not agree to 
Champigny 1 s sending i t back: to France and insisted on commission-
ing i t the following spring. 11 Je suis bi en a.1 se de vous marquer, " 
Champigny informed the m1n1ster, "que cela s'est fait contre mon 
. 1 
avis et par deference aux volontez de M. le comte de Frontenac." 
In 1698 Gallifet, the maJor de Quebec, proposed that a fort 
should be esta.blished a.t Isle Percé to protect the fi shing vessels 
2 
and ships entering the Gulf against atta.ck:s by Ec.gli ah pirates. 
Frontenac, Callières and Champigny were all in fa.vour of this 
project but it was vetoed by the minister, much to the disgust of 
3 
the Canadian officials. 
However, the maritime wa.r in North American waters was not 
al together a one sided a.ffa.ir. The French ma.naged to ta.ke a few 
prizes; one auch was an English ketch captured by the sieur 
Bonaventure which proved to conta.in a very valu able cargo, na.mely 
4 
sa.].t. The 1ack o:f tiJ'fY source of aupp1y of this commod1ty w1thin 
the coloey was a very eerious handicap to the fishing industry • 
At one point during Frontenac' s ca.mpa.ign aga.inst the Ononda.ga.s 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 13 October 1697. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 October 1698. 
3. Can • .Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 20 October 1699. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 October 1691. 
in 1696, the arrii3 caJDped by some a al t springs and in one account 
of th1 a campaign the au thor remarks that these springs "produisent 
assez de sel pour nous faire aouhaitter quelles fussent aupres de 
1 
Quebec, la pesche de la morue seroit fort aisé à faire en Canada." 
In 1691 Champigny requested th at add1 tiona.l supplies of salt 
be sent out in the King' s ships so that he could supply i t to the 
ha.b1 tanta at a reasonable priee and so encourage them to do more 
2 
fiàhi:tlg_!. The following year, the salt duly arrived and Champigny 
·.t: 
sold, purposely keeping the priee low in the belief that he wa.s 
acting in accordance with the King's wishes. But Pontchartrain 
had other views; he took Champigny severely to ta.sk for not having 
rea.lized the ma;ximum profit on this transaction in order to augment 
3 
the mi li ta.ry funds. In reply Champigny pointed out that he had 
made a fair prot'i t on the sale of this salt, having sold i t for 
4 
45 sols the minot one Year and 52 sola 6 deniers the next. A few 
years later Champigny again tackled this problem, pointing oû.t to 
the m1n1ster that the principal obstacle hindering the development 
of the fishing industry was the excessively high priee of salt and 
a.sking tha.t the King' s ships should import supplies which could be 
charged to the account of the colony 1 s funds. He patiently explained 
that he could roealize a fair profit fOI' the King and a till sell 
the salt for a gi'eat deal lesa than the La Rochelle mei'chants 
5 
were charging. But Pontcharti'ain would have none of i t. "Il 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Relation de ce qui s 1 est 
Passé ... 1695 •.• 1696. 
2. Ca,n. Arch. AC: Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 October 1691. 
3. 8~mpt~; ~rs~fri:=,B~8v~i;0~v±6~~t 2, Ministre à M. de 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII Part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693· 
5. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Champigny a.u Ministre, 
Que bec, 13 October 1697. 
ne convient point à Sa Ma.l esté de se mesler d'un pareil commerce," 
he flatly atated, "c'est à ces marchands à chercher eux mesme les 
1 
moyens de s'en pourvoir à bon marché." . 
All in all there waa a fair arnount of ac ti vi ty in the fi ahing 
industry during th1 a period, despi te all the handicaps, and 
certainly Champigny did everything he could to atimulate i t; but 
this industry was very large1y confined to the domestic market. 
So far as cod fishing waa concerned the Q.uebec fishe.rmen could 
not hope to compete with the men fishing ott the Grand Banka. 
The marchants of La Rochelle claimed that the Cana.dian ha.bi tanta 
were not sui ted to fishing for cod and that i t alwaYa coat them 
more thaxt their catch wa.s WOI"th. They stated: 
Le sel, les chaloupes, ~e transport des 
vivres, et le loyer des hommes coustei"oit 
plus a Quebec que 1es habi tans ne I"etireroi t 
du poi saon qui leur couat er a plus de 12 
livres le quintal avec toute leur oeconomie, 
au lieu qu • a Plaisance poste plus avantageux 
le poissonsec revient a 6 livres 10 sols le 
quintal en trocq de sel, et autres danrées 
que l'on vend avec avantage. Il est beau-
coup meilleur que celuy de la Pesche de la 
riviere de Quebec. 
2 
Whether or not these La Rochelle marchants had an axe to 
grind in this matter, or perha,ps were afraid lest the Canadian 
fi shing 1ndustry should become a threat to certain of their vested 
interests, is not known. But in any event, Champigny had to take 
a more sanguine view of things. There he wa.s, intendant of a 
country with a very lop sided economy, but a country situated on 
the banks of a huge river which li teraJ.ly teemed wi th fish, ee1s, 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XX Part l, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 21 March 1698. 
2 • C an • Arch • AC . Series CllA, vol • XIV, Mémoire des Marchands 
de La Rochelle qui commerce au Canada. 1696. 
porpoi ses, seals and whales. âe would have been a veey poor 
intendant indeed had he no:b tri ed to exploit this si tua ti on. 
The French at this time were not una.wa.re of the fa.ct tha.t 
· their North American terri tories possessed considerable mineral 
weal th. They knew of the co al deposi ta on Ca,pe Breton, the iron 
a.t Three Rivera and the porphyry on the island of St. Pierre. 
SeignelaY wa.s pa.rticula.rly interested in the co al, seeing in i t 
1 
a valua.ble source of supply for the forges of the Royal a.rsenals. 
At the minister' s request Champigny ha.d sh1ps call a.t Cape Breton 
on their wa,y ba.ck from Quebec and pick up cargos of this co al 
2 
for ballast. SeignelaY procla.imed i t to be very poor stuff so 
Champigny had a.nother sa.mple 1oa.d sent and this was reported to 
3 
be of a very much better quali ty. But then the wa.r interve.ned 
and no more is hea.rd of Ca;pe Breton' s co aJ.. 
Much the sa.me sequence of events occurred in connection with 
the porphyry and the iron. A sa.mple of the former wa.s sent to 
the m1n1ster with a statement that should it be round good 
enough there wa.s sufficient on the island to ornament all the 
4 
fine houses in France. As for the iron, in 1686 the deposits 
a.t Three Rivera were given a. curso:ry inspection, and another 
deposit was discovered at Baie st. Paul. Champigny and Denon-
1. ca.n. Arch. AN· Series B, vol. XII, Ministre à. Champigny, 
Versailles, 1.2 APril 1687; Ministre à. Champigny, Versailles, 
19 November 1687. 
2. Gan. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal, 6 July 1689. 
3. Gan. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Ministre à Champigny, 
Versailles, 19 November 1687; AC. Series Cl1A, vol. X, 
Champigny au Ministre, 16 November 1689. 
4. ca.n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. VIII, Denonville et Cham-
pigny au Ministre, Quebec, 16 November 1686. 
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ville were agreed that a forge would be a great thing to have in 
the colony if only to produce stoves which would be lesa or a .fire 
haZard than open fi re places, not to mention being much chea.per. 
They also fel t that auch an enterprise would give some of the 
habi tanta, Who ordinarily did little or nothing all winter, some-
thing to do. However, they admi tted that the estima~ed coat of 
building auch a forge was .frightening, and only the King could do 
1 
i t, no one in the colony having that much capi taJ.. .And there 
the matter rested. 
The colony continually suffered heav.r J,.osses as a result of 
.fires; open fireplaces, sub-zero winter weather and cedar shingle 
roofs, caused Denonville to excla.im: "Je suis dans des alarmes 
2 
continuelles pour ma. maison et pour la ville." Consequently, he 
and Champigny kept na.gging the mini ster to send out some tile 
and brick ma.kers. They tartly pointed out to SeignelaY that when 
he ordered them to have the powder magaZine roo.fed wi th til es, he 
was obviously unaware of the fact that there was not a single tile 
3 
to be had in the colony • However, in 1688 two habi tanta of 
Quebec named La.udron and 1' Archev'êque, set up a. .factory for the 
manufacture of' bricks, t1les and earthenware pots, but they were 
severely hand1ca.Pped by the lack of' experienced artisans. Cham-
pigny pleaded wi th the m1n1ster to have three brick ma.kers, three 
tilers and three potters sent out on the f'irst ship lea.ving t'or 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. IX, Champigny et Denonville 
a.u Ministre, Quebec, 16 November 1686. 
2. B .R.H. vol. XXII, 1916, p 161, Denonville au Ministre, Quebec, 
8 Ma,y 1686. 
3. B .R .H. vol. XXII, 1916, p 161, Denonville et Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 6 November 168,. 
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Canada; he even auggested that if the mini a ter balked at the 
1 
expense he could deduct the coat from the colony 1 s a.nnual tunds. 
The following yea;r he reported tha.t the brick works was tunction-
ing, "but he repeated h1 s request for ar ti sans. Th1 s ti me he 
reduced his demand to one of each trade but stipulated tha.t they 
2 
should be skilled a.t thair jobs. Whether or not the men were ever 
sent i s not known, perhaPs the odd craftsman was discovered lurk-
ing in the ranks of the troupes de la marine and dratted into the 
brick and tile fa.ctory. In a:ny case th1 a lkndustry managed to 
3 
struggle along until about 1700 before it was finally abandoned. 
If the people of New France lacked skilled workmen to make 
coverings for their roofs, they a.t lea.st bad a master crattsman 
to make coverings for their hea.ds. In Quebec wa.s a master hat 
maker, Monsieur Quehet, who enjoyed the protection of both the 
King and SeignelaY. When this x. Quenet crossed over to France 
to engage add1 tional hat maltera, the King encouraged him to 
expand his business in the colon;y and gra.nted him and his new 
employees a. free Passage back to Quebec. The minister instructed 
Champigny to keep a:n eye on Quenet to malte sure that he lived up 
to expectations, as i t was fel t that the colony could derive great 
benefi ta from auch an establishment. To main tain the high stand-
ards of his trade, Quenet had auggea~ed that a.nyone wishing to 
make hats in the colony should be required to produce a chef 
d'oeuvre to prove his competence. The King agreed to this and 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Denonville et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 6 November 1688. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1689. 
3. B .R .H. vol. XXII, 1916, 11)1': -p .iCJ. Mlel'iea et. briqueteries 
à guebeo 1111ua le 1'4&\•• hanoa1•. 
Champigny was instructed to issue an ordonnance ordering that 
a.ll auch master pieces should be made in the presence of the 
l 
intendant or hi_s subdelesué in the intendant' s absence. It is 
not very likely tha.t this duty took up much of Champigny' s time. 
One industry which did ta.ke up a great deal of Champigny' s 
time, however, wa.s lumbering; or more specifically, the product-
ion of ship ms.sts and timber. There wa.s more correspondance 
between the intendant and the m1nister over these products tha.n 
over a.ll the other Canadian industries oombined. The main reason 
for this wa.s the vital need in French ship yards for ma.sts once 
the outbrea.k of war in 1689 eut off the supplies from the Bal tic 
2 
area,ufor in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ship masts 
were as important to maritime nations as oil is todaY· Despite 
this assured market, Ch~pigny' s experience in trying to get the 
incipi ent industry onto i ts feet was one of constant frustration 
and d1sa;ppointment, of 1nefficiency and carelessness on the part 
of offieia.ls 1n both France and Canada, and of royal support that 
was usually too little and too late. There i t was, a.n assured 
market for ship timbers in France and one of the world' s great est 
sources for the se very t1mbers in New France. It required only 
to gat the produet to the ·market; but 1 t was here that most of 
the dif'ficul ti es were encountered. During Champigny' s time this 
particular problem can beat be described as a bottle neck. 
In 1686, just a few weeks after his a.rrival in New France, 
Champigny reported that trees sui table for ma.sts were to be f'ound 
in a.bundance in the colony and he informed the mini ster th at he 
1. can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Ministre à M. de Champigny, 
Versailles, 30 APril 1687. 
2 • C an • Arch • AC • Series Cll A, vol • X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Montreal, 6 July 1689. 
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would have soma eut ready to be shipped on the King' s ships the 
1 
tollowing y ear. SeignelaY was very plea.sed at th1 s and demanded 
a full report on the saiilPles being sent, including the age of the 
trees, the season of the year lihen they were eut, how long they 
ha.d been seasoned, and 91J.Y other information ChaJnpigny might think 
pertinent. This detailed report wa.s needed in order that an 
accurate estima te of the ma.sts' quali ty could be made and a deci s-
ion raached as to whet~ or not i t would ba a.dvantageous to 
2 
ob tain further supplias :from Canada. Lea.ving nothing to chance, 
or inexperience, SeignelaY also sent out two ship' s· ca.rpenters 
3 
to gi va the intendant expert advice. 
At th1 s time Champigny was in the mi dst of the preparations 
:for the CaJnpaign aga1nst the Senecas, but he sent one of the two 
carpenters to survey the foreste on both sidas of the river between 
Quebec and Montreal. On the south shore alone some sixty-:five 
hundred feet of very good oak were discovered and Champigny ha.d 
a few samples of this wood dressed and shippad to France along 
4 
wi th the requested mémoire. The two mas ter carpenters also sur-
veyad the area around Mal BaYe where they round stands of red 
pine of twenty up to twenty-eight inches diameter, and of a 
1(Uali ty which they claimed to be the equal. or the beat obtainable 
in Europe. To test the resiliency of these trees the ca.rpenters 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, Denonville et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 16 November 1686. 
2. Can. Arch. AN· Series B, vol. IX, Ministrev·à:Jl.de Champigny, 
V er sailles • 12 APril 1687 • 
3 • Can. Arch. AC. Series ~GllA, vol. IX, Cb_ampigny au Ministre, 
Qijebec, 16 July 1687 • 
4 • Can • Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, Champigny au Ministre, 
Q.uebec, 16 July 1687; Champigny au Ministre, Montreal, 26 
August 1687; Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 5 November 1687. 
f'el.led one of' Jme tallest red pinea on a mounta.in top and let i t 
crash down to the valley below. They reported that i t bounded 
~ down the mountain sida, landed on it s small end and bent without 
1 
brealting. They also marked out e1ghteen thousand f'eet of veey 
fine oa.k on the edge of a large oa.k forest and reported that this 
2 
wood was sui table for ships of all sorts. 
A Quebec marchant, the sieur Hazeur, in partnership with two 
La Rochelle marchants, Jean Grignon and de Lorme, began a sawmill 
afa Me.J/BaYe in 1686, and in 1688 they buil t a second mill. These 
two mille together were able to produce f1fty thousa.nd pla.nks a 
3 
Y aar· In 1685 the Quebeo Seminar;r had buil t a mill at Ba;re St. 
Paul which oould turn out twenty-five thousand pla.nks a year and 
4 
employed fifteen men. :MJst of this lumber wa.s no doubt used 
locally, but the sieur Ha.zeur and his a.ssociates ha.d built their 
mill in the expectations of being able to export most of the 
5 
produce. ' 
By the end of. 1688 Champigny was becoming rather aggravated 
wi th the mast si tua.tion. The previous winter he had had thirty 
ma.sts out and dragged to the ri v'er' s edge in the ex:peotat1on 
th at one of the King' s ships or one belong1ng to a priva te mer-
chant would ta.ke them as cargo, but none of the ships which came 
out th at y ear were sui table for the task.. Champigny informed 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire du Sr Hazeur au 
M. 1 'intendant de Champigny, Quebec, 8 November 1690. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au J!.Iinistre, 
Quebec, 12 October 1691. 
3. 1bid;vol. X, Denonville et Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 
o:Navember 1688. 
4. ibid; B .R .H. vol. XL, 1934, p742, Moulin à. scie et Industrie 
dëSMats à la Baie St. Paul.. 
5· Ca,n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire de Sr Hazeur à. 
M. l'intendant de ChaJD.pigny, Quebec, 8 November 1690. 
the minister bluntly that if the King wanted masts from Canada 
1 
then a large f'lG.te would have to be sent to ship them. The 
f'ollowing year Champigny had more masts eut and the sieur HaZeur 
had a supply of ple.nks, boards and large bea.ms sui table for ship 
building ready to be shipped when the right ships were sent from 
2 
France. 
The minister at least acknowledged his awareness of Cha.mpig:ny' s 
efforts and informed him: "Vous rendriez un service très important 
a.u Roy si vous pouviez vous mettre en estat d 1 envoyer une quanti té 
considerable de masts en France •.• " Cha.mpigny was instructed to 
sand a mémoire giving the number, th1ckness and length of' the 
masts ready to be shipped so that flûtes could be sent to tra.ns-
3 
port them. But by this time the Sieur Hazeur and his associates 
were becom1ng rather desperate. DUring the previous four y ears 
they had invested over fifty thousand livres to clear land, erect 
buildings, build roads, barns, two double saw mille and houaes 
for twenty-five to thirty' workmen, in an area that was almost 
inacess1ble at the beginning. Yet after doing all this they 
still had not been .able to get a:ny masts over to France. In 
1689 they had shipped three masts of eighteen to twenty inches 
dia.meter but the ship had been wrecked off Gaspé. Then their 
buildings had been looted and wrecked by Phipp' s fleet, the cattle 
all killed and the workmen scared awaY. On top of that, except-
ionally heavy a.utumn rains had raised the river so high tha.t 
hillsides had been wa.shed out and the river bed altered in some 
·'·· 
places. This had necess1 tated moving the mille and other build-
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Denonville et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 6 November 1688. 
2. Ca,n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. X, Cha,mpig:ny au Ministre, 
Montreal 6 July 1689. 
3· Can· Arch • .AN. Series B, vol. XV, Ministre à Champigny, 
Versailles, 14 July 1690. 
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inga to a water f'all one league awaY at a oost of two thousa.nd 
écus. Hazeur stated that two things were needed before the com-
pany could ob tain axry return on i ts investment, a fair priee for 
their mast a and timber, and ships to transport them to France. 
Moreover, he stated that the ships should rea.oh Canada. by July 
in order to avoid the Atlantic stt.orms. He also pointed out that 
the crown had spent large sums for masts from the Pyrenees whioh, 
he olaimed, were :not as good as the Ca.nadian ones; a;nd to prove 
this he stated tha.t he was sending a short mast, 1 t being too 
1 
la te in the season to sand a,nything longer tha.n fifteen feet. 
Haz eur had reason on his aide when he stated that maat sh.ips 
should reaoh Canada earlier in the year, for masts were a very 
awkward cargo. Tho se wooden sa1ling ships were not stiff and 
rigid as are the modern steel plated hulls, but had a lot of PlaY 
in their timbers whioh made them answer the helm almost like a 
11 ving thing. But wi th a cargo of mast a on board the ships 1 hull a 
were atiffened and greatly stra1ned by the constant thrusting of 
their own masts wi th their large sprea.d of oa.nvas, ma,king them 
2 
muoh lesa aea worthy in bad weather. Thus, the shipa 1 ca.pta,1ns 
were understandably reluctamt to ta.ke on auch a cargo in the late 
summer or autumn since this mea.nt running the risk of being oaught 
in the equ1noot1al gales. 
The m1nister admitted that for the pa,st two yea.rs the French 
ship yards had suffered owing to a shortage of masts and orderèd 
Begon, the intendant at Rochefort, -to send a master oarpenter to 
3 
aurvey the Ca.nadia.n foreste and submi t a report. By this time 
1. Can • Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Mémoire de Sr. Hazeur à Mf. 1 11ntenda;nt de chaJnpigny, Quebec, 8 November 1690. ,_ 
2 · ALBION, B .J!l'. Foreste and Sea Power, p 149. 
3 • Ca,n. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVI, part 1, Ministre à M. 
Begon, Versailles, 12 May 1691. 
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Champigny was beooming a. 11 ttle tired of ma.king surveys and wri ting 
mémoires; it was flûtes that were needed to transport the masts 
and pla.nks all ready preparetl, he pointed out to the minister, 
1 
r9.ther tha:a more wri tten reports. However, Begon negleoted to sand 
the ma.ster oa.rpen.ter as ordered so for this new survey Champigny 
made use of a:a Eng].ish oa.rpenter,oa:ptured two yea.rs ee.rlier at 
Hudson Ba;y, and a French oa.rpenter resident in Canada. He also 
informed the minister that the oolony oould produoe large qua.ntities 
of tar if a. man wi th experience in i ta manufacture were to be 
2 
sent out. 
As a resul t of this la.test aurvey Champigny wa.s able to report 
tha.t a.t Mal Ba.re there were severa]. red pinea sui table for the 
la.rge·st ships in the King' s navy, masts thi ty to thirty-five inohes 
in di ameter and seventy fi ve feet long. The only trouble was that 
they were hard to get a.t, and would need fifty to sixty men wi th 
the .. neoessa.ry blooks and ta.okle to drag them out owing to the 
rugged terrain. At BaYe St. Paul there were ma.sts of a similar 
quali ty and smaller ones on the Isle aux Coudres. Thus Champigny 
sta.ted: 
Il est certain que si la. cour fai soit un 
peu de depenoe dans ces lieux on y trou-
veroit tous les mats necessaires sans 
chercher ailleurs esta.ns beaucoup meilleurs 
que ceux des monts pira.nnées qui sont très 
ca.ssans et dont la depariee a esté considerable. 
3 
To l end empha.sis to th1 s, Champigny deyly remarked tha.t he ha.d 
1. ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 12 October 1691. 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid. 
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i t on the authori ty of a mastar sh1p' s carpenter, that the King 
of »:lgla.nd had spent over fifty thousand pistolles at a place 
near Bo aton in order to get masts, planks and tar, wh1ch this 
place now supplied in quanti ti es more than sutf'icient for the 
needs o1' all England. It would not oost as much as that to enjoy 
1 
sim1lar advanta,ges in Canada, Champigny added. 
The intendant may have believed auch a tale, but from the con-
text i t seems more likely that i t was intended as a broad rem1nder 
to Pontchartrain that the masts and sh1p timbers wh1ch France 
needed so badlY would not suddenly emerge from the virgin forest 
merely for the asking, or even for the wri ting of a lengthy mémoire. 
Champigny rei terated that in order to ship the masts and timber 
which were all ready and wai ting, i t was absolutely essentiel that 
a large fltlte of six to seven hundred tons should be sent; more-
over, to avold the m1stakes of the past, when ships had arrived 
too late in the season to load auch cargoes, this flûte would 
2 
have to leave France by the end of Mareh. 
When the tiret masts from Mal BaYe reached France in 1691, the 
minis ter declared that they were good enough. He instructed Cham-
pigny to ship all the masts and timber that he had on hand on the 
fllite La Souris, wh1ch was to be sent out to New France the :follow-
ing year· He also instructed the intendant to encourage other 
marchants in the colony to go into the timber business for the 
3 
French market. 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid. 
3 • Ca,n. Arch· /Ji. Series B, vol. ZVI Part 1, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, - APril 1692. 
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Th1 a wa.s verry encouraging news t'or Champigny; on the strength 
of' 1 t he ha.d twenty-eight ma.sts eut a.t BaYe St. Paul during the 
winter. But when the sh1ps a.rrived it proved to be much the 
sa.me old story all over aga.in, the f'lûte wh1ch ha.d been sent out, 
1§ Traqguille, could not take all the masts; She did, however, 
take a cargo of' boards and pla.nks t'rom Mal BaYe, and two merchant 
vessels also took on loads of this timber at Hs.zeur' a mill. 
~ 
Champigny informed the minister that he would to send a flûte 
' " 
la.rger than the Tranquille next year if he wanted the memaining 
1 
masts. 
All in al.l, ChaJD.pigny :regarded this situation as far from 
sa ti sfactory. Ha.Zeur ha.d large stocks of masts, boards and planks 
on hand which they had been unable to get Shipping space t'or. 
The La Rochelle merchan ts wi th Ships big enough to take auch 
ca.rgoes charged auch h1gh f'reight rates they absorbed all the 
profits, thus there was no hope of succour from that quarter. 
Champigny therefore told the mini stër bluntly that i t wa.s up to 
the King to suppl.y a flO.te at La Rochelle for two or three y ears; 
Hs.zeur and his a.ssocia.tes would PaY for its upkeep and use it to 
export their timber and 1mport the equipment they needed for 
their mill. This was the only WaY, ChaJD.pigny wa.rned, tha.t the 
company could re alize on i ta invetsment, for wi thout th1 s ass1 st-
2 
ance they would be forced to abandon the whole enterprise. 
The follow1ng year, 1693, the real cause of this frustra.t1ng 
Shipping problem final.ly came to 11ght. F1rst came a d1spatch 
from Pontchartrain compla1ning tha.t the masts wh1ch Champigny 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 21 September 1692. 
2 • Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 3 November 1692. 
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1 
had sent were too short in proportion to their thickness; then 
came the second dispatch which must have given Champigny cause to 
wonder if the en tire si tua.tion was not well nigh hopeless. The 
mini a ter had just made the awkward discovery that of a.ll the ships 
uaed for careying supplies to Canada, only one flilte was of the 
right tonnage and dimensions to load masts of the aize Champigny 
had had out. However, top priority wa.s given to masts on this 
vessel, even the tura of the Company of the Farm were to be sent 
on o th er ships should the sorely needed masts require all the 
2 
av ail able cargo space. 
During the remainder of Ch~pigny' s intendanoy the hi story of 
this industry followed a set dreary cycle. Champigny continually 
complained that the ships sent out ei ther arrived too late or 
3 
were not big enough to carry masts_. and Begon, the intendant at 
Rochefort, continually complained that the Canadian masts which 
he received were of a very poor quali ty and the minister that 
4 
they oost too much. MOre mémoires were written, more master 
1. Can. Arch. AN· Series B, vol.XVI part 2, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 28 March 1693· 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVI Part 2, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 18 APril 1693· 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693; vol. XIII, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1695; vol. XVII, 
Callières et Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 20 October 1699; 
vol. XIX, Champigny âU Ministre, Quebeo, 30 October 1701. 
4. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII Part 2, Ministre à M. 
Begon, Versailles, 9 Februai"Y' 1695; vol. XIX part 2, Ministre 
à M. Begon, Versailles, 12 J anuaey 1697; vol. XX Part 1, 
Ministre à M. Begon, Versailles, 5 FebruarY 1698; Ministre à 
.M. de Champigny, Versailles, 21 March 1698; vol. XX Part 2, 
Ministre à .M. Begon, Versailles, 21 January 1699; vol. XXII 
Part 3, Ministre à M. Begon, Versailles, 9 February 1701. 
carpenters and inspectors were sent out a.nd they all reported 
the same · thing, that all along the St. Lawrence were excellent 
1 
masts, better tha.n a:ny th a.t were to be had in the Pyrenees. In 
1694 the King began a.n annual subsidy of eight thousa.nd livres 
2 
to help defraY expanses, but there could be little hope of 
heal thy development or profit in a.n industry when ninety masts 
would be eut during a winter and the flûtes sent out for them 
3 
could only ta.ke twelve. 
Champigny did every thing he could to improve the quali ty of 
the masts sent from Canada, and to reduce their coat. He a.sked 
tha.t a. scale sb.owing the proper proporions for masts be sent him, 
he sent experienced men to 1ocate new stands of timber and he 
5 
inspected some of the se himse1f, he asked that a. maitre des 
eaux et forêts be a,ppointed to trave1 through all the concessions 
4 
6 
and c1a1m for the King all trees sui table for naval construction. 
He also had the mill faci1i ties improved a.t Mal BaYe by ha.ving a 
smal1 river c1ea.ned out so that larger masts could be floa.ted 
7 
down to the baY, and a.t Three Rivera he had a hangar buil t to 
1. Ca.n • Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November1693; vol. XV, Challlpign;y au 
Ministre, Quebec, 13 October 1697· 
2 • Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series C11A, vol. XIII, Champigny a.u Ministre, 
Quebec, 24 October lée4. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1699. 
4. Ce,n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693· 
5. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny a.U 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693; vol. XIII, Frontenac et 
Champigny a.u Ministre, Quebec, 10 November 1695;vol. XVIII, 
Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 15 October 1700. 
6. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series Cl1A, vol. XIV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1696. 
7. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac et Champigny, 
au Ministre, Q;uebec, 10 November 1695. 
store the masts eut there, since they wou1d have rotted before 
.. 
shipping space was ava.11ab1e had they not been prteoted from the 
1 A 
elements. 
To reduoe the costa he sent one of Begon's experts,who bore the 
imposing tit1e of escrivain principal de marine au departement de 
Rochefort, back to France in a hurry when he round that this 
offioial's tours of inspection were oost1y and his advioe worthless. 
Champig;oy remarked tart1y to the minister," •.• son retour nous 
1' epargnera a 1' avenir et 1' entreprise n'en aura Pas un moindre 
2 
suooez .fi In 1695 he had been pa,ying the habitante sixt;y l!Yres 
for eaoh mast brought down to the basin at Ba;ye St. Paul and fur-
3 
n1 shing them wi th the neoessary boats, rope and ta.okle. Then in 
1701, when the habi tanta fa.iled to keep their aide of the bargain 
he gave the oontract to the sieur La ChesnaYe who undertook to 
supply the masts for sixty-six livres, an inorease of six livres 
over the old priee, but since he also undertook to provide all 
the neoessary taokle and eqUipment, and could be trusted to live 
up to the terme of the oontra.ct, Champigny oonsidered that he 
4 
would save money on the arrangement. 
Begon ola.imed that many of the Canadian mast a, al though of 
5 
good wood, were too full of kno ts and were twi sted. But Champigny 
l • C an. Arch. AC . Seri es Cl lA, vol • XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 14 October 1698. 
2. ibid. 
3. Oan· Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 6 November 1695· 
4. can. Arch. AC· Series OllA, vol. XIX, ~ampig;oy au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 30 Ootober 1701. 
5. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII part 2, Ministre à M. Begon, 
Versailles, 9 February 1695; vol. XX part 1, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 21 March 1698. 
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claimed just the opposite and quoted Begon 1 s expert: 11 ••• il 
assure que les mats de Canada sont beaucoup meilleurs que ceux 
1 
de France aYant moins de noeuds, es tans plus hauts et plus droi ta •.. " 
He stout+y maintained that Canada could produce masts for far 
lesa than they coat in the Pyrenees; and even if they coat as 
much they should have been gi ven preference, he cla.imed, bec au se 
they were of a much better quali ty. "Peutestre que les interessez 
dans les mats de france obj acteront quelques raisons contre cette 
2 
proposition, il ny en a point qui ne soit très facile a destruire," 
he a.dded accu singly. Other authori ties support Champigny in his 
3 
po or opinion of the Pyrenees masts. 
By 1699 Champigny a;ppears to have become thoroughly di scouraged 
4 
for he had no masts at all eut that year. Begon had complained 
vociferously about the poor quali ty of the last mas ta sent from 
Canada and had suggested to the mini ster that they try Acadia in . 
5 
fu ture. When Champigny was informed of this he told the mini ster 
that that particular shipment of masts had been selected by 
Begon 1 s own expert from a new stand at T'.b.ree Ri vers, to who se 
6 
opinion he had deferaed against his own better judgement. The 
following yea.r only thirteen masts, 1eft over from other years, 
7 
were shipped. However, the minis ter declared, very likely to 
1 • C an. Arch. AC • Seri es Cl lA, vol • XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693 • 
2. ibid. 
3. ALBION, R. G:. Foreste and Sea. Power, p 183 · 
4. Ca,n. Arch. AC. Series Cl1A, vol. XVIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 15 October 1700. 
5. Ca,n. Arch • .AN. Series B, vol. XX part 2, Ministre à M. Begon, 
Versailles, 21 J anuar,y 1699 • 
6. ca;n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XVII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 20 October 1699· 
7. Can. Arch. AC. Serias CllA, vol. XVIII, Champigny au Ministr,, 
Quebec, 15 October 1700. 
ChaJD.p1gny' s surprise, that these masta had been :round qui te good 
1 
enough for the King' a ah1pa. Thus, Champigny gave ordera to start 
cutting aga1n and sent hia customary plea to the miniater that a 
2 
sui table f'lilte be sent out to collect them. 
The most that can be sa.id or the mast and t1mber industry 
during ChaJD.pigny' s intenda.ncy 1s tha.t i t did manage to keep i ta 
head a.bove water. Why this should have been so when at this time 
France was so short or ma.sts that French ship wrighta were having 
to malte do wi th composite masts, made by pinning together etripa 
3 
or Ba.ltic fir, is a question which requires a good deal more 
research before it can be satisf'actorily answered. Three prin-
cipal factors are involved in allY auch inquiry; the quality of 
the Ca.nadia.n product, i ts co st, and i ts a.va.lla.bili ty. .As to the 
'quali ty of Cana.dlan ma.sts there were two con:f'licting opinions; 
Begon had little good to agy of them, and Champigey consistently 
cla.imed tha.t they were superior to tho se of France. Obviously, 
Champigny wa.s a. very interested party, but Begon's position is 
more obscure. It is possible that he was prejudiced for some 
reason or other; certairüy auch prejudices against colonial 
products were not unknown; the Etlglish ship builders at this sa.me 
period were prejudiced aga.1nst ma.sts and timber supplied by the 
American colon1es,f'or no sound rea.son, and a hundred yea.rs la.ter 
the French consul general a.t Philadelphia compla.ined bitterly 
about prejudice in the department de a marine a.ga.1nst the se 
4 
àa.me American products. But none of this proves that Begon' s 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Seri es CllA, vol. XVIII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 18 October 1700. 
2. ibid. 
3· ALBION, R.G: Foreste SAd Sea. Power, p 183. 
4. ibid. p 240, 244, 347. 
-
-279-
opinion of the Canadia:n masts was unwarra:nted; thus one can only 
accept his estim.ate at its drace value, bearing in m1nd the fa.ct 
that the Ca:na.dian industry had sta.rted from scratch and had to 
gain experience the hard wa:r, by learning from i ts mi sta.kes. To 
expect the Canadian produot to com.pete on an even footing, as to 
quali ty and priee, wi th the old establi shed Bal tic and French 
industries, was asking a great deal. 
As to co sts, estima. tes are a.vailable only for ship masts and 
here it is clear that the Canadian masts coat no more than did 
those out in France, since the minister oompla1ned of the fact 
1 
that the masts from Canada coat as much as did the native product. 
Agaln i t must be remembered that this was an infant industry 
requiring considerable capital investment and i t would be na.tural 
to expect high costa at the beginning of an.y auch enterprise. 
2 
In any case, the priee of sixty-six livres quoted by Champigny 
seems very cheaP, although it is not known how much wa.s .added to 
this by freight charges, since in 1770 the English navy was PsY-
ing between one hundred and ten and forty-eight pounds sterling } 3 
for masts, these priees varying wi th the ma.sts' girth. 
However, perha,ps the most signinfica:nt factor was tha.t of 
ava.ilabili ty. The producer could expeot no return on his invest-
ment un til the product reached the market. If one hundred mas ta 
were out and only fifty could be shipped then the remaining fifty 
represented a losa. Th1 s la.ck of adequate shipping facili ties was 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XIX Part l, Ministre à M. Begon, 
Versailles, 12 January 1697; vol. XX part 1, Ministre à M. 
Begon, Versailles, 5 February 1698. 
2 • vide supra, p 276 • 
3· ALBION, R.G: Forests and Sea Power, p 29. 
-280-
beyond the control of the Ca.:na.dian intendant. Whether or not 
intelligent application on the part of the m1nister could have 
solved this problem, or whether the war in :EUrope made this 
impossible, is not known. SUffice it to agy, this seems to have 
been the main reason why all Champigny' s efforts to get the mast , 
and timber indus*r.1 firmly established in New France were contin-
ually frustrated. 
Most of the nascent industries in the colony were seriously 
handicapped by a chronic shortage of skilled labour. There being 
so few experienced tradesmen in the colony, Champigny appealed to 
the m1nister to send some out from Fr~ce. The m1nister a,ppears 
to have done his beat but he had to report that auch men were 
extreaely loath to emigrate to Canada unless they were guaranteed 
a much h1gher standard of living tha.n they enjoyed in France. He 
managed to induce a few to come out but only after guaranteeing 
them a set salary and their Passage back to France at anY' time 
should the.y find Canada not to their liking. Tb.us Champigny was 
instructed to ha.ndle them very gently in the hopes that they would 
decide to staY and could be induced to train young Canadia.ns in 
l 
the skills of their trades. 
All told eight tradesmen were sent out, five masons, one 
, 
armourer and two ships carpenters. Champigny put the masons 
to work on the intendant' a Palace, the armourer wa.s sent to 
Montreal to repair muskets and the two carpenters he sent up 
and down the river to survey the foreste for wood sui table for 
2 
masts and sh1p building. When these two master carpenters ha.d 
fini shed their survey Champigny sent them back to France beca.use, 
1. Can. Arch. AN· Series B, vol. XII, Ministre à Champigny, 
Versailles, 9 April 1687. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, Champigny a.u Ministre, 
Qu ebec, 5 November 1687 . 
--------:~-"""~"''41"''·'•~~'"'-r 
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as he said, " .•. il ne faut Icy que des gens qUi travaillent et 
1 
nous n'avons point de grandes ouvrages à leur donner a conduire." 
The six remaining tra.desmen could ha.rdly have been expected to 
stage an industrial renaissance all on their own, nor did they • 
One answer to the chronic labour shortage in the colony was 
put forth by the sieur d'Auteuil, the procureur généra,l, .who 
2 
advoca.ted the importation of negro slaves. The King gave his 
4.. 
assent to this but warned that in his opinion negros would never 
" 
stand the Canadian climate and their owners would merely be 
::; 
throwing their monay awaY • But d'Auteuil had a rea.dy a.nswer for 
tha.t argument; he stated that negroes stood the cold in New Eng-
land. He also advanced the rather interesting notion that they 
could be made to more than earn their keep by their being com-
pelled to wear robes of c3stor 1!.!2.• which w~uld not only protect 
them from the cold but by the mere act of their wea.ring these 
robes they would convert them i~to castor s.!:M• thereby almost 
doubling the value of the furs. Champigny, however, took a narrow 
view of the whole schema, stating that the Canadian clima.te wa.s 
defini tely too cold and that if anyone disagreed, he could import 
a few negroes at his own expanse and discover tha truth of this 
5 
for himself. T.b.ere i a no evidence that any one accepted this 
challenge, the only other mention of negro slaves being in 1700 
when Callières and cnampigny asked that officers resident in 
1-
Canada should be allowed to import negroes to be employed as 
1. ibid. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XV, Mémoire du Roy aux Srs 
Denonville et de Champigny, Versailles, 1 Ma.v 1689. 
3. ibid. 
4. Gan. Arch. AC. Seri es CllA, vol. X, Mémoire concernant les 
affaires de Canada· (d'Auteuil) APril 1689. 
5 • c a:n • Arch • AC . Series ellA, vol • X, Champigey au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 Novamb•* 1689. 
-282-
1 
servants. The following year the governor and intendant gave 
permission to the habi ta.Bts to import negro slaves provided they 
2 
could guarantee payment of the purcha.se priee. 
Had auch slaves been introduced into the colony in a:ny numbers 
i t would have added just one more item to the colony 1 s adverse 
balance of trade. During Champigny' s intendancy the export trade 
of New France, a:pa.rt from tura, was very small. Th.ere were only 
three possible markets for Canadia.:n goods, France, the West Indies 
and the English colonies. Before the war broke out ships came 
to Quebec from New :England ~ buy grain and in 1686 the King gave 
his consent to this trade for one year provided that care was 
3 
taken to see that they did not obtain a:ny beaver or other tura. 
Champigny maintained that this trade would be of great value to 
the colony but he regretted that owing to[a shorta.ge he could not 
4 
allow a:ny grai:p. to lea.ve the colony that y ear. Al though the King 
did not revoke his consent to foreign trade in principle, so far 
as grain was concerned i t wa.s nullifi ed in eff ect by the di a-
patch of troop reinforcements to the colony, who absorbed all 
5 
and more of the staple foods that the colony could produce. 
The trade w1 th the West Ind1es was begun 1n l.686 by Denis 
Ri verin who sent three ships wi th cargo es of wheat, flour and 
.. . . 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVIII, Callieres et Cham-
pigny au Ministre, Quebec, 18 October 1700. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 5 October 1701. 
3. Can. Arch • .AN. Series B, vol• XII, Mémoire du Roy au Sr de 
Denonville, Versailles, 31 May 1686. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. IX, Denonville et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 16 November 1686. 
5. Oa.:n • Arch • .AN. Series B, vol· XII, Mémoire du Roy aux Srs 
Denonville et Champigny, J. Versailles, 30 Ma.rch 1687. 
peas to the French islands. Champigny gave Ri verin letters for 
M. de Goimpy, intendant of the French West Indies, requesting 
him to atford Riverin 1 s sh1ps his protection and to do all he 
1 
could to f'acili tate greater trade between the two colonies. 
The outbrea.k. of war a.PPea.rs to have put an end to this inter-
colonial trade. However, in 1695 the King instructed the newly 
a.PPOinted intendant of the West Indies, the sieur Robert, to 
try to stimulate trade between the islands and Canada. Certain 
marchants in Quebec were reported to be willing to provide wood 
for boat building, barrel etaves and salt f'ish, all three commod-
i ti es beiê;l greatly in demand in the islands. The King was very 
eager to see trade flouri sh between the two colonies and he 
exhorted Ro'bert to encourage the islanders to send sugar and 
rum to Canada. He even ordered that these commodi ti es should 
2 
enter Canada free of duty, which clearly shows how keen he 
really was about this, sinoe rum would have compèted with French 
brandy. But i t do es not a.PPear tha.t anything came of this liberal 
tra.de policy. 
At the end of the war foreign trade began to revive. In 
1699 a group of merchan ta from New York pro po aed aranging for 
3 
mutual tra.de between the two colonies. Callières and Cham-
pigny suggeated that th~ could exohange English eider and beer 
for French wines ar1d bra.ndy, the import duty being pa1d on the 
latter oommod1 t1es before their re-export of course; and as for 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1686; .AN. Series B, vol. XII, Mémoire du 
Roy aux Srs. Denonville et Champigny, Versailles, 30 March 1687. 
2. Can. Arch • .AN. Series B, vol. XVIII, Instruction que le Roy a 
ordonné mi se ez mains du Sr Robert, Fontainebleau, 12 October 
1695-
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 20 October 1699. 
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grain, they auggested that this should be traded according to 
1 
the needs and supply situation of each colony. However, the 
Ifing this time vetoed the proposal, being atraid that i t would 
lead to the English obta1n1ng beaver pel ta in exchange for 
En~ish wool cloth and other manufactured articlea,which were 
far chea:per than the French equivalents, to the detriment of 
2 
the French manufacturera. 
Shortly atter this order reached the colony, a boat from 
New York arrived at Quebec with a cargo of flour, beer and 
other articles, i ta owners having heard that there was a famine 
in New France. Champigny and Callières did not turn the ship 
a.waY but allowed i t to d1 scha.rge i ta cargo and take brandy and 
wine in excha.nge. 'lhey intormed the minister that they would 
make i t clear to the habitante tha.t the King did not wa:nt alJY 
3 
commerce to be carried on with the Ei1glish colonies· This 
wa.i ting till the horse wa.s well clear of the stable before bol t-
ing the door seems to have infuriated the minister, for there is 
a. terse marginal note on Callières' a;nd Champigny's dispatch: 
4 
"Sàisir et arrester tous sans misericorde." 
Then, to make matters worse from the minister' s point of 
v1ew, this same El'lgliah boat returned to Quebec a few months 
later. And again Callières and Champigny deliberatel.y allowed 
the ship to d1 scharge i ts cargo in ex change for more brandy. 
1. ca;n. Arch. AC· Series OllA, vol. XVIII, Callières et Cham-
pigny au Mini stee, Que bec, 18 Oc tober 1700 • 
2. Can. Arch • .AN. Series B, vol. XXII part 4, Mémoire du Roy 
au Callières et Ot,_aJnpigny, Versailles, 31 MaY 1701. 
3. ca:n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Callières et Cham-
pigny au Ministre, Quebec, 5 October 1701. 
4. ibid. 
They explained that since the sh1p' s ca,ptain ha.d acted in good 
faith they had not had the hea.rt to turn him awaY, but they had 
wa.rned him tha.t he could not come back aga.in; and inst:ead of 
&PPearing remorsefUl for auch actions, Callières and Champigny 
ha.d the :êffronter,y to suggest that this trade should be encouraged 
rather than sta.mped out: 
Cependant nous sommes obligez de vous 
dire que ce batiment a fait beaucoup de 
bien à cette colonie, et que si noua 
tombions en pareil cas il seroit à pro-
pos que nous eussions encore cette liberté, 
de mesme que s'il y avoit d1zette chez eux 
et que nous eussions icy la bondance noua 
pussions aller leur en porter pour avoir 
leur argent dont ce PaYs icy est entière-
ment denué. 
1 
But the m1nister was anything but impressed by auch arguments; 
his marginal commenta on the dispatch this time were: "Kè.J.. ,c' eàt 
2 
très mal~" 
Al though the Royal policy governing the export and import 
trade of New France ha.d been qui te liberal at the beginning of 
Champigny' s intendancy, at the time of his recall i t had become 
very restrictive. In 1702 i t was laid down that in the trade 
between Canada and t.he West Indias, care had to be ta.ken lest 
they should supply each other wi th 8J.f! goods which normally were 
suppli ed by France, Thus Canada was not allowed to ship flour 
to the West Indif.es, nor the West Indies to ship sugar to Canada, 
for this, i t was claimed, migb.t harm the trade of the French ports 
which sent sh1ps to the colonies. As for trade between New France 
3 
and the Etigli eh colonies, that was ba;nned completely. 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Callières et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 31 October 1701. 
2. ibid. 
3. can. Arch. AN .series B, vol. XXIII part 1, Mémoire pour servir 
d'Instruction au Sr de BeaUharnois, Intendant de Justice, Police 
et Finance en la Nouvelle France, (Versailles) 6 MaY 1702. 
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This is an excellent exa.mple of the sort of colonial policy 
wi th which Champigny ha.d to con tend: when New France had no 
export trade to spaak. of, a.Part from furs, the crown encoura.ged 
i t by liberal tra.de policiea, but when the war ended and there 
was bo th the oppo.râuni ty and the po ssibili ty of the colony' s 
export trade beginning to develop, then the crown policy immed-
iately bec ame very restrictive. However, during Champigny 1 a 
in tend ancy the drain of the war on the colony 1 a energies and 
reaources, and the over-riding attractions of the fur tra.de 
were the grea.test hindrances to the economie development of 
New France. 
It ia impossible to se:y what Champigny might have achieved 
ha.d there been no war to so limi t the ecope of his activi ti es; 
i t i a very unlikely tha.t he would have been a second Talon, he 
la.cked that earlier intendant 1 a great imagination and flair for 
initia. ting large sc ale proj ects. But this ia not en ti rely to 
Champigny 1 s diacredi t since ao many of Talon 1 s grandiose schemas 
ended in lailure once his gui ding spirit was no longer there to 
drive them on. 
Throughout his intenda.ncy champigny did all he could to 
implement Oolbert 1 s old policy of colonial self sufficiency, 
bo th negati v ely by trying to cu rb the western fur tra.de 1 s drain 
on the colony' s man power, and po si tively by fost~ring auch 
industries as a.gricul ture, fishing and lumbering. It cannot 
be sa.id that his efforts here met with a. great deal of success, 
but at least the fishing and lumbering industries which he nursed 
•· 
through the di ffi cult natal period did manage to survive and 
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eventually they contributed greatly to the colony' s economie 
well being. Thus, considering the great handicaps wi th which 
Champigny had to contend in this field, i t is difficul t to see 
how he could have accompli shed much more than he actually did. 
CHAJ?TER VIII. 
JUSTICE. 
As intendant de Justice Champigny had qui te extensive judicial 
powers. He was expected to generally supervise the hierarchy 
of lower courts, and al tb.ough he did not have the power of appoint-
ing judges or judicial officers, he kept a close wa.tch on their 
activities; moreover, he could, and did, intervene to prevent 
wha.t he regarded as obvious miscarriages of justice. He wa.s 
empowered to have the attorney general remove a case from the 
lower courts and have i t adjudica.ted before the Sovereign Council, 
to prevent dela.vs and denials of justice. He also had certain 
special judicial powers, such as the right to judge all criminal 
cases of a serious nature, especially trea.son, sed1 tion, counter-
fe1t1ng and any cases where the 1nterests of the crown were par-
ti cul arly concerned. 
In li tigation rel a ting to trade and commerce he had the aame 
powers as did the juges consuls in France; thus civil cases 
involving marchants not resident in the colony were tried by him. 
He also tried all petty civil cases, involving amounts from 
twenty sous to one hundred livres, and in these last cases there 
wa.s no a,ppea.l from his decision. Litigants could by common 
consent a.sk to have their cases heard by the intendant in the 
interests of receiving a swifter decision, but in hia instructions 
Champigny wa.a forbidden to use ei ther his a.uthori ty or his perauaa-
i ve powers to oblige li ti ganta to have their cases judged by him. 
In cases involving the crown and the seigneurs, the governor and 
intendant adjudicated jointly, but litigation between seigneurs 
and their tenants were hea.rd by the intendant alone. Li tiga.nta 
in the intendant' a court paid no fees and they pleaded their own 
cases, there being no attorneys in the colony. On the whole, 
justice ca.n at least be sa.id to have been swift and cheaP in the 
1 
ma.jori ty of cases. 
APa.rt from the Sovereign Council there were various lower 
courts. At ~uebec there was the court of the ;prévôté, made up 
of a lieutenant général., a lieutenant particulier, a crown pros-
ecuter, a clerk and sever al ba1lifs, and in add1 tion, Quebec alao 
2 
had_ four notaries • At lo4:ontreal there was a ..1.'!:!6! roYal from 1693 
on, before that justice was diapensed in the seigneurial court. 
Just previous to this change there had been a great deal of bicker-
ing over the mannar in which justice was diapenaed in Montreal, 
a,nd ChampisnY was instrumental in getting things qu1et1y arranged 
more or lesa to the satisfaction of all concerned • The abbé 
Tronson at one point was afra.id that the King would deprive the 
3 
Su1p1cians of their court of justice al t.ogether; however, on 
1. Edits. et Ords. vol. III, pp 50-51, Commission du sieur 
Champigny, 24 .APril 1686; MUNRO, W J3: The Office of Inten·dant 
in New France, pp 27-29, in Amer. Hist. Rev. Vol. XII, 1906-'07; 
LANCîOT, G: L'Administration de la Nouvelle France, p 146; in~ra, 
APPendix A, Champigny' s official instructions. 
2. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Champigny aU Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1699. 
3. Ca.n. Arch. Librairie de St. SUlpice, Mon treal· Lettres de 1 1 abbé 
Tronson, vol. IV, no. 403, Tronson à M de la COlombière, (Pari al 
Ma;y 1689; no. 434, Tronson à M. de la Colombière, (Paris) 7 June 
1690. 
,,,, __ n _______ _ 
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Cha.mpigny' s suggestion the judge who had presided over the Seig-
neurial Court, M. Migeon, was appointed ~ roya,l, and the SUl-
pici ans retained their .1ustice haute, moy erme et basse wi thin the 
Seminary and alea at their fa.rm at St. Gabriel, and from these 
1 
courts aPPeals went directly to the Sovereign Council. 
In a.ddi tian to the ~ roya). a.t Montreal there were alea a. 
2 
crown prosecutor and three notarys. Three Rivera had much the 
same facilities as had Montreal, a J.'!i!.5.2 l'Olal• a c~wn prosecutor, 
a clerk who was alea a no tary, and two bail1fs. To serve the 
3 
country districts there were a few local inferior courts. Thus 
it would seem that New France was singularly well off so far as 
the maehinery for the adm1ni stration of justice was concerned. 
In addition to the se courts, Champigny tri ed to have an 
AdmiralY Court establ1shed at Quebec; he blandly informed the 
mini a ter that among other th1ngs, auch a court would be one was 
4 
of contributing to, the subsistance of three or four extra officials. 
Howe-ger, Cha.mpigey-' s statem.ent here i s perhaps m1 sleading; i t was 
alwa,ys a problem finding wass of pensioning of'ficers who had given 
yea.rs of service to the crown but were no longer fit for active 
5 
duty; giving them aPPOint.ments in this new court wou1d have been 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 November 1691; Ca,n. Arch. Librairie de st. SUlpice, 
Lettres de 1' abbé Tronson, vol. V, Abbé Tronson à. M. de 
Champigny, (Paris) Ma.rch 1693. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1699· ('!his dispatch wa.s written to a minister, 
or someone of equal rank,other ,than Pontchartrain) 
3. ibid. 
4. Can· Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XVIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 15 October 1700. 
5· Ca.n· Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Q.uebec, 16 November 1686; vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 
10 MaY 1691; Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 12 October 1691. 
one wa,y o:f accomplishing this. In eJJ.Y case, the Admiral in France 
agreed to this innovation and sent commissions :for the men suggested 
by Champigny as being the beat fi tted to :fill the posta. The min-
is ter confirmed these commissions, but at this point the sieur de 
Lotbinière, who was lieutenant généra). o:f the Quebec prévoté, raised 
obj actions; he had been acting as judge o:f maritime cases and a,ppar-
ently he was reluctant to relinquish these duties. Consequently the 
1 
commissions were suspended and the whole matter wa.s held in a.beya.nce. 
It was not until 1717 that an Admiralty Court was finally establishai 
at Quebec, and even then i t d1d not begin to :function un til two and 
2 
a half yea.rs la ter. 
Throughout most of Champigny' s intendancy New FreJJ.ce was little 
more than an armed camp, wi th the habi tanta as well as the troops 
being subj ect to mili tary discipline. However, once hostili ti es 
were ended, Champigny vigo rou ely oppo sed the mi li tary' s a.rbi trary 
assumption of prerogatives which he regarded as belonging to the 
ci vil government. The minis ter, at Champigny' s instigation, 
wa.rned Callières more than once that he was to leave the rendering 
of justice in the colony to the various civil courts and that he 
was empowered only to see to the execution o:f the decisions ha.nded 
3 
down by the courts • 
Despi te this order the local governors and mili tarY commandera 
continued to axercise very arbitrary authority over the habitants. 
Soma of them arrested habi tanta for alleged misdemeanours and had"'tl..-
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 27 October 1698; vol. XVII, ~ampigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1699; vol. XVIII, Champigny' au Ministre, 
Q,uebec, 15 October 1700. 
2 • B .. R .H. vol. XXXII, 1926, p 197, ROY, P .~G: Sièges d'Amirauté. 
3· Call· Arêh. pJl. Series B, vol. XX Part 2, Ministre à. M. de 
Callières, Versailles, 27 MaY 1699. 
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commi tted to ga.ol wi thout gi ving them a proper hearing or wi thout 
l 
their being allowed to gppeal their cases • The a.nonymous wri ter, 
very likely Cha1D.p1gny, of one mémoir.e, took strong exception to 
the la.ck of persona.l liberty allowed the ha.bi ta.nts by these officials, 
some of whom demanded tha.t anyone desiring to malte a trip wi thin 
the confines of the cilllony, auch as from Montreal to Quebec, first 
had to gat official sanction, this sanction frequently not be1ng 
given for several da,ys. In one instance, a. Quebec marchant who 
ha.Ppened to be the nephew of a. member of the Sovereigh CoWlcil, had 
to malte a. sudden trip and he did not a.sk the permission of the 
local lielitenap.t de Roy. Upon his return he wa.s hauled out of bad 
by a body of soldiers and lodged in gaol where he remained for 
2 
soma time. 
As a. reaul t of this mémoire the local governors and f.llle lieutenants 
de Roy were a.ga.in atrictly forbidden to impriaon a;nyone wi thout an 
express order from the governor general, and i t was also apecifi-
cally ordered that the habi tanta were to have every liberty to come 
and· go as they plea.sed w1 thin the colony wi thout any interference 
3 
on the part of the officials. 
The mo at important judicial body in New France wa.s, of course, 
the·Sovereign CoWlcil, i't'.bei:&gJ the final court of aPPeal in the 
colony • Th1 s body wa.s made up of seven coWlcillors, the governor 
who occupied the chair of honour at the head of the council table, 
the bishop who occupied the second place on the governor's right, 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1699; vol. XVIII, Cha)llpigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 15 October 1700; vol. XIX, Mémoire sur plusieurs 
affaires de la Nouvelle France. Canada, 23 March 1701. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Mémoire sur plusieurs 
affaires de la. Nouvelle France, Oa.na.da, 23 March 1701. 
3 · Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Callières et Champigny 
.au Ministre, Quebec, 5 October 1701. 
and the intendant, 
1 
1 
being president in 
-293-
who actually presided over the council meetings 
everything but na.me, on the governor' s lef"t. In 
1 
addi tibn there was the greffier, or clark and registrar of the 
i 1 
court, i a;nd two bailiffs • Cha]npigny did not take kindly to the fact 
1 
that ~s intendant he occupied only the third place of honour at 
the COiWlcil table while performing all the functions of a first 
2 
presidjent, and it was this stra.nge division of authority which 
' spark~d several claShes in the council cha.mber during Frontenac's 
two t~rms in office. 
Ch~mpigny did not have as much trouble on this score as the 
1 
inten~a.nt Duchesneau had had, but he had more th.an enougb. for his 
likinej. When Frontenac was rea,ppointed governor of New Fra.nce 
the Kilng warned him not to overstep the bounds of his authority 
1 
: 
in th~ Sovereign Council; he was told specificallY that i t was 
n t' 
••• 1 Intendant et en son absence le plus ancien du Conseil 
' 
' Souve~ain (qui) fasse les fonctions de President dudit Conseil 
comme 'de recueillir les voix, prononcer les arrests et faire 
generalement tout ce que les premiers Presidents des Compagnies 
' 3 
du Ro~aume ont accoustumé de faire •. ·" He was also told that he 
1 
was irl no wise to medd.le w1 th matters concerning justice except 
to :ènq. the intendant avery assistance in carrying out the decrees 
1 
of th~ courts; and that at meetings of the Sovei"eign Council 
1 
"···il doit se contentir lors 'u'il assistera au Conseil dans la 
1 
premi,re place qu'il doit occuper de ne se servir que de rai sons 
1 
' 
' 
' 
1. Carl. Arch. AC. Sei"1es CllA, vol. XVII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Qu~bec, 20 October 1$9. 
2. i~id. 
1 
3. caJi. Arch. AN. Sei"ies B, vol· XV, Instruction pour le Sr le 
comte d,e Frontenac ••• Versailles, 7 June 1689. 
et jamais d•autorité pour porter les officiers qui le composent 
1 
a donner leurs voix." The King also warned Frontenac to let by 
gonee be by gonee and not to stir up alJ'J of the old disputes which 
had rendered government impossible during his first administration: 
"Elle est bien aise de luy expliquer que rien ne seroi t plus CaPable 
de rendre ses services desa,greea.bles à Sa Majesté qu'une conduite 
2 
opposée." 
Ac tu ally, i t was only in the las t y ear of Frontenac' s tenure of 
office that he abueed his a.Uthori ty in the sovereign Oouncil, when 
issues arose which impinged on his own private interests. There 
were of course, the :ramous conflicts over the l.i.Iareuil case and 
other interwoven disputes, but here it was mainly the bishop who 
was the cause of the trouble, and Frontenac, al though far from 
blameless, was as much sinned against as sinning. 
However, when Frontenac first arri ved back in the colony i t 
looked very much as though, like the Bourbons of post revolutionarY 
France, "he had learned notb.ing and forgotten nothing ." His f&rst 
win ter in the colony he spent in bickering w1 th the Sovereign 
Council as to the protocol of his reception at the Council meetings. 
The Oounc11 propoaed rece1v1ng h1m as it had rece1ved governors in 
the past but this did not please Frontenac; nor would he reply to 
' their :requests that he inform them how he would like to be received. 
EVen when they offered tD recel ve him in the sa.me manner as the 
King wa.s received by the Parlement de Paris, this sti&l did not 
. 3 
sa.tisf'y hlm. 
champigny became so wearied with this long drawn out pantomime 
1. ibid. 
--,-
2. ibid. 
3. Cati. Arch. AN. Seri es F3, vol. VI part 1, Collection Moreau 
de: St • Méry. EKtrai t des Registres du Conseil souverain de 
!'\,._,___ ..... or..». 0'7 ..,...,...,,...,..,,. ;:.. A.. 1~ mal'la. 1600. 
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that he gave 1 t as his opinion that un til the King established 
the of'ficial protocol for the reception of governo:rs, as they had 
requested hlm to do, they were under no obligation to do other tha.n 
had be en the eus tom in the past. And wi th that he quit the council 
chambe:r, leaving the membera to settl.e the matter as they saw fit. 
Whether or not Frontenac was being so difficul t out of pure vani ty 
and. ego ti am, or to reduce the sovereign Council to what he regarded 
as the due degree or submission to a governor, or merely to goad 
Champigny, is very d1fficUl. t to determine; but as soon as Champigny 
washed his ha,nds of the who le affa.ir Frontenac accepted the Coun-
1. 
cil' s pro po sal.s t'or his reception. 
Now, upon hia visita to Council meeting, and as Champigny tartly 
remarked he came nearly every daY, ·the ca,ptain or his guarda entered 
the oh amber- first and announced the governor' a arri val, the presid-
ing officer had to suspend all business, order the cha.mber cleared 
and delegate two councillors to go to the head or the atairs to 
receive the governor and escort hlm to his place before business 
2 
could be resumed. After Frontenac' s death this tedious proceedure 
3 
was promptly aboli shed. 
The re do not a;ppear to have been a:ny further d1 spu tes in the 
Sovereign Council worthy of note until 1694 when the celebrated 
Mareuil case touched off a whole series of petty squabbl.es which 
turned the council. chamber into a veritable bear pit for the beat 
part of-'year. From the beg1nning of the trouble, when the bishop 
1. Can· Arch. A6-· Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 MâY 1691· 
2. ibid. 
3. CAHALL, DUBOIS: Tb.e sovereign Council of New France, p 147. 
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first brought the a.].leged impieties and blasphemies of the sieur 
MareUil to the attention of the Oouncil, these disputes were little 
more than a private vendetta between Frontenac and bishop st. Vallier 
wi th a seconl. feud between the governor and the procureur général 
being carried on concurrenUy. Had i t not been tha.t Mareuil enjoyed 
the protee tion or Frontenac' s friand and influential mentor, de 
Lagny, and had been recommended to the governor' s favour by the 
1 
intendant de commerce, then proba.bly the bishop's rather extrava-
gant charges aga1nst this seemingly unsavoury individual would not 
have a.roused auch a furore, particula.rly since the governor and 
2 
the bishop ha.d been, up to that time, on very good terms. 
Throughout the entire fracas Champigny sta;yed wall clear because 
he. sa.w from the very beginning that the clashing personali ti es of 
Frontenac and st. Vallier made fJJJY aPPeal to rea.son impossible. 
As he put it: 
A l'esgard des demeslez qui sont arivez 
e.U Conseil 1 tannée derniere, j' aY fa1 t 
mon possible dana le Commencement au pres 
de M. de frontenac et de M. l'Evesque 
pour les empescher et n'aYant pû y par-
venir j' aY laissé les choses prendre leur 
cours a.u Conseil ••• 
3 
He ref,erred the whole matter to the King for settlement, and a.t 
the sa.me time ex:pressed the opinion that auch disputes rendered 
a soUJ:l!d and stable government of the col.ony im~ossible and a 
repi ti,tion " ••• seroi t ca;pable de tout perdre." 
1. Can. Arch. BN. Series B Nl/8D, Collection Claira.mbaul t, vol • 
DCCCLXXIX, fol. 320·338, Frontenac à M. de Lagny, QUebec, 25 
October 16~3. 
2 • C a.n • Arch. AC • Seri es CllA, vol • XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Q.uebec, 27 October 1694; vide supra, chapter VI, p 236. 
3. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 6 November 1695. 
4. Can. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 27 October 1694. 
When all the correspondance concerning theae disputes had been 
atudied\by the King and the mambers of hia Council, Frontenac 
received a severe reprima;nd from the minister for his having acted 
1 
wi th " •.. trop d'emportement et mesme avec violence •.• " However, 
al though ChaJllpigny was not made a.wg,re of the minister' s diapleasure 
to the same extent, he certa.inly was not congratula.ted for his 
having PlaY ed a neu tral role. Pontchartrain wa.rned him that he 
was to remain strictly impartial in auch affaira, but that if' 
circumsta;ncea f'orced him to ta.ke aides then he had to support the 
governor' s au tho ri ty un til the King' a wi shes could be made known to 
2 
him. 
For the next three y ears the affâirs of' justice appear to have 
gone along qui te smooth.ly. Then in 1697 a.nother cause célèbre 
aroae, and a.gain Frontenac was one of' the principal ac tora. This 
-case wa.s no thing more than a ba.re faced attempt by the governor to 
chea.t a Q,uebec sea capta.in out of his sha.re of' a legi timate prize 
which he had CaPtured on the high sea.s. 
In Oc~ber 1696 the sieur AUbert, son of the sieur La Chesna;ye, 
the waal tby Quebec marchant, left Quebec in his ship bound for 
BaYonne i1l France. Before lea.ving Quebec he went through the 
uaual formalities of obtaining a commission and Pass Part from the 
governor; by virtue of these documenta he wa.s empowered to cross 
over to France and return, and al.so to a.ttack ~ enemy sh.ipa . 
which he might encounter. Upon his return voyage, during the 
. . 
summer of 1697, Aubert sighted an English brigantine, gave chase 
and captured i t, th en sai led his prize to Quebec. Immediately 
1. Can. Arch. AN· Series B, vol. XVII Part 3, Ministre à M. le 
comte de Frontenac, Versailles, 8 June 1695. 
2. Can. Arch. Ali· Series B, vol. XVII part 3, I~nistre à. M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 18 June 1695. 
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upon his arrival he submi tted a report of the action to the gaver-
nor who sent i t on to the intendant. Champigny· promptly sent this 
report to the sieur Lotbinière, the lieuten:t général of the prévoté 
" de gué bec, since his court wa.s a.t th at time handling maritime cases. 
Then the trouble started. 
The sieur N8el, contrôleur de !A marine, now informed Champigny 
that the commission giv.en Aubert by Frontenac was invalid because 
it had not been registered at the Quebec .Admiralty court, also, 
tha.t the prize was not a prize a.t all but a derelict hulk, and tha.t 
Aubert had transferred part of the cargo to his own ship and had 
likely landed part of i t at a point down ri ver. For the se reasons 
the sieur N8el requested Challpigny to adjudge the prize as a sal-
vaged derelict, whereby one third of the value would go to the 
King, one third to the Admira! and one third to Aubert and his crew. 
Champigny immedia.tely called in Aubert and his crew, and also 
the captured crew of the prize, for questioning. They all declared 
:that the prize was no derelict, AUbert' s ship having chased i t for 
two da,ys and forced i t to strike i ts flag after severa! shots had 
been fi red. '!he officers of the »:lglish ship declared that they 
had had no alternative but to surrender since they ha.d been out 
of ammunit1on. This satisfied Champigny that the ship was a leg1t-
ima.te prize and not a salva.ged derelict. As for the transfer of 
cargo, Aubert sta.ted th at he had had some of the cargo transferred 
to his own vessel and that hé had reported this in the declaration 
he had made upon his arrlval at Qu·ebàc; he denied having discha.rged 
9Jl'1 part of the cargo before reaching th1 s port. 
Next, Champigny exa.mined the va.lidity of N8el' s charge tha.t 
Aubert' s commission was invalid beca.use i t had not been reg1stered 
at the Q.uebec Admiralty Court. He round tha.t this technicality 
provided the only legal basi s that there was for r:iJX1 contestation; 
but as he pointed out, there was no proper Admiral ty Court at 
Q.uebec, auch cases as came up being dealt with by the judge of 
the prévoté or by the intendant. As for certain minor technicalities 
which, aècording to the strict letter of the law, should have been 
obseiJVed, auch as the submission of seven official forma by ship' s 
captains before being commissioned to underta.ke voyages out of 
Quebec, Champigny sta.ted that the ordonnances governing these 
matter a were nei thar known, registered or published in New France. 
In the Past, the governor's commission had been regarded as qmite 
sufficient, one auch hav1ng been issued in 1695 and another in 
1697 wi thout the question of forma and regiatrat1on wi th an acting 
Admirai ty C0 urt ever hav1ng been raised. .And in actual fact, 
Champigny added, in a.ll essential pointa the commission gaanted 
Aubert had conformed to the technical requirements of official 
Admiralty Court commissions. In the J.ight of all this the procur-
eur du Roy had no hesitation in declaring the ship and i ta cargo 
1 
to be a legi timate prize and tb.at i t should be adjudged as auch 
to ·the sieur AUbert wi th the exception of' a tenth share of' i ta 
a.ssessed value which was the perqui:ai te or the Admira).. 
T.he sieur N8el now presented a second petition, dema.nding that 
the prize be adjudged one third to the King, one third to Aubert 
and one third to the go va mor for h~~ing i saue~e comm1 saion, 
and nothing to the Admira).. Champigny pa,id no attention to this 
manoeuvre at all; instead, he had the caae hê&:rd. before a court 
composed of himself, the three senior members of· the Bovereign 
Council and the lle)ena.n; général of the _P;.~;t.f!Jl!, this being the 
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mannar laid down by the King' s ordonnap.ce governing the adjudicat-
ing of prizes in the govern.ment of the Isles de 1 'Amerique, which 
the Q.uebec prize courts had al.wa,y s followed in the Past. After 
studying all the evidence the members of the court had no hesita-
tian in awarding the prize to the sieur AUbert and ordered that 
the Admiral' s tenth should be p~d to the clark of the trésorier 
généra,l de ~ marine to be held pending the King' s instructions. 
This dona, on the ninth of July notices of sale of the prize 
were published. Three weeks later, just as the sale by a.uction was 
about to take place, Frontenac' s secretary aPPaared on the scene 
w1 th an ordonnap.ce da.ted the previous daY which he proceeded to 
read out in front of the assembled official. a a;nd marchants. This 
ordonna,nce stated that as the sieur N8el had made a verbal compla.int 
to the governor to the affect that the judgement of the prize court 
was contrary to the King' s interests, the proceeds of the sale were 
to be pa.id over to an individual by the name of la Louisière. Imme-
. M 
diately, the lietenant sénéra.J,. suspended the proceedings and went 
A 
to confer wi th the intendant. 
Ivieanwhile, several. marchants coming awaY from the abortive 
auction encountered the sieur N8el., tol.d hlm wha.t ha.d haPpened 
and accused him of being the cause of the trouble. N8el was enfur-
iated by this; right ,,·al!laY he sought out the intend~t to inform 
him that he had ha.d no part in this move by Frontenac, and very 
defini tely ha.d not made any auch compla,int as Frontenac in his 
ordonnance stated that he had made. To malte qui te certain that 
he would not be misrepresented further, he made a wri tten statement 
on the spot, formal.ly decla.ring tha..t he had never made aJlY auch 
complaint as al.leged by Frontenac, either verbally or in writing. 
Four daYe later Champigny convened the membera of the prize court 
1 . 
again to diseuse the matter, and they decided tha.t the only thing 
they could do waa to refer the whole case to the King and a.dviae 
Aubert to appeal to Frontenac to reacind hia ordonnance. 
Aubert was extremely loath to aee Frontenac' a nominee, la 
Louisière, get hia handa on the money, for as Champigny remarked 
this man was of no standing in the colony and. wi thout alX1 as sets, 
being merely a minor official in the bureau of the Farm and earning 
only 600 livres a year salarY'. Th.ua AUbert made written a,ppeal.a 
to Frontenac,offering to provide any aecuri ty the governor cared 
to name while the case was being referred to Versailles, provided 
tha.t the proceeds of the ship' a sale should be paid over to him. 
He alao auggested tha.t these funds ahould be handed over to the 
Treaau!ler' s èlerk and letters of ex change i asued, to be paid to 
whomsoever the King ahould decide. But Frontenac refused to ev·en 
ackowl edge, let alone reply to Aubert' s offera; inatead he forced 
the li eu tenant .9:! 1..§: prévoté to sell the ship and PaY the proceeda, 
which amounted to the tidY sum of about 80,000 livres, over to 
this shadowy indi vi dual, la Loui ai ère. 
Seeing that he could not get justice in Canada, Aubert deter-
mined to croas over to France and plead hi a case wi th the mini a ter; 
but when he asked for a pa.ss port and commission for hia ship, 
Frontenac, realizing full well why Aubert wanted to make the trip, 
refused to grant him a commission. Thua, AUbert ha.d to pa;y off 
his crew, laY up his ship, and: wai t till he could get a. Passage 
on a marchant ship. 
Champigny gave i t as his opinion that Frontenac wa.a under the 
impression tha.t the privileges of the Admira]. were his persona]. 
perquisite and tha.t when he round his cla.ims disallowed by the prize 
court he resorted to the stratagem of ta.king the sieur N8el' s 
na.me in vain. '!he intendant ma.v not have been far wrong here 
sinae a few years earlier Frontenac had asked his friand de Lagny 
whether or not he aould alaim all the prizes brought into ports 
1 
within his government, it being his beliet' tha.t he aould. Be 
that as i t ma.v, Champigny pointed out that Frontenac had, by 
annulling the judgement of the prize court, a,ppointed h1mself 
sovereign judge over matt ers deal t wi th by a court duly aonsti tuted 
by the King. Furthermore, he had wai ted un til the very moment 
that the auation was tattmg place before publishing his ordonnance, 
this for the obvious purpoae of ma.king his a.uthori ty seem the 
mo re impo sing and at the same t1me ma,king the o th er o ffi ai al s 
aonaerned look small in the eyes of the publia. '!he very t'act 
that Frontenac had made himself supreme judge of a case by reason 
of whiah he stood to malte a considerable profit, was in i tself 
2 
qui te irregular, Champigny alaimed. · 
In order to keep the pea.ce between h1mself and the governor 
he had not made aJJY attempt to deter Frontenac, he informed the 
minister, despite the t'act that AUbert had suffered a great 
injustice. He had al so refused to allow Frontenac' s marked 
1. Can. Arch. BN. Series B Nl/8D, Collection Clairambault, vol. 
DCCCLXXIX, fol • 320-338, Fron tenaa à M. de Lagny, Quebec, 
25 Oatober 1693. 
2. Ca:q. • A:rch. AC. Se:ries CllA, vol. XV, Champigny au Minist:re, 
Quebec, 10 Oatober 1697; Que. Arch. Publications, Ordonna;naes, 
Commissions, etc etc des Gouve:rneurs et Intendants, vol. II, 
pp 254-264, O:rdonnanae de M. Boaha.rt Champigny, Quebec, 9 July 
1697; ibid, pp 264-269, Ordonnance de M. Boaha.rt Champigny, 
Quebea-;-2August 1697. 
(The entire aaaount of this episode is aontained in these three 
documents.) 
1 
ho stl11 ty to provoke him, which O·f i tself very likely aggravated 
the governor far more than a determined show of opposition wou1d 
have dona. 
Champigny 1 s dispatch to the mini star is a very lucid account 
of the whole affair, reporting what had occurred step by .step 
wi thout persona.]. comment, and merely gi ving at the end in restra.ined 
phrases his opinion asto the legality of Frontenac's actions. 
It i s qui te different in tone to other dispatches where he compla.ins 
of Fronten·ac 1 s actions; th1 s time he obviously was qui te sure that 
the facts wou1d spaak for themselves, Frontenac having put h1mself 
so clear1y in the wrong that for once the mini a ter would be forced 
to declg,re his actions legally invalid. And in this Champigny 
was not mis taken . 
Meanwhi1e, Frontenac was wri ting to the minister compla.ining 
of Champigny 1 s at ti tude towards him over " .•. une petite contes-
tation ••• au sujet d'un jugement qu'il a rendu avec quelques con-
seillers du Conseil Souverain pour l'adjudication d'une prise ... 
d'ont j 1 aY cru éstre obligé de suspendre l'execution." He claimed 
that he had taken this action only because the intendant had not 
made proper provision for the sa:feguarding o:f the King' s and the 
Admira1' s shares of the proceeds of the sale of the prize. He 
also stated that soma of the officials who had executed his ordon-
nance had been subj ected to threats and calumnies by the intendant, 
but that despite Champigny's displa;vs of rancour he had refused to 
2 
be deterred from doing wh at he ha.d fel t to be his du ty . 
1 · Ca.n. Arch. AC. Seriea CllA, vol. XV, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 10 October 1697. 
2 .,can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Frontenac au Ministre, Quebec, 15 October 1697. 
--------------·--·--·--------·~·-------------
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However, the minister was singularly unimpressed by Frontenac's 
version of events. Before subm1 tting the case to the King he wrote 
to the governor, warning him th at his actions in overruling the 
judgement of the prize court were completely ultra vires and that 
he had no doubt whatsoever that the King would disallow his ordon-
na,;nce. He advised hlm to set about immediately to repair the 
1 
damage that had been done as beat he could. Two months later, 
Pontcha.rtrain wrote to Frontenac again: evidently the King had taken 
an even poorer view of the whole affair than the minister had 
expected, and this latest dispatch must have taken, temporariliy at 
least, some of the bombast out of Frontenac' s doublet. In bitter 
phrases the minister wrote: 
La contestation que vous avez eu avec M. de 
Champigny sur la p~ise faite par le Sr Aubert 
est tres mal fondée et je vous avoue que je ne 
comprends pas comment vous avez pu faire un 
pareil incident et vous devez vous attendre 
en faisant ces sortes de choses a des retours 
desagreables que toute 1 'envie que j' aY de 
vous faire plaisir ne peut Pas vous epargner. 
Il est, en verité, fort triste et pour vous 
et pour moy qu'au li eu d'employer ma bonne 
volonté a vous attirer des graces de Sa Majesté 
je sois obligé a excuser une violence qui ne 
vous produit rien et que vous faites de ggyeté 
de coeur sans qu'on puisse en trouver la rai-
son, Je vous prie de vous observer mieux a 
l'advenir et de ne point escouter des gens 
1U1 Par des veues d'interest Particulier voue 
commettent et vous exposent a recevoir de 
pareils desagrements. Je n' aY pu me dispen-
ser de rendre un Arrest pour faire executer 
ce qUi a esté ordonné par M. de Champigny et 
de faire cesser 1' empeschement que vous y 
avez apporté. 
2 
After eight long yea.rs of being told continua].ly by Psntcha.rtrain 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XX part 1, l.Unistre \ Frontenac, 
Versallles, 12 Ma.rch 1698. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XX part 1, Ministre à M. de 
Frontenac, Versailles, 21. Ma,Y 1698. 
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that all the disco rd in the colony stemmed from his refusal to 
cooperate with the gover.nor, this decision by the minister must 
have resto red somewha.t Champigny' a grea.tly a.bused sense tha.t there 
re ally was justice on this earth. 
In replying to the minister Frontenac was no whit chaitened; 
he claimed that he had only been trying to do his duty as he saw 
i t, his main regret being the trouble he ha.d unwi ttingly caused 
the minieter in ~e latter' a eff'orts to excuse hie actions to the 
King. But the mini ster 'a charge that he ha.d be en influenced by 
the counsels of intereeted parties in thi·a case, really flicked 
. - . . -' ~·· .. -
Frontenac on the raw; this was too much for hie amour ;eropre and he 
ho tly deni ed that any one had a1JY auch influence over him " •.. j 'en 
suis le seul autheur," he statedt "et c'est sur moy uniquement 
qu'en doit tomber le blasme si elle en mérite." He then went on 
' 
to bla.me the whole episode on the machinations of tl':\.e intendant 
and his supporters at the· court who were constantly seeking to 
1 
slander him in avery We::/ po sei ble. And in a let ter to a fri end, 
probably. de LagDY, he continuee in the eame vein: 
J' aY trouvé dans 1 'affaire de M. Aubert 
quelque avantage Pecuniare auquel je ne 
m'estois Pas attendu, Mais d'un autre 
costé Jy rencontre des Mortiffications 
que je n' auroi s Pas Cru devoir aPPre-
hender, ainay que je 1 e marque a Mr de 
Chevry, auquel je ne suis pas moins 
obligé de tous les soins qu'il a Voulu 
prendre pour laccomodement de cette 
affaire par ce que Je suis persuadé que 
c'est 1' effort des belles Intrigues des 
E:nissions de l'Intendant, qui ne sont 
pas venus a sa eonno1 ssa:nce. 
2 
1. can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 October 1698. 
2. Ca.n • Arch. BN • Series B Nl/SB-2, Collection Claira.mbaul t, 
vol • DCCCLXXIII, fol. 363, Frontenac à. '? October 1698. 
The dust had ba.rely had a chance to settle following this con-
flict when a fresh dispute arose which had legal and constitutional 
implications more serious tha.n tho se involved in the sieur AUbert' s 
case. 1he trouble began as a civil action taken against La Mothe 
Cadillac, the commander at Michilimackinac, by two coureurs de 
bois named Moreau and Durand. Th. at was i ts rather pro saic beginn-
ing, but it soon developed into an all out constitutional struggle 
between Frontenac and Cadillac on one aide a.nd Champigny and .tbe 
Sovereign Council on the other. Moreover, in following this case 
through all the different a teps one ob tains qui te a clea.r pic ture 
of the legal ma.chinery in the colony a.nd of how justice was dis-
pensed; thus, if for ·no o thar reason, th1 s case is wall worth 
1 
studying in soma detail • 
The case opened in the autumn of 1697 when these two coureurs 
de boi a, Moreau a.nd Durand, presented a petition to the intendant 
against La. Mothe Cadillac for alleged actions of Cadillac some 
eighteen months earlier. Champigny ha.d known for aome time 
that Cadillac had been d1 sregarding all the King' s edicta govern-
ing trading up country and he had received numerous verbal com 
plaints from COngé holders about Cadillac' B interf'ering w1 th 
their legi timate trading. Challlpigny had sent several letters to 
Cadillac ordering him to mend his wa3s but Cadillac had alwgya 
denied that there was any basis to these complainte or to charges 
that he was contra.vening the King' s edicte and sta.ted that he 
1 • The ac co un t of th1 s ca. se i s drawn from two main sources, a 
lengthy dispatch of Cb.alllpigny 's to the minister dated 3 July 
1698, and the ex trac ta of the proceedings of' the Sovere1gn 
Council. 
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would easily be able to convince the intendant of this when he 
returned to the colony • 
In September 1697 Cadillac did return to Quebec, whereupon 
Moreau and Durand presented their petition against him to the 
in tendant. In their petition they sta.ted tha.t they had been 
hired by madame Cadillac for one hundred livres wach to take a 
' 
canoe load of trade goods to her husband at Michilim~inac. 
Frontenac gave them a permission for the trip which allowed 
them to take one hundred livres worth of trade goods each to 
trade for their own account, over and a.bove the amount of their 
wa.ges. However, madame Cadillac had them take not one but two 
canoes of trade goods, and Moreau and Durand added another four 
to five hundred livres worth of contra.band of their own. But 
while they were loading the canoes, the sieur de la Touche, 
Champigny' s commissaire a.t Montreal, ca.ught them in the act and 
seized part of the contra.band. 
Three other canoes of contraband for Cadillac evaded detection 
by the commissaire and when Ivloreau and Durand rea.ched Michilimack-
inac they bougb. t sevan thousand livres worth of trade goods from 
him on credit a.t Michilima.ckinac priees, including one hundred and 
n&nety-eight juge of brandy at twenty-five livres the Jug - this 
brandy having oost Cadillac only three livres the jug in Montreal· 
From this transaction i t is ea.BY to see how a. man lin:; Cadillac' s 
posit1on could a.mass a tidy fortune in a very few yea.rs, provided 
he had no regard for the King' s edict forbidding auch trading by 
officers and men in the troupes de la marine. 
About a month a.fter this transaction took place, Cadillac had 
Durand imprllsonned because he had refused to PaY for a.n India.n' s 
-308-
d.og which he ha.d injured. Durand promptly told Cadillac that he 
no longer wiahed to buy the trade goods which he and Moreau had. 
contracted for, and Moreau informed Cadillac that he did not want 
to take these goods all by himself, whereupon Cadillac thr~w MoreaU 
in to gaol too on the pretext that he had threa.te.ded to shoot Durand. 
Then while the two of them were in ga.ol, Cadillac went into their 
cabin and seized not only the diaputed trade goods but also all their 
other belongings, including their arma, wine, canees à.nd food sup-
plies; not satisfied wi th that he broke open their chests, and in 
Moreau' s he found soma IOU' s and a. prmissory note a.s well as soma 
other Pa.Pars, all of which he seized on the grounds that they con-
tained evidence that Moreau and Durand ha.d brought contraband goods 
up country. 
A few daY s later Cadillac set them fraa, and upon their finding 
themselves fleeced of everything they owned they were obliged to 
borrow a supply of trade goods from some of the other coureurs de 
bois, which they tra.dad in the Sioux country. Upon their return 
to the colony they pa. ti en tly wa.i ted for Cadillac to come down so 
that they could demand justice. 
In their petition to the intendant Moreau and Durand demanded 
tha.t Cadillac ahould PaY them the two hundred livras ha owed for 
their wages, reimburse them for their property which he had seized, 
including the a.mount of Moreau' s IOU' s and promissorynote sinca he 
could not coll act from hi a debtors for lack of the se no tes, plus 
co ste and damages wi th in ter est. Cadillac' s cla.im that he ha.d 
aeized their property beca.use they ha.d smuggled contraba.nd up 
country, they stated should be disallowed since this contraband 
had gone up country in the asme canoe that had carried contra.band 
---.---Jl,.;JIY"«~f'-tlo"''ft' ______________ _ 
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for Cadillac himself, a;nd they had just as muoh right to smuggle 
tradà goods up country as he had. 
In his defenoe Cadillac st9.ted tb.at tb.eir oontraband whioh he 
had seized was his perqui si te as post commander, th a.t they were 
liable for some part of the seven thousa.nd livres worth of tra.de 
goods whi oh he had sold them as a. penalty for breaking their con-
tract, and finally, that he oould not be held li able for debts 
owed to Moreau if his debtors refused to PaY • 
Both parties to the li tiga.tion having stated their case before 
the intendant and submi tted their wri tten sta.tements to him, Cham-
pigny was about to take the matter before the sovereign Counoil 
for hearing and judgement when the li tigants deoided to have the 
case settled by arbi trg,tion before two Quebeo merohants • This 
prooeedure beigg qui te in order, Cha.mpigny sent the arbi tra.tors 
all the documents that he had on the case and asked them to return 
these documents to him once they had rendered their deoi sion. How-
ever, during the course of this arbitration Durand beoa.me discoura,ged 
fol"' some unknown reason and wi thdrew from the li tigation. Then new 
disputes aro se over certain points and the arbi trators asked that 
a court of inqui:ry be held to clarify these particula.r points in 
dispute. ChaJD.pigny thereupon issued an ordonna;noe appointing the 
sieur Dupuy of the prévo.!c§ to hold this 1nquiry . 
What the sieur Dupuy was'required to decide was the priee of 
trade goods at three specifie places, Miohilimackinac, Cha,goua,migon 
and the Sioux country • The arbi trators had not given any indication 
as to why they wished a judioial inquiry on this matter, but 
Cadillac quickly realised what the reason was. Moreau had traded 
the goods he ha.d borrowed, upon his release from prison, wi th the 
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Sioux where their value was many times greater than at Mich1li-
mackinac, thus Cadillac was a.fraid that Moreau was going to demand 
reimbursement for his seized goods at Sioux country priees. He 
voiced his opposition to any auch inquiry on the grounds that as 
comma.nding officer at Michilimackinac he had forbidden trading in 
the Sioux country on orders from Frontenac. Moreau countered 
this by cla1m1ng that Frontenac's order had merely forbidden trav-
elling to the Sioux country via the lands of the Renards, and that 
Cadillac himaelf had sent cano es to trade wi th the Sioux via the 
Illinoi a terri tory, as ha.d sever al o th er traders. 
Dupuy then auapended the hea.ring to perm1 t Cadillac to ob tain 
proof of h1 a allegation that Frontenac had f'orbidden all trading 
in the Sioux country. However, Cadillac failed to produce ePY , 
atatement from the govemor on this point, aubmi tting inatead a 
wrii.ten atatement of h1 a own to the affect that no one had been 
allowed to go to the Sioux country wi thout fi rat obtaining the 
governor' a permission. The sieur Dupuy then proceeded wi th his 
inquiry, decla.ring that there were no grounds for auepending i t 
since Cadillac had failed to produce any grounds fo!' a suspension 
other tha.n his own statement which was inadmissible aince he was 
one of the intereated parties in the case. 
The next daY Frontenac sent for Dupuy and his clerk, rtad the 
record of their inquiry, then declared that i t had been established 
only by virtue of a decree iaaued by the arbitra.tors. Dupuy replied 
that he had been duly empowered to hold th1 a court of inquiry by 
an ordonnance 1saued by the intendant. Whereat Frontenac ia 
quo ted by Champigny as sa,ying "'c'est a cause de cela que je vous 
-----------------'~" •' ··~·,,w,,_,.. __ ,_, -----------
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1 
envoye en prison •. t" and DUpuy was promptly thrown in the celle 
where he remained for two daY a. 
The two arbi trators upon hearing of this, and in the t'ace of 
threats of being treated in a similar 't'aehion, promptly re ti red 
from the case. Moreau, however, refused to be intimidated by 
this and he immediately presented his petition a:new to the inten-
dant who aubmi tted the whole case to the sovereign Council for 
2 
hearing and judgement. This li tigation now becaJD.e t'ar more than 
a ci vil suit between two priva te parties, i t developed into a 
test of strength between the governor and the sovereign Council 
of New France to see whether or not the governor and his friands 
were above or subj ect to the law. 
Cadillac was under no delusions as to where the sYmpathies of 
the Council lgy, wi th Champigny presiding, Frontenac' s bitter foe 
d'AUteuil serving as procureur général and some of the o th er 
members of the Oouncil ha.ving suffered from Frontenac' s aUtocratie 
temper in the Past. ihus he now tried by every means possible 
to preven t the C0 uncil hearing the case. His opening ga.mbi t was 
to present two petitions, one demanding tha.t ChaJllpigny should 
abstain :f'rom taking sAY part in the judging of the case on the 
grounds that he had shown prejudice, and the other that the li t1-
gation should be tried by the prévoté court and not by the sover-
3 
eign Council. ChaJD.pigny decla.red that the first petition was not 
valid since by the terme of his commission his authority to hear 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC . Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 3 July 1698. 
2. ibidr AN· Series F3, Collection Moreau de Bt· Méry, vol. VIII 
part 1, EX:trai ta des Registres du Conseil souverain, Quebeo, 
21 March 1698. 
3. ibid. 
and jud.ge cases could not be challenged, and that the li tigation 
coulld not be heard by the ~réyc:tté court beoause the lieutenant 
1 
général of' that court was a close relative of' Cadillac' s wif'e. 
the procureur général. pointed out too that Frontenac had previously 
commi tted a judge of' the prévoté court to ga.ol for merely complying 
wi th an ordonnap.ce of the intendant, and auch intimidation rendered 
impossible any thought of' a f'a.ir trial being held in the lower 
2 
court. 
Cadillac nEœt began cha11eng1ng o ther members of' the sovereign 
CoWlcil on technical groWlds, claiming tha.t they had shown par-
tiali ty to Moreau in one wgy or another; but the procureur général, 
3 
who .was a member of the bar of the Parlement de Paris, declared 
all these manoeuvres to be inva.lid. Tb.us Cadillac and Frontenac 
resorted to a legal stra.tegem which was exti?emely dubious, to say 
the least. On March lOth Frontenac inf'ormed the Sovereign CoWlcil 
that since Cadillac' s demand tha.t his case be hea.rd by the prévoté 
court had been denied, and since all aubj ects of the King ha.d the 
t 
right to ~eal against the decisions of the Parlements and Superior 
courts to the King' s Privy Council, he as governor, could not per-
. mit the Sovereign Council to proceed wi th the ease as Cadillac wa.s 
ta,k1ng i t be:f"ore the King' s sovereign CoWlcil in France. Frontenac 
f'urther sta.ted tha.t he had no desire to cause the assembled company 
any trouble, but desired only to conserve for the King' s subjects 
the right to avail themselves o:f" the privileges the King had seen 
1 • C an • Arch • AC • Series Cl lA, vol • XVI, Cha.Jligny au Ministre, 
Q,uebec, 3 JUly 1698. 
2. ca.n. Arch. AN· Series F3, Collection Moreau de st. Mér,y, vol. 
VIII part 1, :F.Xtra.i ta des Registres du C0 nseil souverain de Que bec, 21 March 1698. 
3. CAHALL, DUBOIS: '.llle sovere1gp. CoWlciL of' New France, p 66. 
fit to grant them,. and he wa.r:ned d'AUteuil that i t wa.s his duty 
as procureur généra.l to ma1nta1n these privileges so f'a.r as laJ in 
his power. 
This totally unexpected manoeuvre took the Council by surprise, 
but d'Auteuil quickly rose from his chair a.nd replied that i t was 
perf'ectly true he was duty bound to ma.inta.in the privileges of the 
King' s subj ects, but i t was also his essen ti al duty to watch tha.t 
no thing wa.s undertaken oontra.ry to the decrees of the Sovereign 
Council at Quebec. At this rejoinder Frontenac beca.me furious; 
rising from his seat he informed the Council that if it did not 
Pa::/ heed to what i t ha.d been told i t would soon lea.rn which wa:y 
its duty laY· .And with this veiled threa.t he ata.lked out of the 
1 
cha,mber. 
At a subsequent meeting of the Council the procureur général 
ga.ve his opinion on the legal aspecta of the case, quoting prece-
den ta, interpretations of the statu tes whereby the Sovereign 
Council had been established, and subsequent roy al ordonnances, 
all of which, in d'Auteuil's considered opinion, made it quite 
clea.r tha.t Cadillac' s petition and Frontenac' a injunotion in 
support of i t were completelY contrarY to the let ter and the 
spirit of the law, being no thing more tha.n legal chicanery. 
D 1 AUteuil a,nd ChaJD.pigny both sta.ted tha.t i t was merely a trick 
to prevent Moreau. bringing the case before aJ.lY court, Cadillac 
knowing full well that lb reau la.cked the me ans to plea.d his case 
in France. To parmi t auch a. prodeedure, they a.rgued, would estab-
lish a. precedent whereby in any litiga.tion between a rich man and 
1. Ca.n· Arch. AN· Series F3, Collection Moreau de st. Méry, vol. 
VIII part 1, :nxtrai t des Registres du Conseil Souverain· 
Arrest du lOe mars 1698. 
a. poor man, the former could a,lv;aYs evade justice by having the 
a 
case wi thdrawn to a court three thou sand miles awaY · 
However, the Sover"eign Council was now in a very a.wkward po si t-
i on; illegal though they knew the governor' s actions to be, there 
was little or nothing they could do about i t. But they ha.d to 
decide on some action, if only for the record; thus they requested 
Frontenac and Champigey to retire from the chamber while they ca:me 
to a. decision. Frontenac ba.ulked at this request a.t first but 
finally he and Champigny retired. The Council then deliberated 
and decided to evade the issue by asking the intendant to grË'..nt 
them leave not to proceed w1 th the case, and, that he, as intendant, 
should proceed wi th 1 t as he beat saw fit. They also a.sked that 
all the documents relating to the affair should be sent to the 
mini star. 
Th1 s dona, they asked Champigny and Frontenac to return and 
·informed them of this decision. Frontenac took this to mean that 
the Council ha.d deferred to his demanda and he proceeded to con-
gra.tulate them on having refrained from continuing a course of 
action which was highly 1rregular, qui te contra.ry to the King' s 
ordonnances, and which would have resuited i~e1r being repri-
manded by the King. He added for good measûre that he would not 
fa1l to inform the King of the reprehensible conduct of the pro-
cureur généraJ., who, 1nstead or supporting him in h1 a efforts to 
v 
upbold the royal ordonnap.ces and prevent the Council contravening 
them,had pursued a contrar.v course. 
But Fronteuac ha.d · reckoned wi thout the intendant: as soon as 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Cha1Jlp1gny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 3 J:'L1ly 1698; AN. Series F3, 'Collection Moreau de St. 
Méry, vol. VIII part 1, EXtraits des Registres du Conseil 
Souverain à. Quebeo, Conclusions du procureur général du 2le 
mars 1698. 
Frontenac had concluded his remarka Champigny rose and sta.ted 
thg,t in conformi ty w1 th the arrêt of the Council, just pa.ssed, 
he would haar the case of Moreau versus La. Y.LOthe Cadillac a.nd 
render judgment on it himself by virtue of his commission as 
intenda.B;t de ~ justice. Then, for Frontenac' s especi al benefi t 
he added that he would a.dvise His Ma.j esty of the excellent ma.nner 
in which the Council had ha.ndled the a.ffa.ir, and Particula.rly, 
th a.t i t ha.d done no thing t'hat wa.s not in strict accordanée wi th 
the King 1 a ordonnances • 
Immediat ely, Frontenac 1 s choler rose: he turned on the intendant 
and decla.red tha.t if Champigny judged the case he would have to 
1 
a.nswer for his actions tD the King. This did not frighten Cham-
pigny; in his dispatch tD the minister he called Pontchartra.in's 
Pa.rticula.r attention to Frontenac's threa.t and a.sked tha.t the 
governor be taken a.t his word, thereby making i t qui te clear tha.t 
he would like nothing better tha.n to have the whole matter brought 
2 
to the attention of the King. 
When Champigny called the case before him for hearing, Cadillac 
refuàed to appear. Champigny th en rende red judgemen t in f a.vour 
of Moreau, ordering Cadillac to Pa3 }!Jo reau the sums of 1860 livres 
3 
4 deniers, 600 livres, and 99 livres. Considering all the 
turmoil tha.t this case ha.d caused, these amounts were t-eall;r 
trifling, and their PaYment certa.inly would not have ca.used 
Cadillac aJJ.Y fina.ncial di stress. But the daY after this judgement 
was ha.nded down, Frontenac i ssued an ordonnance forbidding 
1. Can· Arch. AN· Series F3, Collection MOreau de st. Mér1, vol. 
VIII part 1, Extra.! t des Regi stree du Conseil Souverain de 
Q.uebec, .Arrest du 2le mars 1698. 
2. Oa.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, volJ. XVI, Champigny au I..U.ni stre, 
Quebec, 3 July 1698. 
3. 1 bid. 
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the execution of Cha.mpigny' s judgement on pain of being charged 
1 ' 
wi th insubordination. Thus, Moreau, the poor coureur de bois 
who had been the innocent cause of this en tire fracas was atill 
no better off than he was when he first presented his petition 
to the in tendant. In fac t, he was in a worse po si ti on, for wh en 
he signed on as crew on a fi shing boat, Frontenac ordered that 
2 
he was not to leave the confines of Quebec. Whether thi a was · 
do ne out of mere vindic t1 veness, or f'ear lest 1-Ioreau ahould some-
how manage to make his ·we:s to France, is not known. But one th1ng 
had be en made very clear to everyone in the colony; tho se who 
enjoy ed the protection of the governor were above the law. 
In summ1ng up this aff'air in hia report to the minister, Cha.m-
pigny quoted from the King' a official inst~tions to Frontenac, 
wherein the King clearly stated that Frontenac was not to inter-
fere in any wgy in the affaire of justice, but only to assist 
and support the intendant and the Council in the execution of 
3 
their duties. Instea.d of which, Champigny pointed out, Frontenac 
ha.d done exactly the opposite, having thrown the sieur Du.puy in 
ga.ol, threatened the arbi trators wi th simila.r treatment just 
when they were about to render their judgement, threatened the 
members of the Sovereign Council, threatened a.t one point to ship 
.... 
the procureur général to France, and fina.lly, he had fo}lidden the 
execution of a judgement handed down by the intendant. 
Nor wa.s this a.ll; ChaJD.pigny went on to malte a strong plea 
that steps be taken to put an end to Frontenac' s all too frequent 
1 • C an • Arch • AC • Series Cll A, vol • XVI , Champigny au Mini s tre, 
Que bec, 3 JUly 1698. 
2. ibid. 
3. Can. Arch. AN'. Series B, vol. XV, Instructions pour le sieur le 
comte de Frontenac ••• (Verdailles) 7 June 1689 • 
interference w1 th the aff' airs of justice in the colony: 
••• tout cela, Mgr, vous persuader aisement 
qu'il n'y a Pas un seul homme en Canada 
qui puisse rendre librement la justice 
sans être exposé a des choses três fa-
cheuaes et ai je vous ajoute que des per-
sonnes qui ont des prétentions contre des 
gene protegez par Ivir le gouverneur, se 
trouvent dana la dure nec es si té de sus-
pendre dana un autre temps pour les pour-
suivre, et que d'autres ont été obligez 
de faire dea protestations secrètes contre 
ce qu'ils ont été forcez de faire Pall'aon 
autorité, quoy que pour dea af:lairea qui 
devraient aller a la justice ordinaire 
voua connoitrez d'avantage, Mgr, combien le 
lJlal est grand, et de quelle importance il 
est d'y remedier, af'ins que la justice 
puisse être librement rendue, sans dépen-
dre n'y être subordonnée comme elle le 
devient a la dure auto ri té de M le gou-
verneur •.• 
1 
Champigny' a next move was to begin to talte action against 
Cadillac for this officer 1 a contraventions of the King 1 a edicta, 
governing the fur trade and the selling of' bra.n.dy to the up country 
Indiana. Etlougb. evidence had come to ligb.t in Moreau' s and 
Cadillac' s own testimony to warrant h1 s ta.king auch action, but 
Frontenac effectively frustrated this move by confirming Cadillac's 
claim that he ha.d had the governor' s sanction for h1 s conduct of 
affaira at Mich111maokinac. Being oheokma.ted in this a.rbi tra.ry 
fashion was bad enough, but when Cadillac sneeringly accuaed 
Champigny of having himself been enga.ged in the brandy tra!fic 
with the Ottawas, this was almost more than the long suffering 
intendant could stand. :lhen, while Cha,mpigny was atill smarting 
under th1 s slanderoua insul t, the en tire trouble was auddenly 
resolved in a mannar so unexpected that Cha.mpigny round himself' 
in a rather false po si t1on so far as his relations wi th the 
1 • C an • Arch. AC • Seri es Cl lA, vol • XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Que bec, 3 July 1698. 
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governor and Cadillac were concerned. 
The was in wh1ch this came aboutis rather mysterious. All 
that is known is that a certain marquis de Coutré a,ppeared on the 
scene and that he was prohably a naval officer, since ChaJD.pigny 
mentions that he was greatlY indebted to the marquis for his 
courtesy and kindness in affording madame de Champigny Passage 
over to France. One thing is certain, this marquis de Coutré was 
a veey giftad diplomat, for he not only persuaded Cadillac to 
a,pologise to Champigny in the presence of himself and M. de 
Vaudreuil, but he also prevailed upon Cadillac to malte a just 
settlement of Moreau 1 s long outstand1ng claims. Y.hen this had 
been done, Champigny, very likely at the marquis 1 instigation, 
included in h1 s d1 spatch to the mini ster a rather grudging request 
1 
that Cadillac' s Past ex cessas be overlooked. 
It would be very interest1ng indeed to know how the marquis de 
Coutré managed to bring about th1 s rapprochement; but regardless 
of how i t was done, in effect i t cons ti tuted a moral vic tory for 
Cha.mpigny, Cadillac' s settlement of :V10reau 1 s claims bei~ a taci t 
acknowledgement that he had been in the wrong. Howaver, the bi ttar-
ness and rancour were not completely d1spersed:;. the const1 tutional 
questions involved st1ll remained at issue and Champigny, to 
prevent a:ny repit1tion of auch troubles asked the minister to 
decide once and for all whether or not: 
M le comte de frontenac étant au Conseil 
peut obliger la. Compagnie a deferer a son 
seul sentiment et s'il peut faire des 
deffenses d'executer mes jugemens et 
empescher leur execution, ce que je ne 
scaurois penser, ny que ce soit votre 
l· Can • .Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Que bec, 12 July 1698 • 
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intention, n'en aYant jamais vau 
d'exemple. J'espere que vous aurez 
la bonté d'y remedier, pour n'etre 
Pas exposé a dea mepris desagreables 
de la part des peuples. 
1 
A few montha la ter Frontenac died, making i t unnecessa.ry for the 
mini ster to render any decision in this matter. But in view of the 
stern reprimand wh1ch Frontenac had previously received for his· 
interferen,ce wi th justice during the AUbert ship prize case, 1 t 
1s more than likely that the m1nister would have taken an even 
etranger view of the governor' a unwarra.nted actions on this la.ter 
occasion. This supposition is leant support by the minister's 
decision in a subsequent contraversy in which Cadillac aga.1n tried 
to evade justice, and in much the sa.me mannar as before. This 
ti•e however, he did not have the backing of the governor. When 
he tri ad to prevent the li tigation being braught before the Sover-
eign Council by challenging the right of bath Vaudreuil a.nd Beau-
harnois to act as judges, the i a sue wa.s referred to the mini a ter 
who refused to tolera. te auch a praceedure: " ••. l'un est vo stre 
Commandant," he informed Cadillac, "et 1 1 autre est a la teste de 
la justice et si ces sortes de recusations avaient lieu un officier 
ne craindrait JaJUala ny aea superieurs n:y ceux qui sont preposez 
pour rendre la justice, ce qui saroi t un desordre qui ne peut astre 
admis dans un bon gouvernement et qui par consequent est tres 
2 
contraire aux Intentions de Sa Majesté." 
It took a good deal of moral fibre to stand up to Frontenac as 
ChaJUpigny did on occasion, particularly when he could never be 
aure that in doing sa he would recai va the support of the mini star. 
1. ibid· 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XXVII part 1, Ministre au sieur 
de la Mo the Cadillac, Versailles, 17 June 1705. 
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However, de:api te this uncertainty, Champigny did succeed in 
mainta.ining the a.Uthori cy of the courts of justice a.gÇ3.1nst the 
assaults on their prerogatives by Frontenac; and this was no 
mean achievement, all things considered. 
Thus i t can fairly be said tha.t Champigny acqui tted himself 
wall of his responsibil1 ties as 1ntendapt de justice; and i t 
wa.s in no small measure owing to his own efforts tha.t in the 
year 1699 he was able to saY: 
La justice se rend (ici) dans une parfaite 
équité et avec autant de desinteressement, 
principalement au Conseil Souverain de 
Québec, où la parti ali té et la prevention 
n'ont point d•Entrée ••• 
1 
1. ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1699. ( To a minister othe.r tha.n Pontchartrain) 
VIEW OF QUEBEC A~ IT· WftS IN 1699 • 
Inset from a map drawn by 
Franquelin in 1699. 
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CHAfTER IX. 
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE. 
To diseuse all the matters dealt with by Champigny in his capacity 
of intenda,n t de police et fina;nce would fill several volumes and 
ma.ke exceedingly dull reading. ) Thus all that will be deal t wi th 
here are tho se matter a pertaining to finance and the ci vil govern-
ment of the colony which presented special problems, were in any 
WaY unique, or otherwise throw some light on the cha.racter of 
Champigny or the nature of his administration: for his responsi-
bili ti es involved avery thing from the i ssuing of tavern lill: anses 
to the pa,yment of scalp bountias to the allied Indiana, and the 
sphare of his au tho ri ty stratchad from Newfoundland and Acadia 
in the east to the most distant of the French po sts in the west. 
However, in Newfoundland his control was larsely nominal owing 
to the lack of communications wi th Quebec; the governor at Plà.1 sance 
had . to rend er an ac co un t of his exp endi tu res to the intendant of 
1 
New France, but in 1698 the mini ster dacided that since Quebec had 
vary little contact wi th the island, in future the twenty thou sand 
livres gran ted yearly for exp ens es at Pl ai sance would ba di sbursed 
2 
and the accounts checked by the intendant at Rochefort. Despi te 
1. Ca;n. Arch. AN· Series B, vol. XII, Ministre au sieur Pa.rat, f 
Versailles, 30 Maroh 1687; AC· Series CllA, vol. IX, Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 5 November 1687. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, ·Vol. XX part 1, :Ministre à M. Begon, 
Versailles, 4 June 1698. 
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th1 s, the commissaire ~ marine at Pla.i sance still rema.ined under 
the nominal control of the intendant at Quebec. In 1692 the commandEr 
at Pla.1 sance asked Ch~pigny for the establishment of a royal notary 
1 
and clerk; C:h~pign.y aPpointed a certain J a.cques DUrand to the 
2 
post, and in 1701 he promoted this official to the vacant position 
3 
of commissaire. 
4 
Champigny also had a sub-delegate at Acadia, but here too the 
intendant' a authori ty waa very tenuous, and Champigny himself 
remarked: "Je me sers de toutes les ocasions qui se presentent 
pour avoir des relations a 1' acadie pour le service du Roy, mais 
cela arive rarement a cause des difficultez qu'il y a d'aller et 
5 
venir·" When Champigny was recalled his auccessor, Beauharnois, 
was informed that althougb. Acadia and Plaisance were nominally 
wi thin his jurisdiction, he would not be held responsible for their 
administration and his only connection with them would be to be 
kept informed each year by hia sub-delegatea of the state of afairs 
6 
in the two areas. The minister was not making aJlY change here, meœoeJy 
taking recognition of the existing situation. 
So far as the intendant' s au tho ri ty in the western posta was 
1 • Ca.n • Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII Part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 21 September 1692. 
2. ibid. 
3. can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XXII part 3, Ministre au sieur de 
Mon1c. (1701). 
4. Can. Arch. AN· Series B, vol. XV, Mémoire pour servir d'Instruc-
tion au Sr. Gout tin choisy Par le Roy pour faire les fonctions 
de Juge et Escriva.in du Roy a 1 'Acadie, Versailles, 10 ~.Pril 1688. 
5. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Ch~pigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1689. 
6 • Ca.n • Arch. AN • Seri es B, vol • XXIII Part 1, Mémoire pour servir 
d'Instruction au Sr de Beauharnois ••. 6 MaY 1702. 
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ooncerned, enough has alrea.dy been said on th1 s score to show tha.t 
during Champigny' s administration his a~thor1 ty there was virtually 
l 
non existent. The post commandera were a law unto themselves and 
the intendant had no effective means of bringing them to heel. 
Thus, to all intenta and purposes, Champigny' s authori ty was con-
fined to the central colony i tltelf, from the western tip of the 
i eland of' Montreal to Mal Baie. 
But w1 thin these confines his authori ty was far reaching to BaY 
the least; there was hardly a single aspect of' the habitants' life 
which was not subject in some degree to supervision by the inten-
dant. As one historian pute it: "The post of colonial intendant 
was a.lmost unique in the scope of' powers commi tted to i t, and in 
the constant heavy demande made upon the firmness, tact, impa.rtial-
2 
ity and integrity of its occupants." 
It is not known how many subordinate officiels the intendant 
had to aid him in his my riad tasks. His chief assistant was his 
comm1 se aire or sub di:ù.égué at Montaeal, who se time seems to have 
been taken up mainly in mili ta.ry dt.ties, that is, in seeing to 
the pa.:ving and feeding of the troops, and in trying, albeit usually 
in vain 10 to prevent inf'ringements of' the edicta governing the up 
country tu.r trade. There were of course a good many minor func-
tionaries; a complete list of these civil servants with the scope 
of their duties was not discovered 10 but the existence of one or 
two auch has come to light. In 1689 Champigny commi ssioned a M. 
Hilaire Bernard de la Ri vi ère, who had been an archi tect in 
1. vide supra, cha,pter V, passim. 
2. MUNRO, W. B: The Gffice of Intendant in New France, in Amer. 
Hi st. Rev. vol. XII, 1906-1907, pp 37-38. 
~ 1 
France, as mesueur and arpenteur ro:ra+ in the colony • This o:tficial 
did not enjoy the frui tf>f office very long, probably he wa.s a victim 
of the Lachine massacre, for f'i ve months la ter Champigny gave a. 
2 
commission for this same post to Fra:noois de Lajoue. ,Anoth.er of'f'iciàJ. 
wi th a rather imposing ti tle was the sergent ro:ra]., juré priseur .!! 
vendeur de biens; in 1694 Champigny appointed a certain Georges 
- 3 
Pruneau to fil1 this position in Montreal· 
The local judicia.I7 from time to time i ssued ordonna,nces govern-
ing local matters; perhaps the main reason fer this was the lack o:t 
communications between Montreal and the sea.t of government at Quebec. 
In 1702 judge Juchereau issued an ordpnn@Ce in Montreal forbidding 
the townspe6ple to drive their pige through the streets to the fields 
outside the town walls except during certain hours, the rest of the 
time pigs had to be kept locked up on pain of a three livre :tine 
4 
for eve17 pig caught wandering about town at the wrong time. 
Obviously, in a bUsY center like Iviontreal a great many auch petty 
matter a would arise and i t would have been rather awkward to have 
to submi t them al1 to Quebec for a ru1ing. The intendant kept an 
eye on these local edicta Just the same, and Champigny la.ter rati-
5 
fied judge Juohereau 1 s ordonnance by an ord.onnapce of' his own. 
The means by which the ordonnaaces of the governor and intendant 
1. Que. Arch. Publications, Ords. Commissions, etc etc des Gouver-
neurs et Intendants, vol. II, p 183, Commission de M. Bochart de 
Champigny 11 Hilaire Bernard de La Rivière ..• Quebec, 20 July 1689 • 
. 2. Que. Arch. Publications, Ords. Commissions, etc etc des Gouver-
neurs et Intendants, vol. II, pp 189-190, Commission de M. Bochart 
de Champigny 11. Fra.nQois de Lajoue ••• Quebec, 22 December 1689. 
3· Que. Arch. Publications, Ords· Commissions, etc etc des Gouver-
neurs et Intendants, vol. II, pp.t.lcr -.Z.&fD Commission de M. Boohart 
de Champigny à. Georges Pruneau, •• ( Quebec) 10 September 1694. 
4. B .R .H • vol. XXXIV, 1928, p 522, MASSICOTTE, E .fz: Les Arrets, 
Edits Ordonn ces Mandements et Re lamenta conserv4§s' Mont-
~~··~Q~40nnance de Juge Juchereau, (Montreal 2 APril 1702. 
5 · ibid· Ordonnance de l'intendant Bochart de Champigny déclarant 
exécutoire l'ordonnance de M. Juchereau en date du 28 avril 
précéderl.t. (Montreal) 11 August 1702. 
-325-
were made known to the peop~e was the very simp~e and effective 
one of having them read out by the priests from the pulpit a.fter 
maas. When the King instructed the abbé de Chevrières, the new~y 
appointed bishop, tha.t this wa.s to be done, he at the sa.me time 
ordered that the governor was to be referred to as Monseigneur, 
l 
but not so the intendant, which was almost &kin to the intendant • s 
be1ng seated below the salt. 
To turn from the general to the Particular aspects of the 
intendant's duties, it wou~d seem tha.t his responsibilities as 
intendant of fi~ance ca.used him more head aches than all his other 
duties combined· Certainly it wa.s in this sphere that Cha1Dpigny 
was con tinually being taken to task by the mini ster. Every ~iv re 
of the King's monay spent in New France ha.d to be accounted for by 
the intendant and his accounts were very ca.refUlly scrutinised, 
item by item, when they reached Versa1~les. Owing to the war, 
colonial expend1ture rose steadily year by yea.r; in 1686 45,000 
2 
livres were allocated for war expanses, by 1692 the Canadian 
3 
defence budget had risen to 75,000 livres and for the following 
4 
year Champigny asked for 102,800 livres, in 1693 expend1 tures 
5 
~eaped to 200,000 ~ivres and in ~698 a.t the war' s 'end ChaJilpigny 
1. Can· Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XII, Ministre à. M. l'abbé de 
Chevrières, Versailles, 31 MaY 1686. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Instruction que 
le Roy veut astre remize es mains du Sr de Champigny •.• 
Versailles, 31 MaY 1686. 
3· Can. Arch. AC. Series OllA, vol. XII part l, Frontenac au 
Ministre, Quebec, 11 November 1692. 
4. Can. Arch. AC • Seri es C11A, vol • XII Part 
Ministre, Quebec, 8 October 1692. 
1, Challpigny au 
5· Can • Arch· AC. Series CllA, vol. XII 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693. 
Part 1, Champigny au 
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1 
drew on the King' s trea.surer to the a.mount of 230,000 livres. 
It is hardly surprising therefore that each year' s dispatches 
from Versailles conta;hed a furious demand by the minister that 
expanses be reduced; in 1693 he threa.tened that if Champigny 
"' exceeded the funds allocated to him in future he wuld run the 
" 2 
grave ri sk of hav1ng to ma.ke up the difference h1msel.f • Th1 s 
did not chasten the intendant in the slightest; he promptly replied 
that he greatly resented the mini star' a remarks, and added that 
they should have been add.ressed to the governor since all war 
expanses were made at Frontenac' s behest. In fa1rness to Fron-
tenac, however, he pointed out that considering the m1li tary 
situation wi th wh1ch they were fa.ced, he could not see how a 
3 
reduction of m1litary expend1tures coul.d possibly be effected. 
This partieular incident points up the awkward situation in 
which the intendant was pla.ced. He was expected to keep the 
colony wi thin i ta budget and at the same time provide the gover-
nOP'.wi th all the supplies and munitions he needed to prosecute the 
war. In 1694, in an attempt to keep a elo ser check on Cha11igny, 
the King ordered that the intendant was not to ma.ke any expend1-
t-ures except on the orders of the governor,. or malte a1J.Y purcha.ses 
wi th.out fi rat obtaining the governor' s a,pproval and signature; 
should the govarnor desire to underta.ke e.'ft1 works or expeditions 
which would exeeed the funds granted for that year then the inten-
dant was to warn him of this faet and the governor was then to 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Seri es CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 27 Ootober 1698. 
2. can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVI Part 2, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 28 Mal"ch 1693. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Champigny au 
~llni stre, Quebec, 4 Hovember 1693. 
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1 
cancel bis plans. '!hus it depended on the governor whether or 
not ~a intendant exceeded the budget; in the final analysis this 
really meant tha.t the intendant wa.s held ffanci ally responsible 
"' 
for the actions of the governor,over which he had no control 
wha.tsoevar. Froneenac' s persistance in reestablishing his fort 
at Cata.racoui and his retention of the f'rigate La Bouffonne, 
dsspi te the vcigorous opposition of Cha;m.pigny, to ci te but two 
exa.mples, show clearly how much control Champigny actua,lly had 
over mili tary expendi ture • 
Throughout Frontenac' s régime colonial finance was a continual 
battle of two against one. Sometimes i t was the mini star and 
Frontenac against Champigny, at other times Cha.mp1gny and Frontenac 
comb1ned forces against the m1n1ster, and towards the end of 
Frontenac's rule, the m1n1ster supported Champigny in the latter's 
attempts to curb Frontenac's extravagance. 
When the King took exception to Frontenac and ChaPigny pgy1ng 
bounties to the allied Indiana of twenty escus for male prisoners, 
ten écus for females, ten écus for scalps, and ordered that thes.e 
a.mounts should be :reduced to two, one and one écus respectively, 
the governor and intendant protested vlgorously. They asked the 
King to reconsider, pointing out that the total outlgy on bounties 
to dat.ad been only about 6,300 livres and that if avery Iroquois 
scalp could be obta.ined at that prive then the enemy could be 
destroyed for only eleven to twelve thousand écus, which would 
2 
have been very cheap a.t the .priee. In the meantime they chose 
1. Can. Arch. IJi. Series B, vol. XVII, part l, Mémoire du Roy 
aux Srs Frontenac et Champigny, (1694). 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Mini atre, Quebec, 4 November 1693. 
l 
to di a regard the o rder • 
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Then a.gain in 1698 Champigny and. Frontenac can1e under f'ire, 
this time for ha.ving executed the minister' s own orders too well 
for his lilting. This caJD.e about as a resul t of the events of the 
previous yea.r. In March 1697 the minister sent a very urgent 
dispatch post haste to Quebec via Pentaguet in Acadia to warn 
Frontenac that the En:glish were prepa.ring to malte an a.ssa.ul t on 
New France via the St. Lawrence the coming summer. In addition 
to taking all mea.sures necessary to repulse auch an attack, 
Frontenac and Champigny ha.d to make re adJ' three hundred f'i ve man 
cano es and have fifteen hundred troops and mili ti a rea.dy to ma.rch 
in the very near future with one mon th 1 s supplies. The minister 
2 
add~d mysteriously that further orders would be sent very soon. 
Shortly a.f'tel:'Wards a second dispa.tch was sent explaining that the 
Canadi an force wa.s to be used in conjunction wi th a fleet sailing 
3 
from France for a combined a.ssaul t on New England and New York. 
Champigny and Frontenac wa.sted no time in ta.king the necessary 
mea.sures to comply wi th these orders. They immediately called a 
corvée and set the habi tanta to work on the Quebec fortifications, 
then brought n1ne compa,n1es of the troupes de la marine up from 
Montreal to join six other companies who had wintered near Quebec. 
Champigny fed them by talting grain from some of' the habi tanta of 
4 
the more distant seigniories who had been excused the corvée. 
1. Ca;n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac et Cha,pigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 5 November 1694. 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XIX part 2, Ministre à M. de 
Frontenac, Versailles, 5 March 1697. 
3. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XIX part 3, Lettre du Roy à M. 
le comte de Frontenac, Marly, 21 APril 1697. 
4. Ca,n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Relation de ce qui s'est 
Passé de plus remarquable .•• 1696 ... 1697. 
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After all this had been dona the threatened English attack 
proved to be a fel se alarm and the French expedition against the 
En'glish colonies was.called off. But this was by no means the 
end of the episode; the following year the King took Champigny 
and Frontenac severely to ta.sk for ha.ving spent forty thousand 
livres on the Q.uebec fortifications wi thout due authorization and 
he threatened tha.t if th1 s sort of thing happenèd. again they would 
1 
have to foot the bill themsel vas. Champigny minced no words in 
informing the m1nister tha.t this expanse would not have been undep-
2 
ta.ken had i t not been for the m1n1ster' s own urgent commanda. 
As we have seen, in the early years of the war the King tried 
to use the governor as a check on the intendant a expendi tures; in 
later years however, the minister aupported Cha,Jligny in the latter' a 
a.ttempts to curb the govemor' s excessive demanda on the royal 
exchequer. A pa.rticula.r ex ample of this wa.s Frontenac' s desire 
to rebuild his residence, the Château St. Louis. Both Denonville 
and Champigny reported in 1686 that the building was in a sad state 
of d1srepair but admi tted that there were too many more urgent 
axpendi tures tha.t had to be made to do any thing about i t a.t tha.t 
3 
time. When Frontenac returned to the colony he compla.ined tha.t 
the château needed a new roof as the snow and rs.in kept seeping 
in and pra.ct1vallY swamped the place a.t times, and that i t would 
be far better to tear the whole thing down and rebuild i t on i te 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XX part 1, Mémoire du Roy aux Srs 
comte de Frontenac et ChaJI.pigny en response de leur lettre du 
19 8bre 1697, Versailles, 21 MaY 1698. 
2. ca.n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XVI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 14 October 1698. 
3· Can· Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. VIII1 Denonville au Ministre, 
Quebec, 8 May 1686; Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 16 Nov. 1686. 
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1 
old foundations. Ch~pigcy agreed wi th Frontenac that this 
would be the beat thing to do under normal circumstanoes, but he 
added that i t would coat at least twenty thou sand livres, and if 
the minis ter did not wi sb. to spend so much then repaira could be 
made which would make the building hold together lor a few more 
years. At· the same time he wa.rned that all auch repaira were, in 
the long run, a waste of money and over a period of years would 
2 
run awaY wi th a considerable sum. 
The following year Frontenac informed the minister; " •.. je 
seraY bien heureux si j'y puis passer encore cet hiver sans astre 
accablé sous ses ruines ce que je suis assuré que vous ne voudriez 
3 
pas·" This cri de coeur had the desired affect and the King 
authorised an expenditure of twelve thousand livres on the château, 
three thousand livres being granted that year and the rest to be 
4 
isaued later. Before many months ha.d passed Champigny foresa.w 
:Drouble. He reported to the mini a ter tha.t a.t the rate Frontenac 
was ·going the new châteaU would coat at lea.st double the twelve 
5 
thou sand livres au tho ri sed by the King. Despi te Champigny' a demurs 
Frontenac peraiated with his ambitious undertaking, cla.iming tha.t 
every time the w1nd sh1:f'ted to the north he expected the whole 
place to c:rumble about his ears. However this does not appear to 
have worried the intendant greatly, for Frontenac complained: 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 November 1690; ChaJlj)igny au I41nistre, Quebec, 10 
MaY 1691. 
2. ~· 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 20 October 1691. 
4. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVI part 1, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Srs. comte de Frontenac et Champigny. (1692). 
5 • C an • Arch • AC • Serie a Cl lA, vol • XII part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Q.uebec, . 8 October 1692. 
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"· •• cependant le coeur de mr l'intendant n'en est point touché et 
il faudrait voir les grimaces qu'il faict, et les declarations qui 
suivent, pour peu qu'on propose de,fa1re quelques preparatifs pour 
1 
commencer a y. travailler." At thi a parti cul ar ti me relations 
between the intendant and the governor were very stra1ned and in 
all likelihood Champigny would have enjoyed nothing better than to 
see the château colla,pse provided that Frontenac was inside when 
i t ha,ppened • 
Then the following year, 1694, atter the old structure had been 
torn down and the new one ha.lf' bu11 t, the King om1 tted to malte the 
annua.l grant of' three thousa.nd livres. Frontenac gave up in d1 s-
guat at this and had a.ll work stopped on the building; but rather 
tha.n leave i t in i ta ha.lf' fini shed condition, wh1ch would have 
mean t i ta ra,pidly going to ruin, Champigny took i t on himself to 
aell six of the twenty-fi ve yearly fur trade congés and use this 
2 
six thouaand livres to finish the Job. The King later resumed 
the a.nnual threelthousand livres grant but Frontenac' s a,ppeti te, 
so far as his château was concerned, grew on what 1 t fed on and 
Champigny pleaded wi th the m1n1ster to check the governor' s 
ex travae;ance, etating: 
Je ne croy pas, Me;r, pouvoir me dispenser 
de vous dire que mes remontrances dans ces 
occasions et dans toutes les autres, dans 
lesquelles il f'a1 t connoi tre ses intentions 
sont tellement CaPables d'alterer l'union 
que vous desirez entre nous, qu'il faut 
absolument, ou acquiescer a ce qu'il desire, 
ou bien faire cesser cette union. C'est sur 
cela, Mgr, principalement que je vous prie 
tres humblement de me donner et vos ordres 
et vos conseils. Il reste encore beaucoup 
d'ouvrages a faire pour perfectionner ce 
1. Can • Arch· 'BN. Series B Nl/SD, Collection Clairambault, vol. 
DCCCJ.niX, fol. 320-338,· Frontenac à M. de La,gny, Quebec, 
25 October 1693. 
2. Can. Arch. AC• Series ellA, vol. XIII, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 25 October 1($4. 
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château. n se pro po se sans cesse cette 
pe-rfection, aYeZ agréable aussy de luy 
faire oonnoi tre sur cela vos intentions. 
1 
To make matters worse, when all congés were revoked by the King 
in 1696, the purchasers of those sold by Champigny to finance the 
château demanded their money back. Thus Champigny was obliged to 
ask the minister to allocate 4500 livres in French fUnds for this 
repaJTment, but he cautioned that the ex:pendi ture should only be 
authorised " •.• en expliquant bien que c'est pour servir a ce rem-
boursement afin que M. de frontenac ne put Pas en faire 1 • employ 
à la continuation de son château, aYant desja dit d'avance que si 
Sa Majesté fesoi t des fonds pour 1 1 achever, il les y emploperoi t, 
2 
sans avoir egard a leurs pretentions." 
By this time events had forced Pontchartrain to the realization 
that all the disputes between the governor and the intendant were 
not caused merely by Champigny' s stubborn refusa]. to coopera te 
with Frontenac. His awareness of this fact at long last was made 
aPParent when he informed Champigny that the King would grant 
another three thou sand livres for the château and not a sou more, 
adding that '' ••• si M. de Frontenac veut exceder ce fonds il faut 
que vous luy declariez nettement que ce sera a luy a en PaYer la 
3 
depense, et il faut bien vous donner de garde de 1 'ordonner." 
Frontenac oompla,ined bi tterly to the mini star tha.t Champ1gey was 
4 
wi thol ding these :fUnds from their proper usage, but for once 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 13 October 1697. 
2 · a·a,n. Arèp. AC. Series ClJlA, vol. XV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 24 October 1697. 
3. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XX part 1, Ministre à. M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 21 March 1698. · 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVI, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 October 1698. 
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Champigny had the a.uthori ty of the mini star on his sida and so 
1 
he remained cheerfully a.da.mant to all Frontenac' s demanda. The 
mini star, howavar, must have fel t that he had lockad the stable 
door a.t a rather la te hour whan he received Champigny' s naxt dis-
Patch st~ting that bills to the a.mount of 6,975 livres, which 
Frontenac had spent during the past yea.r in anticipation of the 
2 
a.nnual grant, were a till out standing. The final ou tcome of this 
struggle over the control of finances ha.d been a. victory for 
Champigny, but i t ha.d tallien him nine y ea.ra to a.chieve i t. 
One major fina.ncial problem with which Champigny ha.d to contend 
wa.s the chronic shortage of specie in New France, due la.rgaly to 
the colony' s adverse balance of trade. This ha.d ca.u'sed his pre-
decassor de Meulles to inaugura.te the tempora.rY expedient of ca.rd 
monay. One of Champigny' a first acta upon taking over as inten-
3 
da.nt wa.s to redeem this card monay, b•t he w~s soon obliged to 
reis sue i t. In 1689 the trea.surer sent out let tara of exchange 
drawn on Ca.na.dia.n marchants in lieu of cash and Champigny protasted 
vigorously aga;i.nst this since the marchants woul4not be able to 
4 
honour the dra.fts un til the following y ea.r. Two yaa.rs la. ter 
Champigny anticipa.ted the arri val of the supply ships wi th the 
a.nnual funds by drawing lattera of credit on the agent of the 
Royal Farm for 87,377 livres, in order to obvia. te the necessi ty 
1. ibid; Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 14 October 1698. 
2. ibid. 
3· Qua. Arch. Publications, Ords· Commissions etc etc des 
Gouverneurs et Intendants, vol. II pp 160-161, Ordonnance de 
M. de Champigny, Quebec, 26 September 1686. 
t. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. X, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 16 November 1689. 
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for i ssuing more ca.rd monay; that of the previous year ha.ving 
been redeemed. Champigny explained tha.t he ha.d dra.wn thes a lattera 
of excha;nge beca.use ca.rd money wa.s very hard on the troops since 
1 t alwaYs coat them more to buy things wi th this monay tha.n wi th 
1 
hard cash; in other words, ca.rd money wa.s at a. discount. But 
this scheme did not succeed for ca.rd monay still had to be issued 
from time to ti me and three y ea.rs a.fter Champigny ' s depa.rture the 
th.en intendant was still trying to redeem nearly 50,000 livres 
2 
worth which had been issued by Champigny. 
Ano thar thing wh! ch added greatly to Champigny' s problems wa.s 
the fact tha.t a large proportion of the colony' a a:nnua.l budget wa.s 
sent in the form of mercb.a.ndise, soma of i t food supplies for the 
troops and marchandise for Intian presents, but a considerable 
proportion Champigny was expected to sell in the colony at a. 
profit; the funds so realised to be used for wa.r and general expen-
3 
di tures. 
This system quickly led to grave abuses, most of them stemming 
from the fa.ct tha.t the marchants of La Rochelle had been granted a 
monopoly on the trada wi th Canada by the King. In return for th1 s 
monopoly these merohants had to transport Part of the munitions 
and supplies for New France free of freigh.t, but to compensate 
themselves for this they raised the priee of the goods they sold 
4 
to the Oanadian marchants on their own account. The minister 
1. Can • Arch. AO. Series 011!, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quabec, 10 May 1691; Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 12 Oct. 1691· 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Serias OllA, vol. XXII, Raudot au Ministre, 
Quebec, l9.0ctobar 1705. 
3 • Can • Arch· AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 2, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ministre, Quabac, 4 Nov amber 1693. 
4. Ca;n. Arch. M. Series B, vol. XVI Part l, Ministre à. M· de 
Champigny, Versailles, 25 APril 1691. 
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l 
forbade tlüs sharP pr<>ctise but it proved impossible to prevent 
the monopoli sts frow pro fi teering in one t>fgJ and an<D.ther. Champié!nY 
and Frontenac, naturally enough, were oppo sed to this monopoly 
and aslred that the merchqnts of St. :r~Ialo g.lld o 
2 
r ports be encour-
aged to tr vil th Ca..:;.J.ad,q,. But even wh en the St. r··Ialo and l·T3):1 tes 
rnerch9.nts offe~ed half and up to two thirds of their ships 1 C&rgo 
space for the free freigh t of the King 1 s stores in return for the 
rig,h t to tr wi th !;;ei'V France, the King would not cancel the La 
Rochelle monopoly, his reg,son b the need to conserve a~Hany 
mari ners as :oo ssibl e for tho navy . 
The governor and intend?,llt pointed out wi th some acerbi ty th 
the La Rochelle me!"chan ts had used the l-i ar as an excuse to rt:?.i se 
their priees to an eAOrbitant leVel, wiich in turn had forced the 
Ca;.'ladig,n habitants to follO"i\" suit by raising the pricepf their 
produce by raore t.'IJ.an fifty per-cent. And not only had these mer-
chants rai sed the priee of their goods, but also their insurance 
charges to a ne,,.; rate of t\.Yenty per-cent, despi te t.he foot thPt 
thei r shi ps were convoy ed by the King 1 s frigates. In addition, 
they ra.ised their freight rotes to 120 livres the ton in 1692, 
•.r:"lereas previously 1 t h"l.d been only 50 livres; this they did on 
the old pre t that they gg,ve one quarter of their cargo sP.?Ce 
to the King's stores, and moreover, they now demB.llded the pa,yment 
of the se exorbitant freight charges in advance. Che,mpigny and 
1. Can. Arch. • Series D, vol. XVI part 1, Ivlinistre à::.:. de 
Cha;1rpigny, -versailles, 25 APril 1691. 
2 . C 3.n. Arch. l;C • Seri es Cl lA, vol • XII part 1, Front en ac et 
Champigny au I<inistre, .!uebec, 15 Se-ç>tember 1692. 
3· Can. J\rch. . Series B, vol. XVI Part 1, Einistre 9, H. de 
Cha~pigny, Versailles, 25 APril 1691. 
Frontenac stated 1nd1gna:ntly that no where else in the world was 
this done and they claimed that i t led to the ship owners being 
very careless as to the sea worthiness of their ships. They asked 
that the colony' s supplies be sent in good sized flt'ites in future 
instead of' in small rotten hulks which were too easily CaPtUred 
or el se foundered in storms; this being, they feared, what had 
l 
happened to the ships bringing hal! their supplies for that year. 
The losa or ships at sea carrying supplies tO New France 
precipitated a verbal battle between Champigny a.nd the minister. 
In 1690, 1691 a.nd 1692 such ships were lost a.nd Champigny requeated 
that the value of the supplies be cred1 ted to the colony' s funds 
2 
by the roy al treasurer • Ina te ad of a credit ad vic è he rec ei v ed 
a di spa.tch from the minis ter dema.nding to know in scathing terms 
what ga.ve Champigny to think that the King would be willing to 
reimburse the colonial :funds in this instance. He sta.ted flatly. 
that the in tendant should have reduced the colony' s expendi tures 
to compensa te for the se losses and added: "Sa Majesté ne veut 
point vous faire ce remplacement, et vous ne devez Pas vous y 
3 
attendre." 
If the minister thought that this ended the matter he was sadlY 
mistaken, for Champigny ref'used to accept the minister' s decision 
in th1 s matter as final· He explained curtly that these mi seing 
supplies, amounting to nearly 30,000 livres had f'or the most part 
been flour and meat for the troops, the oost of which had been 
l. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Frontenac et Cham-
pigny au M1niâtre, Quebec, 15 September 1692. 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XII part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 8 October 1692. 
3. Ca.n. Arch. JJl. Series B, vol. XVI part 2, Ministre à. M. de 
Champigny, 28 March 1693· 
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deduc ted in France from their PaY and all.owa.nces; therefore, 
Champigny added, " ••. je n'aurois Pas esté excusable si j'avois 
manqué a reparer ces pertes Par des emprunts, en attendant que 
1 
Sa Majesté y eut pourveu •• ·" But the minister still retused to 
2 
admit that the intendant had a:ny right to expect this retund, 
3 
and Champigny stubbornl.y persisted in demanding i t. However, 
Champigny won out in the end . In 1700 the minis ter grudgingly 
4 
·~gave in and the tunds were duly credi ted to the colony' a account. 
Another frequent complaint of Champigny' s was that the gooda 
sent out from France all too often were short w81ght and of very 
poor quali ty, which waa hard both. on the troops who had to eat the 
bad flour and meat, and the colony 's tunds since there was no 
profit to be made on the sale of the surplus. In 1692 Champigny 
stated that the flour sent that year was so old and mouldy it 
looked as though i t had been salva.ged from the supplies used on 
5 
some previous mili ta.ry caJilpaign. In an a.ttempt to put an end to 
th1 a sort of thing Champigny sent his seeretary over to Rochefort 
6 
to investigate matters. The sieur Fredin aPParently discovered 
the causes of the difficul ti es but nothing a,ppeara to have been 
done by the Rochefort official a to prevent their recurrence. 
1 • Can. Ar oh. AC • Seri es ellA, vol • XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 4 November 1693. 
2. Can. Arch. AN· Series B, vol. XVII part 2, Ministre à M. Begon, 
Versailles, 9 February 1695. 
3. ibid. 
4. ca,n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XVIII, Champigny au :Ministre, 
Quebec, 15 October 1700. 
5 • Can. Arch. AC • Seri es Cl lA, vol • XII part 1, Champigny au 
Ministre, Quebec, 5 October 1692. 
6. Can. Arch. AC. Seri es CllA, vol • XII part 2, Champigny au 
Ministre, ( l!Xtrai t des lettres de Canada) 1693 · 
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In 1694 when Champigny sent his lista oa supplies need.ed for 
the following y ear he went to the trouble to mark in be si de each 
item the priee pa1d in France by Quebec marchants for auch goods. 
Thl!:.s, he expla;tned wi th wha.t amounted to little more than sarcasm, 
he had decided to do in order to " •• -eviter les inconveniens dans 
lesquels sont tombez ceu.x qui ont fa.i t les a.cha;pts des envoya qui 
ont esté faits 1 1 année presente, en achet tant quelques articles ltjl. 
double de leur juste valleur et presque toutes les draperies estant 
de mechante qualité ••. " Champigny blamed this mainly on the fact 
tha.t the Cana.d1a.n. supplies were all bought at La Rochelle and at 
the last minute, 1nstead of being purchased at first hand direct 
from the producers or manufacturera. He ma1nta1ned tha.t the. only 
waJJ auch difficul ti es could be avoided was by allo ca ting the 
1 
funds used to purchase these supplies in good time. 
In this aaJD.e dispa;toh Champigny asked the minister to make 
inquiries at Rochefort as to why the flour sent out in 1692 had 
been short we1ght six livres in eve:ry hogshea.d. He ha.d complained 
before of this and been told veey brusquely by the minister tha.t 
2 
he would have to settle that matter wi th M. Begon. Just how 
Champigny wa.s to obtain redress from Begon, the mini star did not 
explain. But this time the minister paid more attention to 
Champigny' s request for compenâation and took the intendant at 
Rochefort severely to task, demanding to know why i t was that 
every yea.r .the Ca.nadia.n supplies were short weight when they 
arrived at Quebeo. Begon was told that the King would not tolera.te 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Champigny a.u Ministre, 
Quebec, 24 October 1694. 
2. ca.n. Arch. Ni. Series B, vol. XVI part 2, lünistre aM de 
Champigny, Versailles, 28 March 1693· 
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auch d1sorders a1JY longer, and that in future these supplies had 
to be purchased by 11 ••• des personnes plus fideles ou plus CaPables 
1 
pour n' estre plus trompé dans la qualité." 
~ . t 
The minister also apea.rs to have ta.ken Champigny' s lecture on 
elementary commissa.rY methode to heart, for when Begon claimed, 
in hi a own defence, that the marchants of La Rochelle were not 
pro fi teering but were in fa.ct lo sing money on these shipments, 
the mini a ter repli ed tha t if Begon could beli eve auch y a.rns th en 
he would believe a.nything, and added: 
••• si voua eu exceptez ceux dont les 
navires ont esté pris par 1 'imprudence 
de ceux qui les commandoient je suis 
mesme fort persuadé que ceux à qui il 
n'est point arrivé de pareil malheur y 
ont fait des proffi te très considerables, 
il n'y a qu'a voir ce que les danreez 
leur ont couaté en France et ce qu'ils 
les ont vendues en Canada pour en estre 
convaincu, que voua pouvez faire facile-
ment quand il voua plaira. 
2 
But de spi te all Champigny' s d1 spatches, the sa.me tro~bles kept 
recurring; the La Rochelle marchants continued to overcha.rge both 
for goods and for freight and to ship the supplies in unseaworthy 
sh1ps. In 1697 ChaJD.pigny informed the m1n1ster tha.t the official 
a.t Rochefort responsible for the purcha.ses of Cana.d1an supplies 
had suggested that i t would be better were the funds made av ail-
able in J anuarY, so thg,.t he could buy the supplies at first ha.nd 
and for far lees. W'.h,y this official should address his suggest-
ions to Champigny instead of to Begon is not clea.:r, unless i t 
was merely an attempt a.t subtlety on ChaJD.pigny' s part. In any 
1. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XVII part 2, M1n1st:re à M. 
Begon, Versailles, 22 J anua.ry 1695. 
2 • Ca.n. Arch. AN • Seri es B, vol • XVII part 2, M1n1 at re à M • 
Begon, Versailles, 2 March 1695. 
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case, ChaJilplSJl3f wrote: "Je vous supl.ie, Mgr, d'avoir la bonté 
1 
de donner sur cela les ordres necessaires." Obviousl.y, ChaJilpigny' s 
earli er suggestion of just auch a system had been ignored • 
1!b.us i t is aPParent that ChaJilpigny' s attempts to affect reforme 
in the system of supplying Canada wi th essen ti al commodi ties were 
of no. avail, and he w•s doubtless on1y too glad when in 1700 the 
mini star decided that in fu ture only essen ti al mill tary supplies 
2 
would be sent from France. 
This problem of high priees for merchandi se and produce in the 
colony raised another tricky question, namely, priee controle. 
Throughout his intenda.ncy ChaJilpigny was firmly opposed to auch 
artificial means of lowering priees, and in this he was strongly 
opposed by Frontenac. The issue tiret came into prominence in 
1691; that year, following Phipp' s attack on Q.uebec and the non-
arriva! of most of the supply ships from France, there was a 
food faDÙne in the colony as wall as a great dearth of supplies of 
3 
all kinds. Frontenac and the officers of the troupes de la marine 
urged Champigny very strongly to impose priee controle on every-
thing but he refused. He sta.ted that he vas keeping a watchfflll 
eye on the market to make sure that no one was charging unjust or 
exorb1 tant priees. So far as bread and other food stuffs were 
concerned he stated that he would have controlled their priees 
long a,go had he th.ought for one moment that i t would do arrs good, 
but he could not see that auch controle would be of any use at all 
at a time when everyone was going hungry; as he put 1 t, " ... sy 11 
1 • Can • Arch. AC. Seri es Cl lA, vol. XV, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 13 October 1697. 
2 • Can • Arch. AC . Seri es CllA, vol • XVIII, Champigny au Mini et re, 
Quebec, 15 October 1700. 
3· Vide supra, chapter III, pp 73-75· 
s'est trouvé quelqu'un qui a.Yt vendu un peu de Pain il se l'ostoi~ 
de son necessaire pour avoir d'autres besoins, voila l'état ou 
1 
nous étions redui ta." 
But i t was not just the special circumstances of this particu-
lar time which gave ChaJlpigny to bel1eve tha.t priee controle would 
be ineffective, he was opposed to them in principle. What he 
advoca.ted wa.s ba.s1cally a. free domestic market, as he makes clear 
in this dispatch to the minister: " ••. il est d'une extrema cons'-
quence de laisser la liberté du commerce si on veut atirer les 
marchands de france et il n'y aura que la liberté que fera 1' abon-
2 
dance et l' abonl.a;nce le bon marché." 
Tllis long term economie view ta.ken by Champigny was undoubtedly 
sound, but Frontenac and the off'icers of' the troupes de la marine, 
naturally enough, took the shorter v1ew. Economie theorY buttered 
no parsnips wi th them, and while a few months might be a VerY 
short, time so far as the economie law of supply and dema.nd was 
concerned, men could be reduced to the extremes of mi serY in lesa 
time than that. The whole problem was referred to the King for 
a decision, but all th at the governor and intendant recei ved in 
reply was a discussion or both sidas or the problem with no decis-
ion one wa,y or the other. The King agreed wi th Champigny that, 
" •.. Il est bon de conserver la liberté qu'il doit y avoir dans 
le commerce," but added, "lorsque l'avarice des particuliers va 
trop loin, et qu'elle t1 re a consequence pour le salut du pa,y s, 
i1 est necessaire de 1 'arrester Par tous les moyens praticables, 
1. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XI, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 November 1691. 
2 . Can. Arch. AC. Seri es CllA, vol. XI, Ch~pigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 12 October 1691. 
1 
et mesme par 1' au tho ri té, quand on ne peut Pas autrement·.·" 
Consequently, the arguments between Frontenac and Champigny 
continued; Frontenac matntalning that priee controle were needed 
to prevent the habita*ts aJld marchants from profiteering, and 
Champigny claiming that the Ca.nadian marchants had been f'oraed 
to raise their priees owing to the increased freight rates and 
higher priees charged for goods by the La Rochelle marchants. 
Champigny stated that he had called an assembly of the colony' s 
marchants the previous Year and had made them bring their a.ccount 
books to see what profit they were ma.king, he claimed that their 
profit was lees than ten per cent. As for the priee of grain and 
mea.t,he ma.intalned that the priee rise here wa.s caused by the 
chronic shortages and periodic fam.ines brought about by the 
2 
wa.r and the unpredicta.ble sta.te of supplies from France. Aga.in 
the instructions from the court counselled tha.t the governor 
and intendant were not to allow any profi teering, but 1'fte' supplied 
3 
no clear definition of the term • 
.Another explanation of why Champigny was so reluctant to 
impose priee controle wa.s offered by Frontenac. In a latter to 
his f'zsiend de Lagny the govezsnor stated that the priee of meat 
was double wha.t i t had been before the war and that i t wa.s 
impossible at times to find supplies even if' one wezse willing 
to Pa.Y the se exorbitant priees. He cla.1med th a.t th1 s state of' 
affaira could be rectified b'f establishing a meat market where 
priees would be regula.ted bùt that the intendant would not aeree 
1. Can • Arch • .AN. Series B, vol. XVI part 2, Mémoire du Roy aux 
Srs comte de Frontenac et de Ch~pigny, (1693). 
2 · Can • Arch· AC. Series CllA, vol. XII Part 2, Frontenac et 
Champigny au Ministre, Q.uebec, 4 November 1693. 
3 · Can. Arch. AN • Seri es B, vol • XVII part 1, Mémoire du Roy au:x 
Srs comte de Frontenac et de Champigny, (1694}. 
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beoause he vas 1Ulw1111ng te embarra•• the aleur 4e V1lleraY, the 
deall ot the SOTere1sa OOU11c1l, aud the aleur d'Auteuil, the 
Jlrocui-"'r g4Dt§r&l, who were act1Tel.7 eugaged 1a ~1ng aJl4 aell1Jlg 
meat and oattle, the oae operat1q a regal.ar butcher'a ahop ia hia 
home and the other aoouring the couat17 alde, bUTins u.p beaata 
1 
wholeaale. 
Jtew uath.a later this iaav.e vas broupt iato the ope b7 
Froatenac at a meet1Dg ot the SoTereigD. Ooacil wh• the question 
ot repl.at1ng tb.e priee ot meat came llP ter 41aC1laa1oa.' Dtlrin8 
the enaalag debate Oh&11p1SDJ lett the ohallber tor a Mllat to look 
- ' -· . 
aometb.1ng up in the old o$u.apcea. Ko aooner had he goae th&D 
Frontenac: oasu.all.J r•arked tb.at one ot the aa.ta reaaons whJ a 
meat market had ut been aet up betore was tb.at oerta1n per•ns 
vere b'U1iD.8 up oattle aU t.hroue;h the outJ.71ng d1atr1cts. Tb.e 
aieur 4 1J.Ute&lil PN11Ptl7 roae to the bait and decla:red tb.at aiaee 
he aaw the stw&l'ds or the goTeraer' • aud the intendant' a houae-
bolda bl:Q'ing beaats 1a the eouat17, he consideree! h1maelt at 
11bert,- to 4e the aaJile tor hia own t&11117. FrenteD.ao retorted 
tb.at he aud the 1ate4ant 41d DOt do thia w resell the cattle 
th87 bolilsht, vhereat tb.e Rroeureur sén4raJ. replied, "N7 MJ :non 
plu a," and that F.rontenac ceuld ut proTe hia accusation. 'Ble 
arguaant en4ed at t.laat point when OhaaP1SD1 reentere4 the 
charaber; but no eooner had the 41acuaa1on retume4 rroa peraoa-
&11 t1ea to priees tb.aJl Frontenac raiaed a11 objection on a point 
ot order aUd upon hia obJ ect1on DOt be1ag 1mmed1atel7 auata1De4 
he qui \ted. the chaJiber 1D a f'1 t of' teapera11eat &1l4 Bëtllmed. to 
hia ohâte&lil• He reaa1ned. tb.ere 111lk1ng, retuair&g to retum to 
the Oouneil meeting 4eap1 te tlle oo1Ule11lora• urge:at requeat~J; 
1. Oaa • Arch • Blf. Seriea B Bl/8D; Oollect1oa Ola1raabaul t, 
Tel. DCCCLXXIX, tol. 320-338, Preateao à •· de LagJV, 
Que'beo, 25 . Oot.ber ~$3. 
but aince the councillors also inaiated tha.t the governor' s 
point of order wa.a qui te novel a.nd would have esta.bliahed a pre-
cedent, they could hardly have expected him to accede to their 
l 
requests. 
Champigny later maintained that the establishment of a con-
trolled meat market would make matters worse instead of better, 
sinoe to do so would necessi tate forbidding the habi ta.nts bringing 
ca.ttle and meat into town to sell retail; for if this were not 
done, Cha.mpig:ny sta.ted, then the habi tanta would compete wi th the 
2 
marchants selling on the controlled market and ruin their business. 
In other words, the priees of the producers as wall as those of 
the middlemen would have to be regulated in order for auch priee 
con trols to work. The phrase 'black Market' wa.s unknown in the 
l7th oentury, but this is obviou\s:v what Champigny had in mind. 
Frontenac, on the other hand, claimed that auch a regulated 
market ha.d been set up during his fi rat a.dmini stration a,nd that to 
3 
do so again would result ~in increa.sed supplies and lower priees. 
What he a,ppears to have overlooked i a the fa.ct tha.t conditions 
were qui te different during his fi rat administration; then there 
had been no wa.r to creat chronic shortages, nor had there been 
some fifteen hundred troops to :f'eed. .And as Champigny ha.d pointed 
out earlier, even a.t the beat of times priee controle were very 
4 
diffioul t to enforce effectively. 
1. Ca,n. Arch. AN· Series F3, vol. VII Part 2, Collection MOreau 
de St. Mérz, Ex:trai ts des procedures faites au Conseil Rofl 
de Quebeo depuis le 1 er Fevrier 1695 jusques au 20 ème 
Octobre sui va:m.t • 
2. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIII, Frontenac au Ministre, 
Quebec, 10 November 1695. 
3· ~· 
4 • Ca;n. Arch. AC. Seri es Cl lA, vol • XI, ChampignY au Ministre, 
Quebeo, 12 November 1691. 
Champigny finally settled the issue by what might almo at 
be de scribed as evading i t, from the 17th century point of view; 
he called an. aseembly of the leading residents of Q,uebec to hear 
what they had to sa3 on the aubj ect. At this meeting, held 
during the winter of lé$5, the consensus of opinion went aga.inst 
Champigny' s views and a controlled meat market was duly set up 
1 
in Quebec. The followiM year the food shortage was so bad in 
the Montreal a.rea. tha.t Callières detached the least fit from 
each company o( the troupes de la marine a;n.d sent them to w1nter 
at Three Rivera and Quebec, and Champigny fixed the priee of 
grain a.t four livres ten sols the minot when the habi tanta bega.n 
2 
over cha.rging. 
In 1697 the wa.r in Elrope came to an end a;n.d the Iroquois 
bega.n trea.ting for pea.ce terme. Thus it is not surprising that 
the controversy over priee controle fades a.waY. But the question 
still remains, who wa.s right, Frontenac or Champigny? Frontenac 
a,ppears to have laboured under the delusion that priees and suppliœ 
could be made to respond to orders like troops on Parade: priee 
regulations would not have increased the supply of food or mer-
cha;nd1se, but they m1ght have made :ror a more equitable distri-
bution. Certainly from the long term economie v1ew point Cham-
pigny' s policy of freedom from control a,ppears to be sound, but 
on the short term view the issue is very much in doubt. During 
the present daY this contentions question of priee controle has 
been hotly deba.ted and still continues to be so. Before 8JlY 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIV, Frontenac et Champigny 
au Ministre, Quebec, 26 October 1696. 
2 . Ca.n. Arch. :AC • Seri es Cl lA, vol • XV, Rel a ti on de ce qui s'est 
Pass~ de plus remarquable en Canada. · .1696 ..• 1697. 
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defini te opinion can be offered on thi a problem so far as 17th 
century New France is concerned, a. good deal more evidence is 
required than is contained in the conflicting claims of Fron-
tenac and Champigny • 
,Another very troublesome problem wi th which Champigny had to 
deal was the reconciling of differences which arose between the 
Ca.nadian marchants and the Oompany of the Farm over the priee 
of beaver. Owing to the glut on the French market the Farm 
cha;nged ha;nda severa.l times and eventua11y Louis Guigne, a Paris 
hat ma.ker offered to take i t over, including the stock of fur a 
which the old company had been unable to dispose of, provided 
that the priees pa,id for bea.ver in Canada were considerably 
reduced. To arrange the new terms wi th the Canadia.n marchants 
Guigne and his a.ssocia.tes sent two agents, Saulger and Ville-
1 
bois to Quebec in 1698. The proposais put forth by the new 
company arouaed an 1m:ned1ate storm of protest from the Canadia.n 
fur traders who claimed that any auch reduction in priees would 
not only ruin them :fina.ncially but would also cause the Indiana 
to take their tura to tb.e English colonies. Champigny round i t 
virtua.lly impossible to reconcile these two factions and his 
sympathies were clearly wi th the Canadian traders. Then, at 
the height of e.f the deba.te Denis Ri verin came forward wi th 
a proposa]. to take over the Farm a.t the old priees on begalf of 
a company which he ha.d tentatively formed in France. In view 
or this new development Champigny held the discussions in a.beyance 
and no agreement wi th Guigne' s agents as to new priee ecales 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AN· SeriesB, vol.XXII Part2, MinistreàM. 
Begon, Versailles, 7 July 1700. 
1 
was a.rri ved a.t. COnsequently, Guigne and Company retused to 
honour the bills of exchaPge drawn on them for tura brought in 
a.t the old priees and Champigny received a severe dressing 
down from the mini ster who informed h1m that " •. ·Ba Maj es~ 
•. ·a trouvé tres mauvais que vous gyiez preferé un discours 
2 
d 1un particulier a. des ordres precis qu'Elle vous avoit donné'! 
The intendant was ordered to have the priee ecale offered by the 
new company put into affect immed1ately even though this mea.nt 
a. reduction in profits for the Ca.na.d1a.n traders. "Vous devez 
entrer en cette affaire," wrote the ministre, "non Pas comme un 
homme qui veuille s'attirer l'aPPlaudissement d'un nombre d'habi-
ta.ns qui ne parlent que pour leur interet mal connu et nullement 
3 
pour le bien du PaYS.· •" 
After this Champigny did his beat to reconcile the differing 
views on priees held by the Ca.nad1a.n merchants and the agents of 
the new company, but wi thout suocess. The merchants ola1med that 
53 sols 4 deniers the livre weight for castor sec was the lowest 
priee they could consider wi thout d1sgusting the Indiana oompletely 
and driving them to the English market. Champigny tried to affect 
a compromise by suggest1D8 new priees of 5 livres for castor gras, 
3 livres for demi-gras and 45 sols for~~ but neither the 
marchants nor the company agents would acoept this priee sca.le; 
the latter ola,imed tha.t the compa;ny oould not PaY even 25 sols 
1. can. Aroh.BN,. Series B Nl./SB-2, Collection Clairambault, 
vol. DCCCLXXIII, fol. 362, Frontenac à ? Quebeo, Ootober 1698 ; 
AC. Series CllA, vol. XVII, Champigny au Ministre, Quebec, 
21 September 1699 • 
2 • Can. Arch. k~ . Seri es B, vol. XX part 2, Ministre à Champigny, 
Versailles, 1 APril 1699. 
3. ibid. 
the 1;1 TEt ror outor .lf2 cnr1ms to t.lle sreat q•aut1 t.J wh1ch th!J 
alreadl had in France. 
'.l'hUa the Canaüan aerchanta propoae4 tor.1as a ooapaJQ' tb.•-
ael Yea w1û ob. woul.4 Pa'l the Fal'ller t.lle ••al guart a:Dd aocept 
beaT er at the old b.igher priee ecale. ~e as~ ta or the G~!fte 
COilP&DJ acoepte4 tbia otter w1t.b alaori_. but Cb.aapiSDJ waa TeJ!IJ 
aoepUcal aa to the ab111 Uea ot tlle Caua41ana to Dlake a •ooeaa 
or 'tlû a new Y enture. aJld he adv1 aed the Jliaiater acoordiasl7: 
•• ·asr'ez a'il voua p1a1 t que te voua 
41H qu. 'il eat trea cloute'IIX qae les 
hab1 tana ,\11 •••t r•aa1r tana la coa-
papie qu. ila ae propoaeat de toaer, 11 
eat certaia qu. 'i1 ae faut qta •u tel'ld.er 
pour le oaator. en Canada, Gv.1pea 'tant 
au rait de e.ette terme, et a,Tant tait 4ea 
4tabliaa•enta ete aarmtacwrea, 11 petit 
111.-x la tatre qu •un autre, et aToir plua 
cle T-.ea pour la cODIItDDation dV. Castor. 
2 
Ohaapigtr~' a a11181T1nga vere 1ater abown to be well tounded. 
The C0 apapie cle Coloaie waa org&ll1ae4. 1D 1700 but never hacl ex:rt 
aaoceaa &114 b7 1706 1 t œlla,paed &Del waa peplaeed. b7 a new coapanJ; 
Ma. A.U.be!'t, H4Pet .ad. GaJot be1ng engaged b7 Denia R1TeP1n to tate 
- , OTer the J'ara, &D4 tb.e OollPasn1e de COlome waa o!'dered. bJ the 
• ~ :5 
XiDS t.o aecept the new coap&l2J' a teraa • 
One proj eot or Oà .. P1snl 1 a wh1oh hat ao4ern coDDOt.aUoaa vaa 
tllat ot rent 0011trel ancl towa plamüng, la 1688 th.e populatioa 
ot MoB,real abowecl signa ot 1ncreaa1ng l'aP1cD.1 aa people troa the 
1 • C aa • J.roh • AC • Serie a Cll.&, T01 • XVII, Oalli \Pea et Cb.•p1(5111 
au M1Jùatre. Qllebeo, 20 Oeto'ber 1699; Ch•P181V a11 JU.:n.1atre, 
Qu.ebec, 20 Oct.ober 1$9. 
2. ibid.. 
3 • Cau •- Arch • AN. Serie a B, vol. XXII part_2, M11d.atre à K. Begon, 
Veraà111ea, 1 JulJ 1700; H.AJIJMAWG, P JI: D!t Karg1!1a 4t Y•f.rl!lil , 
p 91· 
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outald.rta of the town besan to m.oTe ina1de the town valla tor 
aeeuri tJ :troa the threatened Iroquois attacka. Seme peraona 
oWJû:ug Tacant land v1 thin the town proaptlJ' took adTantase of 
the a1 tuat1on and bega;n d•au~ng priees out o:t all propor.t1on 
to their land' a fol!'ller value be:tore theJ would rent or aell th8i:r 
. 
p:rope:rtiea. Ob.IJIP1PJ ptt a stop to this by or4e:r1ng tb.at no one 
would be perai tted to own DIO :re than oae ar:pet inaide the town 
valls, and al1 land ownera b.ad to build a •aaon17 hou.ae w1 th a 
atone oh1J11187 w1 thin one yea:r trom the date o:t the Ordotm@oe. 
Persona owning more than one arpent who 414 not wiah te bulld on 
the1r laud had to c11apo ae of the s~rplua w1 thin aix JDOntha; a:Q'one 
dec1a:ring lûa intct1on to b-.114 a hoaae and ta11ing ~ ao waa 
to forte! t the propertJ to the aeigneu:ra and reee1ve onl7 tvo 
hu.ndred li Trtl pe:r a.rpep.t compensation. 
At the aaJIIe tiae as thia vent into effect, ChaiiPisnJ ordere4 
that aine e aome of the at:reeta in the town wwe too narrow, thereb7 
oonat1 tuti:ns a tire haZ&l'd, all the at:reeta vere to be w14ened te 
thirt.J teet, alld alllOne intend1ua ta bU114 a new bouse had ti:rat 
to have i ta alit5DJ1ent wi th the street ohecked by the town BUl'TeJOr. 
lo reoTer, all the atreeta were to be repa1 red., b:r-iqea b111lt OTer 
the atreaaa, pot bolee tilled in w1 th roeka and !l"&Yel, a%14 the 
atwaps and botlldera r•oved, 110 that carta oould paaa tb.:rough the 
town wit.bo1lt undae d1tticu.lt.J. !!le propert7 ownera vere giTen 
oae month' a Bl'&Ce in wh1ch w begin this work and al'J18De failiag 
to do 10 lett b1maelf 11able to a ten liTre• tine, plas the coat 
ot the labour wh1ch would be h1red b7 the town authon ti es ta do 
1 
the work tor hill· Ia tb.ia respect at leaat, Montreal was tar 
1. Que. Aroll. Pu.b1icat1oaa: Qd•· Coaissionf, etc etc dea 
Gou.Temtura t\ InttnAtatlf · vol. • II~ pp 17•17~1 Orflonnance •• M. Bocllart d.e '1t.,.Pi!DJ, 11Datreal1 15 Jue loe8. · 
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·· l)lea4 ot •&01' aajor D;ropean cl t1ea; 18ta oen.t1117 Brlatol, ter 
••ple, had at.r .. ta 110 narrow that. cart.a coulcl DOt ••• t.ll• and 
1 
ale4Sea ha4 t.o be uaed to transport poele· MaJ)J of tboae self 
aaae Kontreal. atreeta 4o l'lOt a,ppear to haYe bec w14ene4 b7 Tel'J 
auch a1nce Ch•p19Q' • 8 1J.a7 • 
-
.A:AOtlaer ot the lnteclallt' 8 att.pta at e1T1o 1aprov•ent, 
al.thouSh of relat1Tel7 little a1gr&1t1•a1lce 1J7 ltael:t, reaalted ln a 
1-s tbJ and rather puerU e 41 apu. te w1 th the pve.rno r. When Ch-.-
plS'DJ o•e out to l'n FraJ'.LCe in 1686 he brougbt w1 th bia a 'IN.st of 
Lol11a XIV to let the people of the coloZJJ aee what tb.elr X1r&g lookecl 
lllte, and he had 1 t laaialled at. b1•:;on expcae on a pe4eatal in 
2 
the Place Re7ale at Quebeo. Hov«er, when ln 1700 aoae of the 
habitants coapla1Jled that lt •ll• la the wq, •akiDS it avkwar4 tor 
th• to aanoeuYre their oarts ln the craaped Qace ot the aq•are, 
Ch•p1fSD7 o-11s181l7 haâ. the bust and l'ta pedeatal r.-vecl. !be 
buat he 1Ubaeque.t17 had pl.ac ed la a Dlche on the trront ot t.he 
a1eur H.zear' a houae :taclq onto ·the eq•are; .sain PaJiBS tor 1 t 
.· 3 
out ot hia own pocket • 
.tt th1a pout Oall1èrea aPldcleal7 took •'brase, ola1a1iag that the 
lntenctaat bilA DO blta1neaa •v1J16 the btast w1 tAout :t1rat eonaul ting 
4 
hia. 8o the bu.at waa asaia r_,Yecl aucl the whole aatteP refeRed to 
the 111n1ater, who r•arltecl t.o the J!1'0011l'EE s4Dértl.e, thinld~&g tbat 
the buat waa st111 in 1 ta niohe on the wall ot Haz•r' a ••••= 
1. PLUMB, J ..a: D•lll4 1a !è• IQd!.temt.h Ceatyrz, p 12. 
2. CaJl-. .&PM• AC. 8er1ea 0111, Y01• VIII, DeaoD'Yille &11 Ja.Diet.re, 
Quebeo, 10 lloY•ber 1686; Wl• XVIII, OhalQ18D7 a11 lf1n1atre, 
~uebeo, 15 Oot.Gber 1700. 
3. 1b1A: 
4 • Caa • .&roh. AC • 8er1ea OllA, vol. XIX, Oh .. plp.r ali. M1n1stre, 
~ebec, 30 Oc tober 1701 • 
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A l'esgard du buste qui estoit dans la 
place de la Basseville, Sa Ma.j esté na 
Pas crû devoir ordonner qu'on le remit 
ou il estoit puisque led. Sr de Cham-
pigny n'a rait que le changer de place 
ainay elle ne desire Pas que cette 
affaire soit suivie davantage. 
1 
2 
The minister's sympathies were with the intendant, but Cal-
lières persisted in making an issue of the matter, claiming that 
the people were very disturbed at the bust's removal from its 
original si te and intimating that Champigny had been guil ty of 
3 
lèse majesté. Champigny retorted that this was all nonsense and 
that all he wanted was to *'faire placer honorablement ce buste 
4 
avant mon depart de ce PaYs •• ·" 
The dispute was finally settled by the minister' s telling 
Callières that if he so desired he could put the bust back in 
i ts old place, but that in order to spare the intendant' s feel-
5 
inga he had to wa1 t till Champigny had left for France. This 
6 
Callières agreed to do, and todaY that same bust still stands 
on i ta pedestal in the middle of the square in front of Notre 
Dame des Victoires chur ch. Just one thing i s proven by this 
incident, that an intendant' s lot was not a haPPY one when he 
had to work wi th a govemor who eould be as petty as Callières was 
in th1 s instance. 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XXII part 4, Ministre âu Sr 
Dauteuil, (1701). 
2. Can. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XXII Part 4, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 31 Mgy 1701. 
3. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Callières au Ministre, 
Quebec, 31 Ootober 1701. 
4. Can. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XIX, Champigny au Ministre, 
Quebec, 30 October 1701. 
5· Can. Arch. ,Al\f. Series B, vol. XXIII part 1, Ministre à 
Callières, Versailles, 6 MaY 1702. 
6. Can. Arch. AC. Series Cl lA, vol. XX, Callières au Ministre, 
Quebec, 4 November 1702. 
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Of all Champigny' a plans or proj ecta for New France perha,ps 
the most intriguing were his suggestions for the establishment 
of a Canadia.n x-states General. The mannar in which he diacuaaes 
this schema ia rather myaterioua and leavea one wondering just 
what exactly waa behind it. His remarks on the aubject are quite 
brief and deserve to be quoted in full: 
Si voua prenez quelque resolution, Mgr, de 
faire de la Colonie un pa;ys d'états, l' Assem-
blée pouroit être composée de M le gouverneur 
général qui y presiderait, de M l'Evesque et 
de 1 'Intendant, ce dernier a;ra.nt voix delib-
eratrice avec les deux autres,. Il aeroi t 
charger d• recueillir les voix et de faire 
rediger ce qui se Passerait; Il y as si sterol t 
deux députez du Clergé, deux du Conseil .,u-
vera.tn, un juge de la prevoté de Quebec, celuy 
de la justice des Trois·Rivi'èrea et celuy de 
Montreal, deux seigneurs de paroisses de 
chaque gouvernement particulier qui seraient 
deputez par les gentils hommes et seigneurs, 
trois marchands de Quebec deputez de la ville, 
un de Trois Rivières et deux de Montreal, dans 
cette assemblée ·les affaires du PaYs seroient 
terminées à la plura.li té des voix et il y 
seroi t poul'Veu pour la levée de l'impost que 
le PaYs seroi t chargé de fournir. Voila, Mgr, 
mes v eues Par raport au peu de connai seance 
que j 1 fi3 de ce qui se pratique dans les PaYs 
d';tats, si vous desirez de plus grands 
eclairci ssemens, prenez la peine, a' il vous 
plai t, Mgr, de me faire envoyer dea memoires, 
afin que je puisse voua marquer mes pensées 
sur ce qu 1i1 s con tiendront • 
l 
I t would be all too eas.Y to re ad into th1 a statement far more 
than is actually there; but there is not enough evidence here to 
support cla.ims that Champigny waa an a,poat1e of colonial self 
government. He do es not displa;y aJ.l.Y marked enthuaiasm over the 
schema, rather i t is as tbough he ha.d made his suggestions merely 
in response to some query of the minis ter' a. Also, in view of 
1. Ca.n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XVIII, Champigny au Ministre, 
Q.uebec, 15 October 1700. 
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the inoreasingly despotio tendenoies of Louis XIV' s personal 
government, 1t is hard tD visualize the King reacting favourably 
to any auch proj ect. Nor do es Champigny malte a1JY claim to expert 
knowledge of the organization or working methode of an Estates 
General, 1nstead, he admi te his laok of auch knowledge and asks 
for f'urther information on these matters should the m1n1ster wish 
to pursue the lllllbjeot further. In none of hie other diepatohes 
1s there any statement which could be interpreted as ind1cat1ng 
that he was not in ~m.pathy wi th the autocratie. ~stem of govern-
ment, which in .Pllrope generally at this time, as the English 
historian G .N. Clark points out " •• •Was regard6d as making for 
1 
efficiency and in ma.T13' placee. ••Was a reforming tendency ." How-
ever, no matter what CnaJD.pigny had in mind when he sketched out 
,A 
this embryonic constitution, nothing ever Ca1Jle of it. 
But to come down from the abstra.ct to the concrete, Champigny 
did introduce one innovation which is of major significance to 
historians of the present daY. In 1698 he informed the minister: 
.... Il est important pour la Colonie que les 
ordres edite et declarations du Roy qui 
la concernent soient portez au Conseil 
s:>uvera.in de Quebek pour y être enregistrez 
afin qu'on y puisse avoir recours et les 
trouver en tout temps, ce qui ne seroi t 
Pas s'ils dem.euroient entre les mains de 
1.-1 les gouverneurs ou celles des intendans, 
parce qu'ils ne sont que pour un temps 
dans le PaYs et ordinairement ils emp~tent 
leurs papiers, vous aurez agréable de 
1 'ordonner, si vous le jugez a propos. 
2 
The following yea.r Champigny informed the m1n1ster tha.t they had 
put into practise this $,Ystem of having auch documents registered 
1. CLARK, G .N:. The Later Stuarts 1660-1714, p 88. 
2. Ca;n. Arch. AC· Series CllA, vol. XVI, ChaJDpigny au Ministre, 
Que bec, 27 Oc tober 1$8. 
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and :filed. for future reference by the clerk of the Sovereign 
1 
C0 uncil. Thus, ChaJDpigny should be gi ven credit for having 
2 
established the :first official archives in Canada· 
Of a.ll Champigny 1 s responsibili ties in New France the most 
important were the da.Y tD daY tasks of general administration. 
The intendant was the civil government of the colony; if he 
di scharged his du ti es effici en tly and equi tably th en the colony 
had a good government, if he was inefficient or dishon.est then 
the government of the colony was inefficient and corrupt. Thus, 
one must ask, what sort of goYernment did New France enjoy during 
ChaJDpigny 's intendancy, good, bad, or indifferent? 
Unfortuna.tely, one has little but negative evidence t'rom which 
to draw conclusions. It was qui te impossible t'or anyone in 
Champigny' s po s1 tion to please everyone all the time; Frontenac 
was di ssatisfied w1 th his refusa.]. to take stronger action in the 
matter of priee controle, and throughout the war Pontchartrain 
continually oompla.i.ned of Champigny • s t'inancial arrangements. 
Undoubtedly the best criterion of his administration would be 
the cons1dered opinion of the habitante, ot' the colony' s merchants, 
artisans, clergy, sold1ers and farmers; but to our great losa 
the opinions of the se people have not come down to us. SU.ch 
things as the fact that there 1 s no evidence of any public 
1 • C an • Arch • AC. Seri es CllA, vol. XVII, Callières et Champign;r 
au Ministre, Quebec, 20 October 1699. 
2. By the :front entrance of the Public Archives of Canada in 
Ottawa a large bronze plaque is set in the wall, stating that 
the first archives in Canada was conceived of and establi shed 
by the intendant Hocquart. In the light of the above, this 
is clearly a misstatement, and a new plaque would seem to be 
in order. 
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demonstrations aga.i.nst the admini et ration, as occurred dur1ng 
the 1ntendancy of his successor, Beau@,arnois, and more notably 
during Bigot's regime, ào not permit or a1J.Y Yeey far reaching 
conclusions. However, unsat1sfactory though th1s negative 
evidence undoubtedly is, one can at least sgy that Champigny 
must have d1 scharged h1 s mul t1 tudinous dut1es wi th reaeonable 
e:f'fici ency and pro bi ty, el se the compla1nt s o:f' the governors 
and the min1sters o:f' marine would have been :f'a.r more frequent 
and voc;1ferous than they actually were. 
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CHAPTER X. 
CONCLUSION • 
:OUring those first years following the rea;ppointment of Frontenac, 
it must have seemed to ChaJilpigny that he could do nothing right in 
the eyes of the minister. However, gradually a d1scernible change 
took place in Pontchartrain' s estima te of the intendant as he 
became increas1ngly aware that all the troubles in the coloJiJY were 
not caused by Ch-pigny' s refusa). to coopera te w1 th the governor, 
as Frontenac would have had him believe. Thus, just a few months 
before Frontenac•s demise, he informed Champigny that he had been 
pleased to tell the King of Champigny • s services and that His 
MaJ esty " ••• en est sa ti sf e1 te, et IUle y aura esgard dans les 
1 
occasions qui s'of.fri:ront de vous faire plaisir." Coming from 
Pontchartrain th1 s was high prai se indeed. 
Then three years later Pontchartrain showed his aPPreciation 
of Champigny' s services in a much more substanti al manner. The 
position of intendent de a mfàl'ine at Le Havre, one of the most 
important posta in France, fell vacant and Champigny, through his 
f'amily connections, let the mini ster know tha.t i t would be both 
1. Gan· Arch· AN. Series B, vol. XX part 1, Y.ini stre à Champigny, 
Versailles, 21 March 1698. 
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plea.sing to h1m and very convenient for h1 s priva te aff airs, to 
1 
be a.ppointed to this post. The minister promptl;y broa.ched the 
matter to the King, who gave h1 s assent to the a,ppointment. "J 1 â3 
esté bien aise," wrote Pontchartrain, ude trouver cette occasion 
2 
de vous marquer la consideration part1culiere que j 1 aY pour vous ••• " 
'!his took place during the spring of 1701, but Champigny had to 
remain in Canada un til a sui table successor could be found for 
the intendancy of New France. '!hus it was not until the following 
autumn that he and his wife finally left the colony, arriving at 
3 
La Rochelle in December a.fter a long and very stormy oro seing. 
However, this by no means marked the end of ChaJUpigny 's concern 
w1 th the aff airs of New France for in addition to occupying the 
post of intendant a.t Le Havre, he also served for a number of years 
4 
as the minister' s adviser on Canadia.n affaira. The mini ster 
submi tted the Canadian d1 spatches to Champigny who made marginal 
commenta and suggestions, and also wrote précis on particular 
matters for the minister' s guidance, giving his views on the action 
that ought to be t.aken and the general policies which he thought 
5 
should be pursued. 
In 1705 when La Mothe Cadillac wished to buy the beaver monop-
oly of the whole of Canada. from the Compagnie de COlonie, g,].ong 
wi th the compa):ly' s other as sets and liabili ti es, for the enorr.nous 
l. Ca.n. Arch. AN. Series B, vol. XXII part 4, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Marly, 4 June 1701 • 
2. ibid. 
3. can. Arch. AN· Series B3, Fonds Français, vol. XII, no. 
22861, fol. 357. 
4. HAMMAL~G, F .H. The Mvguie de Vaudreuil, pp 21-22. 
5. ibid. 
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sum of fourteen hundred thousa.nd livres (1,400,000), the m1nister 
sent all the correspondence pertaininp; to this propo si t1on to 
Champi gDY and a.sked him to s tudy i t, th en subm1 t a mémoire g1 ving 
1 
h1 s vi ews a.nd recommendations. Consideridlg what the relations 
between Champigny a.nd C~illa.c had been in the past, i t is perha,ps 
not surpri sing that Cadillac' s offer was very promptl;r rej ected 
2 
in favour of an arrangement wi th the sieur Aubert. 
Champigny' s views were al so a.sked on a pro po sal made by the 
sieur Duplessis, who had been a clerk of the Company of the Farm 
at Quebec, to Pa1 70,000 livres a Yea.r for a farm on the import and 
export duties in New France. The m1nister was very hopeful that 
this proposition would perm1 t them to do a.Wa1 wi th the droit .9:.! 
quart on bea.ver and a.t the sa.me time provide sufficent funds for 
the ordina.ry expenses of colonial government, wh1eh at tha.t time 
were far in excess of the re1renue raised in the colony. In send1ng 
all the relative correspondence to Champigny, including the drafte 
of h1 s own letters, the mini a ter said ,. ••• je vous prie de prendre 
la peine de le revoir ••• et ••• informez moy exactement de tout ce 
3 
que vous ferez et de ce que vous pensez sur cela. ••• " Obviously, 
Champigny' s vi ews on these matters carri ed considerable weight. 
I t wa.s during the wa.r of the Spa.n1 ah succession that Champigny 1 s 
influence on the coui'se of events in New France was the most pro-
round. From the beginning of ho stili t1 es lle voie ed h1 s: opposition 
1. Ca.n· Arch.~. Sei'ies B, vol. XXVII part 3, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 2 June 1706. 
2. Ca;n. Arch.~. Sei'ies B, vol. XXVII Pai't 3, Ministre au Sr de 
la Mothe Cadillac, Vei'sailles, 9 June 1706. 
3. Can. AI'ch. AN. Seri es B, vol. XXVII part 3, Ministre à M. de 
Champigny, Versailles, 2 June 1706 • 
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to the raids by the French on the Etlglish colonies' border settle-
ments; he mainta.1ned that the English coloniale waJ).ted only to be 
le:f't in peace and tha.t i t wa.s alwa,y e the French who had stirred 
up the bornets' nest. In h1 s opinion these border raids served no 
uae:f'ul purpose, and in t'act, d1d t'ar moNha.rm than good, part1cula.r~ 
sinoe the Iroquois took a very poor view of the French aggressive 
action, olaiming that the great peace of 1701 had included not just 
the Iroqu6i s and the French wi th their allies, but the Engli eh as 
well. Champigny was grea.tly afra.id that the French raids would 
enable the Ehgl.ish to stir up the Iroquois again and he strongly 
advi sed that a. treaty of neutra.li ty wi th the E.ngli sh colonies 
1 
was not only desirable but necessary • 
At first the minister was not 1mpressed by this advice; he refer:re• 
the matter to the Council w1 th the blunt notation that he disagreed 
with Champigny's views. But the following year when the Canadia.n 
d1 spa.tches ar ri ved a.t Versailles w1 th repo:rts tha.t m111 tary aff airs 
there were in a deplorable sta.te, great expense having been entailed 
and no th1ng but mili ta.ry fa.1lures to show for 1 t; the m1n1 ster 
2 
immed1 a.t ely adopted the neu trali ty po licy urged by Champigny • 
Vaudreuil was in:f'ormed tha.t since hi a border raids caused an 
immense expense and were of a. very dubious mili ta.ey advantage, 
they were not to be undertaken unless absolutely necessaey. 
Champigny had also ca.Utioned that for the sake of' the King' s 
prestige, the neutrali ty understanding between the French and 
the P.ngli sh should not be a.rranged by the direct mediation of the 
Iroquois; he suggested inatea.d tha.t the m1 ssiona.ries should subtly 
indic a te to the Iroquois that if the English w1 shed to cease 
1. H.AMMANG, F Ji, The Ma.rguis de Va.udreuil. pp 120-122. 
2 • 1 bi d. p 176. 
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ho s ti li t1 es th en the French migh t be willing to follow suit. 
Thus, in the eyes of the Iroquois the onus would aPPea.r to rest 
with the J!)l.glish· This condition we.s also a.ceepted by the King 
on advisement, by the minister and included in that year's dis-
1 
patches to Vaudreuil· 
It is rather iron1cal that throughout Champigny' s sixteen Years 
as intendant of New France, his influence on the policies concern-
ing the affaire of the coloey wa.s virtually nil, yet once he had 
been recalled then his advice on va.rious colonial ma.tters was 
sought by the m1n1ster and his v1ews, even on the all important 
question of m1li tary pol1cy, were adopted by the King. However, 
this is proof pos1 tive tha.t ChaJllp1gny had finally esta.blished his 
worth and ga.ined some recogn1 tion for the ma.nner in which he had 
di scharged his du ti es as intendant of New France. 
His had been a herculea.n, and most of the time a tha.nkless ta.sk, 
requiring not so much great decisions as a meticulous attention to 
the daY to daY affaira of gove:rn1ng the eolony during one of the 
. most trying periode in its turbulent history-. It is chiefly as 
a colonial ad.min1strator that he must be judged, as a civil servant 
rather than as a poli tie1 a,n; for, at the ri ek of a:ppearing rep1 ti t-
ous, i t cannot be emphas1zed too strongly that the seat of govern-
ment of New France resided at Versailles, not at Quebec. 
Thus one must ask, bow well, or ill, did Champigny admini ster 
the aff airs of New France? To th1 s question the answer, in the 
light of all the a.vailable evidence, can only be that his admin-
istration was one of the beat that New France evert had. He was 
not an ini tiator of great schemes, the times were not propi tious 
fort such things, furtherm.ore he wa.s fart more concettned wi th huma.n 
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and social values tha:n w1 th material things. It was his funda-
mental concern wi th the se values that made him auch a bitter 
opponent of western expaJ1s1on, wh1ch in hi a view sapped the social 
and economie strangth of the central colOIJ1• Also, he was far 
sighted enough to see that the greedy attempt to control the whole 
of western North America before strangthen1ng fltl.e economy and the 
social fabric of the central colony was to build a bouse upon 
sand. His views in th1 a matter were qui te disinterested; the same 
cannot be sa.id for those who used every possible strategem to 
circumvent his efforts to curb the drain of the western fur trade 
on the resources of New France. 
In mili tary atfairs, which oversbta.dowed all other activi ti es 
in the colony during most of his intenda.ncy, he showed a remarkable 
grasp of mi li tal'Y strategy. His efforts to susta.in the fighting 
f'orces of New France during the darkest deYs of the war contributed 
in no small degree to the successful outcome of the struggle wi th 
the Iroquois • His attempts to effect reforma in the trouPes de la 
marine in the hopes of making them a more efficient fighting unit, 
and sa sparing the habi tanta from c6ntinuslly bearing the brunt 
ot: the t:ighting, were of' no av ail but li ttl.e blame ca:n be attached 
to Champigny for this • 
As intendant ~ Justice he fought vigorously on occasion to 
pro tee t the prerogatives of the sovereign Council and the rights 
of the individual· It might be argued that his struggles here 
were merely an aspect of his persona]. feud w1 th Frontenac; certainly 
it is impossible to saY definitely wheth.er or not he perm1tted 
equally flagrant examples of injustice to go unchecked because 
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Frontenac wa.s not concerned in any waY. But it is also qui te 
clear that ma.n3 of h1 s d1 sputeè wi th thi a governor aro se as a 
re sul t of Frontenac 1 s disregard for the rights of tho se who were 
not amongst his personal following. Champigny' s life would have 
been far lees trouble~ and his prospects of a.dva.ncement in the 
King • s service far more promi sing had he never oppo sed Frontenac 
in any thing • 
His rel a. tions w1 th the three governors under whom he served, 
al thougb. they left much to be desired, n"8ver were so bad tha.t the 
administration dlf the colony was completely disrupted as i t had 
been during Frontenac 1 s :f'i rat régime. Wi th· Denonville his relations 
were of course excellent; and wi th Callières they were better than 
they had been wi th Frontenac. So far as Frontenac was concerned, 
the wonder is, not t'hat the conflicts were so bitter but tha.t they 
were not far worse and far more frequent than they actua,lly were. 
Frontenac' s influence at court was verry great, y et in spi te of 
i t the mini ster finally had to support Champigny in the latter 1 s 
struggle to curb the governor 1 s abuse ot his power. 
Finally, the question must be asked, was Champigny above 
suspicion so :t'ar as ta.k1ng adva.ntage of h1 s abundant opportuni ti es 
to enrich himself at the expense of the crown or the habi tenta 
was concerned? 'lhere i s only one pi ece of evidence which casta 
any doubt on his probity, and this is contained in an anonymous 
let ter to the mini ster, wri tten by a very d1 sgruntled member of 
the troupes de .!..& mm;:ine. This parti cul a.r sol dier 1 s main qua.rrel 
was wi th one of h1 s of fi cers whom he accused of exploi ting and 
mal treating his men in a shameless fashion. He also blamed this 
officer for the fort at Chambly' s having been destroy ed by fire 
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and a.dded a .!!2!! segu1 tur to the effect tha.t the minis ter would 
not learn of how this had come about from the intendant since 
Champigny and this pa,rticular cgptain had pocketted 6,000 livres 
ea.ch when the fort was rebu1l t. He then went on to rema.rk that 
two other ca,pte.tns were good for nothing, being continually drunk, 
l 
and that the sieur de VS).ld.reu11 was no better. 
The phra.sing of this letter shows clearly that i t was the 
work of a semi-li tera.te siildier wi th a grudge and a. persecution 
complex. At the head of the missive is a marginal note, presum-
a.bly by the m1n1ster, tha.t it be sent to M. Bea.uharnois for him 
to investigate. On the face of i t, this accusation aga,inst 
Cha.mpigny i s deserving of no more serious consideration tha.n wa.s 
gran ted i t by the minis ter. 
All things considered, Champigny' s career as intendant of New 
France can perhaPs beat be summed up a.s that of an honest, 
competent and conscientious royal official· It was due, largely 
to the circumsta.nces of the times, but partly· to his own character, 
tha.t he BP.ént most of his time and energies in negative pursu1 ta, 
in va,inly trying to force New France along a. path wh1ch he firmly 
believed led in the right direction. He failed in this, it is 
true, but the odds agatnst him were far greater than a1JY one man 
wi th his 11m1 ted aU tho ri ty could be expected to have overcome. 
I t is perhaPs too much to cla.im greatness for a:n intendant 
who lef't very little tha.t wa.s tangible by we:y of outstanding 
a.chievements, to mark his tenure of office. But the people or 
1. Ca:n. Arch. AC. Series CllA, vol. XX, Lettre aU Ministre, 
(non signé) Quebec, 6 November 1702. 
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New France had good cause to regret h1 s departure, and in la ter 
y ears probably looked ba.ck on hi a admin1 stra. ti on as one of' the 
aoundeat tha.t they had ever had. Very likely they would ha.Te 
agreed w1 th mère Juchereau of the Hôtel Dieu who remarked of 
Champigny, af'ter he had called to PeY his finâl respects betore 
leaving for France, "Il étoi t bon, humain et populaire, il nous 
1 
a:f'tectionoi t beaucoup." 
1. JUCHEREAU, Les Anna,les de 1 'Hôtel Dieu de guebec, pp306-307. 
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.APPEND IX !.:._ 
INSTRUCTION 
que le Roy veut estre remise es mains du Sr de Champigny choisy 
par Sa Majesté pour servir d'Intendant de justice, police et 
finances en la Nouvelle France • 
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Sa Majesté estant informée de la capacité et de la bonne 
conduite dudit Sr de Champigny, Elle a bien voulu faire choix 
de luy pour luy confier l'employ d'Intendant de la justice, 
police et finances dans le pays de la Nouvelle France, s'asseurant 
qu'il s'en acquittera à son entière satisfaction, et comme Elle 
aveu clairement par tout ce qui s'est passé dans ledit pays 
l'extrema prejudice que son service a reçeu des demeslez qu'il 
y a eu entre les Gouverneurs et les Intendans, Elle est bien 
aise de luy faire connoistre ses intentions à cet esgard, quoy 
qu'Elle soit persuadée que cette precaution sera inutile par la 
connaissance qu'Elle a de la modération du Sr ~!arquis de Denon-
ville, Gouverneur et Lieutenant General dudit pays, et de la 
sagesse dudit Sr de Champigny; pour cet effet il doit sçavoir 
que rien ne peut l'autôriser dans les demeslez qu'il pourrait 
avoir avec ledit Sr de.Denoyille et que si mesme il connoissoit 
clairement qu'il fiat dans le detail de sa fonction des choses 
opposées au service et à l'intention de Sa Majesté, ou qu'il 
entreprit sur ses fonctions d'Intendant, il n'aurait d'autre 
party à prendre que celuy de luy representer ses raisons luy 
marquer les ordres qu'il a receu et le laisser agir ensuitte 
sans le troubler en aucune manière ny faire autre chose à cet 
esgard que d'en rendre compte à Sa I~jesté. 
Elle veut qu'il sache que toute sa conduitte doit tendre 
à deux fins principales, l'une de faire jouir les habitans fran-
çois qui sont establis audit pays d'une entière tranquillité 
entre eux, et les maintenir dans la juste possession de tout 
ce qui leur appartien, et l'autre de conserver lesdits habitans, 
et mesme d'augmenter le nombre par tous moyens possibles, à 
quoy il doit tascher de parvenir pendant le temps qu'il servira 
en ladite qualité audit pays. C'est en cela principalement qu'il 
fera connoistre à Sa ?-1ajesté 1 'utilité de ses services, et pour 
parvenir à ces deux fins Sa Majesté Weut qu'il voye et examine 
toutes les lettres patentes, arrests et ordonnances qui ont esté 
données depuis douze ou quinze ans sur tout ce qui concerne le-
dit pays, scavoir, 
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L'establissement du Conseil Souverain, lee noms des officiers 
que le composent leur rang leur sceance et leur ju~isdiction. 
Les concessions des terres et les autres dons, pour lee 
reprendre en cas qu'apree le tempe reglé, lee terres ne se trouvent 
pas defrichées. Les Edite, Ordonnances et les Reglemene fait pour 
deffendre le commerce avec les Sauvages pour le reglement des 
dixmes des curez, l'interpretation de divers articles de l'Ordon-
nance civile et criminelle, le Reglement des salaires de justice, 
et pour empescher les Gouverneurs pabticuliers de faire mettre en 
prison aucun habitan de leur autorité et sans ordre du Gouverneur 
general. 
Et comme le devoir principal et essentiel est de satisfaire 
à ce qui regarde la Religion et que de la depend la benediction 
qu'on doit attendre du Ciel sans laquelle rien ne peut avoir un 
heureux sucees, Sa ~~jesté veut que ledit Sr de Champigny tienne 
la main à ce que Dieu soit bien servy dans l'esteadue de la 
Colonie, et que la Religion Chrestienne s'estende autant qu'il 
se pourra parmy les Sauvages voisins. Pou:r cet effet, il obser-
vera de vivre avec le Sr abbé de Chevrières nommé à l'Eveaché de 
Quebec avec le defference qu'il doit dans tout ce qui concerne 
la Religion et le salut des ames, et luy donnera toutes les 
assistances dont il pourra avoir besoin, et en cas mesme qu'il 
arrivast quelque division entre ledit Sieur abbé et les Ecclesias-
tiques establis audit pays, ou quelques demesles entre ledit Sr 
de Denonville et ledit abbé et autres Ecclesiastiques, il s'entre-
mettra pour les accommoder et fera en sorte que chacun se con-
tienne dans ses fonctions, et que tous concourent au bien, à 
l'advantage at à l'augmentation de la Colonie. 
Les Peres Jesuites ayant un establissement considerable 
audit paya et ayant beaucoup contribué par leur vertu et par leur 
pi3té a estendre audit pays les lumieres de la foy et de l'Evan-
gi+e, Sa Majesté veut pareillement qu'il les assiste sans neant-
moins souffrir qu'ils portent l'autorité Ecclesiastique plus loin 
qu'elle ne doit e'estendre. 
La Colonie de Montreal située au dessus de Quebec recevant 
beaucoup de secours des Ecclesiastiques du Seminaire de st. Sulpice 
qui y sont establis, il doit leur donner toute la. protection qui 
dependra de luy, et comme les Jesuites et ceux dudit Seminaire se 
sont appliquez depuis plusieurs années a. attirer des sauvages dana 
les habitations françaises qu'il y en a mesme deux villages con-
siderables establis l'un à la prairie de la Magdelaine et l'autre 
à la. Montagne de Montreal, Sa. Majesté veut qu'il s'applique à 
maintenir et augmenter un establissement aussy advantageux qui 
fortiffiera. considerablement la Colonie, establira solidement la 
Religion Chretienne parmy les Iroquois à la foy et de les sous-
mettre entièrement à l'obeissance de Sa Majesté c'est pourquoy il 
doit exciter fortement les Jesuites et ceux dudit Seminaire à 
augmenter le nombre de ces habitations Sauvages parmy les françois, 
à chercher les moyens de les attirer, et l'informer toue les six 
mois du nombre de Sauvages augmenté en chaque habitation, afin d'en 
envoyer tous les ans un recensement exact à Sa Majesté. 
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Et comme il n'ya rien de plus important que de peupler cette 
isle qui est a la teste du pays il doit exciter ceux qui prennent 
soin de ce Seminaire d'y faire des moulins, d'y bastir s'il se 
peut une nouvelle Eglise pour y attirer des habitans, et chercher 
de son costé des gens qui y prennent des concessions et qui comman-
cent à deffricher les terres. 
sa Majesté veut pareillement qu'il donne protection aux 
Recollets establis a ·~uebec, et s' 11 .leur ar ri volt de manquer en 
quelque chose au respect qu'ils doivent audit Sr abbé de Chevrières, 
11 doit avec prudence leur faire connoistre qu'ils doivent se sous-
mettre à ses ordres, mais Sa Majesté espere que cela n'arrivera pas 
leur ayant fait expliquer de sa part qu'une pareille conduite ne 
pouvant que luy astre tres désagreable, les priveroit de ses graces 
et d'ailleurs le dit abbé ayant resolu de se servir de tous ceux 
qu'il trouvera propres à veiller au salut des diocesains et con-
siderant ces Religieux comme tres necessaires dans le pays pour 
suppleer au manque de prestres seculiers, et servir à l'instruction 
des habitans. 
Sa l~jesté veut qu'il s'applique lorsqu'il sera arrivé à bien 
co~~oistre le nombre d'Ecclesiastiques qui sont à present en 
Canada le nombre d'Esglises et la maniere dont elles sont basties 
combien 11 y a de paroisses et l'este!ldue de chacune, si les habi-
tans ont les secours apirituels qui leur sont necessaires, et 
generalement entrer dans la connoissance de tout ce qui regarde le 
culte et le service divin et la maniere dont il se fait pour du 
tout et en faire une relation exacte qu'il envoyera à sa Majesté. 
Il doit astre informé à cet esgard que lesdits Srs de Denon-
ville et abbé de Chevrieres et le Sr de Meules ayant examiné par 
ordre de Sa Y~jesté le nombre des curez necessaires dans le dit 
pays, ils ont trouvé qu'il en falloit jusques à 51 et qu'ils ne 
peuvent subsistèr à moins de 400 livres monnoye de France chacun 
et comme cela fera une depense de 20,400 livres et que les dixmes 
ne montent qu'à 6,196 livres, il manque encor 14,204 livres qui 
se pourront trouver dana la suitte soit par l'augmentation des 
dixmea soit par le moyen de la culture des terres qui seront 
deffrichées estant necessaire que la Colonie se soustienne par 
elle mesme pour le spirituel et fournisse aux curez dont elle à 
besoin, la subsistance necessaire, et c'est ce qu'il doit examiner 
soigneusement estant sur les lieux et en rendre compte à Sa JV::S.jesté. 
Cependant considerant combien il est important d'establir des 
cures fixes, et d'en augmenter le nombre, Sa Majesté à consenty 
pour cette année de faire un fonds de 8000 livres qui pourra 
suffire pour la subsistance de trente-six curez au lieu de vingt-
cinque, qui ont servy les cures l'année derniers. 
Sa Majesté veut que cette somme soit distribuée par ses ordres 
de concert avec ledit Sr abbé de Chevrieres et qu'il envoye un 
estat de cette distribution. 
Il doit astre aussy informé que les dixmes qui se rece*0ient 
autrefois sur le pied du 13e ont esté reduites depuis 15 ou 16 ans 
au 26e de la recolte, ce qui a esté fait par le Sr de Tracy comman-
dant au dit pays et Sa ~~Jesté veut que ledit Sr de Champigny 
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examine avec ledit Sr de Denonville s'il est necessaire de main-
tenir cette reduction pour le bien de la Colonie, ou si, sans trop 
charger les habitans, la dixme pourroit estre remise au l3e. 
Sa Majest~ veut qu'il examine s'il ya aucun habitan en estat 
de faire bastir des Eglises de pierre pour obtenir le patronage 
que Sa Majest~ a accordé à ceux qui feroient la depense de basti-
ment, et il doit exciter ceux qui seront le plus en estat de le 
faire, Ba Majest~ ayant appris que les Esglises sont fort eloign~es. 
Le Sr Talon avoit cy devant propos~ d'establir en Canada un 
hospital general et pretendu que la Colonie en tireroit de grands 
advantages tant pour la subsistance qui y seroit donnée aux pauvres 
invalides, que par l'establiseement qu'on pourroit faire de manu-
factures utiles au pays et quoique cette proposition paroisse 
spceieuses, Sa ~~jesté n'a pas voulu qu'elle fust execut~e qu'apres 
avoir fait examiner plusieurs inconveniens qui paraissent con-
traires à cet establissement, Le premier et le principal est que la 
facilité que les habitans auraient la certitude de trouver une sub-
sistance asseur~e dans ledit hospital pourroit augmenter la 
faineantise parmy eux. 
Qu'il n'y a pas d'apparence que dans un aussy petit nombre que 
celuy,qui compose la Colonie il y ayt assez de pauvres invalides 
pour rendre cet hospital necessaire. 
Que l'establissement des manufactures peut bien astre utile à 
un pays desja estably, mais il faut dans un pays nouveau commancer 
par la culture de la terre qui doit estre regardée comme le point 
essentiel de la Colonie. 
Sa Majesté veut qu'il examine ces maisons avec ledit Sr de 
Denonville et abbé de Chevrieres et qu'ils envoyant un Memoire 
concerté entre eux. 
Il doit astre inform~ que le precedent Eves~ue ayant pretendu 
pendant plusieurs années deffendre que les françois ne vendissent 
aux Sauvages des boissons enyvrantes, et en ayant mesme fait un 
cas reserv~,cette pretention du dit Evesque a fait une difficulté 
tres considerables qui a esté enfin reglée par l'Ordonnance de 
Sa Majest~ du 24 may 1679, à l'execution de laquelle il doit tenir 
exactement la main. 
Il tiendra pareillement la main à ce qu'il ne s'establisse 
aucune personne de la Religion pretendue reformée dans tout le dit 
pays et il travaillera de concert avec lesdits Srs de Denonville 
et abbé de Chevrieres à la conversion de ceux de catte Religion 
qui y sont à present en leur procurant les instructions dont ils 
auront besoin apres luy avoir expliqu~ les intentions de Sa 
Majest~ sur tout ce qui a raport a la Religion, il doit astre 
inform~ de tout ce qui regarde la deffense du pays. 
Premierement Sa ~~jesté ne doute pas qu'il ne soit suffisamment 
informé de la situation du dit pays habité par les françois, qui 
commance à l'embouchure de la riviere de St Laurens et continue le 
long des bords de cette riviere jusqu'a la sortie du lac appellé 
de Frontenac. 
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Il est pareillement informé que les Sauvages les plus voisins 
des habitations françaises sont les Algonquins et les Iroquois~ que 
ces derniers ont troublés plusieurs fois le repos et la tranquillité 
dea Colonies de la Nouvelle France jusques a ce que Sa Majesté leur 
ayant fait faire une forte guerre 11 y a environs vingt ana. Ils 
furent enfin contrains de se sousmettre et de vivre en reapos sana 
faire leurs incursions ordinaires sur les terres habitées par les 
françois, mais ces peuples inquiets et aguerris n'ont pas laissé 
de faire depuis quelques violences a ses sujets qui ont donné lieu 
a Sa Majesté d'envoyer des troupes et des munitions de guerre audit 
pays pour les contenir par la crainte de ses armes. 
Le Sr de la Barre cy devant Gouverneur dudit pays bien loin 
de proffiter de ce secours et du zele avec lequel leshabitans dudit 
pays et les Sauvages voisins, estaient accourus pour detruire les 
Iroquois, fit une paix avec eux de plus fort a Sa r·fajesté et comme 
Elle est informée que ces Sauvages continuent leur mauvaises volon-
tés, et qu'ils ont mesme envoyé des gens de guerre contre les 
Islinois qui sont sous la protection de Sa Majesté, Elle a donné 
ordre audit Sr de Denonville de leur faire la guerre s'il l'estime 
a propos pour le bien de la Colonie, et pour luy donner les moyens 
de la soustenir Elle luy envoye le contenu dans le Memoire cy joint 
que ledit Sr de Denonville luy a demandé, et Elle donne ordre au 
Tresorier de la Marine d'avoir des lettres de credit des fermiers 
du Domaine sur leurs commis a Quebec pour la somme de 45,000 livres 
dont il disposera par les ordres d*dit Sr de Denonville pour les 
frais de la guerre si on est obligé de la faire et Sa Majesté 
l'exhorte d'apporter toute l'oeconomie possible dans l'employ de 
cette somme. 
Et enfin de mettre les Islinois en estat de deffense Sa 
r·1ajesté a donné les ordres necessaires pour 1 'achapt de 500 fusils 
qu'un marchand de ~uebec nommé Azur s'est obligé de livrer audit 
Sr de Denonville, et pour cet effet Elle a fait payer au Corres-
pondant dudit Azur a la Rochelle la somme de 5000 livres pour le 
prix de ces :fuzils, mais comme ledit Sr de Denonville a escrit que 
cette somme ne seroit qu'un advance, vau que les Islinois payeront 
volontiers le prix de ces armes, Sa Majesté la fait prendre sur le 
fonds des despenses ordinaires pour la presente année et s'il sera 
necessaire que ledit Sr de Champigny tienne la main a ce quel soit 
incessament remplacée afin qu'elle soit employée a sa destination. 
Il doit tenir la main a ce que tous les habitans soient fournis 
des armes necessaires pour le service de Sa Majesté en cas de 
besoin et qu'ils les tiennent en bon estat. 
Au surplus il agira de concert avec ledit Sr de Denonville 
dans les achapts de tout ce qui sera necessaire pour soustenir 
cette guerre, Sa Majesté veut qu'au sytost apres son arrivée, il 
fasse faire un denombrement general de tous les habitans dudit pays 
divisez par habitations dans lequel il distinguera ceux qui sont 
en estat de porter des armes, des veillards et des enfans, fera 
mention du nombre des femmes et des filles de tous ages valets et 
domestiques dont chacune habitation est composée comme aussy le 
nombre d'arpens de terres deffrichées et labourables, et le nombre 
de bestiaux de toute sorte qui se trouveront dans ledit pays. 
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Sa Majesté veut qu'il fasse faire ce denombrement par lee juges des lieux, ou autres personnes qu'il choisira, et qu'il le 
fasse renouveller tous les ans, en sorte qu'Elle puisse connois-
tre clairement de combien d'habitans de tous sexes et ages cette 
Colonie aera augmentée. 
Elle donne ordre audit Sr de Denonville d 1 envoyer dea Iv!emoires 
de la depense a faire tant pour les reparations des forts qui sont 
desja bastys que de ceux qu'il propose de faire, il ne doit pas 
manquer d'assister a la visite que le dit Sr de Denonville doit 
faire des.forts, de travailler de concert avec luy a ces memoires 
et faire scavoir eon advia a Sa ~~jesté sur ce sujet. 
Sa Majesté veut qu'il s'informe de tout ce qui se pratique 
sutt le fa.i t de la. police dans les villes de son Royaume les. mieux 
policées, d'autant qu'Elle veut qu'il s'applique pa.rticulierement 
a faire des Reglemens de police sur ce qu'il connoiatra estre du 
bien et de l 1advantage des habita.na et qu'il tienne la main a 
les faire executer avec soin. Sa Majesté ayant clairement reconnu 
que la faiblesse de cette Colonie a empesché jusques a present 
qu'ils n'ayant esté observez et que rien ne peut contribuer davan-
tage aux-bien des habitans et a l'augmentation de leur nombre. 
Elle veut qu'il s'applique aussy bien a connoistre tout ce qui 
concerne la justice, tant subalterne, que superieure qui doit astre 
rendue audit pays suivant la coustume de la Prevosté et Vicomté de 
Paris, et qu'il fasse en sorte par son application, lorsqu'il 
arrivera audit pays de connoistre de quelle sorte la justice s'y 
rend, et se prepare a la rendre brieve et a detruire et a retrancher 
les chicannes Sa ~a.jesté voulant surtout qu'il fasse en sorte que 
lee habitans ne soient point detournée de leur travail par lee 
longeurs de la justice. 
Le dit Sr de Champigzzy est informé qu'il ya. un Conseil Souverain 
estably a. ~uebec auquel ressortissent les jastices subalternes 
establies au mesme lieu de quebec et aux Trois Rivieres, et comme 
il est important qu'il soit instruit de ce qui a. esté fait lors de 
l'esta.blissement du dit Conseil et les ordres que Sa Majesté a. 
donné depuis sur les differends mens (sic) entre ledit Sr de Fronten-
ac et l'Intendant pour le tiltre, et les fonctions de President du-
dit Conseil, Sa ~~jesté fera joindre a cette Instruction copie des 
Arresta et Declarations données sur ce sujet, par lesquelles il 
connoistra. que l'intention de Sa Majesté est que l'Intendant audit 
pays y fasse toutes les fonctions des premiers presidens des Cours 
Superieures, conformement a la Declaration du 5e juin 1675 et qu'en 
son absence le plus ancien Conseiller dudit Conseil Souverain 
recuelle les voix et prononce les arrests. Le plus grand desordre 
qui ayt esté en Canada par le passé, est venu du peu de liberté 
que les officiers ont eu dans l'administration de la justice par 
les violences qui ont esté exercées contre eux et par la part qu'ils 
ont esté obligez de prendre dans lee demeslées continuels du Gou-
verneur et de l'Intendant, en sorte que la justice se rendant par 
cabale et par animosité les habitants ont esté tres esloignés 
jusqu'a present du repos et de la tranquillité qui ne peuvent se 
trouver dans un lieu ou chacun est obligé de prendre party, et 
comme Blle ne doute point que ledit Sr de Champigny n'ayt toute la 
defference qu'il luy a esté reco~na.ndée pour ledit Sr de Denonville, 
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non seulement par l'honneur qu'il a de representer la personne 
de Sa Majesté au dit pays, mais aussy par son merite personnel, 
Elle s'asseure qu'il n'entreprendra rien dans toutes les fonctions 
de son employ sans sa participation et qu'il travaillera de con-
cert avec luy a restablir toutes choses en bon ordre en laisant 
la libre administration de la justice aux officiers et tenant la 
main a ce qu'ils la rendent avec l'integrité, la diligence et le 
desinteressement necessaire. · 
Sa Majesté veut qu'il connaisse qu'Ille l'envoye audit pays 
en la dite qualité d'Intendant de la justice, pol~ce et finance, 
non pas pour fsire la fonction des officiers qui y sont establis, 
soit des premiers juges, soit du Conseil Souverain, mais pour tenir 
la main a ce que tous les officiers fassent et s'acquittent bien 
de leurs fonctions et pour tenir sa place dans ledit Conseil Sou-
verain, ainay qu'il est reglé, et sa principale application doit 
estre d'establir une bonne police dans ledit pays, et d'empecher 
toutes les longueurs des proces soit en faisant juger toutes les 
matieres qui se presentent a l'audience, soit par les voyes qu'il 
estimera les plus convenables. 
Et en cas qu'aucun des officiers des justices subalternes et 
du Conseil Souverain fust accusé et convaincu de mauvaise conduite 
il pouroit informer contr•eux et leur faire le procez avec ledit 
Conseil Souverain mais s'il en estoit seulement soupconné, il 
pourra en donner advis a sa Majesté pour y pourvoir. 
Que s'il voyoit clairement que par l'interest des particu-
liers qui composent lèdit Conseil la justice ne fust point rendue, 
ou qa~ils contrevinsent manifestement dans leurs jugemens aux 
Ordonnances de Sa Majesté, il pourrait travailler a reprimer ces 
desordres de concert avec ledit Sr de Denonville, mais sans aucune 
violence, Sa Majesté voulant seulement qu'il l'en informe par le 
retour des vaisseaux, et qu'il se donne bien de garde pour quelque 
cause et sous quelque pretexte que ce soit d'obli~er aucun officier 
du Conseil Souverain de passer en France ainay qu il est arrivé cy 
devant en plusieurs rencontres. 
Sa Majesté ayant observé que dans les pays aussy esloignez 
que celuy la les officiers principaux se departent assez facile-
ment de l'execution des lettres patentes, a~rests, Ordonnances et 
Reglemente qui ont esté donné par Sa Majesté. Elle veut que ledit 
Sr de Champigny les examine avec grand soin, et qu'il tienne la 
main a ce qu 1 ils soient ponctuellement et exactement executez, 
sans s'en departir pour quelque cause et sous quelque pretexte que 
ce puisse astre, et en cas qu'il soit necessaire de quelques nou-
veaux Reglemens, ou de nouvelle clause dans ceux qui sont faits, il 
y pourra pouvoir par provision avec le Conseil Souverain et en 
donner advis a Sa Majesté pour y pourvoir en deffinition. 
En cas que dans le procas et differends qui surviendront 
entre les habitans et autres les parties d'un commun son sentiment 
voulussent s'en rapporter au jugement soit dudit Sr de Denonville, 
soit dudit Sr de Champigny, ou de quelqu'autre, Sa Majesté veut 
bien leur permettre de les juger comme ajbitres nommez et choisis 
par les parties, mais Blle ne veut point que par autorité ny per-
suasion les parties soient induites a se sousmettre a leur jugement. 
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Sa. Majesté veut de plus que pendant le temps qu'il servira. 
audit pays, il fasse travailler a. une forme de papier terrier 
general, et pour cet effet qu'il fasse raporter par tous ceux qui 
ont des concessions leurs t1ltres, qu'il fasse veriffier si ce 
qu'ils possedant est conforme a leurs tiltres et ensuite qu'il en 
fasse faire les declarations en forme pour composer le papier 
terrier, mais comme ce travail est fort long et qu'il pourrait estre 
a charge aux habitab.s, Sa Majesté veut qu'il observe de faire faire 
les declarations sur les lieux lorsqu'il s'y trouvera sans qu'il 
n'en couste rien auxdits ha.bitans; et comme Sa Majesté avoit donné 
le mesme ordre audit Sr de l~eulles, Elle luy ordonne de remettre 
audit Sr de Champigny toutes les declarations qu'il peut avoir 
prises, par le moyen desquelles il pourra avoir plustost finy ce 
travail. 
Sa Majeté veut qu'il visite une fois l'an toutes les habita-
tions qui sont scituées depuis la mer jusques a l'isle de Montreal, 
qu'il s'informe avec soin de tout ce qui s'y passe et entendre 
tous les habitans dans leurs plaintes et leurs aesoins et y pour-
voyé tout autant qu'il sera possible et fasse en sorte qu'ils 
vivent en paix qu'il s'entre secourent dans leurs besoins et qu'ils 
ne soient pas divertis.de leur travail. 
Le Sr de rv::eules s'estant plaint du peu de service qu'on tire 
des archers de la mareschaussée et ayant p~oposé de la supprimer 
entierement et d'establir. en sa place un exempt et 5 archers qui 
resident continuellement a Quebec et de donner 350 livres audit 
exempt et 300 livres a chacun des archers il est necessaire qu'il 
examine cette proposition et qu'il fasse sçavoir son advis la 
dessus, en observant que comme Sa Majesté n'a jamais fait fonds 
que de 1700 pour l'entretien de ladite mareschausée Elle ne pretend 
pas qu'il luy en couste davantage pour les gages de l'exempt et 
des archers. · 
Si la justice qu'il doit faire regner parmy les habitans de 
Canada est un des moyens principaux de leur faire gouster la dou-
ceur et le repos necessaire pour le maintien et l'augmentation du 
commerce, est un autre moyen qui n'est pas moins utile et auquel 
il doit fortement s'appliquer. 
Une des choses qui s'est le plus opposé a l'augmentation du 
commerce en Canada a esté la liberté que plusieurs ha.bitans se sont 
nonobstant les deffenses expresses portées par les Ordonnances de 
Sa Majesté d'aller dans la. profondeur ~es bois porter l'eau de vie 
aux Sauvages dans les habitations, et t)er d'eux les pelleteries 
qu'ils a.voient accoustumé de porter a. Ta.doussac et a Montreal et 
par ce moyen ils ont privés les habitans d'une partie du proffit 
du commerce qu'ils avoient accoustumé de faire, ce desordre avoit 
est~··si loin que le pluspart des habita.ns ayant laissé le soin de 
la. culture de leurs terres excités par le mauvais example et par le 
profit que faisoient les coureurs de bois, a.voient pris le mesme 
party, en sorte que les habitations demeureraient abandonnées et 
la terre n'estant pas cultivée retourn~oit dans le mesme estat 
auquel elle estoit avant que d'avoir esté deffrichée c'est ce qui 
a porté Sa. Majesté pour les ra.ppeller a. leur devoir de leur accorder 
une amnestie il y a. cinq ans avec permission au Gouverneur et a 
-373-
l'Intendant de donner conjointement des passeports a vingt cinq 
canots par an pour aller dans les habitations des Sauvages ~aire 
le mesme commerce que faisoient les coureurs de bois. 
Il doit donc tenir la main a l'execution de ce qui est en 
cela des intentions de Ba Majesté, agir de concert avec ledit Sr 
de Denonville pour empescher le desordre desdits coureurs de bois 
et se servir des archers de la prevosté pour faire arrester ceux 
qui seront allez dans la profondeur des bois sans permission; et 
comme celle qui a esté donnée d'accorder des passeports est plus-
tost une tolerance qu'une chose que Sa Majesté ayt estimé utile au 
bien de la Colonie, Sa ~Ajesté veut qu'il examine avec ledit Sr de 
Denonville s'il est necessaire d'accorder ces passeports, et qu'il 
en reduise le nombre de concert avec luy, autant qu'il se pourra. 
Elle a donné ordre aussy audi» Sr de Denonville de pre~erer 
dans les premieres années ceux qui n'ont point fai:b-:pa.r le passé 
le mestier de coureur de bois, et surtout d'observer une telle 
equité dans la distribution de chacun de ces passeports que chacun 
y vienne a son tour et qu'il ne se laisse point aller a la recom-
mandation ny a aucune autre rayson pour donner des preferences dont 
les autres habitans eussent lieu de se plaindre, et c'est a quoy il 
doit tenir la main autant qu'il dependra de luy. 
Sa Majesté ne veut point pour quelque cause que ce soit qu'il 
se mesle ny passe aucun achapt de pelleteries ny de marchandises 
du Royaume ny qu'il sou~fre que ses domestiques fassent aucun 
commerce deffendu ny qu'on se serve de son nom pour prendre par 
preference les pelleteries des Sauvages, ainay qu'il n'a esté fait 
que trop souvent par le passé et Sa Majesté luy recommande seule-
ment a l'esgard du commerce de laisser une libebté entiere a ceux 
qui le font, n'y ayant que cette libebté qui puisse contribuer a 
le faire fleurir et au bien et a l'advantage de la Colonie et des 
fermes de Sa Majesttf; 
Plusieurs particuliers habitans de Canada excitez par l'esperaœ 
du proffit qu'ils trouvaient dans le commerce des pelleteries avec 
les Sauvages ont entrepris en different temps des descouvertes vers 
le pays des Nadoussioux et autres endroits de 1 1Amerique Septentriotr 
nale, mais comme Sa Majesté n'estime pas que ces decouvertes soient 
advantageuses et qu'il vaut bien mieux s'appliquer a la culture de 
la terre dans les habitations deffrichées Elle ne veut point qu'on 
continue a leur donner de ces permissions, mais seulement qu'on 
laisse achever celle commencée par le Sieur de la Salle jusques a 
l'embouchure de la riviere de Misissipi Sur quoy Sa Majesté veut 
bien luy faire sçavoir que pour favoriser l'establissement qu'il 
doitfiire dans le Golphe de Mexique, il partit de Rochefort il y a 
deux ans aur un de·ses vaisseaux de guerre avec une barque 200 
soldats et les ustencilles necessaires pour une pareille entreprise 
et Elle veut qu'il donne aux gens dudit De la Salle toute la pro-
tection dont ils auront besoin pour la conservation de l'interest 
qu'il peut avoir dans les forts de Frontenac, et de St Louis et 
des affects qu'il y a laissé. 
A l'esgard de la Baye d'Hudson dans laquelle les Anglois et 
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les françois ont fait des est'3.bl1ssements qui ont donné lieu a 
plusieurs contestations entr' eux, comme Sa "1aj esté a bien voulu 
convenir avec le Roy d'Angleterre que ladite rivière demeurerait 
commune ent~e les deux nations, Elle fait escrire audit Sr de 
Denonville de faire cesser toutes sortes d'hostilités et sursoir 
la procedure sur la saisie de la caiche angloise arrestée l'année 
derniere par le navire le St François Xavier et par la barque le 
Dt Antoine et conduitte a -~uebec. 
ll.1ais pour ernpescher que sous pretexte de l' establissement des 
anglois a l'entrée de cette riviere les nations Sauvages qui ont 
accoustumé d'apporter les C!:l.stors et autres pelleteries aux colonies 
françaises de Canada ne puissent se jetter de ce costé la et que 
les anglois ne puissent detourner lesdites nations du commerce 
qu'elles ont toujours fait avec les sujets de Sa T":ajesté pour se 
l'a.tti~er au prejudice de la possession d~1s laquelle sont les 
françois, ledit Sr de Champigny doit non seulement appuyer autant 
qu'il pourra la Compagnie françoise pour soustenir quelque sorte 
d'establissement audit Nelson que les interessés indiquent par 
leur lettres et memoires sous les noms des rivieres de Ste Theresa 
et de Bourbon, mais il doit aussy empescher par tous les moyens 
qu'il pourra s'imaginer que les nations Sauvages ne discontinuent 
de prendre la route des C~lonies françaises pour porter leur pelle-
teries par la du costé de la mer et que les a.nglois n'y fassent 
aucun progrez. Pour cet effet Sa :·1ajesté estime qu'il faut f~tire 
quelque establiseement au dessus de la coste ou les anglois sont 
establis et dans les endroits qui seront trouv6 plus convenable 
afin de couper le pass9.ge des Sauvages. 
S'il est vray comm'on l'asseure que les meillerues pelleteries 
puissent estre f?.cile:nent portées par la aux anglois et qui tt er la 
routte des C0 lonies françoises, tout le Canada en general et la 
Compagnie du Nord en particulier ont gre.nd interest d 1 entrer do.ns 
les moy ens qu'on pourra prg,tiquer pour remedier a. un si grand mal, 
ainay il ne doit pas manquer de les porter a s'y appliquer fortement. 
Il informera Sa ~'1ajesté de tout ce qui concerne en pgrticulier 
cette affaire, afin que par la connaissance qu'il en prendre sur les 
advis Elle puisse y pourvoir co~ne il conviendra a son service et 
au bien de la Colonie. 
A l'esgard de la Compagnie du Nord si ses entreprises peuvent 
contribuer a l'advantage du PaYs et faire un commerce utile pour 
Elle en les conduisant bien il doit convier les principaux marchanda 
de Canada ou ceux qui y traffiquent et d'autres habitans d'y entrer 
afin de la fortifier, et pour cet effet il faut qu'il examine bien 
meurement son projet, l'utilité qui en peut revenir aux associez 
et tout ce qui peut regg,rder en cela le service de Sa ~faj esté et le 
bien general du pays. 
Sur la plainte que ladite Compagnie a fait que les commis des 
fermiers de Se. '·.:aj esté font commerce, lesdits fermiers a qui Elle en 
a fg.i t parler 1-t-ont asseuré que pqr les instructions qui leur ont 
deffendu d'en faire aucun c'est pJurquoy il doit tenir la main a ce 
que lesdi ta commis s1{p.i sfassent en cela aux ordres de leurs commett.!fl.S 
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N'y aYant rien qui puisse :œoduire plus d' avantsge que le 
commerce p~r mer, 11 exhortera les principaux ha.bitans de s'y appli-
quer et comme l'on a besoin dans les isles de l'Amerique des bois 
tant pour construire les batimens quie pour faire des tonneux proprœ 
pour mettre les succres il inviteri':L lesdits habitg_ns a. en porter dsœ 
ces isles, est9,nt certgin que sy ce commerce est une fois estably 
et que la. navigatic.m de Canada EtUX isles devienne ordin9.ire, les 
peuples de l'une et 1' autre Colonie retireront plusieurs e.dvante.ges 
de ce tr"'l.fic autuel, pour cet effet Sa Yajesté desire que ledit Sr 
de Champigny tienne correspondance avec ledit Sr dumaits de Goimpy, 
Intendsnt de la justice, police et f~na.nces auxdi tes i ales te.nt pour 
le bien comnun de 1 'une et l'autre Colonie par le moy en du commerce 
et de 1 1 envoy des denrées et rnarche.nd.ises dont elles auront reci-
proquement besoin ou qui seront d'un debit advantageux, que pour se 
donner des assistances r~tuelles suivant la disposition du temps 
et des occasions qui se pourront rencontrer. 
L' §stablissment des pesches sedentaires de,ns la riviere de St 
lLaurens, ou dans les ;ners voisines pouvant apporter beaucoup d 'utili-
té aux ha bi tans de Canada p;u:• la fscili té du debit qu'ils peuvent 
qVomr soit aux di tes i ales, soit en Fra.nce, il les exciter a forte-
rnent a s'y appliquer et leurs fera commoistre en mesme temps que 
portant aux dites isles du poisson, des viwdes et du merrein ils 
en pourraient tirer un sà.vantage considerable par le retour des 
sucres qu 1 ils apporteraient en FrF.~.nce et des m~œchwdi ses qu'ils 
rRporteroient en suite en Cang_da, et comme le Sr Ri verin s'est enga~ 
a Sa ::ajesté de com!lencer cet establissement il doit tenir la main 
a ce qu'il y satisfasse et luy donner dans la sui te toute le protec-
tion dont il aura. besoin le soustenir et pour obliger les h9.bi tans 
du PBY s a suivre son ex ample. 
Sa i-hjesté est bien aise de luy fn.ire scavoir sur ce sujet que 
ledit Riverin s'est obligé de faire l'establissemnt de ces pecheries 
et pour cet effet de faire passer cette année 20 pescheurs expres 
en Canada par le moyen desquels il espere d'instruire les gens du 
pa.y s et les rendre ce.pable de continuer cet establissment, en faveur 
duquel Sa >~aj esté luy a accordé pendant trois !:'l.llnées deux congez par 
chacun an pour sller en trai tte au dela des 25 ordinsires qui doi vert 
estre distribués, et comme il est importent que ledit Riverin satis-
fasse a l'engagement dans lequel il est entré a cet esgard Sa l\ffaj esté 
fait escrire audit Sr de Denonville qu'tille veut qu'il se fasse 
representer par ledit Riverin aussytost apre son arrivée en Can!1da. 
le certificat du Sr P)rnoul, Intendant de la Iiarine a Rochefort, de 
l'embarquement desdits pescheurs et qu'il tienne la main a ce que 
ledit Riverin fasse travailler incessament a ces pescheries et les 
fasse continuer com.ne il a promis sans quoy et faute d'executer ce 
qu'il doit faire 9. proportion des adv-:mte,ges qu'il tirera de la 
concession de ces deux congés et de protection que Sa l''aj esté veut 
bi en qu'on luy donne pour le succez de son entreprise, Sa !lifaj esté 
escrit audit Sr de Denonville de ne pas dellivrer lesdits congés ou 
de cesser d'en donner aussytost qu'il s' qpercevra que ledit Ri verin 
ne sera pas preparé pour executer des choses equivalent es a ce qu'il 
plaist a Pa. :tajesté de luy accorder, veu qu'Elle ne s'y r9solve =!Ue 
d.gns l'esperance q_ue ledit Riverin p::>urra contribuer a l'adv.a.ntage 
du pa.:Js et particulierement a enge.ger les jeunes gens a. se former aux 
dibes uescheries et O'est a quoy ledit Sr de Champigny ne doit pas 
manquer de tenir exactement la main. 
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Sa ~=aj esté veut qu'il s'informe avec soin de tout ce qui se 
pratique pour la :JOli ce dans l' estendue dudi t pa.y s, et com:ne tous 
les ordres contraires aux nouveaux establissemens cessent par ce 
moyen et qu'elle est la source de l'abondance, que le bon usage du 
travail et de l'application des hommes produit, il doit examiner les 
Reglemens qui peuvent estre advantageux audit P3,YS de concert avec 
ledit Sr de Denonville et porter le Conseil Souverain a les faire 
executer, et comme les foires et marchez peuvent a.ligmenter consid-
erablement le co~aerce il travaillera a en establir ~utant qu'il 
s2ra possible de concert qvec ledit Sr de Denonville et le Conseil 
Souverain. 
Sa ~Viaj esté veut qu'il apporte une pareille application pour 
1' establissement des mB.nufactures qui peuvent avoir quelque succez 
dans le pays et principalement celle des toiles, et pour cet effet 
il faut qu'il entre de concert avec ledit Sr de Denonville dans tous 
les expediens qui pourront obliger leshabi ta.ns a la culture des 
chanvres et pour luy dom~er les moyens d'establir cette manufacture 
Sa ~~aj esté ~ donné ordre 9. Y:r Arnoul de faire Passer a :';uebec six 
bons tisserands ppr les premiers vaisseaux qui y iront. 
Il doit prendre un pareil soin de celle de la potasse qui a 
esté coïllillg,ncée les années precedentes, et qui n'a pas eu jusques e, 
present tout le succez qu'on en pouvait attendre. 
Il doit auasy s'appliquer a chercher des mines de fer et faire 
examiner de concert avec ledit Sr de Denonville celle qui a, esté 
decouverte aupres êtes Trois Hivieres. 
Il examinera avec soin ce qui se passe audit pa.y s, a 1' esgard 
des monnayes et donnera son advis sur ce qu'il y aura a faire pour 
en establir et en faire fabriquer pour rendre ce moyen le commerce 
et la communication des habi tans plus facile. 
Comme la fin de toute sa conduite et du service ou 'il neut 
rendre a Sa esté dans cet employ, doit est re l' augrnentstion et 
la ;!!Ultiplication des peuples audit pe,ys, il doit e:xqminer de temus 
en temps avec les principaux habitans les moyens d'en attirer un-
plus gr'3.lld nombre et de multiplier ceux qui y sont desj a. 
Pour cels il tiendra le main a 1' e:secution de tout ce que Sa 
?i~ajesté a ordonné pour po:bter les garcons et les filles au marrrage 
et com;Lle Elle fqit distribuer des gr<>tiffica.tions aux filles q_ui 
se tTI!lrient Elle ne doute point que la. protection qu 1 il domJ.era. 
dailleurs a ceux qui se Hlg,ri eront de bonne heure ou auront un grand 
nombre d'enfans ne produise le bon effect qu'Elle en attend pour la 
:mltiplication des habitans. 
Sa ~1aj esté veut qu'il prenne soin pareillement de marier les 
filles des Sauvages qui auront esté eslevées dans des couvens et 
qu 1 il leur fasse donner les ~nesmes gratific.::>tions qu'a celles des 
francois, et pour cet effet qu'il puisse de concert avec lesdits 
Srs de Denonville et abbé de Chevrieres. 
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Encore que par les advis qu'on a dudit pays par le retour des 
vaisseaux il ne paroisse pas que les habitans soient sujets a •ucune 
maladie considerable ny popU18ire neantrnoins Sa ~~raj esté considerant 
combien lA. santé est necess!:tire tant pour l'augmentation de la 
Colonie, que pour la culture et deffrichement des terres, veu:b que 
ledit Sr de Champigny s 1 applique a observer les maladies qui regnent 
9lus ordinairement et les re:nedes que le climat et la n"l_ture du 
lieu peuvent produire. 
Un des moyens principaux que d~)ivent concc)uri:b a 1' augmentation 
de cette colonie est le deffrichement et la culture des terres et il 
doit principalement s 1 ap·;:Jliquer a examiner la qualité desdi tes terrœ 
et ce qu'elles peuvent porter plus abondamment si elles produisent 
et se fertilisent a 1 1 adv-antage al..es prorietaires, ou si en mettant 
d 1 autres ser11enses ils en p:mvroient tirer plus d'utilité, ce detail 
qui Pl3.roist d'abord difficile estant tres considerable et tres 
i:nportlmt. 
Sa daj esté ayant esté infor<née que plusieurs habi tg_ns av-oient 
obtenu des concessions fort estendues au deffrichement desquelles 
ils avaient negligé de tr:wailler en sorte que plusieurs années 
inutile::;ent passées il se trouvait a peine une tres petite de ces 
terres cultiv-ée, Sa ~ajesté estima necessaire d'y remedier comme 
Elle fit P9.r l'arrest de son Sonseil du 4 j tilin 1675 dont il 
trouvera cy joint copie par lequel Elle ordonna qu'a la diligence 
de l'IntendAnt il seroi t fa.i t une declaration exacte et precise de 
toutes les concessions de terre qui ont esté faites jusc:ues a 
nresent en Cane,d9. -oour estre reduites sur le pied de 19. cul ture 
qui en aurait esté-faite, ou de celle que les peuples pJurroient 
faire a 1' advenir, et 0our remedier a ce qui se pourrait f•üre de 
contraire a ses intentions, Elle ordonna, par ses lettros patentes 
du 20 ma,y 1676 dont il trouvera pareillement la copie cy j ::»inte que 
les concessions se feraient a l'advenir Pe.r le Gouverneur et 
l'Intendq,nt conjointement aux clauses et conditions portées psr 
lesdites lettres natentcs a 1 1 execution desauelles et des arrests 
rendus sur ce sujet, Sa _ig,j esté V9Ut qu 1 il tienne la main en 
observant sur toutes choses de n 1 a.ccorder des concessions que de 
proches en proches, et contigues a celles qui ont esté f~ites cy 
deve.nt. 
1 
Il excitera fortement les chefs de familles d avoir le plus 
grand nombre de bestiaux qui leur sera possible en-sorte que le 
pays ne soit point obligé d • avoir recours au:; bestiaux du Royaume 
pour la subsistance et pour 18. culture des terres; et comme Sa 
:·.Iaj esté a deffendu dans son Royaume par ses Declarations des mois 
de janv-ier 1671 et 1678 que les bestiaux ne puissent estre saisis 
pour deptes, Elle estime necessaire de faire observer la mes~ne 
chose en Canada, ce qu'il pourra. fg_ire non de s::»n autorité, ma,is 
par l!i voy e du Conseil Souverain. 
Elle veut pareillement que ledit Sr de Cha,mpigny s'applique 
a faire valoir les droits qui se levant p,udi t Pa.Y s sç qVOir les 10 
pour cent, la trl':l.ite de 'l'adoussac, et le qU8,rt des castors, et qu'il 
donne toutes les assistg_nces dont les fermiers J:~Uront besoin p::mr 
maintenir la perception de ces droits, et nour retrancher les 
fraudes et les abus qui s&:y sont commis jusques e. present, observant 
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qu'aucun ne se doit dispenser du payement de ces droits si ce n'est 
p~r ordre expres de Sa 7~aj esté et il dol t donner tous ses soins et 
son application a faire en sorte que les fermiers de ces droits y 
gagnent afin que Sa ~Iaj esté en puisse augmenter la ferme quand le 
bail finira. Lorsqu'il ira quel::.;_ues vaisseaux de Sa ~':aj esté dans 
la riviere de ·:.::,uebec, Sa :r-ajesté veut qu'il permette aux commis 
des fermes d'en faire la visite en entrant et en sortant de la 
riviere S8.ns souffrir qu'ils y establissent des ~ardes. 
Il fera connoistre au:<: officiers des troupes de terre que 
1' intention de Sa ?·~aj esté n'est pas qu'ils jouissent de l'exemption 
qu'ils pretendent des droits d'un tonneau de vin ch.9,cun et empeschena 
qu'ils n'inquietant les~ermiers la dessus. 
En cas qu '11 fut necessaire de f•üre QUelque n:Juveau Reglement 
pour la perception de ces droits et mesme pour les jugemens qui 
seront a rendre pour les establir et pour empescher les fraudes Sa 
~·:aj esté souhaite que ledit Conseil Souverain est cette jurisdiction 
mais en C9.S que ledit Sr de Champigny reconnaisse que ledit Conseil 
Souverain ne soit pas disposé a coneervér la justice au;: fermiers, 
Elle luy donnera un J'J.rrest avec une co::n:nission pour en conno:Stre 
seul dont Elle ne veut pas toutefois qu'il se serve qu'en cas qu'il 
y eust necessi té. 
Le Sr de 7~eules aYant proposé a Sa. :':aj esté d'expedier des 
lettres de noblesse pour 12 des principaux ha.bitans du PPJS, Elle 
n'a pas approuvé cette proposition et au contraire consider9.nt c:u 'un 
des plus gre.nde maux de cette colonie vient du nombre des gens qui 
sous pretexte de noblesse demeurent unutiles dans le pays et y 
causent une infinité de desordres, Elle veut que ledit Sr de 
Champigny exatnine les til tres de ceux qui se pretendent nob):es et 
qu'il ne reconnaisse pour tels que ceux qui en rapporteron~ons, 
et l'intention de Sa I1aj esté est qu'il choisisse dans ce nombre de 
concert avec ledit Sr de Denonville deux gentilhownes de 17 a. 20 
ans pour remplir les places de g::=œde le la Marine dont Sa >'aj estti 
luy a fait remettre les certifica.ts. 
Fait a. Versailles le 31 I·.fa.y 1686. 
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APPELWIX B. 
6 Novembre 1695· Canada. 
Mémoire concernqnt le Fort de Cqtaracouy. 
Rai sons qui neuvent estre 
ci té es pour ill3,rquer son 
un ti li té. 
1 
En temps de Paix on poura y 
faire la traitte avec les 
Iroquois qui chassent aux 
Environs et avoir d'eux par 
ce moy en quelques pelle-
tGri es, y estg,blir un forger-
on qui seroi t armurier pour 
racomode.r leurs haches, et 
1 eurs ~.r~nes, et apliquer cee 
avantages aux creanciers M 
de la Salle cy devg,nt proprie-
taire de ce poste ausquels il 
est deub des sommes considerab-
les. 
2 
~ temps de guerre, nos sauv~ges 
alliez des PaYs eloignez y fer-
ont leur retrg,i tte et y prend-
ront des vivres. 
3 
On le fera servir d'entrepos 
des vivres et munitions neces-
saires pour les entreprises 
qu'on voudra faire et de lieu 
Raisons qui justifient combien 
il est inutile et a charge. 
1 
Cet te tr ~::ti te en te.:nps Dg,ix ne 
sera pas considerable parce que 
l'Iroquois portera le plus qu'il 
poura de ses pelleteries g,Ux 
~~glois qui luy en donnent plus 
que les Fr<lnçois. 
Observ,tion: (d'une ~utre 
écriture) Cette traite en soy est 
contre les principes sur lesquels 
la colonie doit estre reglé, il 
ne courrent point d'aller au 
dGv.'=Jnt dil co_stor, et rien n'est 
tant deffenâu par les ordres de 
Sa MB.té · Le COliLJerce du castor ne 
peu:b estre bon qu 1 9.Utgnt que les 
sauvages l'apporteront dans la 
colonie pour y prendre leurs 
besoins en éc l"lnge. 
2 
Il fqut qu'ils s'Eloignent de 
30 a 40 lieues de leur droit 
chemin pour Passer a ce fort 
allans du P<>....YS des :Ennemis chez 
eux et on ne sn.uroi t y donner des 
vivres a de gros Partis Parce qu' 
il y a trop de dif:'icul té a en 
tr!:J):lsporter de r·lontreal seulement 
pour la g~rnison. 
3 
Si on voulait envoyer des vivres 
a e fort a l' ava.nce pour servir 
a un gros detg,che1nent il faudrait 
y aller g,Vec les :nes;nes forces 
de re tt" ai tte g~UX Frgnçoi s et 
S!!.UV s qui P8.rtiront de la. 
colonie pour aller chez les 
Iroquois, soit en qlll3.i"lt, soit 
en revenant, et ~. nettre les 
malades et blessez au retour 
des occ ons. 
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·~ue si on qlloi t 8.ux ennemis, 
8.U t rem en t i 1 n 'y au ro 1 t <:>.U c une 
seuret~, il n'y ,g, Pa.s plus de 
dif'ficul té p"'::.'tgnt de .i'~ontre 8~, 
d' 9.ller en droiture ?.U pg:y s des 
Ennemis, qui sont eu sud, oue 
1 " d !:l.ll er a. ce fort, qui est e,u non: 
(Le lac Ontg,rio entre d' eu..x) les 
gens qui iront 8. cette guerre por-
teront facilement dans les bat-
teaux et d8.l1S les cgnots leurs 
besoins pour la c ~gne, et le 
lieu d'entrepos qui sera aussi 
celuy de retr tte doit estre a 
l'endroit du debaroue~ent sur les 
terres le plus proches des enneinit: 
ou il est absolument ~ecessaire 
de f'qire un fort de pieux oui est 
un ouvrage d'un jour, pour.la 
seureté des battea.ux, vivres et 
muni tians pend "ln t qu 1 on ffiqrchet" 3. 
Par terre aux vill s des 
Ennemis. 
Comment Ce.tara.couy pouroi t il 
servir de retr"'i tte aux frqnçois 
et a.ux SR,UV es ét éloigné de 
50 lieues 0.u plus proches village 
des Ennemis, et a.ré P!:!r un 
grand la.c qui est sque toujoun 
agi té d 1 ailleurs ne fr.:>ut r;uère 
plus de temps et peut estre moi:ns 
a descendre a i:·1ontrea.l qu'a tra-
verser g;u fort de CJ?.taracouy, la 
rivière ét~nt fort raDide. On 
dai t a.ussy con si er. a. l' Egqrd 
des malades et s blessez aue ce 
fort est tres S?.in y est!:lnt 
mort 87 hommes dqns un an de 100 
qui y es toi ent en g3rni son, ad-
joutons a cela, oue 1 1 armée aui VA 
""" -"• ..- " ... 
aux ennemis ne pouv0nt porter ~ue 
ce ~ui luy sera necess"'ire pour 
son voyage, il fa.udra. en fqire 
un second de la colonie a ce fort 
pour le ravitailler, qui est 
exposer les troupes et les habi-
t.c>ns a. leur destruction pqr les 
extr1:1.ordina,ires f~:ttigues de ces 
voya.~es, ou on est uresoue tou-
jours dena l'eau, q. tir~r les 
b'-lttequx et les C'3nots, et qu'il 
fa.ut 9.ba.nàonner les se:nences et 
les ré col tes. 
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4 
C'est un po ste avancé qui 
ti ont en bride les Ennemis 
duquel on peut f rA plusieurs 
detachements contre eux. 
4 
Il est en effet un po ste qVgncé de 
60 li eues n.u dessus de 1·~on treAl 
dg,ns le fond d'une petite be.Ye pres 
un rnarqis qui jnjecte le. g"-'!'nison 
s~s estre sur a~cune riviè~e ny 
le,c ny sur <1Ucun Pass!:!ge, il ne 
ueu t servir qug, se gorder luy :nesrre 
et ce qui est a la po!'tée du fusil 
les ennemis pouvo.nt PB.sser eu dela 
sq,..-rJ.s 'lucun empèchement C<:tr ce ser-
oi t un pur ebus de vouloir persugd--
erque lq g.cœni son iroi t apres, ne 
luy estJnt possible d'aller dnJls le 
bois et n'est9,nt pas non plus pru-
dent d'y envoyer pgrceque quand il 
ne paroitoit que quatre ennemis, ~ 
pour::->oi t y en t=J,Voi r un grqnd nombro 
et 8. bien considerer toutt'3s chosES 
c 1 est une g·:œni son de 50 ho::Draes 
d'elite qui àe:neure jnutile, et 
comme en prison entre ougtre 
lilUctr!'.l.illes. 
La riviere pour y gJler n'e 
que r~pides, s~uts et chutes ~esme 
en plusieurs endroits de tout por-
ter Par terre, ce qui r l 1 qcez 
de ce lieu tout ~ fqit difficile 
donne une f 8Cili té fort gr 1 nde qUX 
enne;nis d' q,ttg.QUer et détruire les 
detqc:J.emens oui y seront envoyez, 
ou bien de se servir d~ t s de 
leur marche pour taube,.. sur lq col-
onie et lq soler. 
Si le ret~=tblissement en q esté 
f:ü t sq,ns EJlpeschernent de 1 1 Ennemy 
c'est parcequ'il n'en avoit aucun 
"lVi s, et p, moins d'y envoyer tous 
les !:l.ns 1200 q 1500 hommes :9our le 
renvi ta.iller, on ne peut pqs estre 
asseurc s'y 2:'endre, si les en:1e-
::tis s'y veuler1t o·a;oser ouverte-
ment. 
Comme21t sei'Oit jl possible d'y 
envoyer un detqchement si consids-
r8.ble, et mes:ne un ï.l1oindre, si on 
e.Vq,i t !::l.Vis de quelque Entreprise 
de 1' al1t=:;lois sur l"' colonie, l:;t 
diversion de nos fo2:'ces est âe~a 
trop g"'c:.nde !1.U P!:lY s des soUVg,ges 
nos alliez, a le. :a.g,ye du nord, q 
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1 '>, pesche, et aU fort de CJ:19,fflbly, 
s ..,ns don~J.er li eu 8. cet te :1ouvell e 
diversion oui neut l0.isser la 
colonie s"lns presqu'aucun secours. 
Si d' s.illeurs on considere les 
f;ra,nds depenses qu'il convient 
fqire ~our le soutien de CA poste, 
qui se conn8J tron t pg.r 1 'estat qui 
est envoyé avec ce memoire, on 
troUY8rr:, dg.ns tout celq une infini-
té de pulss~~tes raisons pour 
détruire entiere~ent les desseins 
c;u'on pouvoit avoir de le soutenir, 
2~::.::-,nt plus convenqble de 1' ab3.n-
donner une seconde fois que de 1 e 
conserver o.vec d"',nger de :Jerdre le. 
Colonie. 
Le 6e Novembre 1695 ( S'3.11S lieu) 
Ch qJl:_Ji gny . 
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t\PPE(;DIX C • 
lî.l.oire conce::~ng;nt le "PaYe et le d8compte des troupes en GR,n 
.Cham.pigny, { Q,uebec) 10 l{oveniber 1695. 
Sert:<: en ts, 
Pour livres des Invalides 
Pour l'Etat Major 
Pour le petit officier 
Reste au Sergent 
Caporaux, 
Chacun Cqporal a pqr mois 
sur quoi il lui est déduit 
pour les sue (sic) denie~s 
·oour livres -
Pour l'Etat Kajor 
Pour le petit officier 
.rteste au Caporal 
2 livres 
17 
20 livres 
12 livres 
2 livres 
10 
12 livres 
p,nro ess g,des, (Lance Co:rpo ral s) 
Chacun ~rûpessg,de 9. p•,J,:_'"1 mois 
sur quoi il lui est déduit 
pour les sue (sic) doni ex-' s 
pour livres -
Pour L'Etat I'Iajor 
Pour le neti t officier 
Reste à i 'ampessade 
Soldats, 
Le soldat a p"'r mois 
sur auoi il lui est déduit 
pour ·les sue (sic) deniers 
pour livres -
Pour 1 1 Et~.t 1-iajor 
"=teste au soldg_t 
9 li ·v· res 
1 livre 
7 
~ livres 
6 livres 
;- livres 0 
5 livres 
10 sols 
2 
5 
7 
5 sols 
15 sols 
6 sols 
"' c::_
5 
l 
15 sols 
15 sols 
4 sols 
2 
10 
17 
1:2 sols 
15 sols 
7, sols 
../ 
"" sols -"
9 sols 
15 sols 
l denier 
6 
5 
5 deni ert:. 
6 
l 
ll deniers 
6 
7 
5 deniers 
6 deniers 
l denier 
L'Etat Major Consiste:-
Du chirurgien qui a 
Du ·rambour lviaJor 
Pr. le Rolle 
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3 livres par mois de chacune Cornne.gni e, 
5 sols 
20 sols 
La r tion de vivres est de 4 onces de 1 qrd, 4 onces de noi s, d'une 
livre et deni de Dain ou 18 onces biscuit ou 20 onces de r~rine. 
:Elle revient à 3 sols P"'.r jour et à 4 livres 10 sols :J"'.r mois. 
_Ainsi chaque sold".t ""Sant 6 livres 9 sols 1 denier 
lui dé dui S~"A t pour ses 
vivres 4 livres 10 sols 1 denier 
ste pour son décompte 1 livre 19 sols 1 denier 
On .q ci-deY8nt retenu jusqu'a 3 sols 9 deniers pour chacune 
rg_tion, la f9.rine envoyée de Fr"1-'1Ce 9J.qDt été achetée 10 livres 
le quintal, le la,rd 23 li-vres, •3t les pol 6 à 7 livres le 
not; il y a même eu des temps où les vivres ont couté d'avqntage. 
Il y a encore petits officiers, un par compagnie, qui ont 
comùlission de E. le souverneur, dont les ap)ointe:nents, qui sont 
de 22 livres 10 sols de France par rnoi s se trouvent sgvoi r 
6 livres 15 sols en une pgye de soldl'l,ts, éto.nt g,insi employé 
dryns le role de la compagnie où il est g,tta.ché; 4 livres 15 sols 
sur la Pa.ie des trois Ca;pore~~,ux et 4 livres 10 sols sur celle 
des trois ampessades. 
'i,ue •. 1\rch. l-~a.nuscri ts Relatifs 'q l'Histoire de l:=t ~~cuvelle ,-,nee, 
2 me serie, vol. VII, ==é:noire conceY>n<:~nt le nnye et le décoac>te des 
troupes en Canada. Cbg;:J.pip:ny, ( ~uebec) 10 l\ovember 1695. 
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